TURKMENISTAN: Muslim prisoners of conscience transferred to new labour camps 28 October 2022 Felix Corley, Forum 18 Five Sunni Muslims jailed in Balkanabat for 12 years each in August 2017 for meeting to study the works of the theologian Said Nursi were transferred recently to new labour camps. The strict-regime labour camp at Bayramali in Mary Region, where four of the five are held, also holds another jailed Nursi reader, 47-year-old Begench Dadebayew. At least two among more than 60 men jailed from 2013 for participating in a Sunni Muslim group in Turkmenabat have been freed after completing their jail terms. Ovadan-Depe Prison, 2019 (Source: Google/DigitalGlobe) Five Sunni Muslims jailed for meeting to study the works of the late Turkish Muslim theologian Said Nursi are now being held in the strict-regime labour camp at Bayramali in Mary Region. A sixth is being held at the labour camp in Balkan Region for former police officers. Five of the six were jailed in Balkan Region for 12 years each in August 2017 and were transferred recently to the new labour camps. The five men jailed in August 2017 are Myratdurdy Shamyradow, Meret Owezow, Ahmet Mammetdurdyyew, Begejik Begejikow and Jumanazar Hojambetow. It is not known when and where the sixth Nursi reader – 47-year-old Begench Dadebayew, also jailed in Bayramali labour camp - was sentenced (see below). At least two of the more than 60 Sunni Muslims from in and around the city of Turkmenabat in the eastern Lebap Region imprisoned in 2013 and after to punish them for their involvement in a Muslim study group have been freed. Both had completed not only their original five-year jail terms but extra sentences of five years added to their terms (see below). "The boys did nothing bad," an individual familiar with the group told Turkmen.news in early October 2022. "They didn't drink alcohol or smoke, didn't steal and didn't deal in drugs. Their only 'guilt' was their faith in Allah and their observance of the canons of Islam" (see below). The leader of the Turkmenabat group, Bahram Saparow, is among members of the group believed to be held in the high-security Ovadan-Depe prison. Other prisoners in Ovadan-Depe are known to have been tortured, and some have died from maltreatment or neglect. Relatives of other prisoners held there often have no information as to whether they are still alive. Three other members of the group have already died in prison of neglect or torture (see below). The regime offers no alternative civilian service for those unable to undertake compulsory military service on grounds of conscience, despite repeated calls including from the United Nations human rights bodies (see below). All 16 conscientious objector prisoners of conscience (all of them Jehovah's Witnesses) were freed in a prisoner amnesty in May 2021 and no criminal cases are known to have been launched since then to punish those unable to undertake compulsory military service on grounds of conscience. However, Military Conscription Offices continue to summon young Jehovah's Witness men, including in the autumn 2022 call-up. Some of these have submitted written statements on their religious-based refusal to serve in the military and their readiness to undertake a civilian alternative service, were one to be offered (see below). On 9 June, the United Nations Human Rights Committee published its Decision that the regime had violated the rights of yet another conscientious objector, Arslan Begenchow, who had served a one-year jail term from January 2018. The Human Rights Committee has now issued 14 Decisions in favour of 16 conscientious objectors from Turkmenistan, all of them Jehovah's Witnesses. However, the regime has not honoured its obligation to expunge their criminal records and provide compensation for their jailing (see below). The new Criminal Code which takes effect from 1 January 2023 retains the same punishment of up to two years' imprisonment for refusing compulsory military service on grounds of conscience (see below). Justice Minister Merettagan Taganow did not answer his phone each time Forum 18 called on 27 October. Yusupguly Eshshayew, Chair of the Human Rights Committee of parliament's lower chamber, did not answer his phones each time Forum 18 called on 27 October. The regime-appointed Human Rights Ombudsperson Yazdursun Gurbannazarowa did not answer her phone on 27 October. The woman who answered the phone at the Ombudsperson's office the same day put the phone down as soon as Forum 18 began to introduce itself. Subsequent calls went unanswered. Five Nursi readers serving 12-year jail terms In May and June 2017, the authorities arrested five Sunni Muslims who met with others to pray and study their faith using the works of the late Turkish Muslim theologian Said Nursi. On 15 August 2017, a panel of three judges at Balkan Regional Court in the regional capital Balkanabat in western Turkmenistan sentenced the five men to 12-year jail terms each in strict regime labour camps. The court ordered that religious literature, mobile phones and cash be seized from them. The five Muslims jailed were: 1) Jumanazar Yuldashowich Hojambetow, born 17 April 1981, ethnic Uzbek, single, unemployed, lived in Koneurgench and Balkanabat 2) Begejik Begejikow, born 23 January 1963, ethnic Turkmen, married with 4 children, unemployed, lived in Balkanabat 3) Ahmet Bayramberdiyewich Mammetdurdyyew, born 13 August 1978, ethnic Turkmen, married with 2 children, worked as guard at oil company, lived in Balkanabat Myratdurdy Shamyradow (Source: Private) 4) Meret Hydyrowich Owezow, born 16 February 1960, ethnic Turkmen, married with 4 children, unemployed, lived in village of Gokje in Mary Region 5) Myratdurdy Shamyradow, born 7 May 1973, ethnic Turkmen, married, businessman, lived in Mollanepes in Mary Region Balkan Regional Court convicted the five men under three Criminal Code Articles: Criminal Code Article 177, Part 3 punishes "Incitement of social, ethnic or religious hatred with the use or threat of physical violence , or conducted by an organised group" with prison terms of between three and eight years. Criminal Code Article 275, Part 2 punishes "Participation in the activity of criminal structures" with prison terms of between five and 12 years with confiscation of property. Criminal Code Article 275.1, Part 2 punishes "Storage or distribution of property of criminal structures and planning the financing of them" with prison terms of between five and 10 years with confiscation of property. The five failed to overturn their 12-year strict-regime jail terms at the Supreme Court in Ashgabat on 11 July 2018. Despite the verdict that states that the five men were to serve their terms at a strict regime labour camp, four of the five men - Shamyradow, Owezow, Mammetdurdyyew and Begejikow - were transferred to the much harsher Ovadan-Depe prison. The isolated top-security prison is located in the Karakum Desert 70 kms (45 miles) north of Ashgabat. Other prisoners in Ovadan-Depe are known to have been tortured, and some have died from maltreatment or neglect. Relatives of other prisoners held there often have no information as to whether or not they are still alive. The fifth prisoner, Jumanazar Hojambetow – apparently a former police officer or other official – was sent to serve his sentence at the special labour camp for former law-enforcement officials at Akdash near Turkmenbashi (formerly Krasnovodsk) in Balkan Region (BL-K/4). Nursi readers transferred to new prisons Four of the five Nursi readers jailed in Balkan Region in 2017 - Shamyradow, Owezow, Mammetdurdyyew and Begejikow – were transferred out of Ovadan-Depe Prison. They are now being held in the strict-regime labour camp MR-E/16 at Bayramali in Mary Region, fellow Muslims told Forum 18. The fifth of the group, Jumanazar Hojambetow, is now being held in the labour camp BL-E/6 in Balkan Region, fellow Muslims told Forum 18. The camp houses former police officers and other former officials. Another Nursi reader in Bayramali labour camp Also serving a prison term in the strict-regime labour camp MR-E/16 at Bayramali in Mary Region is Begench Dadebayew (born 1 January 1975), fellow Muslims told Forum 18. He too was jailed for meeting to study the works of Said Nursi. It remains unknown when he was jailed or the length of his jail term. Turkmenabat Muslim jailings from 2013 More than 60 Sunni Muslims from in and around the city of Turkmenabat in the eastern Lebap Region were imprisoned in 2013 and after to punish them for their involvement in a Muslim study group. At the first trial of 21 group members in May 2013, 20 were convicted and jailed. The leader of the group, Bahram Jumanazarowich Saparow (born 31 May 1982), received his first 15-year sentence. While in prison, Saparow was handed his second 15-year prison sentence in July 2014 and his third in June 2016. The three prison terms were combined into a 15-year sentence. After the May 2013 trial, further trials of other members of the Sunni Muslim group were held, with many more Muslims jailed. Most or all the prisoners are believed to be held at Ovadan-Depe. Relatives often have no information as to whether they are still alive. At least three are known to have died in prison, while at least three are known to have been freed on completing their sentences (see below). "The boys did nothing bad," an individual familiar with the group told Turkmen.news in early October 2022. "They didn't drink alcohol or smoke, didn't steal and didn't deal in drugs. Their only 'guilt' was their faith in Allah and their observance of the canons of Islam." At least two Muslims freed on completing sentences At least two Muslims who were among dozens jailed between 2013 and 2016 for taking part in a Sunni Muslim group in the eastern city of Turkmenabat were freed at the end of their sentences, the exile Turkmen.news noted on 12 October. Atajan Imitjanovich Reyimow and Sultan Ahmetovich Bebitov were freed in summer 2022 after completing their full original prison terms and extra terms of five years added later. "This is a usual practice in Turkmen prisons: they accuse a prisoner that they do not want to release of attacking a guard or some other new crime and add a further term," Turkmen.news observed. It said Reyimow and Bebitov were apparently given the extra jail terms for refusing to collaborate with the Ministry of State Security (MSS) secret police. Another member of the group, Ahmet Ergeshevich Mirzayev, was released in late 2017 after completing his full five-year sentence. However, at least three members of the Muslim group are known to have died in prison. Lukman Yaylanov died in summer 2016, possibly as a result of torture, and Narkuly Baltayev several months later. Both men were in their thirties. Although the two men's bodies were handed over to their families for burial, relatives had to sign a document banning them from revealing what they saw. However, Baltayev's body showed that at death he weighed no more than 25 kilogrammes (55 pounds). In his lifetime he had been a large man. Aziz Gafurov – who was in his mid-thirties - died in the top-security Ovadan-Depe prison in summer 2017. His thin body - returned for burial to relatives in his home village near Turkmenabat - was covered in bruises. Other members of the group are said to have attempted suicide because of the torture and harsh prison conditions, Turkmen.news noted. It said prison guards mocked them, asking where Allah was and why he did not help them. Still no alternative civilian service Turkmenistan offers no alternative to its compulsory military service. Military service for men between the ages of 18 and 27 is generally two years. Article 58 of the 2016 Constitution describes defence as a "sacred duty" of everyone and states that military service is compulsory for men. Jehovah's Witnesses are conscientious objectors to military service and do not undertake any kind of activity supporting any country's military. But they are willing to undertake an alternative, totally civilian form of service, as is the right of all conscientious objectors to military service under international human rights law. Turkmenistan has ignored repeated international calls, for example by the UN Human Rights Committee, to introduce a genuine civilian alternative to compulsory military service, to stop prosecuting and punishing conscientious objectors, and to compensate those it has punished. Conscientious objectors not currently jailed, but still summoned to conscription offices All 16 conscientious objector prisoners of conscience (all of them Jehovah's Witnesses) were freed in a prisoner amnesty on 8 May 2021. Fifteen of them were freed from the two labour camps in Seydi in Lebap Region and one from the Temporary Detention Centre in Dashoguz. The 16 freed conscientious objectors were included in the amnesty at the initiative of the authorities and no bribes were paid. Nor were they pressured to swear any oaths or submit to any other obligation to gain release. All had to report to the police within three days of arriving home. No conscientious objectors are known to have been convicted and punished since the release from prison of the 16 Jehovah's Witnesses under amnesty in May 2021. Nor are any criminal cases known to have been launched. However, Military Conscription Offices have continued to summon young Jehovah's Witnesses, including in the autumn 2022 call-up, Jehovah's Witnesses told Forum 18. Some of these young men have submitted written statements on their religious-based refusal to serve in the military and their readiness to undertake a civilian alternative service, were one to be offered. However, Military Conscription Offices have continued to summon young Jehovah's Witnesses, including in the autumn 2022 call-up, Jehovah's Witnesses told Forum 18. Some of these young men have submitted written statements on their religious-based refusal to serve in the military and their readiness to undertake a civilian alternative service, were one to be offered. UN again says jailing conscientious objectors violates their rights On 9 June, the United Nations Human Rights Committee published its Decision that the regime had violated the rights of yet another former jailed conscientious objector, Arslan Begenchow (CCPR/C/134/D/3272/2018). When sentenced in Charjew District in the eastern Lebap Region to one year's imprisonment in January 2018, Begenchow was the first conscientious objector to be sentenced to prison since 2014. He lodged a case to the UN Human Rights Committee on 20 June 2018, while he was still in prison. Arslan Begenchow (Source: Jehovah's Witnesses) Begenchow continued to face harassment after his release from prison in January 2019. On 23 February 2019, Charjew District Police summoned him and questioned him about his religious beliefs. An officer then took Begenchow to his home, seized his electronic tablet and personal notebook and escorted him back to the police station. On 10 May 2019, Charjew District Court fined Begenchow 200 Manats (one week's average wage) under Administrative Code Article 76, Part 1 ("Violation of the Religion Law"). On 20 May 2019, he appealed against the decision. On 24 May 2019, Charjew District Court responded, claiming that he had missed the deadline for lodging the appeal. In its 2022 Decision on Begenchow's case, the Human Rights Committee found that "imprisoning him as punishment for refusing to perform military service amounts to arbitrary detention" in violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It pointed out that "deprivation of liberty as punishment for the legitimate exercise of a right protected under the Covenant, including freedom of religion and conscience as guaranteed by article 18 of the Covenant, is ipso facto arbitrary in nature". The Human Rights Committee also found that the decision to place Begenchow in pre-trial detention in January 2018 "without a need to do so" had violated his rights, given that he had not tried to abscond. "The Committee notes that neither the Office of the Prosecutor nor any other law enforcement officers stated why it was necessary to have detained [Begenchow], or whether alternatives to deprivation of liberty had been considered in [Begenchow's] case." The Human Rights Committee noted that states are required "to make full reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated. Accordingly, the State party is obligated, inter alia, to expunge [Begenchow's] criminal record and to provide him with adequate compensation, including by reimbursing any legal costs incurred by [Begenchow]. The State party is also under an obligation to take steps to prevent similar violations from occurring in the future." The Human Rights Committee expressed regret that Turkmenistan had failed to respond to three requests for its comments on Begenchow's case. It pointed out that under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Turkmenistan "is required to submit to the Committee written explanations or statements clarifying the matter and indicating the measures, if any, that have been taken by the State to remedy the situation". The Human Rights Committee has now issued 14 Decisions in favour of 16 conscientious objectors from Turkmenistan, all of them Jehovah's Witnesses. In its most recent previous such Decision, published in September 2019 (CCPR/C/126/D/2302/2013), the Human Rights Committee ruled that the right to freedom of religion or belief of former conscientious objectors Juma Nazarov, Yadgarbek Sharipov, and Atamurad Suvhanov had been violated by their jailing. Nazarov and Sharipov were jailed in 2012, and Suvhanov (for the second time) in 2013. The men had lodged their Human Rights Committee appeals in August 2013. In none of these cases of the 16 formerly jailed conscientious objectors has the regime expunged their criminal record or provided compensation, despite the UN Human Rights Committee's calls. Further UN complaint over jailed conscientious objectors pending Another complaint is pending with the United Nations. On 20 May 2020, Jehovah's Witnesses filed a complaint with the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention on behalf of 19 convicted conscientious objectors. Of the 19 men, 8 were imprisoned at that time in Seydi Labour Camp, while 11 had been released after serving earlier sentences. New Criminal Code retains punishments for conscientious objection Since the current Criminal Code came into force in July 2010, those unable to undertake military service on grounds of conscience have faced prosecution under Criminal Code Article 219. Criminal Code Article 219, Part 1 punishes refusal to serve in the armed forces in peacetime with a maximum penalty of two years' imprisonment or two years' corrective labour. Criminal Code Article 219, Part 2 punishes refusal to serve in the armed forces in peacetime "by means of inflicting injury to oneself, or by simulation of illness, by means of forgery of documents, or other fraudulent ways". Punishment is a jail term of one to four years. The regime adopted a new Criminal Code on 17 April 2022, which was officially published in government newspapers on 22 April. The new Code comes into force on 1 January 2023. In the new Criminal Code, Parts 1 and 2 of Article 219 are transferred unchanged to Parts 1 and 2 of Article 243. Article 243 of the new Criminal Code adds an extra Part 3, which punishes refusal to perform military service in wartime with a jail sentence of between 3 and 10 years. Other provisions of new Criminal Code The new Criminal Code which comes into force on 1 January 2023 continues to include almost unchanged an Article punishing "Obstructing the legal activity of religious organisations" (Article 154 in the current Criminal Code, Article 152 in the new). Forum 18 is unaware of any officials or individuals being punished under this Article. The new Criminal Code also continues to include almost unchanged an Article punishing "Illegally creating public or other organisations or participation in their activity" (Article 212.1 in the current Criminal Code, Article 232 in the new). This broadly-framed Article not only punishes creating political, religious or other organisations calling for violence or the overthrow of the regime, it also punishes creating such organisations "inciting in individuals a desire to refuse to carry out their civil obligations or undertake other illegal actions". (END) © 2022 Forum 18 https://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2786

Strikes launched in retaliation for Istanbul bombing target ‘terrorist bases’, but civilian deaths reported by Kurdish officials People look at a site damaged by Turkish airstrikes in Hasakah province, Syria. Photograph: Baderkhan Ahmad/AP Turkey launched deadly airstrikes over northern regions of Syria and Iraq, the Turkish defence ministry said on Sunday, targeting Kurdish groups that Ankara holds responsible for last week’s bomb attack in Istanbul. Warplanes attacked bases belonging to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK), and the Syrian People’s Protection Units, or YPG, the ministry said in a statement, which was accompanied by images of F-16 jets taking off and footage of a strike from an aerial drone. The ministry cited Turkey’s right to self-defence under article 51 of the UN charter in launching an operation it called Claw-Sword late on Saturday. It said it was targeting areas “used as a base by terrorists in their attacks on our country”. Syrian Kurdish officials have alleged that civilian deaths were caused by the air attacks. The airstrikes came after a bomb rocked a bustling avenue in the heart of Istanbul on 13 November, killing six people and wounding more than 80 others. Turkish authorities blamed the attack on the PKK and its Syrian affiliate the YPG. The Kurdish militant groups have, however, denied involvement. Ankara and Washington both consider the PKK a terror group, but disagree on the status of the YPG. Under the banner of the Syrian Democratic Forces, the YPG has been allied with the US in the fight against Islamic State (IS) in Syria. The PKK has fought an armed insurgency in Turkey since 1984. The conflict has killed tens of thousands of people since then. After the strikes, the defence ministry posted a photo of an F-16 fighter plane with the phrase: “Payback time! The scoundrels are being held to account for their treacherous attacks.” The DHA news agency reported that F-16s took off from airfields in Malatya and Diyarbakır in southern Turkey while drones were launched from Batman. The ministry claimed that 89 targets were destroyed and a “large number” of what it designated “terrorists” were killed in strikes that ranged from Tall Rifat in north-west Syria to the Qandil Mountains in Iraq’s north-east. Turkey’s defence minister, Hulusi Akar, oversaw the airstrikes from an operations centre and congratulated the pilots and ground staff. “Our aim is to ensure the security of our 85 million citizens and our borders, and to retaliate for any treacherous attack on our country,” he said, according to a ministry statement. Akar claimed that a wide range of targets “were destroyed with great success”, including what he described as the “the so-called headquarters of the terrorist organisation”, without giving further details. Other Turkish officials responded to the attacks. The presidential spokesperson, İbrahim Kalın, tweeted a photograph of the Turkish flag with the comment “Payback time for Istiklal” a reference to the street where last week’s bombing happened. The airstrikes targeted Kobane, a strategic Kurdish-majority Syrian town near the Turkish border that Ankara had previously attempted to take in its plans to establish a “safe zone” along northern Syria. The Syrian Democratic Forces spokesperson, Farhad Shami, wrote in a tweet that two villages heavily populated with displaced people were under Turkish bombardment. He said the strikes had resulted in 11 civilian deaths and destroyed a hospital, a power plant and grain silos. In the Syrian town of Derik, which lies where the borders of Syria, Iraq and Turkey meet, the Associated Press found a burnt-out petrol station with destroyed buildings nearby. “There were Turkish airstrikes here, approximately five strikes,” said Abdulgafar Ali, an employee at the petrol station. “The bombardment caused mass destruction. It shut down the station completely and resulted in the killing and injuring of innocent civilians, who committed no sin.” The Women’s Protection Units, or YPJ, which is linked to the YPG, said the airstrikes targeted areas along the Turkey-Syria border including Kobane, Darbasiyah and Ain Issa. “The airstrikes are random that target the people,” the YPJ media office said in written response to the Associated Press. “The people who fought the Daesh terrorist organisation are now under attack by Turkish warplanes,” it said, using an Arabic acronym to refer to IS. The Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, an opposition war monitor, reported that the strikes had also hit Syrian army positions and that at least 12 had been killed, including SDF and Syrian soldiers. The observatory said about 25 airstrikes were carried out by Turkish warplanes on sites in the countryside near Aleppo, Raqqa and Hasakah. The Syrian defence ministry said several Syrian soldiers were killed in the northern Aleppo countryside and Hasakah province. Syrian state media had previously reported that three soldiers were killed. In neighbouring Iraq, officials of the Kurdistan regional government said at least 32 PKK militants had been killed in 25 air raids. The Kurdish-led authority in north-east Syria said on Saturday that if Turkey attacks, then fighters in the area would have “the right to resist and defend our areas in a major way that will take the region into a long war”. The SDF commander, Mazloum Abdi, called on people to remain at home and abide by security forces’ instructions. “We are making every effort to avoid a major catastrophe. If war erupts, all will be affected,” he tweeted. An SDF statement later said the attacks “will not remain unanswered. At the appropriate time and place, we will respond in a strong and effective manner.” Turkey’s state-run Anadolu news agency reported that a Turkish soldier and two police officers were later wounded in a rocket attack on the Öncüpınar border gate with Syria. It has emerged that the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, gave the order for the airstrikes as he was returning from the G20 meeting of world leaders in Indonesia on Thursday. The president’s office released images of Erdoğan being briefed on his plane by Akar. Later on Sunday, Erdoğan, accompanied by a clutch of officials including Akar, left Turkey for the World Cup opening ceremony in Qatar. Turkey has invaded northern Syria three times since 2016 and already controls some territories in the north. Earlier this year, Erdoğan threatened another military operation in the border area. Turkish forces launched a fresh ground and air operation, called Claw-Lock, against the PKK in northern Iraq in April. © 2022 Guardian News & Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved. (modern) Link to article: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/20/turkey-confirms-airstrikes-kurdish-groups-syria-iraq-bombing

The Holodomor commemoration came as President Vladimir V. Putin was accused of degrading Ukraine’s power grid to freeze the country into submission. Placing candles on Saturday at a memorial to honor the victims of the Holodomor, a famine engineered in 1932 by Joseph Stalin that killed millions of Ukrainians. Credit: Brendan Hoffman for The New York Times By Marc Santora and Cassandra Vinograd Nov. 26, 2022Updated 4:58 p.m. ET KYIV, Ukraine — When Joseph Stalin engineered a famine designed to break the will of Ukrainians opposed to the Kremlin’s farming policies, he turned the grain-rich breadbasket of Europe into a land of starvation, deprivation and death. Ninety years later, President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia has turned his missile arsenal on civilian infrastructure in an effort to shatter Ukrainian resolve and force Kyiv to bend to his will, leaving millions in darkness and cold, threatening access to clean water and compromising the nation’s health care system. But when Ukrainians across the country lit candles at 4 p.m. on Saturday to mark the 90th anniversary of the Holodomor, which means “death by hunger” in Ukrainian, President Volodymyr Zelensky vowed that Ukrainians would not allow history to repeat itself. “Once they wanted to destroy us with hunger, now — with darkness and cold,” he said. “We cannot be broken. Our fire will not go out. We will conquer death again.” This time, he said, the world would not be silent. Mr. Zelensky was joined by European leaders in the gilded halls of Mariinsky Palace, the ceremonial home of the president of Ukraine that was commissioned by the Empress Elizabeth Petrovna of Russia in 1744, to announce a new “grain from Ukraine” initiative, using the potent symbolism of the day to pledge to support nations struggling to feed their people. “Even as the country struggles with food shortages, devastated farmland and widespread blackouts, we will never forget our role as a responsible global citizen, especially having experienced famine as a nation ourselves,” Mr. Zelensky said. Salvaging belongings and clearing debris from a residential building hit by Russian missiles this week in Vyshhorod, Ukraine. Credit: Brendan Hoffman for The New York Times At least 20 nations have pledged more than $150 million to fund the effort to deliver 60 Ukrainian vessels loaded with grain to some of the world’s poorest countries next year to feed roughly one million people. That includes Hungary, which has frustrated its NATO allies by remaining friendly with the Kremlin. But on Saturday, President Katalin Novak became the highest Hungarian official to travel to Ukraine since Russia invaded in February — an apparent effort to shed the country’s image as Europe’s weak link in an otherwise united front against Russian aggression. The visit by Ms. Novak came just days before the European Union was scheduled to make a final decision on whether to release billions in frozen funding for Hungary. She noted that Hungary had “150,000 reasons” to support Ukraine, a reference to the country’s ethnic Hungarian population. “I am horrified by what is happening in our neighborhood,” she said, noting that Mr. Putin’s responsibility for the war was “crystal clear.” But it was Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki of Poland and Prime Minister Ingrida Simonyte of Lithuania who drew a clear connection between the events of the past and what Mr. Morawiecki called the “imperial terror” of this war. “If we allow Putin to continue, he will become the Stalin of the 21st century,” he said. Ms. Simonyte said that far too few people knew the history of the Holodomor, and that it was the duty of the world’s nations to stop Russia’s “grotesque plans” to commit another genocide of the Ukrainian people. Leaders and scholars in Eastern and Central Europe have long lamented that the West lacks a full appreciation of the Soviet crimes in the region stretching from Lithuania to Ukraine, a swath of territory that the Yale historian Timothy Snyder labeled the “Bloodlands” for the sheer scale of the suffering inflicted on the people there in the 20th century. Jostling for food handouts in Kherson, Ukraine, this month. Credit: Finbarr O'Reilly for The New York Times That history was also obscured by Soviet rule, which made discussion of the crimes of Stalin — and the Holodomor specifically — taboo. But there is now widespread scholarly agreement that the Holodomor, which spread in Kazakhstan, through southern Russia and across Ukraine, was an orchestrated event designed by Stalin that started in 1932 and ended 22 months later with millions dead. “Survival was a moral as well as a physical struggle,” Mr. Snyder wrote in his groundbreaking book on the period. “The good people died first. Those who refused to steal or to prostitute themselves died. Those who gave food to others died. Those who refused to eat corpses died. Those who refused to kill their fellow man died. Parents who resisted cannibalism died before their children did.” The United States is among the 17 nations that recognize the Holodomor as an act of genocide, and Mr. Zelensky urged other nations to follow suit. While it was forbidden to be spoken about publicly in Ukraine for years, a survey this month by the Rating Sociological Group found that some 93 percent of Ukrainians agreed with the statement that the Holodomor was genocide of the Ukrainian people. “Different historians call different numbers of victims, but either way, all of them are shocking,” Mr. Zelensky said. He added that every Ukrainian had someone in the National Memory Book of victims. “We remember the stories of those who managed to survive these horrors, truly vivid memories,” he said. “How you can be shot for a hidden bowl of grain or flour. How a large family shares a loaf of bread for a week. How it is a soup from two rotten potatoes to eat the whole day. How in the morning there is no strength to even live and open your eyes. How it is hard to fall asleep at night because you just want to eat. How exhausted people fall dead on the road.” Today, with soldiers huddled in freezing trenches, nationwide missile attacks on critical infrastructure, daily shelling tearing apart towns and cities stretching across a 600-mile front line and millions struggling to stay warm, Ukrainian officials sought to use the shared suffering of the past to inspire endurance today — including for those now living under Russian occupation. A funeral in Kyiv on Saturday for a Ukrainian soldier who was killed in action fighting in eastern Ukraine. Credit: Brendan Hoffman for The New York Times Petro Andriushchenko, an exiled adviser to the mayor of the occupied city of Mariupol, said that Russian forces destroyed the monument honoring the victims of the Holodomor even as hundreds of people now had to resort to lining up for bread. “As in the past century, the Russians continue to destroy Ukrainians and destroy them with hunger,” he said. Amid the hardship, there were glimmers of recovery. For the first time since Russian soldiers blew up much of the infrastructure in the southern Kherson region as they departed two weeks ago, the authorities said on Saturday that the electricity supply had been restored. That still left more than six million households without power after another deadly barrage of Russian airstrikes this past week that further damaged an already battered national grid. That was down from 12 million on Wednesday evening, the day of the strikes, Mr. Zelensky said. Ukraine has struggled to restore power, as weeks of Russian strikes have degraded its infrastructure, making repairs progressively harder as the destruction piled up. The waves of Russian assaults have left about 40 percent of Ukraine’s critical energy infrastructure damaged or destroyed, officials say — with some sites hit at least five or six times. The national energy utility, Ukrenergo, said on Saturday that the grid could now meet 75 percent of the country’s consumption needs. In a statement posted on Facebook, it urged Ukrainians to continue conserving energy. Repairing a transformer this month at an electrical substation damaged by a Russian missile strike in central Ukraine. Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s energy grid are taking a growing toll on the nation. Credit: Brendan Hoffman for The New York Times But one could sense tensions rising in the capital, which has been particularly hard hit by the latest wave of blackouts. Mr. Zelensky has championed a national drive to create “Points of Invincibility,” thousands of makeshift centers that would provide basic services — electricity, internet access, heat, water and more — in the event of prolonged blackouts. But on Saturday he expressed some frustration over the pace of getting the sites up and running. He singled out the capital and its mayor, Vitali Klitschko, in particular, though he did not mention him by name, saying that some of the sites “still need to be improved, to put it mildly.” “Kyiv residents need more protection,” he said in his nightly address. “I expect quality work from the mayor’s office.” He added, “Please be more serious.” Mr. Klitschko did not immediately respond. © 2022 The New York Times Company

Dr. Stanton debates former State Dept. Legal Advisor John Bellinger on immunity of Saudi Prince MBS for murder and torture of Jamal Kashoggi credit: PBSNewshour To view program segment click on image or here. Full transcript of PBS Newshour debate between John Bellinger and Gregory Stanton regarding State Department opinion that Mohammed Bin Salman has immunity from civil suits in US by PBS Newhour The State Department issued a legal opinion that said Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has immunity from U.S. Courts. The prince has been sued by the fiancée of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, who was murdered and dismembered in Saudi Arabia’s Istanbul consulate. John Bellinger and Gregory Stanton joined Amna Nawaz to discuss the opinion. Amna Nawaz: The State Department issued a legal opinion yesterday that said Saudi Arabia's crown prince and prime minister, Mohammed bin Salman, known as MBS, has immunity from U.S. courts. The crown prince has been sued in the U.S. by the fiance of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. He was murdered in Saudi's Istanbul consulate in 2018. And U.S. intelligence believes MBS ordered the killing. Meantime, for months, the Biden administration has been pushing Saudi Arabia to increase oil production amid high gas prices. So, should the U.S. have been tougher with Saudi Arabia? For that, we get two views. John Bellinger was the legal adviser to the State Department during the George W. Bush administration. And Gregory Stanton is a former State Department lawyer and founder and president of Genocide Watch, a nonprofit that seeks to stop genocide and its perpetrators. 4 Welcome to you both. Thank you for being here. Gregory Stanton, Genocide Watch: Thank you. Amna Nawaz: Let's jump right in. Greg, what do you make of this call by the U.S.? Was this the right decision? Gregory Stanton: I think the State Department got this wrong. The fact is that the law here is the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of the United States. And in the opinion they gave, they only cited customary international law. In fact, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act has a number of exceptions that have been actually passed by Congress and signed into law. The 2008 Defense Act was accompanied with an exception to allow people to sue certain governments that were declared to be terrorist states. But then, in 2016, there was another act passed, the Justice for Victims of Terrorists Act, that specifically takes away the need for the State Department to designate a country as a terrorist country. And it makes it possible to actually sue anybody involved in murder, in torture, in hijacking, and in hostage-taking. Amna Nawaz: You think this should have fit under that exception? Gregory Stanton: I think that it's very clear that MBS was responsible for the murder and for the terror — the torture of Jamal Khashoggi. Amna Nawaz: Let me bring in John on that point, then. I mean, President Biden has said — and he did agree with the CIA assessment that MBS did order the operation that led to Khashoggi's killing. So why issue immunity in a murder case? John Bellinger III, Former Legal Adviser of the Department of State: Well, I think, for the reasons you just mentioned, this was a very uncomfortable, if not unpalatable decision for the Biden administration to have to make, given the really awful circumstances of the killing of — for Jamal Khashoggi. But the administration was simply complying with its obligations under international law. International law recognizes that heads of state in government, like now Prime Minister bin Salman, enjoy immunity from civil suits or, in fact, from criminal prosecutions in the courts of other countries. So, under international law, he had immunity here. And, for that reason, going back decades, every administration has asserted immunity on behalf of any foreign head of state who was sued here in the United States, often for really horrific actions. When I was legal adviser at the State Department, I had to sign an immunity determination for Pope Benedict, who was sued with respect to the clergy scandal. So this was not a favor to Saudi Arabia. This was simply compelled by international law. Amna Nawaz: Greg, what do you say to that, decades of precedent here? Gregory Stanton: I think the reason that that doesn't hold here is that MBS is not the head of state in Saudi Arabia. Amna Nawaz: He is prime minister, right? Gregory Stanton: Well, they just made him prime minister. So he might be able to argue this point. But the fact is, the head of state in Saudi Arabia is the king. This is just a prince. So, the only one who would have this right under the international law would be the king. Amna Nawaz: What would be the U.S. options in this case? What would you have liked to see happen? Gregory Stanton: What I would have liked to see is that he could be sued, and that is specifically allowed under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and its exceptions. He's not being tried criminally here. This is a lawsuit to get compensation for the murder of a man, a very great man, in fact. So, for me, this is not a case where it was governed by international law at all. It was governed by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Amna Nawaz: John, what about the concerns that there could be political considerations here? We know about the tensions. We know about the Biden administration asking them to increase oil production. Could that have influenced the decision? John Bellinger III: Candidly, I think the political considerations would have gone the other way. I think the Biden administration was probably so angry with Saudi Arabia right now and really upset about this particular killing that their policy view would have been not to find immunity. But international law provides that a head of government like this, as well as a head of state, as well as foreign ministers, enjoy immunity. And, unfortunately, with respect to what Mr. Stanton said, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act does not apply in circumstances like this. The Supreme Court held a few years ago that the immunity of heads of state or government is governed by international law. So, I think the Biden administration here, perhaps, in fact, looking back at things that happened during the Trump administration, said, we want to comply with international law, do what the United States regularly does, even though it's unpalatable in these circumstances. Amna Nawaz: Could the U.S. have not done anything? Could they have not given their opinion to the Justice Department? Gregory Stanton: Exactly. Amna Nawaz: OK. Gregory Stanton: There is no requirement, under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, that the State Department has to give an opinion to the Justice Department. Amna Nawaz: And that would mean that he could then still be sued; is that correct? Gregory Stanton: That's correct. He could be. It's really up to the judge. In other words, this is a judicial decision. It didn't have to be an opinion from the State Department. And I, as I have already said, think the State Department got this wrong. And not only that. There was a Supreme Court case in 2010 in which Justice Stevens held and the court decided unanimously that foreign officials do not qualify for sovereign immunity. And that is why this is, I think, a misapplication of law. Amna Nawaz: John, at the end of the day, what does this mean, then? If he is now shielded from any kind of suit, what does this mean for any accountability for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi? John Bellinger III: Well, this is really the concern. When someone can't be sued, then the argument is, the person has impunity or there's not accountability. It doesn't mean that at all. And, in fact, the Biden administration went to great pains to state in their legal brief that we condemn the killing, it was wrong, it was heinous, but simply observing international law here, Mohammed bin Salman had immunity in these courts, but there would be other ways to hold him accountable, just not in the courts of the United States, if the U.S. is going to comply with our longstanding obligations under international law, and act the way we always have, which is to recognize the immunity of foreign heads of state, as we expect, candidly, other states to treat our head of state in their courts. Amna Nawaz: It's certainly another layer on a very complicated relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Gregory Stanton, John Bellinger, thank you both so much for being here. John Bellinger III: Thank you. Gregory Stanton: Nice to be with you. POST DEBATE COMMENT BY DR. STANTON: I relished a debate with John Bellinger, the former State Department Legal Advisor. Mr. Bellinger is currently a partner and head of international law practice at Arnold and Porter, one of Washington, DC's leading law firms, which represents many large oil companies. He is also head of the international law section at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is a worthy adversary who always faithfully defends State Department legal opinions. The PBS NewsHour segment ended without any opportunity for me to respond to Mr. Bellinger's simplistic portrayal of "international law." Mr. Bellinger asserted that the State Department position was required by "international law." He ignored the fact that international law doesn't only consist of unwritten "customary international law". It also includes treaties and international conventions, decisions of the ICJ, and decisions of the UN Security Council. Among those conventions are the Genocide Convention and the Convention Against Torture. Both conventions prohibit immunity for anyone who commits those crimes, including heads of state. Our Torture Victims Protection Act, the law applied in the case the State Dept. gave its opinion about, specifically gives jurisdiction to US courts for civil claims against torturers or those who ordered the torture of anyone anywhere in the world. That’s called “universal jurisdiction.” The US, most of Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Senegal, and Argentina are states that have universal jurisdiction for crimes of genocide and for torture. That means anyone who sets foot in the US can be criminally prosecuted for genocide or torture, no matter where that person committed the crime. Neither the Genocide Convention nor the Torture Convention allow immunity for anybody, including heads of state, heads of government, prime ministers, or foreign ministers. MBS directed the genocide by bombing and starvation of hundreds of thousands of civilians in Yemen. The murder and torture he ordered of Jamal Kashoggi isn’t his most serious crime. MBS should be indicted, arrested, and tried for both torture and genocide the next time he sets foot in the United States or in any other country with universal jurisdiction. I will write an Op-ed to make that point. But it will be read by only a few readers compared to the audience for PBS NewsHour.

2022 Dhaka conference on recognition of the Bangladesh Genocide (left to right: Dr. Hoque, Dr. Stanton, moderator, Dr. Momen, Dr. Jarvis credit:bdnews.com Recognition of the Bangladesh Genocide by Tawheed Reza Noor In 1971, Bangladesh emerged as a new country after experiencing one of the most devastating genocides of the twentieth century. The massacres and material destruction of the Bangladesh Genocide were intentional and systematic. Renowned scholars have recognized the Bangladesh case as genocide. But to date only a few governments have done so. The genocide is omitted from most publications about genocide. 2021 was the golden jubilee of Bangladesh independence, as well as the 50th anniversary of the Bangladesh Genocide. In 2021, Tawheed Noor, son of the slain journalist Serajuddin Hossain, requested the recognition by the Lemkin Institute and Genocide Watch. The Liberation War Museum of Bangladesh requested the International Coalition of Sites of Conscience to publish its statement of recognition. In 2021 and 2022, three United States-based organizations, the Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention, Genocide Watch, and the International Coalition of Sites of Conscience recognized the atrocities committed by the Pakistani occupation force and their allies during Bangladesh’s liberation war in 1971 as genocide. The Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention said, “…the West Pakistan government, the center of political, military and administrative power in postcolonial Pakistan, perceived Bengalis as being influenced by Hindus, and therefore, not “true Muslims”. West Pakistan established discriminatory policies with the intent to destroy their cultural and national identity and impose on them a singular West Pakistan identity.” Identifying the Pakistani army as the key perpetrators, The Lemkin Institute also mentioned the local collaborators – such as Razakars, Al Badr and Al Shams– who were responsible for committing the atrocities following a systematic policy. Genocide Watch recognized the Bangladesh Genocide in detail in its Country Report on Bangladesh in 2016. In 2021, Genocide Watch repeated its recognition of the Bangladesh genocide. Genocide Watch declared: “Conclusive research by internationally recognized genocide experts indicates that the nature, scale and organization of the Pakistani Military operations demonstrates planning and intentional design by the Pakistani junta leadership and military command to destroy a substantial part of the Bengali ethnic and national group and a substantial part of the Bengali Hindu religious group.” Genocide Watch stated that the crimes committed against the Bengalis of East Pakistan during 1971 were widespread and systematic and had the specific intent to constitute genocide. Genocide Watch urged the member states of the United Nations, especially the US, the UK, and Pakistan, to recognize the crimes committed by Pakistani Military Forces in Bangladesh as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. It also demanded that surviving leaders of this genocide be prosecuted in national courts with universal jurisdiction. It called for proper reparations for these crimes from Pakistan to Bangladesh. The International Coalition of Sites of Conscience officially recognized the Bangladesh Genocide on 24 March 2022.The organization expressed its concern that lack of formal international recognition of the Bangladesh Genocide has meant that – fifty years later – no Pakistani war criminals have faced prosecution. The genocide also resulted in the forced displacement of millions of Bengalis to India. At least 200,000 Bengali women and men were victims of sexual violence, leaving them with lifelong trauma. A draft resolution recognizing the Bangladesh Genocide was submitted by Tawheed Noor in August 2021 to the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) and approved by the IAGS Resolutions Committee and Executive Board. On its initial presentation to the IAGS membership, a quorum was not obtained for passage, so the resolution has now been resubmitted to the IAGS for a vote of the membership. Many Bangladesh diaspora organizations have called for recognition of the Bangladesh genocide. During the 51st session of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), a discussion was organized in Geneva by the Europe-based diaspora organization Bangladesh Support Group (BASUG), in collaboration with European Bangladesh Forum (EBF) and Switzerland Human Rights Forum, Bangladesh. A distinguished panel discussed the Bangladesh Genocide and the importance of its recognition. Sanchita Haque, Deputy Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to the UN in Geneva, demanded recognition of the 1971 Genocide committed by Pakistan. BASUG and Projonmo ’71 (Platform for children of the martyrs of 1971), and Aamra Ekattor appealed to the UN Human Rights Council to issue a resolution recognizing the 1971 Bangladesh Genocide. On October 14, 2022, bipartisan legislation seeking formal recognition of the 1971 Bangladesh Genocide was introduced in the US House of Representatives by Congressman Steve Chabot and Congresswoman Ro Khanna. The US resolution titled “Recognizing the Bangladesh Genocide of 1971” calls for: · punishment under international law against war criminals in the Pakistan Army and their allies for the murder of 3 million people in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh); · the government of Pakistan to acknowledge its role in the genocide and to offer formal apologies to the government and people of Bangladesh; · the government of Pakistan to prosecute, in accordance with international law, any perpetrators who are still living. All these initiatives pay tribute to the innocent millions who were the victims of the Bangladesh Genocide. It is hoped that in the coming years other organizations and countries will recognize the Bangladesh Genocide.

Supreme Court hearing on landmark Indigenous adoption law sparks outcry. As the Supreme Court considers the Indian Child Welfare Act, activists fear loss of Native sovereignty. By Prachi Singh November 16, 2022 at 6:33 pm PST Demonstrators stand outside of the U.S. Supreme Court, as the court hears arguments over the Indian Child Welfare Act, Wednesday, Nov. 9, 2022, in Washington. (Photo courtesy of AP Photos) It was a landmark federal law protecting Native American children from being placed into non-Native families that compelled Erika Salinas, a Ph.D. candidate at USC, to pursue her research into the Indian Child Welfare Act, also known as ICWA. Salinas, who is Native American, had seen firsthand the impact of the Act growing up, when her parents had become ICWA foster parents. So when the United States Supreme Court took up a case earlier this month that carried the potential to strike the act down, it alarmed her. Separating children from their tribes can cause a loss of connection to the community, she said, and a loss of familial ties. “There are various studies that show the positive impact of [American Indian and Alaska Native] youth being connected to their culture — some examples being lower rates of depression, substance use, and delinquent behavior,” Salinas said. Under the IWCA, if more than one tribe has an interest in the Native American child, a court is called upon to determine which tribe has more significant contact with the children. American Indian and Alaska Native children, she said, “are able to maintain a connection to their family, tribe, community, and culture,” even if they’re placed in a different tribe. The Supreme Court last week heard oral arguments in the Brackeen v. Haaland case, in which plaintiffs argue existing law discriminates on the basis of race and does not consider the children’s needs. They say it harms the Native children and the non-Native families who want to provide a loving, safe environment for the kids. But activists have said overturning the IWCA would remove a “gold standard” in child welfare policy and practice. The federal law, passed in 1978, was designed to prevent Native children from being taken from their homes and tribal communities and put into foster care. According to Salinas, this act preserves cultural and familial ties among American Indian and Alaska Native youth and families and encourages respect for tribal authority in decisions concerning the placement of Native American children in foster care. And she’s not alone. Jair Peltier, a PhD candidate studying tribal sovereignty and a cultural ambassador to the Native American Pasifika Student Lounge at USC, said reservations do have problems ranging from poverty to drug use that causes kids from the community to be put into the welfare system. “But for years and years and years, it was kind of being used as a tool to take Native children from their Native families and being put into white families,” Peltier said. “And it became a form of assimilation for these children being put into foster care. And so, [ICWA] was kind of designed to prevent that.” Ryder Jiron, who is the communications and policy coordinator for the Coalition to Stop Violence against Native Women, a survivor-led nonprofit, said that a Native foster parent will have an understanding of the importance of the kids’ culture and where they come from. “And if the resources are there, the opportunity to be going into the community, visiting the community, doing visitations with family who may not have gotten custody but are aware that they’re around or still have connections to them.” While growing up, Jiron had witnessed a few kids in his town being adopted out by non-Native parents and families and not being able to understand who they were. They would know they were Native, he said, but not understand what it meant and it could be harmful not recognizing the complexities of either their situation, identity or their cultural background. To Peltier, from The Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, who started studying tribal sovereignty wanting to solve problems of sovereignty and tribal constitutions, this is very concerning. According to him, if the Supreme Court agrees, then they would be potentially setting the groundwork to eliminate Indigenous sovereignty because it would completely dismantle all systems that have been in place that Native people have been treated differently because of their race. Tribal sovereignty had come into question not long ago when in the summer, the Supreme Court had held that all states have, as a matter of state sovereignty, the power to prosecute non-Indian crimes within Native lands. “So that’s the main issue because it’s not a racial thing,” Peltier said “Native people do not exist by virtue of a racial category. We exist by virtue of our historic and political realities.” © 2022 USC Annenberg Media https://www.uscannenbergmedia.com/2022/11/16/supreme-court-hearing-on-landmark-indigenous-adoption-law-sparks-outcry/

Thousands more people are fleeing their homes in eastern DRC amid fighting between M23 rebels and government forces. Residents don't believe that new talks in Kenya will bring peace. Kayembe camp first filled with people fleeing the eruption of the nearby Nyirangono volcano. Now they are fleeing armed rebels (© GUERCHOM NDEBO AFP | Getty Images) Members of the collective Goma Actif, which brings together artists, activists and businesspeople from Goma, have been helping those at Kayembe as best they can. They are distributing porridge and bread to the vulnerable — children, women who are pregnant and breastfeeding, and the elderly. "We are providing them with food so that they can hold out until major humanitarian organizations start helping them," Depaul Bakulu, one of Goma Actif's members told DW. Recent camp arrival Ange Matias told DW her family urgently needed food and shelter. "We haven't had anything from anyone except this porridge we receive every morning," she said. "The government has brought food to the other camps in [the territory] but not here to Kayembe. Attempts to restore peace to the eastern part of Congo will resume on November 21 in Kenya's capital, Nairobi. Former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, who is the facilitator of the East African Community-led talks, visited Goma on Tuesday after talks in the capital Kinshasa on Monday. In Goma, Kenyatta met with DRC authorities as well as community members of North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri, the three eastern provinces of the DRC and the regions most affected by ongoing violence. After visiting Kanyaruchinya camp, just 3 km (1.9 miles) from Kayember, Kenyatta appealed to the various rebel groups in DR Congo to put down their weapons as a prelude to the upcoming negotiations. "All these children, mothers and old people we have seen have become strangers in their country. Whatever our differences, ... let us have pity on them and stop the war before we start talking," he said. More than one hundred armed groups are thought to operate in DRC's east, according to Global Conflict Tracker. Talks in April between the Congolese government and armed groups failed to stop the resumption of fighting in eastern DRC, particularly between the Congolese army and the M23. The Congolese government has since refused to negotiate with the M23 group, which it describes as a Rwandan-backed "terrorist" movement, something Rwanda has denied several times. Conflict has ebbed and flowed in eastern Congo now for some 30 years. As such, many here don't have much faith in the ability of talks to improve the situation. Instead, they say, the army needs to be strengthened. "We believe that [when] our army is strong, we believe that our army is capable of putting an end to all these M23 adventurers,” said Kartumwa Sankara from the North Kivu-based civil society group LUCHA. "Nothing will come from Nairobi," he said. "So instead of talking, it is very important to focus on how we are going to end to the insecurity in the east." Patrick Mundeke from the Goma Actif collective had similar views, saying that "only a professional, trained, well-equipped, well-paid army" could prevent the ongoing violence. Goma resident Josue Wallay told DW that even if the various parties reached an agreement in Nairobi, people in North Kivu wouldn't benefit. "There have been signed agreements in the page, and none of them have been favorable to us," he said. "Rather the agreements destroy and continue to plunder our country's natural resources." Thousands of people marched in various Congolese cities on Thursday in a show of support for the army as it fights the rebels. Protests also took place in DRC's capital Kinshasa, the mining city of Lubumbashi, Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema and Bandundu provinces. © 2022 Deutsche Welle

By Jonathan Landay and Tom Balmforth KHERSON, Ukraine, Nov 16 (Reuters) - Residents in Ukraine's southern city of Kherson call the two-storey police station "The Hole". Vitalii Serdiuk, a pensioner, said he was lucky to make it out alive. "I hung on," the retired medical equipment repairman said as he recounted his ordeal in Russian detention two blocks from where he and his wife live in a tiny Soviet-era apartment. The green-roofed police building at No. 3, Energy Workers' Street, was the most notorious of several sites where, according to more than half a dozen locals in the recently recaptured city, people were interrogated and tortured during Russia's nine-month occupation. Another was a large prison. Two residents living in an apartment block overlooking the police station courtyard said they saw bodies wrapped in white sheets being carried from the building, stored in a garage and later tossed into refuse trucks to be taken away. Reuters could not independently verify all of the events described by the Kherson residents. The Kremlin and Russia's defence ministry did not immediately respond to questions about Serdiuk's account or that of others Reuters spoke to in Kherson. Moscow has rejected allegations of abuse against civilians and soldiers and has accused Ukraine of staging such abuses in places like Bucha. On Tuesday, the U.N. human rights office said it had found evidence that both sides had tortured prisoners of war, which is classified as a war crime by the International Criminal Court. Russian abuse was "fairly systematic", a U.N. official said. As Russian security forces retreat from large swathes of territory in the north, east and south, evidence of abuses is mounting. Those held in Kherson included people who voiced opposition to Russia's occupation, residents, like Serdiuk, believed to have information about enemy soldiers' positions, as well as suspected underground resistance fighters and their associates. Serdiuk said he was beaten on his legs, back and torso with a truncheon and shocked with electrodes wired to his scrotum by a Russian official demanding to know the whereabouts and unit of his son, a soldier in the Ukrainian army. "I didn't tell him anything. 'I don't know' was my only answer," the 65-year-old said in his apartment, which was lit by a single candle. 'Remember! Remember! Remember!' was the constant response." 'PURE SADISM' Grim recollections of life under occupation in Kherson have followed the unbridled joy and relief when Ukrainian soldiers retook the city on Friday after Russian troops withdrew across the Dnipro River. President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said two days later that investigators had uncovered more than 400 Russian war crimes and found the bodies of both servicemen and civilians in areas of Kherson region freed from Russian occupation. "I personally saw five bodies taken out," said Oleh, 20, who lives in an apartment block overlooking the police station, declining to give his last name. "We could see hands hanging from the sheets and we understood these to be corpses." Speaking separately, Svytlana Bestanik, 41, who lives in the same block and works at a small store between the building and the station, also recalled seeing prisoners carrying out bodies. "They would carry dead people out and would throw them in a truck with the garbage," she said, describing the stench of decomposing bodies in the air. "We were witnessing sadism in its purest form." Reuters journalists visited the police station on Tuesday but were prohibited from going beyond the courtyard, rimmed by a razor wire-topped wall, by armed police officers and a soldier who said that investigators were inside collecting evidence. One officer, who declined to give his name, said that up to 12 detainees were kept in tiny cages, an account corroborated by Serdiuk. Neighbours recounted hearing screams of men and women coming from the station and said that whenever the Russians emerged, they wore balaclavas concealing all but their eyes. "They came in the shop every day," said Bestanik. "I decided not to talk to them. I was too afraid of them." RESISTANCE FIGHTERS Aliona Lapchuk said she and her eldest son fled Kherson in April after a terrifying ordeal at the hands of Russian security personnel on March 27, the last time she saw her husband Vitaliy. Vitalii Serdiuk, 65, who says he was tortured by Russian service members, and his wife Olena speak during an interview with Reuters after Russia's retreat from Kherson, Ukraine, November 15, 2022. REUTERS/Valentyn Ogirenko Vitaliy had been an underground resistance fighter since Russian troops seized Kherson on March 2, according to Lapchuk, and she became worried when he did not answer her phone calls. Soon after, she said, three cars with the Russian "Z" sign painted on them pulled up at her mother's home where they were living. They brought Vitaliy, who was badly beaten. The soldiers, who identified themselves as Russian troops, threatened to smash out her teeth when she tried to berate them. They confiscated their mobile phones and laptops, she said, and then discovered weapons in the basement. They beat her husband in the basement savagely before dragging him out. "He didn't walk out of the basement; they dragged him out. They broke through his cheek bone," she said, sobbing, in the village of Krasne, some 100 km (60 miles) west of Kherson. Lapchuk and her eldest son, Andriy, were hooded and taken to the police station at 4, Lutheran Street, in Kherson where she could hear her husband being interrogated through a wall, she said. She and Andriy were later released. After leaving Kherson, Lapchuk wrote to everyone she could think of to try and find her husband. On June 9, she said she got a message from a pathologist who told her to call the next day. She knew immediately Vitaliy was dead. His body had been found floating in a river, she said, showing photographs taken by a pathologist in which a birth mark on his shoulder could be seen. Lapchuk said she paid for Vitaliy to be buried and has yet to see the grave. She is convinced her husband was betrayed to the Russians by someone very close to them. 'THE HOLE' Ruslan, 52, who runs a beer store opposite the police station where Serdiuk was held, said that at the beginning of the occupation, Russian-made Ural trucks would pull up daily before the grey front door. Detainees, he said, would be hurled from the back, their hands bound and heads covered by bags. "This place was called 'Yama' (The Hole)," he said. Serhii Polako, 48, a trader who lives across the street from the station, echoed Ruslan's account. He said that several weeks into the occupation, Russian national guard troops deployed at the site were replaced by men driving vehicles embossed with the letter "V", and that was when the screams started. "If there is a hell on earth, it was there," he said. About two weeks ago, he said, the Russians freed those being kept in the station in apparent preparation for their withdrawal. "All of a sudden, they emptied the place, and we understood something was happening," he told Reuters. Serdiuk believes he was betrayed by an informant as the father of a Ukrainian serviceman. He said Russian security personnel handcuffed him, put a bag over his head, forced him to bend at the waist and frog-marched him into a vehicle. At the station, he was put in a cell so cramped that the occupants could not move while lying down. On some days, prisoners received only one meal. The following day, he was hooded, his hands bound, and taken down to a cellar room. The interrogation and torture lasted about 90 minutes, he said. His Russian interrogator knew all of his details and those of his family, and said that unless he cooperated, he would have his wife arrested and telephone his son so he could hear both of them screaming under torture, Serdiuk said. Two days later, he was released without explanation. His wife found him outside the shop in which Bestanik works, virtually unable to walk. © 2022 Reuters. All rights reserved

To view webinar click here Dr. Stanton's speech, "The New Nazism" is at 4:14 in the YouTube recording. The text of Dr. Stanton's speech is also published below. The New Nazism by Dr. Gregory Stanton Founding President, Genocide Watch November 17, 2022 I will begin with the old University of Chicago football cheer: "Define your terms!" What is Fascism? Fascism has eight essential attributes: Racism. Nationalism. Religious intolerance. Male chauvinism. Reliance on violence. Opposition to democracy. State supremacy. Rejection of universal human rights. Nazism and its state-fascist communist variant are not opposites. They are twin brothers. The so-called left-right spectrum is a systematically misleading expression. The political spectrum is really a circle, with one axis, openness to change, and the other axis, tolerance for liberty. I do not accept the Marxist theory that capitalism is the origin of fascism. In fact, state-fascist Marxist communist states have murdered millions more people than nations with capitalist economies. I also reject the Leninist theory that only capitalism results in imperialism. In fact, the only remaining classical empires are the Russian Empire, a post-communist empire, and the Chinese Empire, a communist empire. Nazis, communists, colonialists, religious zealots, and My-Country-First nationalists have no tolerance for liberty. They are freedom's foes. They drag whole nations down into the dark dungeons of tyranny. Nazism replaced the Christian religion with worship of the Nazi party and the state. Nazis made genocide state policy. The Holocaust murdered six million Jews and another six million Roma, Slavs, homosexuals, and other "inferior races." Communism replaced the worship of God with worship of the communist party and the state. Intolerant atheism became the communist state religion. When Adolf Hitler's Nazi Regime, Mussolini's Fascists, and Japan's Empire were defeated in 1945, many hoped that Nazism and Fascism were vanquished. But it took years for Spain's Franco and the racist colonial empires of Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal to fall. The most murderous of all genocidal empires, the state-fascist Soviet Union, lasted until 1991. It murdered sixty million people. The second most deadly empire, Communist China slaughtered over forty million people. Maoism's variant in Cambodia murdered two million, a quarter of the Cambodian people. North Korea murdered millions more. It began by murdering five hundred thousand Christians and continues to send all Christians to its vast gulag. America still supports genocidal monarchs and dictators in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Central America. Today Fascist and Communist regimes again rule half the people of the world. And they are gaining. China commits genocide against Tibetans and Uyghurs with impunity. It has built a high-tech totalitarian world with cameras, artificial intelligence, and facial recognition that George Orwell could only imagine. Russia's Putin is destroying entire Ukrainian cities and murdering and forcibly displacing their people in a new form of genocide, Urbicide, the intentional destruction of cities, substantial parts of the Ukrainian nation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates destroy Yemeni cities with American Raytheon smart bombs and finance jihadist Islam while controlling Islam's holiest places. Turkey bombs northern Iraq and Syria in its genocidal campaign against Kurds. Iran sponsors terrorists around the world and declares its intent to destroy Israel. India's Modi and his BJP exclude Muslims from their Hindutva program to convert India into a Hindu state. Here in America, Donald Trump's attempted coup d'état came close to destroying American democracy. Trump preaches racism, hatred and fear of Muslims, division of Americans into true patriots and traitors. His narcissistic personality disorder created the Big Lie that he did not lose the 2020 election. He has trapped the Republican Party into a cult of personality addicted to election denial. Now Trump, the Mussolini of Mar-a-Lago, has announced that he will again run for President. His jaw-dropping arrogance is equaled only by the cowardice of the US Department of Justice, which hasn't even indicted him for his crimes. Trump will continue to dominate the news, rejoin Twitter, and campaign for election-denying Republicans, rather than rot in prison where he belongs. Make no mistake about it. The leaders of these fascist movements are the new Nazis. They are racists dedicated to the triumph of their own race or religion: Chinese, Russian, Sunni, Shi'a, Hindu, or White. They are nationalists who deny the human rights of anyone who doesn't belong to their nation. Nationalism is racism on steroids. This combination of racism and nationalism is at the heart of Nazism. It is the ammonium nitrate mixed with fuel oil that, when ignited by hatred, explodes into war and genocide. Today we declare that we oppose all tyranny. We will fight the rise of the new Nazism, the new Fascism. And we will fight all war and genocide. We will fight everywhere for freedom of religion, expression, and control over our bodies, ourselves, and our destinies. The freedom we fight for is freedom for every human soul. We will fight with soul force, the sacred force that the Buddha, the Hebrew prophets, Ashoka, Jesus, Mohammed, Mahatma Gandhi, and Martin Luther King, Jr. taught us is the most powerful force on earth. That soul force is the Force of Love and Justice. We are fighting the darkness in every human heart. But we affirm the light in every human mind. In each newborn baby's brain, there are as many neural connections as all the stars in the Milky Way. In each of us is the stuff of the stars. Each of us was created by the Force that created the Universe. Love is God's Force personally expressed. Justice is God's Force socially expressed. As a five-foot-tall Babushka (grandmother) told me in 1991 as she pulled me down by the lapels to look me in the eye at an Orthodox church in Kyiv after I had spoken to 5000 people in the Maidan with Stepan Khmara and the leaders of Rukh, the Ukrainian independence movement: "We will win. Because it is God's work."

COUNCIL on FOREIGN RELATIONS by Joshua Kurlantzick November 15, 2022 President Biden's attendance marks an important development in the U.S.-ASEAN relationship, but ASEAN continues to prove ineffective in addressing the region's most pressing issues. U.S. President Joe Biden poses with other leaders during the 2022 ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, November 12, 2022. Kevin Lamarque/Reuters Last week, President Biden attended the ASEAN summit in Cambodia, which is currently chair of the regional organization, and also held a U.S.-ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh. The U.S.-ASEAN summit did serve some important purposes. Just showing up in Asia, as nearly every pundit has noted, is important, demonstrating face time for Southeast Asian leaders that many former U.S. presidents of both parties have failed to do. While the president reportedly seemed tired during his visit to the ASEAN summit, as he was amid a grueling travel schedule, he pushed forward some minor initiatives with ASEAN. These included the launch of a comprehensive strategic partnership between ASEAN and the United States (which was unveiled before the summit) and some other joint efforts to bolster electric vehicle usage in the region, support female entrepreneurs, and other plans. But, as expected, Biden did not achieve any sort of consensus with ASEAN leaders about pushing back against China’s growing maritime assertiveness—Cambodia, China’s closest partner in the region, defanged any real public discussion of the topic. There are certainly countries in Southeast Asia that are seeking greater strategic ties with the United States, as fear of China’s assertiveness, coercion, and authoritarianism at home is rising: The Philippines is rapidly rebuilding its strategic relationship with the United States after the backsliding of the Duterte years. Indonesia also has moved slightly more toward the United States, and Vietnam and Singapore already were close U.S. partners. But ASEAN as a whole will never confront China, since there are already too many countries within the organization that are shifting toward Beijing, and the organization simply will not alienate its most important trading partner. As Phelim Kine of Politico has noted, the prior U.S-ASEAN Special Summit, held in Washington in May, produced little in the way of concrete deliverables, and many ASEAN states see the Biden administration’s regional economic plan, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, as a bunch of talk with few concrete actions—especially if the United States does not include expanding market access as part of IPEF. Biden also made little public progress on getting ASEAN to take a tougher line toward the brutal Myanmar junta, which has overseen an ongoing civil war, economic collapse, vast rights abuses, and a slide into failed state status. ASEAN operates by consensus and, though some leaders like Indonesian president Joko Widodo want to bar Myanmar from all future ASEAN meetings unless it agrees to ASEAN’s already-stale five-point consensus for ameliorating the conflict, ASEAN could not even agree on that step. Instead, as Bloomberg reported, “ASEAN…came out with a more neutral statement to say it will review Myanmar’s representation at ASEAN meetings ‘if the situation so requires.’” In its own summit, ASEAN did at least take one positive step forward, admitting Timor-Leste, which, against all odds, has become probably the most robust democracy in the region. But ASEAN’s Myanmar policy is just disastrous, and the summit did nothing to push it forward. The five-point Myanmar consensus is now useless, more than a year into civil war, and with the junta clearly willing to hold on, stonewall the world, and try to paint over its abuses with what will surely be a flawed “election” next year. Even if implemented, it would do nothing at this point to facilitate real political dialogue or mitigate the humanitarian collapse in Myanmar. Yet ASEAN refuses to move beyond it, showing that the organization as a whole just does not really care what happens in Myanmar. ASEAN also continues to go nowhere real in creating a Code of Conduct on the South China Sea with Beijing, and the tensions over these two elements, as well as other fissures, are driving the organization apart and may well lead individual ASEAN states to pursue more aggressive bilateral policies toward Myanmar—a sign of the organization’s faltering abilities. Copyright 2022 @ COUNCIL on FOREIGN RELATIONS

By Tom Shacklock This piece was first published as a three-part blog series on The Call, a Genocide Watch blog site. Part 1: Why Recognition Matters for Peace and Security Part 2: False Dichotomies Between Conflict and Genocidal Violence Part 3: False Equivalences and Asymmetric Victimization First published by The Call on June 28, 2022. Banyamulenge men at a herder's funeral. (ALEXIS HUGUET/AFP via Getty Images) Part 1: Why Recognition Matters for Peace and Security Since 2017, the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has witnessed some of the region’s worst violence since the Congo Wars (1996-2003). In the Plateaux region of South Kivu province, a coalition of militias has been fighting armed groups representing the Banyamulenge, a Tutsi community. This violence has been conventionally framed as “intercommunal conflict,” though certain academics and organizations have recognized the anti-Banyamulenge violence as genocidal. More neutral stances on this crisis emphasize its complexities while also reflecting differing views about the term “genocide.” In the field of genocide studies and prevention, there exists a tension between positions that reserve the term for clearer cases of extermination, to prevent its devaluation, and more critical stances that broaden its applicability, usually to situations that raise existential concerns for vulnerable populations. Given these divergent perspectives, this blog series does not focus on explaining the interpretation of a Banyamulenge genocide. Instead, it problematizes narratives that oppose or avoid this interpretation or downplay dynamics that inform it, highlighting arguments on the crisis that represent potential false dichotomies between genocide and complex violence and situating its asymmetries within its complexities. This analysis could have implications for certain shifts needed in interventions tackling this crisis. There are numerous reasons why international actors may choose to maintain neutrality in this context. Appearing biased towards groups risks compromising their peacebuilding or humanitarian work. Similarly, humanitarian organizations have discussed the politicization of aid in Ethiopia. Yet, given these limitations, the narratives they present publicly and the locations they focus on are not necessarily a comprehensive reflection of this crisis. Furthermore, complete neutrality has in many contexts been problematic. Samantha Powell argued that United States (U.S.) diplomacy in pre-genocide Rwanda displayed a “bias toward states and negotiations” and a reluctance to disrupt peace negotiations. United Nations (U.N.) actors have also demonstrated this bias in adopting denialist narratives on genocides in both unstable contexts, including Sudan, and more stable contexts like China. Additionally, denial mechanisms are often based on conventional views regarding the scale of genocides and certain strict criteria for proving intent to destroy. So far, disagreements regarding a Banyamulenge genocide have not compared with denial of clearer, more well-known genocides, and there are debates on whether the Banyamulenge’s current persecution represents a warning for genocide or a “slow genocide” already underway. Notwithstanding these disagreements and concerns, the Banyamulenge are vulnerable to what would be more widely considered genocide. The term “conflict” does not always contradict interpretations of genocide, though variations of it can. During the Rwandan civil war (1990-94), the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a rebellion that committed severe abuses but predominantly represented the persecuted Tutsi minority, was in conflict with the ideologically extremist Hutu Power regime. The latter resisted and eventually caused large-scale genocide. Today, the idea that Banyamulenge experience “cyclical” conflict or violence does not necessarily contradict the claim they face genocide. Galtung’s “Conflict Triangle” further captures the dynamics of “cyclical” conflict. However, “intercommunal conflict” is too specific and reductive a categorization. While marking an improvement from when media sources used terms like “tribal violence” during the Rwandan genocide, it still portrays violence as symmetric and coalesces armed groups with civilians. It also reduces explanations for violence to being centred around material issues including land, resources, and local power. While these factors are relevant, “intercommunal conflict” insufficiently captures the deeper socio-political dynamics these factors feed into while negating the destructiveness of the crisis. Additionally, this framing represents certain neo-colonial power dynamics in peacebuilding. It disregards interpretations from within communities, who are expected to accept narratives imposed on them by international actors in order not to complicate peace. Notwithstanding the importance of peacebuilding processes, they can still be problematized. Though there is a tension between facilitating reconciliation and recognizing a community’s specific victimization, the latter may humanize and complement the former. Commitments to impartiality raise questions about what “peace” means and on whose terms it should be negotiated. Peace can become an abstract goal that overlooks specific experiences of different communities. During the Rwandan civil war, Samantha Powell argued that U.S. diplomats feared setbacks to “the peace process” rather than for “Rwandans.” Additionally, non-recognition of community vulnerabilities can be counterproductive in hindering interventions necessary to avert violence and has implications for justice. In complex conflict settings, genocide accusations can be perceived as biased or stigmatizing for entire “perpetrator groups,” creating simplistic victim-perpetrator binaries. Yet, non-recognition can be hurtful or disconcerting for targeted communities, depriving them of a sense of justice and peace of mind. In the short term, if peacebuilding downplays the insecurities of targeted communities, it risks perpetuating the armed mobilization of some community members. In the long term, recognizing genocide, or at least appreciating such interpretations, can bring targeted communities some closure. It is recognition that they have been targeted as “unwanted peoples” by certain actors. This piece focuses on socio-political dynamics and emphasizes that quantifying suffering alone is problematic. Yet, broader factors create limitations in data that can be indicative of these dynamics. Across the DRC, various forms of suffering and violence facing many communities have become neglected, normalized, and chronically underreported. One source that does document violence in the Plateaux is Kivu Security Tracker (KST), though its data is perpetrator-focused and rarely identifies the ethnicity of victims. Various U.N. documents have also been generalist when reporting on data concerning all civilians. While this approach appears comprehensive and unbiased, it presents civilians as abstract numbers rather than members of different communities whose specific experiences need to be humanized and understood. One U.N. report from 2020 does provide more specific data. There are also disparities between verified data on the crisis and higher numbers of victims and displaced persons estimated by Banyamulenge researchers. These figures warrant further investigation to enhance understanding of the crisis and account for every individual’s story from each community. Verifying data is challenging in South Kivu, and accuracy remains an important principle. However, the overall lack of comprehensive data reflects a lack of genuine responses to this crisis among various actors globally. With the revival of the M23 rebellion in North Kivu, the Banyamulenge’s situation could change and coalesce with the persecution of other Tutsi. Nationally, all Tutsi groups are associated with the rebellion and related anti-Tutsi conspiracy theories. While anti-Banyamulenge violence may escalate to more clearly resemble genocide according to conventional views, there is still value in seeking recognition for the Banyamulenge’s experience from the past five years. From a justice perspective, this blog maintains that the violence should not have needed to escalate further to receive attention or even be understood, through some conceptual approaches, as genocidal. It also unpacks the dynamics of the crisis that have been warning signs for large-scale genocide. Similarly, members of Myanmar’s Rohingya community still refer to the history of their hidden genocide prior to 2016-17, despite their situation having worsened since then. From a research perspective, recognizing the interplay of such dynamics can be applicable to genocides of various scales in other contexts with multifaceted violence, such as Tigray, Ethiopia. However the Plateaux crisis develops, the past five years have been a key chapter in the region’s history where all communities suffered collectively while the Banyamulenge’s existence came once again under threat. A MONUSCO delegation in Fizi, one of the territories affected by violence March 16, 2019. (MONUSCO/Jacob de Lange) Part 2: False Dichotomies Between Conflict and Genocidal Violence The crisis in the South Kivu Plateaux in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which has seen a coalition of ethnic-based Mai-Mai militias outnumber a coalition of Banyamulenge groups, has been complex, with abuses on all sides. Yet, complexities can be cited to minimize the significance of certain dynamics. Such arguments can be examples of false dichotomies, where ideas are considered mutually exclusive when they may rather intersect or be interrelated or mutually reinforcing. Denial mechanisms regarding a possible Banyamulenge genocide can sometimes be based on false dichotomies. In 2019, a source from MONUSCO, the U.N. peacekeeping mission, said there was no genocide but “some ethnic cleansing of the Banyamulenge and other communities.” While this statement captured the suffering of all communities, it reinforced some false equivalences. Furthermore, some consider “ethnic cleansing” a term for genocide denial because it has no legal meaning, while its implications can complement elements of genocide. Even insightful research publications on this crisis contain false dichotomies. While not all areas discussed in this blog are examples of false dichotomies per se, they include important nuances that, perhaps inadvertently, can feed into a false dichotomy between recognizing genocide or asymmetric victimization and addressing complex violence. In academic literature, explanations for violence across the DRC are often subject to dichotomization. Research findings on localized conflicts are seen to reduce the importance of national and regional dimensions, while incentives created by “conflict minerals” are seen to outweigh identarian factors of violence. Regarding the South Kivu Plateaux, one important paper titled “Mayhem in the Mountains” and other related articles challenge the suitability of the term “ethnic conflict.” They argue ethnic identity is only one of various factors driving violence, including contestations over local authority, territory, access to land and resources, the taxation of goods, and the movement of cattle (transhumance). Indeed, only focusing on ethnicity produces simplistic, essentialist explanations for violence, armed mobilization, and community-based support for armed groups. Yet, arguing the violence is “not ethnic” downplays the way this same research and previous publications show that material factors intersect with ethnicity and are susceptible to ethnicization when linked with socioeconomic insecurity and perceived security dilemmas. For example, farmers more likely feel strongly about Banyamulenge cattle trampling on their farmland than about abstract anti-Banyamulenge conspiracy theories. Given the effective popularization of such theories and narratives about being collectively victimized by Banyamulenge, they can become inseparable from material grievances. The build-up of different factors of violence can feed into less visible undercurrents of the crisis. Kivu Security Tracker has suggested some Mai-Mai are trying to remove Banyamulenge from their homelands. Incitements to genocide may be indicative of the intent behind different anti-Banyamulenge attacks. Additionally, genocidal intent may not necessarily be the direct or stated intent behind every incident of anti-Banyamulenge violence. Instead, general intolerance towards the group can be secondary to more immediate factors. Though there may be specific triggers for incidents, including tensions over resources, a defining source of division between the two armed coalitions is the belief that Banyamulenge are “outsiders.” Separate incidents can reflect an underlying preference among Mai-Mai and some supporters for the non-existence or removal of Banyamulenge. For example, in 2020, the creation of the Minembwe municipality, which would give Banyamulenge more local political representation, was suspended after provoking hateful backlash. The “Mayhem in the Mountains” paper cautions against overstating the direct impact this issue had on violence, instead underlining its indirect effects on intercommunity relations. Nonetheless, while clearly identifying causal links between certain discourses and incidents is challenging, these indirect links remain significant. Such discourses feed into beliefs about indigeneity, rendering Banyamulenge vulnerable. Another dimension adding complexity to the crisis is the fragmentation of the armed coalitions and the volatility of armed group relations. Such volatility has risked affecting regional stability, causing local community insecurities to be overlooked. Burundian rebels in the Mai-Mai coalition, RED-Tabara and the National Forces of Liberation, have perpetrated attacks in Burundi, which has accused Rwanda of supporting them. In past years, Rwanda accused Burundi of supporting the rebel group Rwandan National Congress, which occasionally linked with Banyamulenge armed group Gumino but has now practically left the area. Additionally, the coalitions are themselves fragmented. Nonetheless, the “indigeneity” narrative that unifies Mai-Mai causes this overarching division to override any subdivisions and threaten Banyamulenge civilians. There have also been shifting alliances between armed groups and unlikely alliances formed due to interests transcending ethnicity. Sometimes, Banyamulenge groups have reportedly linked with groups that could be considered hostile towards them. Such developments demonstrate a need for Banyamulenge fighters to strategically adapt to changing circumstances. Any alliances they previously had with Mai-Mai or other ethnic groups became irrelevant as the Mai-Mai coalition united in its anti-Banyamulenge hostility. The volatility of group relations does not reduce but rather reflects and exacerbates the Banyamulenge’s precarious position. There are perceptions that Banyamulenge are not vulnerable because of certain protections and integration efforts within the country’s political and security structures. However, such developments create false impressions of the security Banyamulenge enjoy. Despite the 2004 nationality law being worded to include Banyamulenge, many people locally and nationally still reject their citizenship. Hostilities have necessitated that Banyamulenge move closer to the government, yet with caution. Their decisions to join both Rwandan-backed insurgencies and counterinsurgency operations later have reinforced prejudices. Tutsi and Banyamulenge elites in high-ranking state positions represent small gains made in their struggles for acceptance that risk being reversed while reinforcing conspiracy theories of a Rwandan infiltration. Government solidarity also remains precarious. At a diaspora conference in London in 2020, President Tshisekedi’s declaration that Banyamulenge were Congolese provoked a hostile reaction. Additionally, the positions of elites do not reflect the broader community’s situation. The role of elites from all communities in contributing to armed group activities links with the country’s structural challenges of militarization and ineffective governance. Meanwhile, attempts by MONUSCO and the army (FARDC) to tackle violence overshadow times where they do not prevent attacks and some FARDC soldiers support Mai-Mai. Such contextual complexities obscure the Banyamulenge’s vulnerability. In this context, false dichotomies reflect a high bar for recognizing the significance of certain threats towards minorities in relation to other dynamics. Instead, the nuances of this crisis can be situated within its broader underlying dynamics. The obscuring effects of the country’s structural challenges have implications for the concept of a “slow genocide,” where one community’s fate is hidden by complicated, normalized violence. Recognizing genocide can mark a recognition of how severely intercommunity relations have deteriorated in this context. It could also have implications for peacebuilding and other interventions, which can become more holistic, as well as for justice. Even if practical dilemmas remain for peacebuilding actors whose work relies on neutrality, other actors can enhance peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions. In 2019, a Banyamulenge politician declared Banyamulenge would not attend intercommunity dialogue as there was no conflict but a genocide against his community. While this did not reflect the position of all Banyamulenge and reinforced some false dichotomies, it underlined the problem of relying on dialogues alone. Perhaps even more long-term efforts, including tackling ethnic-based prejudice within communities and reducing support for militias, may remain challenging unless accompanied by commitments to improving governance and security at a structural level. Banyamulenge women at a herder's funeral. (ALEXIS HUGUET/AFP via Getty Images) Part 3: False Equivalences and Asymmetric Victimization The crisis in the South Kivu Plateaux in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has seen all communities suffer from abuses by the Mai-Mai or Banyamulenge armed coalitions. However, it has displayed asymmetries rendering Banyamulenge particularly vulnerable and has been subject to false equivalences in various narratives. An example of a false equivalence can be found in a report by the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO) from 2020, which otherwise outlined various asymmetries. It framed claims by Banyamulenge that other communities wanted to exterminate them and that the army collaborated with Mai-Mai as hate speech similarly as incendiary as incitements to the Banyamulenge’s extermination. Though these claims contained some generalizations about entire groups, they reflected real findings on individuals, and the report’s framing reflected a problematic commitment to neutrality. While this blog does not focus on explaining interpretations of a Banyamulenge genocide, it emphasizes that recognizing the Banyamulenge’s specific experiences need not minimize other complexities and can rather help challenge false dichotomies between genocide and conflict. Underlining asymmetries involves interpreting numerical data, which can be indicative of certain power dynamics. However, quantifying suffering alone is problematic and needs to be accompanied by engagements in other dynamics. There are asymmetries in the socio-political dynamics of this crisis, which represent not just a conflict over local authority but a struggle for equality among Banyamulenge. A common claim is that many neighbouring communities, not just Banyamulenge, are minorities, but this disregards other factors. Most communities, including Banyindu, Bafuliro, Bavira, and Babembe, display a higher sense of identification with each other as “indigenous” communities. Meanwhile, the Banyamulenge have historically faced persecution as pastoralists considered “outsiders.” Banyamulenge have sought to redress their history of being excluded from local political power since colonial rule through the creation of the Minembwe municipality. This would have a similar status to other decentralized entities and could enhance Banyamulenge political representation. Yet, behind some legalistic arguments, the selective opposition to its creation by public figures, who have portrayed it as a Rwandan plot to “balkanize” the DRC, has exposed the high levels of intolerance towards the Banyamulenge. Furthermore, the municipality remains associated with a territory created during the Congo Wars (1996-2003). Though all sides perpetrated abuses during the wars, and Banyamulenge were among the main targets, abuses by Banyamulenge fighters, who joined Rwanda’s invasion, have stood out in people’s memories and reinforced their label as “outsiders.” The names and histories of each armed group also indicate asymmetries in their ideals and purposes. Mai-Mai mainly originated in the 1990s and share the ideology of “indigeneity” or “autochthony.” One member of the current Plateaux-based Mai-Mai coalition is called Biloze Bishambuke, meaning “If we have to destroy, let’s destroy” in Kifuliiru. This name alone does not necessarily provide a causal explanation for the group’s violence, but its overtness conveys a certain boldness and destructive mentality. In contrast, the name of Banyamulenge group Twirwaneho translates as, “Let’s fend for ourselves,” while Gumino means “Stay here” in Kinyamulenge. Their actions do not always reflect these names, and both armed coalitions have perpetrated counter-attacks attributing collective responsibility to whole communities. However, Banyamulenge group names reflect their community’s victimhood. Gumino has a relatively long, complicated history as an offshoot of an earlier group. However, Twirwaneho became active more recently, reviving another past group, when insecurity increased and Banyamulenge fell into another vulnerable and isolated position from 2015. Additionally, Mai-Mai had begun stepping up expressive violence towards Banyamulenge in 2011, meaning they aimed to inflict pain for identarian reasons. Overall, the Mai-Mai’s exclusionary ideology differs from the Banyamulenge groups’ fight for acceptance and survival. Certain socio-cultural and socioeconomic dynamics have also displayed asymmetries. All communities experience cattle-looting, particularly Banyamulenge. As a pastoralist community, cows are central to their livelihoods and culture. Therefore, Mai-Mai use cattle-looting to attack Banyamulenge where it hurts the most, portraying this as self-defense by capitalizing on frustrations around transhumance (movements of cattle). Sometimes, Banyamulenge cows trample on farmers’ crops, which is considered a trigger of violence. In a context of widespread socioeconomic insecurity, this causes distress for farmers. However, the region lacks a suitable legal framework for farming. Furthermore, a common problem worldwide is that settled communities are normatively favoured over pastoralist and nomadic communities, who are often considered threatening trespassers by default when moving onto territories. Hence, challenges related to transhumance link with the Banyamulenge’s structural marginalisation. Another regular trigger of violence is the killing of customary chiefs, which are considered symbolic acts against entire communities. This symbolic effect in killing Banyamulenge leaders can additionally mark an expression of the rejection of Banyamulenge as Congolese and can weaken the community socio-politically. This effect has also been seen in the military. The recent assassination of a Banyamulenge major, cheered on by a mob, caused pain and fear throughout the community. A combination of quantitative asymmetries and tactics adopted by the Mai-Mai have signified the Banyamulenge’s vulnerability. Kivu Security Tracker (KST) has documented similar numbers of abuses by both armed coalitions. However, their focus on perpetrators creates limitations in understanding the impact on different civilians. The UNJHRO’s report from August 2020 documented abuses in the Plateaux from February 2019 to June 2020, finding that 38% of victims of documented abuses were Banyamulenge, while 25% were Bafuliiru, 13% Banyindu, 12% Bashi, and 9% Bembe. The report omitted some areas but demonstrated the seriousness of the crisis. While such asymmetries by no means suggest Banyamulenge are the only people suffering, they reflect power dynamics that render them particularly vulnerable. Mai-Mai have attacked Banyamulenge in their villages and again in a Minembwe internally displaced persons (IDP) camp from multiple directions, demonstrating their levels of coordination as a coalition. Other communities have suffered from displacement, such as the Bafuliiru struggling to survive in another camp. Yet, Mai-Mai have additionally used tactics to effectively besiege Banyamulenge IDPs, directly threatening the community’s survival. Their physical attacks have been compounded by their mental effects on Banyamulenge, which serve as reminders of the community’s status as an “unwanted” people. Existing peacebuilding initiatives have not only overlooked different drivers of this crisis. They have also relied on neutral dialogues between armed groups and elites that have exposed their unequal positions. Some talks have failed due to decisions by members of both coalitions, often reflecting feelings of uncertainty among Banyamulenge representatives. However, many such failures have reflected the deep distrust towards the Banyamulenge among “autochthonous” representatives. Altogether, the data limitations, chronic underreporting, and narratives downplaying asymmetries demonstrate that the international community has yet to take this crisis seriously. Until incongruences between verified data on the crisis and higher estimates by Banyamulenge researchers can be further and independently investigated, the threats signalled by the dynamics of the crisis still need addressing. Asymmetries alone are not necessarily signs of genocide, but they can indicate certain vulnerabilities that inform this interpretation. Highlighting the disproportionate suffering of Banyamulenge need not undermine the suffering of others. In every death and abuse, there are members of communities whose human rights have been violated. Rather, it underlines threats that necessitate specific interventions. It can also give Banyamulenge more assurance that their story has been heard and can be situated within this crisis and the DRC’s multitude of challenges. Tom Shacklock is a Senior Research Analyst and Advocacy Manager​ at Genocide Watch. He is also author of an earlier blog, 28 Years After Rwanda, Anti-Tutsism Still Kills in Congo, which can be found here at The Call. The views and opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Genocide Watch. You can download a PDF version of this blog series by clicking on the attachment below: © 2021 Genocide Watch