By FLORENT BAJRAMI and LLAZAR SEMINI, Associated Press Published February 17, 2023 People wave Kosovar and Albanian flags as they watch a parade during celebrations of the 15th anniversary of Kosovo independence in Pristina, Kosovo, Feb. 17, 2023. PRISTINA, Kosovo (AP) — Europe’s youngest country, Kosovo, on Friday launched festivities for the 15th anniversary of its independence from neighboring Serbia with a military parade, wreath-laying ceremonies and a special Parliament session. But the celebrations are overcast by revived tension with Serbia, despite years-long Western efforts to reconcile the former foes. Both want into the European Union, and have been told they must first overcome their differences. Speaking in the capital Pristina Friday, Prime Minister Albin Kurti steered away from the violence of Kosovo’s begetting, describing his country — one of Europe’s poorest — as “a project of peace, a contributor to peace and a guarantor of peace.” Ethnic-Albanian-dominated Kosovo unilaterally declared independence on Feb. 17, 2008. That came nearly nine years after a 78-day NATO bombing campaign in 1999 ended Serbia’s bloody crackdown on ethnic Albanian separatists. The International Court of Justice ruled in 2010 that the independence declaration did not violate international law. The United States and most Western powers are among the 117 countries that have recognized Kosovo’s statehood, and about 200 international organizations have accepted Kosovo as a member — although not the United Nations. Serbia, which for centuries considered Kosovo the cradle of its civilization, still sees it as part of its territory and refuses to recognize its independence, backed by Russia and China. That makes for uneasy relations. Underlying tension has flared recently over matters as seemingly trivial as vehicle license plate formats, or the arrest of an ethnic Serb police officer, triggering concern among Western leaders who fear another Balkan conflict amid Russia’s war in Ukraine. Kosovo’s President Vjosa Osmani played to that concern on Friday, urging NATO and the EU to accept Kosovo and other Western Balkan countries “the soonest possible ... as a preventive step toward political, military and economic violation from Russia and its regional satellites.” Osmani also said Pristina’s negotiations with Belgrade must lead to mutual recognition, adding that Kosovo’s “territorial integrity, constitutionality, legal order and sovereignty are non-negotiable.” EU foreign affairs chief Josep Borrell on Friday said Kurti and Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic would meet in Brussels on Feb. 27. U.S. and EU envoys visited Pristina and Belgrade regularly in recent months with a new proposal for normalizing relations. Its details have not yet been made public. Until now, 12 years of EU-mediated talks produced 33 agreements, which have only been partially implemented or largely ignored. In Serbia, pro-Russia nationalist groups have demanded that Belgrade stop all normalization talks. But Vucic said that would isolate Serbia internationally and kill its EU prospects. Vucic has said he is ready to consider the latest Western plan. Kosovo is still grappling with the political legacy of the war with Serbia. Former President Hashim Thaci and four other wartime leaders from the Kosovo Liberation Army are in the detention center of a tribunal in The Hague, Netherlands, facing charges of murder, torture and persecution. All have denied the charges. The special court is investigating alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity linked to the actions of the KLA during and after the war. All contents © copyright 2023 The Associated Press.

Knesset Passes New Bill to Deport Arab Citizens of Israel Charged With Terrorism Arab lawmakers in the Knesset argue the legislation violates international law. Netanyahu says 'This is a powerful response to terrorism'. The Knesset vote on Wednesday. Credit: Emil Salman A majority of Knesset members voted on Wednesday to revoke both the citizenship and residency status of Arab citizens of Israel who were convicted of a terrorism and received funding from the Palestinian Authority, going as far as handing the government the power to deport them to the West Bank. The law gives Israel's interior minister the power to revoke the residency status of an Israeli citizen if they were convicted of terrorism, served a prison sentence for their act, and received a direct financial reward for the act. Any citizen must be given seven days to respond to the minister's decision and has the power of appeal. If the court approves the request, then they will be deported to the Palestinian Authority once they complete their prison sentence. The law also states that the deportation will take place even if the Palestinian Authority refuses to grant status to the deportee. Israel's Deputy Attorney General, Avital Sternberg, said that this part of the law may result in its disqualification. Following the vote, the chairman of Israel's coalition, Likud MK Ophir Katz said that "the government's legal advisers tried to block us at every turn. It is absurd." Israels Labor Party representative did not attend the vote in the Knesset but party members told Haaretz that "The Labor party supports fighting terrorism and we supported the bill when it was first proposed. But it is inconceivable that we will vote to support the agenda of this extremist government who is trying to undermine the democratic foundations of the country which protect the human rights of Israelis." Israel's Interior Ministry already has the power to revoke the citizenship of anyone charged with terrorism, which it has done in the past, but the High Court has ruled that anyone whose citizenship is revoked must still retain residency status if they do not hold another passport. Prior to 2008, the interior minister had complete authority to revoke citizenship, but it was used in very rare cases. In 2008, the Citizenship Law was amended to ensure that any request by the interior ministry to strip the citizenship of an Israeli involved in terrorist activities was first approved by the court system and attorney general. The new law now grants the Interior Ministry the unprecedented ability to revoke the residency status and deport citizens of Israeli. The Knesset is also set to vote on a bill to expand the legislation to include family members of convicted terrorists. The bill proposes that if the interior minister can deport a family member of a convicted terrorist if they have sufficient evidence that they "knew in advance about plans to commit an act of terror" or showed any public support for such an act, . The bill we be finalized after internal discussions regarding the Shin Bet's opinion on the matter. Last year, then-Interior Minister Ayelet Shaked ordered the deportation of Salah Hammouri, a Palestinian lawyer from Kafr Aqab in East Jerusalem, arguing that he worked “tirelessly to promote terror against Israel.” Palestinians in East Jerusalem hold official residency status in Israel but are the overwhelming majority of them are not citizens. The new law passed on Monday permits to deport convicted terrorists who also hold citizenship no matter where they live in Israel. © Haaretz Daily Newspaper Ltd. All Rights Reserved

By Monika Pronczuk and Matina Stevis-Gridneff, New York Times Published February 14, 2023 A dinghy with Afghan refugees approaches the Greek island of Lesbos in 2020, followed by a border patrol boat from Britain operating as part of Frontex. Aris Messinis/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images The top rights officer at Europe’s border agency said in a confidential report that it should stop working with Greece because border guards there were mistreating asylum seekers. The human rights chief of the European Union border agency said last year that it should stop operating in Greece because of serial abuses by Greek border guards, including violently pushing asylum seekers back to Turkey and separating migrant children from their parents, according to confidential documents reviewed by The New York Times. The E.U. agency, Frontex, deploys border guards from around Europe to help the Greek authorities with border operations, and provides equipment such as helicopters, boats and drones paid for by European taxpayers. Instead of following the recommendation, taking legal action against Greece or investigating the findings, the E.U. set up an obscure “working group.” In a follow-up finding submitted last month, the rights chief said that there had been “no change in the reported practice.” The reticence to act highlights a major tension in Europe’s migration policy: how to keep the number of migrants low while adhering to European laws. The bloc’s rules protect the right of people to be given a chance to apply for asylum, and oblige E.U. nations to uphold that right. But the arrival of more than one million refugees, mostly from Syria in 2015-2016, recast politics across Europe, pushing even traditionally progressive E.U. countries to the right and fueling the rise of identity politics. After several years with fewer migrant arrivals in the E.U., angst over migration is now back. Almost five million people, a record number, sought protection in the bloc last year. The vast majority, some four million, were Ukrainians who came through legal routes and were immediately granted the right to stay and work. The remaining approximately 800,000 asylum seekers, mainly from Syria and Afghanistan, arrived in the bloc via unofficial routes, including the Greek-Turkish border. In this political environment, the drive to keep down the number of arrivals has intensified, often trumping commitments to legal and human-rights protections, and becoming a priority over and above putting in place a shared, functioning policy. “Among member states, there is currently no other consensus than on border control,” said Camino Mortera-Martínez, the head of the Brussels office of the Center for European Reform. “The debate on common asylum policy is going nowhere, so countries on external borders are left to their own devices.” The case of Greece is emblematic of these complex dynamics. For years, Greece, one of Europe’s biggest gateways for migrants arriving through Turkey, has been criticized by human rights organizations for forcibly sending people back to Turkey without processing their asylum requests. But the E.U. needs Greece to keep its border tight; most migrants and asylum seekers who arrive in Greece go on to settle elsewhere in the bloc, in places like Germany, where there are more jobs and established migrant communities. “The E.U. as an organization, and Greece as a frontline state, have a legal obligation to protect the external borders of the Schengen area,” said Ms. Mortera-Martínez, referring to Europe’s internal borderless region. “Because once someone comes in, they can freely move around.” Members of the European border agency Frontex outside a migrant camp on the Greek island of Kos in 2021. Frontex deploys border guards from around Europe to help Greece with border operations. Aris Messinis/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images The role of Frontex is to help countries like Greece guard the borders but also to create a European standard for how to do so humanely and in accordance with E.U. law. But the agency, which has grown over the past decade to become the E.U.’s best-funded, has been accused of overlooking, covering up and even carrying out human rights violations. Last year, its executive director stepped down after accusations of harassment, mismanagement and rights abuses. New leadership vowed changes, including strengthening the role of the rights chief. The Greek files illustrate how, even in this bolstered role, the fundamental rights officer remains marginal when political decisions are at stake, such as suspending Frontex’s work in Greece. The human rights officer, Jonas Grimheden, issues confidential quarterly reports on conditions and abuses at E.U. borders, including countries such as Poland and Italy, as well as Greece. In the reports for the last two quarters, which were seen by The Times, the Greek segment is the longest and most dramatic. The officer wrote that he had gathered continued “credible reports” of the Greek authorities systematically expelling migrants at both sea and land borders, denying them access to protection, separating children from their parents and treating migrants in a “degrading” way. The severity of these claims prompted the officer to recommend suspending the operation, after he issued three escalating “opinions,” documenting his findings in detail, over the course of 2022, the documents said. The documentation of illegal practices in Greece by Frontex’s human rights chief is significant, experts said, because it comes from the agency itself, rather than outside sources like the news media or nongovernmental organizations. “By staying in an operation where there are rights violations, Frontex is in breach of the rule of law,” said Luisa Marin, a legal fellow at the Florence-based European University Institute, who has been researching Frontex for over a decade. Dr. Marin said there had been a “systematic disregard” of internal rules by Frontex’s management. The officer’s recommendations are nonbinding, Frontex said in written comments to The Times. It said that it was addressing concerns together with the Greek authorities, and that the human rights officer had reported “progress” late last month. “As a conclusion, currently, we don’t see a reason to pull out from one of the most challenging border areas of the whole E.U.,” Frontex said in a statement. Mr. Grimheden said in an interview that he had drafted “opinions escalating the concerns I have seen in Greece, and reported on that to the Management Board throughout 2022 but also earlier and this year.” He added that he saw “some positive procedural steps being taken by Greece, which now have to lead to concrete results on the ground.” The European Commission said it reserved its right to launch a process, known as an infringement procedure, that could lead to taking Greece to court. Frontex has only once suspended operations over human rights abuses, in Hungary in 2021, after this procedure led to a successful court case against the country. The Greek government said that it respected European and international law and that the allegations were being investigated. It also said that it had appointed its own human rights officer and had a broader plan, developed with the Commission, to tackle problems. “Protecting Europe from irregular arrivals is a priority for the European Council,” the Greek government said, referring to an E.U. leaders meeting in Brussels last week. A statement after the meeting on Friday made no mention of human rights or European asylum law, but the leaders demanded more money from the bloc’s budget to build fences to keep out would-be migrants and asylum seekers. “I am glad we agreed on operational and concrete steps forward,” Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the Commission, told the news media after the summit. “We will act to strengthen our external borders and prevent irregular migration.” © 2023 The New York Times Company

The Malian government said the decision was due to the UN mission chief’s choice of civil society witnesses for UN Security Council briefings. Colonel Assimi Goita, leader of Malian military government, attends the ECOWAS consultative meeting in Accra, Ghana September 15, 2020 [File: Francis Kokoroko/Reuters] The Malian interim government says the head of the United Nations peacekeeping mission’s human rights division has been asked to leave the country within 48 hours after being declared persona non grata. In a statement on Sunday, it said the decision to expel Guillaume Ngefa-Atondoko Andali was connected to his allegedly biased choice of civil society witnesses for UN Security Council briefings on Mali, the most recent of which was held on January 27. MINUSMA, as the UN mission in Mali is known, did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Andali could not be reached for comment. The Malian authorities have come under pressure for alleged human rights violations and abuses reportedly perpetrated by Malian armed forces in partnership with the Russian private military contractor Wagner Group in Mali. On January 31, UN experts called for an independent investigation into possible war crimes and crimes against humanity by both these forces. “Since 2021, the experts have received persistent and alarming accounts of horrific executions, mass graves, acts of torture, rape and sexual violence, pillaging, arbitrary detentions and enforced disappearances perpetrated by Malian armed forces and their allies,” said the statement. The Malian government, which took power in a 2021 military coup, on Saturday released a statement that pushed back against some of the UN allegations and emphasised the authorities’ commitment to respecting human rights in accordance with international and national law. © 2023 Al Jazeera Media Network

February 14, 20231:01 PM ET Deborah Amos A view of the courtyard of Kherson regional children's home in Kherson, southern Ukraine, Friday, Nov. 25, 2022. Russian authorities have been accused of deporting Ukrainian children to Russia to raise them as their own. Thousands of children were seized from schools and orphanages in Ukraine by Russian authorities, according to researchers at Yale University. Bernat Armangue/AP The Russian government is operating a systematic network of at least 40 child custody centers for thousands of Ukrainian children, a potential war crime, according to a new report by Yale University researchers in a collaboration with the U.S. State Department in a program to hold Russia accountable. The report, "Russia's Systematic Program for the Re-Education and Adoption of Ukrainian Children," describes a system of holding facilities that stretch from the Black Sea coast to Siberia. "This is not one rogue camp, this is not one rogue mayor or governor," says Nathaniel Raymond, executive director of the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab. "It is a massive logistical undertaking that does not happen by accident." Raymond's team of researchers is tackling one of the most explosive issues of the war. Ukrainian officials say Russia has evacuated thousands of Ukrainian children without parental consent. Russian officials do not deny Ukrainian children are now in Russia, but insist the camps are part of a vast humanitarian project for abandoned, war-traumatized orphans and have been surprisingly public with social media messaging aimed at a Russian audience. Russia does not, however, acknowledge how many children are in Russia or where they are housed. "All of this strikes us as a carefully orchestrated performance," says Caitlin Howarth, director of operations at the Yale lab. "The Russian government needs to legitimize its activities, that make all of this seem normal," she says, "because you simply can't move these many children through these many places without their movements being noticed." The children are held in camps across the Russian expanse The Yale team says it has verified at least 6,000 Ukrainian children detained by the Russian government, although researchers believe there are thousands more. The report identifies 43 camps. "Eleven of the camps are located more than 500 miles from Ukraine's border with Russia, including two camps in Siberia and one in Russia's Far East," according to the report. The Ukrainian children transported to Russia range in age from teens to toddlers, says Raymond. "In some cases there is adoption, other cases summer camp programs where the kids were slated to return home and never did," he says, "and in some cases they are re-education camps." The Yale report is the most extensive look at the program so far, says Raymond. "It shows scale, it shows chain of command, it shows logistical complexity," he adds. The report also documents a start date for transporting Ukrainian children to Russia, days before the full-scale invasion began on Feb. 24, 2022. "These first transports of children in early February 2022 included a group of 500 purported orphans 'evacuated' from Donetsk Oblast by Russia. The reason given publicly at the time was the supposed threat of an offensive by the Ukrainian armed forces," according to the report. Some of those Ukrainian children were later adopted by Russian families. Researchers obtained evidence through open sourcing The Ukrainian government and U.N. senior human rights officials have consistently raised the alarm over these activities since the early days of the war. The alarm grew louder in May 2022, when Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a new decree that made it quick and easy to adopt Ukrainian children, which was next to impossible before the war. In addition, Russian officials announced it would extend government support to Russian families who adopt Ukrainian children; the biggest financial incentive is for adopting handicapped kids. The Yale researchers began investigating missing Ukrainian children when the first Russian social media posts appeared last year. The messaging began at about the time of Putin's adoption announcement, says one of the Yale researchers. He asked not to be named to protect the security of his work from hackers. "I believe the first places we saw this were on Telegram and then VK," he says. Telegram is a popular Russian messaging service. VK is the Russian version of Facebook. "It quickly became clear there was an enormous amount of information publicly available," he says. The Yale Humanitarian Research lab is defining the future of war crimes investigations by combining open source research techniques with high-resolution satellite imagery to offer analysis of alleged war crimes in real time. There are about 20 researchers who scour social media posts, news reports, government announcements and Russian messaging services, looking for patterns and connections that otherwise might go unnoticed. As a partner with the U.S. State Department's Crisis Observatory, the Yale lab has access to non-classified satellite imagery from the U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. For this investigation, it is a key to mapping the camps, said the researcher. "You can see people. You can see cars. You can see certain types of activity," he said. "There's a very large amount of material related to the patriotic education that they undergo while they are in camps," he added. The lessons are designed, he says, to instill loyalty to Russia and promote Moscow's version of the war. "What we are seeing," he says, "is the government of Russia and Russian leaders training and indoctrinating a generation of Ukrainian children." What Russia calls a humanitarian project is identified by Yale researchers as a possible war crime Russia has not publicly issued a list of Ukrainian children evacuated and detained. The number of children adopted by Russian families since Feb. 24, 2022, is also unknown. However, Russian officials insist adoption is only permitted for orphans, although evidence gathered by the Yale team shows otherwise. The Yale report has verified that 37 Ukrainian children have been returned to their families, says Nathaniel Raymond. The thousands who remain in Russia may constitute a war crime, he says. "It is fundamentally the unconsented custody and control of thousands of Ukrainian children. Not only is it against the law, but against common decency," he says. The report, released Tuesday by the U.S. State Department, shows that the program is controlled by the Russian government from the top, Raymond says. "This operation is centrally coordinated by Russia's federal government and involved every level of government," according to the report. The Yale program identified several dozen federal, regional and local figures "directly engaged and politically justifying the program." War crimes evidence that can lead to trial is elusive Gathering evidence of alleged war crimes has always been difficult. That part hasn't changed. But now, open-source investigators have a trove of potential source material from on-the-ground witnesses who photograph war damage, map mass graves, record interviews with refugees — and post the results online. In addition, high-resolution satellite images make it easier than ever to identify deliberately damaged hospitals, targeted grain silos or local children's summer camps. A commercial satellite image of a facility known as Gornyi Kluch, or "Mountain Key," in October 2022. The camp is one of more than 40 locations in Russia verified by a team of researchers at Yale University to have been part of Russia's system of camps for and adoptions of children from Ukraine. Maxar The Yale team are all young Internet sleuths who work to verify the data they dig up and document the steps needed to meet the exacting standards and protocols for trial. Raymond describes the lab's role as a "cop shop" – a "cyber cop shop," that is mindful to detail a chain of custody for the evidence produced. To understand the Lab's role, he points to the TV show Law and Order. "We are the Jerry Orbach, beat cop side," he says, "Our job is to collect the evidence, digital evidence, and then how that comports or does not with the law." Also for the first time, war crimes investigators can gather evidence in real time while those crimes are still occurring, says Raymond. "We are showing that we can collect perishable evidence and make it actionable in ways that were previously impossible. In the past this scale of operation was only available to governments," he says. It is the future of war crimes investigations happening now at the Yale Lab, says Raymond, as civil society uses the same tools as governments, "at scale and at speed." © 2023 NPR

Wagner mercenaries helping Serbia prepare potential attack on our nation, Kosovan president warns Originally published by the Telegraph on February 11, 2023 Serbia is preparing for a potential attack to grab Kosovan territory, president Vjosa Osmani warns | CREDIT: Heathcliff O'Malley Mercenaries from Russia's notorious Wagner Group are working with Serbian paramilitaries to smuggle weapons and unmarked military uniforms into Kosovo, the country's president warned on Friday. The secret operation is designed to lay the groundwork for a potential hybrid attack by Serbia to grab Kosovan territory, Vjosa Osmani claimed in an interview with The Telegraph. The alleged preparations by Serbia bear parallels to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, when Russian soldiers wearing uniforms stripped of any insignia, dubbed “little green men”, prepared the way for the peninsula’s secession from Moscow. “They bring in weapons and uniforms but they are not formally part of the Serbian army. Serbia wants to achieve its aims without it being called a military operation,” Ms Osmani told The Telegraph in the presidential office in Pristina, Kosovo’s capital. The Serb objective is to “prepare situations for a possible annexation - not through a traditional military operation but through a hybrid sort of attack”. The border between Kosovo and Serbia, one of the most incendiary fault lines in the Balkans, has been wracked by tensions for months, initially sparked by a dispute over driving licences. Ethnic Serbs, who make up the majority of northern Kosovo’s population, were furious that they were ordered to ditch their Serbian-issued licences and number plates and adopt those issued by Kosovo authorities. Road blocks and barricades were erected by ethnic Serbs on roads across the north and shots were fired between police and protesters. The crisis grew so bad in December that president Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia, who does not recognize Kosovo’s independence, threatened to send Serbian troops into northern Kosovo. Kosovo’s president, Ms Osmani, claimed that Belgrade is continuing to stoke tensions in the region, in league with Russia’s Wagner Group, which recently began advertising for Serbian recruits for the Ukraine war. The covert strategy to smuggle arms for a suspected annexation has been taking place for at least six months, Ms Osmani said. The intention is “precisely” the same as the one used by Vladimir Putin in Crimea nine years ago, she claimed. “If you look at what Putin did in 2014 it is a complete copy cat, it is the same playbook. Initially, he instrumentalised Russians who lived there, then he was creating all kinds of false flag operations and then he sent in these paramilitary groups. “There is clear evidence that Serb paramilitary groups have been planning and organising this (with Wagner). How many were at the border or inside (Kosovo territory), that’s an issue that is still being investigated.” The northern, Serb controlled district of Mitrovica, adorned with Serbian flags and nationalist graffiti CREDIT: Heathcliff O'Malley Their intentions were clearly aggressive, she said. “They build trenches and military-style barricades. The kind they could use to fight.” Serbia has denied that mercenaries from the Wagner Group have had any role in the standoff with Kosovo. Many Balkan experts are skeptical that Serbia would dare try to annex northern Kosovo because it would bring them into a confrontation with the Nato-led KFOR or Kosovo Force, which includes American and British soldiers. “For as long as KFOR is based in Kosovo I don't think Serbia will take military action,” said Helena Ivanov, a Belgrade-based Balkans expert with the Henry Jackson Society think tank. “Serbia is not going to enter a war with Nato. It did that once and it lost. It's not going to do it again. KFOR’s presence is a deterrent for both sides, not to over escalate.” But President Osmani recalled the widespread scepticism among world leaders early last February when it looked like Russia might invade Ukraine. “Two or three days before the invasion of Ukraine, I was listening to so many world leaders saying ‘Putin is not that stupid, he’s not going to do that’. We hear that now about Vucic – ‘he’s not that stupid, he’s not going to do it'.” Just because KFOR is in Kosovo “doesn’t mean that Vucic would never attempt it. I’m not saying he will but we always need to be ready to prevent such a scenario,” she said. An hour’s drive north of Pristina, in the part of Kosovo dominated by ethnic Serbs, the influence of Serbia and Russia is clear to see. In the town of Mitrovica, which is divided by a river into an ethnic Serb north and an ethnic Albanian south, Serbian flags flutter in the streets. Shops prefer to take the Serbian dinar instead of the euro, which is the currency in the rest of Kosovo. There are murals proclaiming that Kosovo is forever a part of Serbia and muscular statues of nationalist heroes. The letter Z – the symbol of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – has been spray painted on a door along with the words “No Surrender”. A few doors down, someone has scrawled “Nato go home” on a wall. A few days ago, the word "Wagner" was sprayed onto the walls of a school in the northern, ethnically Serb part of the city. The Kosovo police denounced it as “incitement of hatred and inter-ethnic division”. The bridge that divides the two halves of the city is patrolled by Italian Carabinieri police, who have been deployed to Kosovo for years. “For now it’s calm but you can feel the tension in the air. It can change from one day to the next,” said a Carabinieri officer, as stray dogs dozed in the winter sunshine and flocks of pigeons pecked at crumbs on the bridge over the Ibar river. Beneath the bridge, on the ethnic Albanian side of the river, there was more graffiti, including “F*** Serbia” and a two-headed Albanian eagle painted in black. On a two-line highway that leads from Mitrovica north to the border with Serbia, there is a huge billboard which declares Vladimir Putin, as well as President Vucic of Serbia and the Serbian tennis player Novak Djokovic, honorary citizens of this part of Kosovo. A banner strung across a main road proclaims “This is Serbia”. The dispute between Kosovo and Serbia, which has dragged on since Kosovo sustained 13,000 deaths in a brutal war of independence in 1998-1999, may seem like another remote blood feud in the Balkans. But it has far wider implications and is evidence of Russia using Serbia as a proxy to destabilize the Balkans, to prevent countries from moving towards EU and Nato membership and to distract the West from the war in Ukraine. “The Russian interest is to use the western Balkans, through Serbia as a Trojan horse, to attack values-based systems such as Nato and the EU,” said President Osmani in Pristina, where streets are named after Bill Clinton and George W Bush in thanks for American help in securing Kosovo’s independence. “The more security tensions they create, the less are our chances to join the EU. Sometimes they do it in Montenegro, sometimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, sometimes in Kosovo, and they have created problems in North Macedonia as well.” She accused Serbia of viewing Kosovo, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina as “temporary countries” which Belgrade wants to reabsorb. Serbia, for its part, accuses the Pristina government of failing to adhere to a 2013 agreement to grant greater autonomy to the ethnic Serb north of Kosovo. Pro Putin billboard CREDIT: Heathcliff O'Malley Malign meddling and propaganda efforts by the Russians have only increased since the invasion of Ukraine, President Osmani said. “Through Serbia, they want to create other centres of conflict so that Western democracies would have to deal with a lot of crises at the same time rather than have all of their focus on Ukraine.” Ms Osmani, who at 40 is the youngest head of state in Europe, has bitter personal experience of the wars that tore apart the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. As a 16-year-old forced to flee Mitrovica in 1999, a Serbian soldier jammed the barrel of his AK-47 assault rifle into her mouth. “I was pleading with them not to shoot my dad. The soldier was trying to shut me up. It was hell. Thousands of us were forced to walk to Albania. People were raped and murdered.” While Kosovo is calm for now, the heavy trucks and lorries that were used to create road blocks in the north are still parked by the side of highways, ready to be deployed at a moment’s notice. Even so, some ethnic Albanians are doubtful that Serbia would ever contemplate military action. “There is already a big conflict in eastern Europe and the international community certainly won’t allow a second one to develop. And if the Serbs did attack, how long do you think they would last against Nato?” said one ethnic Albanian in Mitrovica. A Kosovan Serb petrol station adorned with pro Putin imagery CREDIT: Heathcliff O'Malley A Serb attempt to annex northern Kosovo could unleash chaos in the rest of the Balkans, where several nations are unhappy with their current frontiers. “If we start changing borders here, everyone in the Balkans will want border changes. It would be a big mess,” said Ismail Latifi, 56, an ethnic Albanian emigre who was visiting Mitrovica from his home in Vancouver. Standing in the shadow of a newly-built mosque with two slender minarets, his friend Behxhet Jashanica said Nato was the guarantor of Kosovo’s stability. “But if KFOR left Kosovo, Serbia would move in within hours. And the Russians would help them.” © Telegraph Media Group Limited 2023

At the start of his trial in Belgrade for the killing of 51 non-Serbs in 1992, former reservist policeman Milorad Kotur explained how prisoners were taken from the Omarska detention camp and then shot dead. Originally published by BalkanInsight on February 10, 2023 Belgrade Higher Court. Photo: BIRN. Milorad Kotur, a former member of the reservist police force at the Public Security Station in Bosanska Krupa in north-west Bosnia and Herzegovina, told Belgrade Higher Court on Friday at the start of his trial that his superior ordered the shooting of around 40 civilian prisoners. Kotur is accused of participating in the killing of 51 people in the village of Donji Dubovik near Bosanska Krupa in two separate incidents in July and August 1992. The victims of the first incident were civilians who were being held at the Omarska detention camp. According to the indictment, in July 1992, Kotur and his colleagues Dusan Culibrk and Bozo Dosen went to Omarska camp in Prijedor and took away 44 Bosniak and Croat prisoners, one of them a woman, purportedly so they could be freed under a prisoner exchange. The detainees were taken by minibus from Omarska to the village of Donji Dubovik, tied up with wire and shot dead next to the Lisac pit. Culibrk was sentenced in Bosnia and Herzegovina in January to 20 years in prison time. Dosen has since died. Kotur pleaded not guilty. “I was a soldier and wherever I had to go, I went, but where I went I did not commit any offense,” Kotur told the court. “When it came to Omarska [camp], I was there but I did not open fire,” he added. He told the court however that the chief of the Public Security Station in Bosanska Krupa, Milan Vojnovic, ordered that “the shooting should be carried out”, and that Kotur and his colleagues should go to the Omarska camp and “everything will be waiting for you there”. Kotur said he went to Omarska in a minibus with seven or eight of his police colleagues and that on arrival the vehicle parked at the entrance to the camp. “The bus was parked next to some wire [fence] by the road, I saw that they were bringing people, I don’t know how many,” Kotur said, claiming that “some police” were taking prisoners from camp but neither he nor his colleagues participated. “There were several policemen there, we were there for 3, 4 minutes, they were just crowding [prisoners into minibus], so we barely even got in, that is a small [vehicle],” he added. He said that Milan Vojnovic told him that, after picking up the prisoners, an elderly Serb in Donji Dubovik “would take us where it was necessary, he knew where the pit was”, referring to the Lisac pit. Kotur claimed that the minibus then stopped and that prisoners were taken up onto a hill where the pit is. “One of the policemen went, brought a wire [for tying up the prisoners] and they were taking people up,” he said. He claimed that he remained by the minibus. “When I got up there, everything was finished,” he said. When judge Mirjana Ilic asked Kotur if he knew the prisoners were going to be killed, he responded: “Everyone knew, it was a state of war.” He said that when he got to the pit, he saw dead bodies. The indictment also accuses Kotor of participating in the shooting of seven Bosniak civilians in the village of Donji Dubovik in August 1992. Kotur told the court that the police had information that Bosniak “terrorists” had been sent into their territory and on the day of the crime they were looking for them. When they got them, a large groups of local villagers came to beat the captives up. “I fired a short burst into the ground to stop it, then there was chaos, and after that I don’t know what happened or who fired,” he said, adding that he did not know what his gunshots hit. Kotur insisted that victims were not civilians, but soldiers. Belgrade Higher Court took over Kotur’s case from Bosnia and Herzegovina, where he was initially indicted. In November 2021, he was supposed to appear at the Bosnian state court in Sarajevo to enter his plea but did not turn up. Copyright BIRN 2023

Criticized by some as susceptible to abuse, the move targets ultranationalist party with jailed leader Published by the Wall Street Journal on February 9, 2023 Golden Dawn supporters at a rally a few years ago. A Greek court later ruled that the party was a criminal organization. PHOTO: KOSTAS TSIRONIS/REUTERS Greece banned an extreme-right political party and its jailed leader from running in elections later this year, a move some lawmakers warned could be susceptible to future abuse. The Greek Parliament late on Wednesday passed an amendment that will outlaw parties whose leaders have been convicted of a serious crime and are deemed to be a threat to democracy. The amendment, published on Thursday, doesn’t mention specific parties, but government officials have said it targets the Greek National Party and its leader Ilias Kasidiaris. Mr. Kasidiaris, who has a swastika tattoo, is a former top official of the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party and is serving a 13-year prison term for belonging to the group, which a Greek court ruled in 2020 to be a criminal organization. Golden Dawn briefly became Greece’s third-largest political party a decade ago, when the country was in the depths of a severe economic crisis, with unemployment reaching 27%. The amendment, which passed with the votes of the ruling center-right New Democracy party and the opposition center-left Pasok party, comes just months before a national election in which recent opinion polls indicate the Greek National Party might have broken the three-percent threshold needed to enter parliament. Greece must hold its election by July. “Our constitution mandates the smooth functioning of democracy, and it is precisely this democratic functioning that the regulation attempts to enhance by preventing gangs from masquerading as political actors,” Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis said in a speech before the vote. The amendment bans not only political parties whose official lead candidates have been convicted of a serious crime, but also parties whose de facto figureheads might be directing policy despite not running for election. A law passed in 2021 already bars people with criminal convictions from leading political parties in elections. Syriza, Greece’s main left-leaning opposition party, abstained in the parliamentary vote and criticized the amendment, saying that it was too broad and could be abused to ban other political movements in the future. Some smaller parties voted against it on the same grounds. “We won’t be accomplices, first, in the heroization of Kasidiaris and the other Nazis that the prohibition devised by your government will achieve,” said Kleon Grigoriadis, a lawmaker with the left-wing DiEM25 party led by former Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis. “You can’t cripple democracy to supposedly save it from those who are trying to cripple it.” Greek authorities launched a large-scale investigation into Golden Dawn after a series of violent incidents in late 2013, including the killing of an antifascist rapper. The party remained a force in parliament. But support for Golden Dawn later ebbed as the Greek economy began to recover and the trial that concluded in 2020 revealed hundreds of photographs and videos that showed the leadership’s attachment to Nazi ideology. Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Elections crucial for ending unrest in which dozens have died and economy has suffered. Peru’s congress has been unable to set a date for early elections, deepening the political paralysis in the world’s second-biggest copper producer as widespread anti-government protests enter their third month. The assembly’s failure to pass legislation before its closure would make it unlikely that elections can be held this year, analysts said. Congress is in session until February 17 after it was extended late on Friday, and could agree to schedule elections this year, but a consensus seems distant. Lawmakers from ousted leftwing president Pedro Castillo’s Peru Libre party have refused to support any changes that do not open the door to drafting a new constitution. The elections are due in 2026 but President Dina Boluarte has urged congress to bring them forward and Prime Minister Alberto Otárola said at the beginning of the month that polls were the only way to restore “the peace and calm that the country needs”. The unrest was triggered by the ousting and subsequent arrest of Castillo on December 7 after he attempted to close congress and rule by decree ahead of an impeachment vote. Boluarte, who served as his vice-president, was sworn in to replace him hours later. Castillo, who is in detention awaiting trial on charges of “rebellion”, maintains strong support in Peru’s poorer rural areas, where many felt left behind as the wealth generated by mining after the country’s return to democracy in 2000 was concentrated in the cities. Demonstrators seeking new elections and calling for Boluarte to resign have blocked highways, attacked mining infrastructure and invaded airports. A state of emergency is in place in swaths of the country, including the copper-rich southern provinces where the protests have been focused. Dozens have been killed in the crisis, with police reportedly firing live rounds. Seventy-one per cent of Peruvians want congress to close and Boluarte to resign, triggering new elections, according to a poll published by Datum on Friday. Only 26 per cent want the president to stay on. Congress last week rejected multiple bills that would have scheduled presidential and congressional polls for October this year, with a new president sworn in in December. Lawmakers from Castillo’s Peru Libre have long sought to amend the country’s constitution, which was enacted in 1993 during the authoritarian government of Alberto Fujimori. Other lawmakers have been accused by protesters and analysts of acting solely to save their seats. “Clearly elected congress people don’t have enough incentive to leave their positions,” said Denisse Rodríguez-Olivari, a policy leader fellow at the School of Transnational Governance at the European University Institute in Florence. Some lawmakers were hoping the protests would lose momentum as deliberations continued, she added. Congress could still theoretically approve elections this year, but the challenges were formidable, analysts said. A majority of 87 votes in the 130-strong assembly would be required this week to advance any legislation. Alternatively, any proposal with a majority of 66 votes in favour could be put to a referendum. However, Peru’s fractured congress, which has 13 unruly voting blocs, makes both prospects unlikely. “The hardest thing is getting congress to change its mind, and without that, elections this year are impossible,” said Rodolfo Rojas, a partner at Sequoia, a Lima-based consultancy. “Unless, of course, if Boluarte resigns.” Under the constitution, if the president and then the vice-president are removed from office or resign, the president of congress replaces them and must immediately call elections. The current crisis has long been brewing — Peru has had six presidents in five years. But it escalated in December after Castillo moved to close congress. Boluarte has failed to unite the country and has become a target for demonstrators’ anger. If the unrest continues, the consequences for Peru’s economy, which doubled in size between 2001 and 2014, could be dire, analysts warn. The IMF on Thursday forecast slowing growth for 2023 and said the outlook for Peru was uncertain. Several mines have been forced to temporarily suspend or reduce operations owing to roadblocks and attacks by protesters, putting nearly a third of Peru’s copper output — approximately 2.4mn tonnes a year, or about 11 per cent of the world’s mined total — at risk. Agricultural exports have also been hit, with the country’s farming association estimating a loss in value of $300mn in the first two months of demonstrations. Last week, rating agency Moody’s switched its outlook for Peru’s sovereign debt to negative from stable. It affirmed the country’s investment-grade rating but warned that growing instability threatened “a deterioration in institutional cohesion, governability, policy effectiveness and economic strength through successive governments”. Peru’s crucial tourism sector has also been hit by international travel warnings and attacks by protesters on infrastructure. The Inca citadel Machu Picchu, which in 2021 received 450,000 visitors, was forced to close, while hotels in the nearby city of Cusco have faced mass cancellations. Restaurants that usually teem with international diners are shuttered. “Everybody that comes to Peru goes to Machu Picchu,” said Marisol Mosquera, who runs Aracari, a luxury travel company. “Bookings have disappeared.” Like other tourism businesses, Aracari was only just recovering from the Covid-19 outbreak when the political turmoil began. The pandemic forced the company to downsize from 27 staff to 12. Now it may face further cuts. “We hope things calm down soon,” Mosquera said. Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2023. All rights reserved. Joe Parkin Daniels in Bogotá

Jakarta has been vocal in its defense of the Rohingya and the Palestinians. So why is it being so cautious about the situation in China’s Xinjiang region? By Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat and Yeta Purnama, The Diplomat on 8 Feburary 2023 Police officers stand at the outer entrance of the Urumqi No. 3 Detention Center in Dabancheng in western China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region on April 23, 2021. Credit: AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein, File The prospects for China’s Uyghur Muslims are increasingly looking bleak. The 8 million ethnic Uyghurs living in the Xinjiang region have experienced discrimination by the Chinese government for many years. Hundreds of thousands of them have reportedly been imprisoned in concentration camps and undergone “re-education” by the Chinese government. Others have been subject to forced labor. According to a 2020 report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), 80,000 Uyghur workers who had been transferred from Xinjiang between 2017 and 2019 were transported there by train and labeled as having been “bought” or “sold” by government and commercial brokers. These workers were identified as having been employed to manufacture goods for well-known companies such as Apple, Uniqlo, Adidas, Nike, and Skechers. Although there have been numerous reports of human rights violations against Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, many countries have also remained silent on this issue. Western media reports have also questioned where the voices of the world’s Muslim countries are. Among them is the world’s most populous Muslim-majority nation, Indonesia, which, while being forthright in defending the rights of Muslims elsewhere in the world, has been seen as passive in defending the rights of Uyghur Muslims. Indeed, in this article, we will argue that Indonesia has contributed, and is contributing, to China’s persecution of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang in two key respects. Blocking Discussions at the U.N. In October of last year, Indonesia was among the countries that rejected a motion seeking to discuss the Xinjiang situation at the United Nations Human Rights Council. Of the 47 countries that took part in the vote, 17 countries voted “yes” and 19 countries voted “no,” including Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Uzbekistan. Meanwhile, 11 countries abstained, including The Gambia, Libya, and Malaysia. The results of this vote have diminished hopes that the U.N. will deliver any kind of justice for the Uyghurs. Many parties expressed regret at Indonesia’s vote. One was Dolkun Isa, the president of the World Uyghur Congress, who said that the countries that voted “no” had effectively supported China in committing genocide, while attacking Islam itself. Greg Barton, a scholar at Deakin University in Australia, also commented that Indonesia’s attitude was not surprising, and credited it for not simply parroting the propaganda of the Chinese government. But he said that “it would have been good to see Indonesia being more bold.” Indonesia justified its vote by saying that the members of the U.N. Human Rights Council that sat on the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) had pledged not to make the Council a vehicle for political competition, in this case between China and the West. Achsanul Habib, director of human rights and humanitarian affairs at the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, described the Council as an inclusive forum for countries to carry out dialogue that is impartial and non-selective in its approach to rights issues. However, this reasoning clashes with the OIC Charter, which calls for its members to safeguard the rights, dignity, and religious and cultural identity of Muslim and minority communities in non-member countries. Indonesia in this case is also known for providing support to Rohingya Muslims and fighting for Palestinian independence. Its silence about the Uyghurs, therefore, seems to ignore the substance of the OIC Charter itself. Returning Uyghur Refugees to China The second way that Indonesia has abetted the Chinese government’s policies in Xinjiang is by returning Uyghur refugees to China. On July 1, 2022, an Uyghur named Ahmet Bozoglan was found to have been released from prison for his alleged involvement in terrorist activities in Poso, Central Sulawesi. After being released, Bozoglan was also informed that he was being deported. Reinhard Silitonga, director General of Corrections at the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, said that he could not confirm the destination, but it was almost certainly China. In 2014, Bozoglan and three of his fellow Uyghurs came to Indonesia disguised as Turkish citizens. Not long after, in September of that year, they were caught in possession of forged passports. Police claim that the group intended to join the East Indonesia Mujahidin (MIT) militant group in Poso. MIT is known to be affiliated with the Islamic State. However, Bozoglan claimed that he was a victim of human traffickers, who he contacted in an attempt to flee from Xinjiang to Turkey, but who transported him against his wishes to Indonesia. The truth remains unclear. If it is true that these Uyghurs wanted to join an Islamic extremist group, they needn’t have traveled all the way to Indonesia, when Afghanistan is much closer at hand. Whatever the truth, in 2015, the group was tried and sentenced to six years in prison. Bozoglan submitted an appeal to the panel of judges, but this was rejected and his sentence was increased to eight years or a fine of 100 million rupiah. Three of Bozoglan’s colleagues were released in 2020 after China paid the fines on their behalf, while Bozoglan was released in 2022 after serving his full sentence. After Bozoglan’s fellows’ release in 2020, they were deported back to China in secret, on a flight chartered by the Chinese government. The same fate most likely befell Bozoglan. There have been many criticisms of Indonesia for permitting the deportation of the Uyghurs to China, where rights activists say they are very likely to receive treatment such as torture, enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention, and other serious human rights violations. Andreas Harsono, a researcher for Human Rights Watch who accompanied the four Uyghurs during their trial, also expressed concerns for the fate of these individuals. “They should not have been deported to China because they will most likely be executed. We don’t believe the legal system there is fair,” he told BenarNews. “We have conveyed this to the Indonesian government, but there has been no answer.” Indonesia is not the only country that has sent Uyghurs back to China, of course. More than 300 Uyghurs are confirmed to have been forcibly returned from 16 different countries in the past 20 years, a figure that doesn’t include those who were returned in secret. Indonesia’s Failure The biggest factor behind Indonesia’s vacillating Uyghur policy is that it is increasingly reliant on China for aid and development. China is now Indonesia’s largest trading partner and investor, including as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. During the COVID-19 pandemic, China also became Indonesia’s largest supplier of vaccines. This has made Jakarta reluctant to voice any criticism of Beijing’s policies in Xinjiang. The country has also likely been influenced by China’s Islamic diplomacy, which has engaged with Islamic mass organizations and students in Indonesia in order to shift public opinion against the Uyghurs. China has also approached Indonesian Muslim influencers who are active in preaching on social media platforms to spread misinformation and denials that large-scale rights abuses are taking place in Xinjiang. By voting against a motion to discuss the Xinjiang situation at the U.N. Human Rights Council Indonesia was effectively voting “yes” to China’s commitment to human rights violations against the Uyghur minority. The country has clearly failed to maintain its credibility and solidarity in supporting fellow Muslims. It is also regrettable that it has deported Uyghurs back to China knowing that they will be persecuted. The Uyghurs were not proven to have committed any terror crimes, and even if they had, Bozoglan and his friends had served their sentences, which should have been sufficient reason for Indonesia to protect them and allow them to remain in Indonesia. Indonesia, as the largest Muslim-majority nation in the country and the leading figure in the Human Rights Council, should work more to defend the rights of the Uyghurs, lest it damages its image as a defender of the world’s Muslims beyond repair. © 2023 DIPLOMAT MEDIA INC.

Detentions, Interrogations, Harassment, and Restrictions on Basic Rights Jordanian teachers display their national flag during a protest in the capital of Amman on September 5, 2019.© 2019 KHALIL MAZRAAWI/AFP via Getty Images By, Human Rights Watch (Amman) – Civic space in Jordan has shrunk over the past four years as authorities persecute and harass citizens organizing peacefully and engaging in political dissent, Human Rights Watch said today. The authorities use vague and abusive laws that criminalize speech, association, and assembly, Human Rights Watch found. The authorities detain, interrogate, and harass journalists, political activists, members of political parties and independent trade unions, and their family members, and restrict their access to basic rights, such as work and travel, to quash political dissent. “There is an urgent need to address the downward spiral on rights we are seeing in Jordan today,” said Lama Fakih, Middle East director at Human Rights Watch. “‘Maintaining stability’ can never be a justification for abusing people’s rights and closing space that every society needs.” Human Rights Watch investigated 30 cases between 2019 and 2022 in which authorities used overly broad criminal defamation provisions to arrest and charge citizens for peacefully expressing political opinions on social media platforms or in public gatherings. Human Rights Watch also asked 42 Jordanian activists to provide written responses to a survey about their experiences with law enforcement agencies. Jordan’s authorities are using vague and overly broad criminal provisions including under the Penal Code of 1960, the Cybercrime Law of 2015, the Anti-Terrorism Law of 2006, and the Crime Prevention Law of 1954 to suppress free speech and assembly. The declaration of a state of emergency following the onset of the coronavirus pandemic in 2020 has also given the prime minister sweeping powers to further curtail civil and political rights. In 2020, the number of cases relating to these charges almost doubled from the previous year, according to the annual reports from the National Center for Human Rights (NCHR). Taken together, these practices amount to a systematic campaign to quell peaceful opposition and silence critical voices, Human Rights Watch said. Relatives of those targeted and others with direct knowledge of the cases said that in several cases, detainees were placed in solitary confinement and denied access to lawyers and families. In most cases, the country’s two primary security agencies, the General Intelligence Department (GID) and the Preventative Security department of the Public Security Directorate (PSD), were responsible for the arrests. In some cases, those arrested were charged, but the charges were later dropped. In others, people were detained for long periods but not charged. A small number of cases resulted in prosecution. In several cases, General Intelligence told people to sign a pledge not to insult the king or the intelligence services. The Jordanian government has also dissolved political parties and independently elected trade unions after members exercised their right to protest and express political opposition. In 2020, following a high-level dispute between the government and the teachers’ union over salaries, the authorities raided and arrested union board members, then dissolved the union. Human Rights Watch previously documented how Jordanian authorities have limited media freedom in recent years through sweeping gag orders, harassment, and arrests in order to control and restrict reporting on sensitive issues. In February 2021, King Abdullah II sent a letter to the head of General Intelligence asking him to limit the department’s involvement in non-intelligence-related matters. In June 2021, the king convened the Royal Committee to Modernize the Political System, which issued recommendations for amending laws on political parties and elections, and other legislations that would allow for further engagement in the country’s political life. The recommendations emphasized the need for “full respect for human rights and the creation of a safe space for fundamental freedoms that would enable political participation.” Despite these high-level calls for reform, little has changed, Human Rights Watch said. In December 2021, CIVICUS Monitor, an organization that collects data on the situation for civil society in 197 countries, downgraded Jordan’s civic space rating from “obstructed” to “repressed.” Under international human rights law, freedom of expression, assembly, and association are recognized as fundamental human rights, often overlapping, and essential to the effective functioning of a democratic society and to the enjoyment of other individual rights. Human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to which Jordan is a party, permit restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly only if they are provided for by law, are strictly necessary and proportionate to achieve a legitimate aim, including the protection of national security, public order or public health, and morals, and are non-discriminatory. In no case may restrictions be applied or invoked in a manner that would impair the essence of a human right. Jordan’s partners and donors, such as the United States and European Union, provide direct assistance and training to Jordan’s security agencies. These donors have highlighted democratic governance and rule of law reforms as key objectives of their economic and political cooperation with Jordan, but these programs have done little to halt the visible deterioration of basic rights. Jordanian authorities should extend the country’s political reform program by undertaking concrete measures that would alleviate the growing repression that restricts civic space and political participation in the first place, Human Rights Watch said. Such measures should include amending vaguely worded legislation that authorities use to curtail basic rights as well as halting all informal harassment and persecution using the legal system of Jordanians who seek to peacefully express their views and form independent groups. “It is doubtful that Jordan’s political reform program will succeed in the face of a deterioration of freedom of speech, assembly, and association across the country,” Fakih said. “Jordanian authorities should take urgent steps to reverse the closure of civil space and allow Jordanians to fully participate in the social and political life of the country without hindrance.” Abusive Legal Framework In the last four years, Jordan’s authorities have increasingly used vaguely worded criminal laws to prosecute citizens for peacefully expressing political opinions on social media platforms or in public gatherings. Human Rights Watch investigated 84 government charges in 30 cases in which the authorities used such laws between 2019 and 2022. In 63 cases, the authorities used criminal defamation provisions under the Penal Code of 1960, including article 132, which allows for the prosecution of citizens “who broadcast fake or exaggerated news that would undermine the prestige of the state.” Such provisions cast a wide net for what constitutes defamation and give authorities significant leeway to pursue charges without any clear connection to criminal wrongdoing, with a chilling effect on freedom of expression. To extend the reach of these provisions to the use of social media and the internet, the authorities have also used the Cybercrime Law of 2015, which, under article 11, stipulates a penalty for anyone who intentionally sends, resends, or publishes libel or slander with imprisonment for a period of no less than three months and a fine of no less than 100 JDs (US$141) and a maximum of 2,000 JDs ($2,820). The authorities also frequently use article 15, which criminalizes use of the internet or information network to carry out acts that are punishable by other legislation. While the government previously proposed amendments to the existing laws, for example in December 2018 for the cybercrimes law, in response to the objections to the texts, no positive changes were made. In certain cases, amendments were ultimately adopted with more problematic provisions, including for example, the penal code amendments of 2022, which criminalized attempts to commit suicide or express intent to commit suicide and statements that seek to instill fear in people. According to statistics available by the NCHR in 2020, there were 2,140 court cases on the basis of article 11 of the cybercrime law. In the same year, 402 court cases were recorded on the charge of “insulting an official agency,” 49 cases on “inciting strife,” and 311 cases for “lengthening the tongue” against the king (Lèse-majesté or insulting the king). In November 2021, King Abdullah II issued a royal decree pardoning 155 people convicted for “lengthening the tongue” against him. The Counterterrorism Law of 2006 includes a broad definition for a terrorist act. These cases are tried by the State Security Court (SSC), a special military court with mostly military judges that does not meet international standards of independence and impartiality, and that has been regularly used to prosecute civilians in contravention of international law. Between 2019 and 2022, Human Rights Watch documented 19 of these cases, for “disturbing relations with a foreign state” under article 3.B and “committing an act that endangers the safety and security of the society and violates public order” under article 2 of the counterterrorism law. Article 149 of the of the penal code is also under the jurisdiction of SSC. It criminalizes any act that “undermines the political regime or incites opposition to it” or “intends to change the economic or social entity of the state.” It has been regularly used to prosecute political and anti-corruption activists linked to an umbrella coalition known as al-Hirak al-Muwahhad, a political reform movement that emerged from the 2011 protests. Finally, the Crime Prevention Law of 1954 includes expansive powers to use administrative detention in contravention of rights obligations. Under article 3, local governors are allowed to take action against anyone “under their jurisdiction,” allowing officials to routinely circumvent the criminal justice system to detain people by administrative order with limited judicial review. In mid-February 2022, the authorities arrested 11 political activists under this law. In March, they used it to arrest at least 150 people to pre-empt protests or quash sit-ins across the country. Jordanian authorities also used emergency legislation brought in at the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 to quash dissent, including activating the Defense Law of 1992, which grants the Prime Minister expansive powers to curtail basic rights. In March 2021, al-Hirak al-Muwahhad called for demonstrations to mark the 10th anniversary of the 2011 protests against unemployment and corruption. Riot police broke up protests and detained hundreds of people across the country. A lawyer from the National Freedom Forum, an initiative by Jordanian lawyers providing legal aid for political activists, provided Human Rights Watch with a list of 105 people detained on March 25 and released on March 28. Forty-five of them were charged with participating in an illegal gathering and causing public disturbance under article 165 of the penal code, in addition to breaching Defense Order No. 16, which prohibits public gatherings of more than 20 people and under Defense Order No.22, which increases sentences for such violations. Human Rights Watch reviewed the charge sheet of 12 activists who took part in protests in Dhiban, a town in the Madaba governorate, and were sentenced to three months in prison, but were later found not guilty by Madaba’s Court of First Instance after submitting a complaint regarding the court’s decision because two of them were convicted in absentia. In seven photos and videos filmed by an activist in the northern city Mafraq, which Human Rights Watch reviewed, police are seen surrounding and arresting protestors who were abiding by public health laws, including by maintaining social distancing and wearing masks. Arbitrary Arrests Human Rights Watch documented 10 cases in which the GID, Jordan’s main intelligence department, and the Preventive Security, a branch of the PSD, arbitrarily detained activists between 2018 and 2021. In all 10 cases, family members or the activists said that officers wearing civilian clothes from one of these agencies enforced the arrests, alongside other police forces. In five of these cases, family members or activists said that officers identified themselves as being from one of these agencies. In eight cases, family members or activists said that large numbers of police, including plainclothes police, either raided their homes or arrested them on the street. In three cases, activists said they were held in solitary confinement at the General Intelligence headquarters in Amman, with limited or no light and irregular or no visits from families and lawyers. These accounts are consistent with previous Human Rights Watch documentation of the agency’s detention practices and the NCHR 2017 annual report. Activists said that General Intelligence officers interrogated them for long hours about their political activism. Two of those detained at the General Intelligence headquarters were taken before the state security prosecutor, a military officer with offices in the complex. Under the State Security Court Law of 1959, the prosecutor can extend the detention warrant for a renewable period of 15 days after charging a suspect if it is in the interest of the investigation. In April 2021, the authorities arrested a political party member and Hirak activist after he posted on Facebook about the arrest of 20 people, and the house arrest of King Abdullah’s half-brother following an investigation into an alleged plot to unseat the king. Human Rights Watch reviewed a video recorded by neighbors showing at least 17 vehicles, including civilian, Preventative Security, and gendarmerie vehicles surrounding his house. The activist said that a police officer alongside a General Intelligence officer presented him with a search and arrest warrant issued by the public prosecutor. He said four agents blindfolded him and took him in a civilian car to General Intelligence headquarters in Amman. He said he spent 16 days in incommunicado detention, during which he was subjected to mental pressure throughout long interrogation sessions with security officers who accused him of being one of the plotters. He said officers also questioned him about his political activism, particularly his membership in one of the country’s registered political parties. During the interrogation, the officers told him to sign a pledge not to, directly or indirectly, insult the king or General Intelligence. Six days into his detention, his case was transferred to the state security prosecutor, who charged him with undermining the political regime based on the same Facebook post. Those charges were later dropped before the case went to trial for reasons that were not made clear. He was released 16 days after his detention. In August 2021, Human Rights Watch interviewed an activist with the Dhiban branch of al-Hirak who was detained and prosecuted three times. Authorities detained him for the first time on October 22, 2018, following his participation in anti-austerity protests, then in 2019 for a Facebook post that criticized officials, and in March 2021 as one of the 12 activists in Dhiban who participated in protests. He said he was arrested at 7:30 a.m. on October 22, 2018, by a group of plain clothes officers who surrounded the school in Amman where he was a teacher. Security officers confiscated his personal belongings, blindfolded him, put him in a civilian car and drove him to the General Intelligence headquarters, where he was held in solitary confinement for 37 days. After two days, his case was transferred to the state security prosecutor, who showed him a video of him chanting slogans criticizing the royal family and charged him on the basis of that video with undermining the political regime, as well as insulting the king and the royal family. During his 37 days in solitary confinement, the authorities permitted one visit with his lawyers, and a few days later with his family. In one interrogation session, an officer asked him to provide information about the protests near the prime minister’s office, as well as a statement to the king demanding further reforms that he signed along with hundreds of other people. He also said that intelligence officers offered to support him financially “if he commits to leaving the Hirak.” After 37 days, he was transferred to Juwaida Prison and was finally released on November 29. After three hearings in his case, the state security court sentenced him to two and a half years in prison for undermining the political regime. That sentence was later dropped as part of the General Amnesty Law of 2019. In March 2019, he was brought in again for “lengthening the tongue” on the basis of a Facebook post and convicted in April, for which he spent a year in prison. Harassment Security agencies, primarily General Intelligence, have arbitrarily and without any clear legal basis, imposed restrictions on citizens in reprisal for speaking out or engaging in political activities including by restricting their ability to work, travel, and obtain official documents. In most cases, there is no official evidence such as judicial documents mandating any of the measures against them. Human Rights Watch reached out to 42 Jordanian political activists and asked them to provide written responses to a survey about their experiences with law enforcement agencies. They could submit their responses anonymously to avoid fear of retaliation. While the rates of harassment found in the survey cannot be generalized to all Jordanian activists, the responses indicate trends commonly experienced. All respondents, except one, said they had been summoned and questioned about their political activism by security agencies, including the GID, Preventative Security, and governors. Twelve said the authorities had summoned them more than 10 times through various means, by phone, through distant relatives and friends, or while visiting an official government agency. In some cases, the authorities handed documents summoning activists for interrogation to family members while they were visiting government agencies to conduct other business. Nineteen said they were told during interrogation to halt their political activism. Thirty-one said that after their interrogation, authorities told them to remain in touch with the security agency. Security agencies imposed travel bans on several activists without explanation, or confiscated their passports or passports of their family members at the airport while they or their relatives were attempting to leave the country or returning, strongly suggesting the restrictions were arbitrary. Nineteen said they had lost their jobs due to security agency harassment of them or their employers and 16 said that relatives and friends were threatened with either losing their jobs or with further harassment. Seventeen said they faced difficulties in obtaining a certificate of good conduct, a document issued by General Intelligence that indicates a clear record, and is required for work, visa, and residency applications, while nine others said they struggled with obtaining a clear criminal record due to past court convictions. Nine said they had problems renewing official documents, such as passports, IDs, and driver’s licenses. Case studies In January 2022, Human Rights Watch documented the case of a Hirak activist banned from traveling on three occasions, twice in July 2019 and once in October 2021. Based on the person’s account, during each incident at Queen Alia International Airport officials told him that General Intelligence had ordered his travel ban. Between 2017 and 2021, the authorities detained and prosecuted him four times on charges related to free speech and assembly, including “lengthening the tongue” against the king and queen. In 2021, al-Salt Criminal Court sentenced him to three months in prison for resisting an official employee carrying out a public job, while participating in protests in al-Salt governorate after oxygen ran out in the city’s hospital leading to at least six deaths of patients on ventilators. The activist’s lawyer submitted two applications to replace the sentence with a fine. The court rejected the petitions, and he started to serve his prison sentence in February 2022. In December 2020, Human Rights Watch researchers interviewed an artist currently living in exile and whose political satire work is known on social media. He said that General Intelligence had summoned him twice earlier that month while he was in Jordan. In two long interrogation sessions, he said, intelligence officers questioned him about at least eight of his published art pieces that were critical of the country’s electoral law and parliamentary elections held in November 2020 amid the Covid-19 pandemic. He said that at least five intelligence officers were present during the interrogation and pressured him to identify local and international entities and individuals who supported his work. He said that intelligence authorities threatened him with prosecution on charges such as inciting election boycotts, “lengthening the tongue” against the king, and insulting high-ranking officials. He said that GID told him not to publish artwork that is critical of the state and its institutions, and to obtain approval from intelligence officers before publishing any other work. The political activist arrested in April 2021 told Human Rights Watch that GID summoned him four times between April and September 2021 to question him about his political activity. He also said that in May 2020, authorities had prohibited his brother-in-law from traveling with the Jordanian Armed Forces, of which he is a member, denying him the required security approval. He said his brother-in-law was told to tell him to visit the GID office as part of the brother-in-law’s security approval process. “They [the authorities] transfer your clash with them to a clash with your society – it doesn’t remain personal,” he said. Restrictions on Freedom of Association and Assembly In 2020 and 2021, Jordanian authorities targeted organized groups such as professional unions and political parties, using dubious legal grounds to halt their work, creating serious constraints on freedom of association. Several Jordanian laws restrict freedom of association, including the Labor Law of 1966, which limits the ability to freely form trade unions, and the Associations Law of 2008, which regulates the formation and operation of nongovernmental groups. Jordanian authorities impose onerous pre-approval restrictions on the receipt of foreign funding by nongovernmental groups. In late 2019, Jordanian authorities created a centralized committee under the prime minister’s office to study and decide foreign funding approval requests, but representatives of donor states and local nongovernmental groups told Human Rights Watch in 2022 that the committee has done little if anything to ease the restrictions. In September 2022, the Community Media Network, a local nongovernmental group, filed a complaint with the NCHR over authorities' arbitrary rejection of a 25,000 Jordanian Dinar ($35,200) grant from the German development agency to produce a campaign to raise awareness about recycling. Professional Unions In July 2020, the police raided the Jordan Teachers Syndicate, an independent elected labor union, and arrested its board members, then dissolved the union. The harassment occurred shortly after high-profile disputes between the government and the union over the salaries of public school teachers. Human Rights Watch documented due process violations during the process and retaliatory measures against the hundreds of members. In July 2021, Amman’s Criminal Court found the deputy head of the union, Nasser al-Nawasrah, not guilty in the three charges. They included “intervening in broadcasting fake, exaggerated news which undermine the state’s prestige,” in violation of articles 132/1 and 80/2 of the penal code, and “threatening to cause unjustified harm,” in violation of article 354 of the penal code, with reference to article 15 of the Cybercrimes Law. In November 2021, authorities forced dozens of teachers into early retirement, and barred the union’s former board and members from protesting or holding a news conference. In June 2022, a court approved a request to halt the prosecution of members of the syndicate but upheld the 2020 decision to dissolve it. In May 2020, 11 board members of Jordan’s Medical Association resigned following an April government decision to freeze all public sector pay raises due to Covid-19. In June 2020, Prime Minister Omar Razzaz’s cabinet approved the board’s dissolution based on article 75 of the Medical Association Law of 1972, which states that the cabinet may, upon the recommendation of the health minister, dissolve the association’s board for “public safety and security requirements.” The cabinet then appointed a committee headed by the health minister to lead the association. A higher administrative court upheld the decision. In June 2021, Human Rights Watch interviewed two former board members, who said they resigned because their repeated requests to hold meetings to discuss the decision to halt raises for public sector employees were dismissed, preventing them from adequately fulfilling their mandates. Both said that during their terms on the board, prior to the outbreak of Covid-19, GID offices frequently intervened in their association work. When the board’s agenda focused on reforms around the labor rights of Jordanian doctors, one of the board members said, they received calls from GID officers directly after meetings, questioning them about their opinions on demands related to labor reforms. Both said that in 2019, intelligence officers told them not to participate in the board’s planned protests in support of the 2019 teachers’ union crisis. One said that after they participated, an intelligence officer sent them a photo of them protesting. Political Parties In mid-2022, Jordanian lawmakers approved a new Political Parties Law based on a recommendation by the Royal Committee to Modernize Political Systems. Under the law, party registration and oversight is transferred from the Political and Parliamentary Affairs Ministry to the Independent Elections Commission, but the law maintains vague provisions that can be used by authorities to restrict political parties. The previous Political Parties Law of 2015 included several articles that restricted political parties from operating freely and allowed for their oversight by the Political and Parliamentary Affairs Ministry and its Committee of Party Affairs. On January 7, 2021, for example, the ministry filed a Court of Appeal case to dissolve the Partnership and Salvation Party, a registered political party since 2018, and made an expedited request to suspend the party’s work and activities during the trial. The ministry’s action was based on article 34.B of the Political Parties Law of 2015, which allows the court of appeal to dissolve political parties if they commit violations under any provisions of the law, including failing to correct any violations within a 30-day notice. Human Rights Watch reviewed court documents provided by the party’s lawyer that show that the Party Affairs Committee, which operates under the ministry and is responsible for oversight of political parties, alleged in filing the case that the party had committed six administrative and procedural violations. The documents said that the party submitted its 2018 annual budget late, and failed to report party employees’ salaries and to submit certified copies of the party’s rental agreements or any bank statements. The law does not appear to require these documents. In its trial defense, the party provided documents showing it had submitted the budget reports within the legal period. On May, 4 2021, the Court of Appeal dismissed the case and revoked the decision to halt the party’s work during the trial. Based on local media reports, the Committee of Party Affairs previously referred three political parties to the courts, which then dissolved the parties on grounds of violating administrative and financial laws and policies. The most notable was the 2020 decision by the Court of Cassation to dissolve the Islamic Action Front party, the Muslim Brotherhood’s political wing in Jordan. Based on a Human Rights Watch review of publicly available court documents, the authorities in mid-2020 detained and prosecuted two high-ranking members of two prominent political parties for posts expressing political opinions on social media. The court documents say that one was charged with “broadcasting news that undermines the prestige of the state” because of an online post criticizing Independence Day celebration. Amman’s Criminal Court found in May 2021 that “his action does not constitute a crime and does not require punishment.” In the other case, authorities charged a high-ranking party member with “lengthening the tongue” against the king and insulting the president of a foreign country under article 122 of the penal code, both charges under article 15 of the Cybercrime Law. Amman’s Criminal Court found him not guilty of both charges in June 2021. Separately, Human Rights Watch interviewed leading members of two political parties, in September and October 2021. They said that along with the restrictions they face under the current Political Parties Law of 2015, political parties frequently deal with violations by security agencies, including summonses and arbitrary harassment measures. One political leader said that over the last two years, at least 30 members of political parties withdrew due to the authorities’ pressures. He also said that intelligence authorities imposed arbitrary measures on members of his party including travel bans, confiscation of passports, and inability to obtain official documents. One political party member was summoned for security approval, then interrogated, after he applied for a motorbike driver’s license. He said he was asked about reasons for his membership in the political party, about certain party members and about political discussions within the party. He was not given the security approval after the visit, and authorities rejected the two other applications for a license, in August 2021 and January 2022. Recommendations The government and parliament should immediately amend problematic provisions in the Cybercrimes Law of 2015, the penal code, and the Counterterrorism Law of 1964 in line with international standards, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and repeal the Crime Prevention Law. The GID Department should abide by King Abdullah II’s February 2021 instruction not to exceed its intelligence mandate and stop all interference with peaceful political opposition or dissent, including peaceful protests or other expression of dissent. The GID Department should also respect the rights of defendants, and not force them to sign pledges. The government should put in place a system to independently and transparently investigate allegations of harassment by GID officers of individuals, family members, their employers and relatives, including through arbitrary travel bans and work restrictions, and should rescind any such arbitrary restrictions, and hold those responsible for such harassment to account. The government should allow the creation of independent, elected trade unions in all trades, limit official involvement in the creation and management of such unions, and allow for the reinstatement of the unions and political parties that have been arbitrarily dissolved, or dissolved based on abusive and overbroad provisions. Jordan’s international partners should publicly and explicitly condemn all violations relating to freedom of expression, association, and assembly in Jordan and should ensure that respect for such freedoms is a condition of all existing programs. Donors should push for and track concrete reforms in these areas. © 2023 Human Rights Watch

Russian fighters clash with rebels as Kremlin tries to extend power in mineral rich country Zeinab Mohammed Salih in Khartoum and Jason Burke Thu 2 Feb 2023 A soldier from the government Central African territorial infantry battalion passes a Russian flag in Bangui in December 2022. Photograph: Barbara Debout/AFP/Getty Images Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group have sustained heavy casualties in a new surge of fighting between government troops and rebels over the control of lucrative goldmines in Central African Republic (CAR). The clashes come amid increasing instability in the anarchic, resource-rich country, which in recent years has become one of Russia’s main hubs of influence in sub-Saharan Africa. The government offensive is led by some of the estimated 1,000 Wagner fighters stationed in CAR since 2018. Wagner was founded by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a businessman with close ties to the Kremlin, and has been deployed in about a dozen African countries as part of a Russian effort to project power on the continent and extract valuable resources. Last month, the US designated Wagner as a “significant transnational criminal organisation”, in part because of its increasing role in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In CAR, Wagner fighters have defended the regime of Faustin-Archange Touadéra against successive rebel attacks on the capital, Bangui, and have been accused of human rights abuses. The clashes started two weeks ago in a town near the border with Cameroon and Chad, pitting rebels against the Russians and the government troops. Violence flared again near the Sudanese border last weekend. Between seven and 17 Wagner fighters were among the dozens of casualties, rebel sources claimed. “We have lost two [killed] and many injured, but we defeated them and confiscated many military trucks … We staged an ambush and they fell into the trap,” said Ahmadou Ali, a senior leader in the rebel Coalition of Patriots for Change, in a phone interview. Experts say reliable figures are difficult to establish, but that it is clear Wagner sustained relatively heavy casualties. A source close to CAR’s national military said seven Russians had been killed in the ambush, one of the heaviest single losses by Wagner in Africa since battles against Islamist rebels in Mozambique in 2019. Ali said CAR’s forces had not joined the fighting. “It was a battle between us and the Russians. They only used the government troops to legitimise things. The Russians have taken all over the country. They are everywhere: they guard the borders and you see them everywhere there are [valuable] resources. They stole all our resources,” he said. Though Touadéra’s grip on power remains strong, the new violence suggests greater instability in CAR than in recent years, analysts said. The country, one of the poorest in the world, is facing economic collapse. A series of shifts in the alignment of regional powers in recent months have also raised tensions. “The government in Bangui is totally running out of money,” said Enrica Picco, central Africa director for the international Crisis group. “Wagner don’t fully control all the mining sites and there is still fighting at several. The group’s move [into frontier zones] changed the conflict dynamics because the rebel factions there united in the face of the common enemy to protect their mining revenues.” Marie-Reine Hassen, a former diplomat and an opposition politician, said the president should give up power. “He’s losing it and nobody wants him, I know he won’t do it, but the country is a mess. People are dying of hunger, no clean water, no electricity,” she said. Last year there was another round of clashes after Wagner fighters attacked artisanal goldmines along the CAR border with Sudan. Dozens of miners were killed in at least three attacks and witnesses interviewed by the Guardian described “massacres” by fighters they identified as being from Wagner, who swept through encampments full of migrant miners and mine workings during a six-week period. Since Wagner arrived in CAR, it has tried to establish control over the flow of gold and diamonds as part of a broader push to secure resources. Analysts believe the group was initially promised gold and other mining concessions for its services in place of cash payments. Such concessions have gained in importance as the Russian rouble has come under pressure since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. Precious metals, especially gold, could help Vladimir Putin’s regime survive the economic impact of sanctions. The new clashes are a further example of how intervention by Wagner is often linked to an increase in civilian deaths, despite the group’s boasts that they fight insurgents more effectively than UN peacekeepers or conventional troops deployed by former colonial powers such as France. A study by the NGO the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project found that civilians were targeted in more than half of the political violence involving Wagner in CAR, and 71% in Mali, where the Russian mercenaries were deployed in late 2021 to reinforce a military-led regime as French troops withdrew. “In both cases, this exceeds the rate of civilian targeting perpetrated by allied state forces, as well as the major insurgent groups operating in each context,” the NGO said. Human Rights Watch, in a report in May, said forces in CAR who witnesses identified as Russian appeared to have beaten, tortured and killed civilians there since 2019. It said Russia-linked forces in CAR did not wear a designated uniform and had no official insignia or other distinguishing features. © 2023 Guardian News & Media Limited or its affiliated companies.