Women’s rights activists protest against Latvia’s possible withdrawal from domestic violence treaty By Claudia Ciobanu National flag flutters over Latvian central bank headquarters in Riga, Latvia April 9, 2019. Photo by Ints Kalnins/ Reuters WARSAW, Poland (AP) — Women’s rights activists taped their mouths shut at a demonstration Wednesday outside the Latvian parliament to protest the country’s possible withdrawal from an international treaty aimed at supporting women who are victims of violence. Dozens of protesters watched as several women, with their hands tied behind their backs, sat down in front of a table with a white cloth covered in red paint handprints. The demonstration, the second of its kind in two weeks, follows a decision by Latvian lawmakers last month to start a process that could lead to withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention. The Council of Europe treaty, which Latvia ratified in 2023, is meant to standardize support for women who are victims of violence, including domestic abuse. Ultra-conservative groups and political parties across Europe have criticized the treaty in recent years, arguing that it promotes “gender ideology,” encourages sexual experimentation and harms children. In 2020, the previous conservative nationalist government in Poland lobbied neighboring countries to support an alternative treaty to the Istanbul Convention that would ban abortion and same-sex marriage. “What I see is how a foreign ideology is creeping into our everyday lives,” Linda Liepina, a lawmaker from the opposition Latvia First party, told parliament, according to the Latvian Public Media. “I see how common sense and balance are disappearing, how the abnormal is being made normal.” Marta Kraujina from the MARTA Center, a charity supporting female victims of violence in Latvia and one of the organizers of Wednesday’s protest, said political parties are targeting the Istanbul Convention as a way to attract conservative voters ahead of next year’s parliamentary elections. “The attack on the Istanbul Convention is happening because the populist movement is on the rise in Latvia, and this is a first trial for their future electoral campaign,” Kraujina told The Associated Press. The charity said the ratification of the treaty has led to improvements in criminal law and crisis support and encouraged women to seek help. Prime Minister Evika Silina took to social media on Tuesday to argue the treaty had “significantly improved” assistance to victims. Her governing coalition committed to ratifying the treaty when coming to power in 2023. “Those who have been brave enough to seek help are now witnessing their experiences being used for political battles,” Silina wrote. “It is cruel.” © 1996 - 2025 NewsHour Productions LLC. All Rights Reserved.

By Michael Woldemariam and A bel Abate Demissie People walk through an intersection in Mekele, in Ethiopia's Tigray region, on April 2. Ximena Borrazas/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images For more than a year, another catastrophic war between Eritrea and Ethiopia has appeared imminent. Seasoned experts and some political figures have repeatedly raised the alarm, citing the seemingly irreconcilable differences between the leaders of the two states, escalating rhetoric, and military mobilizations as the most ominous signs. So far, mutual uncertainty has helped keep the peace. But recent developments in Ethiopia’s Tigray region may further erode this fragile balance and trigger a conflict. Although Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki had been close political allies between 2018 and 2022, the fallout of the war in Tigray and Ethiopia’s subsequent push for sea access have created a wide chasm. Ethiopian leaders have also openly questioned the legitimacy of Eritrea’s 1993 independence, and both sides have traded public allegations of ill intent and belligerence. Rumors of arms purchases and military deployments to the area of Assab—an Eritrean Red Sea port Ethiopian authorities covet—seem increasingly likely to be closer to fact than fiction. Yet Eritrea and Ethiopia have not gone to war. This restraint has been undergirded by the fact that both Addis Ababa and Asmara lack confidence that they would prevail in a conflict. The trajectory of wars is always difficult to predict ex ante, but this is doubly so along the 620-mile Eritrea-Ethiopia frontier. Both sides have waged wars in recent memory that have not gone according to plan. The responses of critical international actors including the United States and the Gulf remain hard to forecast, and political flux in Tigray has made it impossible to assess how this critical swing actor might position itself when the shooting starts. Now, new dynamics are increasing the risk of war. The growing proximity between Tigray’s governing class and Eritrean authorities is accelerating a major confrontation. Only de-escalating tension between Addis Ababa and Tigray, and finding mutually agreeable pathways to enhance Ethiopian port access, can sustainably reduce the risks of war. The outcome of a potential war between Eritrea and Ethiopia is wildly uncertain. This reality is not lost on leaders in Addis Ababa and Asmara, even as they project confidence. Within living memory, key decision-makers on both sides of the border have embraced wars that took unexpected turns and ultimately proved disastrous. Amid limited border clashes with Ethiopia in 1998, Eritrean officials surmised that they could deter and even defeat an Ethiopian military escalation. The resulting two years of total war culminated in Ethiopian troops breaking Eritrean defensive lines, occupying much of the western portion of the country, and forcing Asmara to accept unfavorable terms for peace. Similarly, Ethiopia’s 2020 attempt to put down an armed rebellion in Tigray—with active support from the Eritrean government—quickly turned into a quagmire : By the summer of 2021, Addis Ababa had lost control of Tigray, and Tigrayan forces were racing southward into government-held territory. Parallel counterinsurgency wars in the Amhara and Oromia regions have also gone awry, although perhaps not as spectacularly as in Tigray. The international context adds to the uncertainty. In an era of dramatic global reordering, neither Addis Ababa nor Asmara can be sure of where the balance of international support—diplomatic and material—will ultimately fall. Both sides are also nursing specific vulnerabilities that add to the haziness. Consider first the United States. Ethiopian and Eritrean leaders are racing, with some initial success, to reach out to the Trump administration and rehabilitate frayed bilateral ties. For Ethiopia, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam remains a potential stumbling block, as U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent comments on the issue suggest he continues to see the matter through an Egyptian lens . Eritrea, meanwhile, has a much deeper diplomatic hole to dig itself out of, as decades of anti-U.S. posturing have left it with few friends in Washington. Relative to Ethiopia, Eritrea may also have less to offer the Trump administration. Ethiopia is larger and has a more dynamic economy, as demonstrated by the ongoing multibillion-dollar expansion of U.S.-Ethiopia cooperation in the arena of commercial aviation. Asmara can of course trade on its strategic location along the Red Sea, situating itself as an alternative for U.S. assets in Djibouti. But Somaliland now looks to have momentum as the preferred option for an expanded U.S. military presence along the Horn of Africa littoral. The balance of external support is no less confused closer to home. A war between Eritrea and Ethiopia would likely merge with the conflagration in neighboring Sudan . Addis Ababa and Asmara would almost certainly attempt to mobilize the actors engaged there: the United Arab Emirates on the side of Ethiopia and Egypt and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) backing Eritrea. But the Sudanese conflict has itself become a grinding stalemate, leaving doubts about which side will prevail—and whether either set of external actors would fully invest in yet another costly African war. Eritrea’s ruling People’s Front for Democracy and Justice must also be aware that despite its current strategic alignment with Egypt and SAF, these partnerships have been laden with considerable historic tension and are hardly ironclad. Dynamics in Tigray are perhaps the most consequential area of uncertainty. As relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara have nosedived, both have sought to court support in this region of northern Ethiopia. Straddling much of the Eritrea-Ethiopia frontier, and teeming with roughly 250,000 still-mobilized fighters, Tigray would obviously be a critical swing player in any confrontation between the two countries. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the de facto administrators of the territory, also understand this fact and seek to leverage it. But exactly how Tigray would align has remained an open question for several reasons. First, the recent memory of the brutal 2020-22 Tigray war , when Addis Ababa and Asmara were militarily aligned against Tigrayan fighters, has left a bitterness and suspicion toward both that is hard to ignore. This strategic wariness applies at the level of both the public and political elite and cuts across many of Tigray’s prevailing political divides. Second, Tigray’s political cohesiveness has dramatically eroded, a fact signaled by the rift within the TPLF between former Tigrayan interim administrator Getachew Reda and TPLF party boss Debretsion Gebremichael. The former has clearly leaned toward Addis Ababa, while the latter—who now fully controls the TPLF—is closer to Eritrea. Finally, a key strategic objective of the TPLF remains the reacquisition of disputed territories in western Tigray that were lost to Amhara during the war. This is an outcome that the TPLF may be willing to pursue through the risky option of force if necessary. But both Addis Ababa and Asmara are balancing delicate equities in Amhara that they do not want to see disrupted by changes to the status quo in western Tigray. Furthermore, neither is enthusiastic about a TPLF corridor to Sudan, albeit for different reasons. For Addis Ababa, the return of these territories to Tigray would provide the TPLF with yet another avenue for external supply, and for Asmara, it might reduce the TPLF’s dependence on the Eritrean state. But all this uncertainly does not guarantee continued peace. Past restraint along the Eritrea-Ethiopia frontier should be no reason for comfort. The risks of open conflict between the countries are growing, and the Tigray factor is the key catalyst. Two recent developments underscore the forces at work. The first occurred in June, when a border post between Ethiopia and Eritrea was reopened in Zalambessa, a town in northern Tigray. This was the first such reopening since 2020. That it occurred without the involvement of the Ethiopian government raised concerns that the crossing could be used to facilitate the movement of goods and potentially ammunition between the Eritrean government and the TPLF. The second development came later that summer, when the TPLF violently seized dissident regional administrations in southern Tigray. Collectively, these developments illustrate shifts that have been in evidence for months: the tipping of factional struggles within Tigray in favor of Debretsion and old-line TPLF and the further movement of this group toward Eritrea . These trends began in earnest in March, when the Debretsion faction ousted its rivals from the interim administration and exiled them to Addis Ababa. The move was yet another blow to the 2022 Pretoria Agreement, which ended the Tigray war and was meant to anchor the rapprochement between the TPLF and Abiy’s government. While an immediate crisis was averted through the selection of Tadesse Werede as the new president of Tigray’s interim administration, that has not attenuated prevailing trends. Emerging reports suggest that the TPLF is now attempting to gauge and shape public sentiment in Tigray through “regional consultation” forums with an eye toward potential conflict with the federal government. And the TPLF’s official rhetoric has become more explicitly pro-Asmara and anti-Addis Ababa in recent weeks. The reasons for the TPLF’s increasingly pronounced pivot toward Eritrea—just years ago its mortal enemy—are complex. The central issue is the failure of Addis Ababa and Tigray to agree on the reentry of the region into Ethiopia’s body politic as provided for in the Pretoria Agreement. Both sides share considerable blame. As a result, thorny questions around demobilization, disputed regional boundaries, the resettlement of displaced Tigrayans, and the TPLF’s political normalization have been left to fester. With Pretoria effectively moribund, the TPLF—the weaker of the two signatories and the one under considerable pressure from its own population to see key provisions realized—has gradually looked for greater leverage and security. Its alignment with the Eritrean government appears to be the answer. In this context, the risk that the TPLF attempts to test its muscle against the federal government in conjunction with Eritrea and other local anti-government forces, or that Addis Ababa acts to preempt deepening ties between its northern rivals through operations in Tigray or even Eritrea, grows by the day. With the logic of restraint quickly collapsing, urgent action is needed to prevent the next Eritrea-Ethiopia war. Since dynamics in Tigray are a key driver of escalation, it is here on which initial efforts to stabilize tensions should focus. Rehabilitating the stalled dialogue between the federal government and Tigray is an essential first step. These efforts should be geared toward advancing implementation of the Pretoria Agreement in all its facets. Western powers that have in the past been supportive of Pretoria, particularly the United States and Europe, should insist on this point and offer the necessary incentives and guarantees necessary to generate follow-through. They must also unequivocally denounce provocation and be vocal in signaling their displeasure when the federal government and Tigray act in ways inconsistent with their obligations under the agreement—something they have consistently been reluctant to do. But taking the Tigray card off the table will only go so far in stabilizing Eritrea-Ethiopia relations. Longer term, Ethiopia needs secure access to the sea , possibly through Eritrean ports. This matter must be addressed seriously, respecting Eritrea’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as Ethiopia’s demand for reliable access. A practical framework might involve the Trump administration, the Europeans, and key African and Gulf states facilitating dialogue between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Offering the right mix of investment, sanctions relief, and deepened bilateral relationships could help create incentives for peace. More broadly, it is pivotal to support Ethiopia in diversifying its port options for its growing demand. Continuing talks with Somalia (and, by extension, Somaliland ), exploring Djibouti’s proposal for a controlled port, and assessing alternatives such as Lamu in Kenya or Port Sudan merit serious consideration. This would also serve to regionalize the question of Ethiopian port access, which may assuage Eritrean apprehensions about being the target of Ethiopian revanchism. Whatever the formula for de-escalation, the bottom line is that the Horn of Africa, and the world, cannot afford another Eritrea-Ethiopia war. It would further destabilize a region already racked by a constellation of devastating conflicts from Sudan to Somalia. And it would take generations for the region and its people to recover. With dynamics in Tigray beginning to erode the tense but not yet violent status quo along the Eritrea-Ethiopia frontier, all must act to bolster peace before it is too late. Foreign Policy Magazine is a division of Graham Holdings Company. All contents (c) 2025, Graham Digital Holding Company. All rights reserved.

A United Nations letter to Colombia warns that mercury contamination from illegal gold mining in the Atrato River basin is causing a grave human rights crisis for Indigenous and Afro-descendant communities By Steven Grattan A group of women, part of Asociacion Nuestra Casa Comun, or Our Community House Association, go by boat to an area destroyed by illegal mining, on the Quito River, the Atrato River’s main tributary, near Paimado, Colombia, Sept. 24, 2024. (AP Photo/Ivan Valencia, File) BOGOTA, Colombia -- BOGOTA, Colombia (AP) — The United Nations warned that mercury contamination from illegal gold mining in Colombia’s Atrato River basin has created a “serious and ongoing human rights crisis,” threatening the health and survival of Indigenous and Afro-descendant communities who depend on the river for food, water and culture. In a letter made public on Tuesday, three U.N. Human Rights Council special rapporteurs raised concerns with the Colombian government about insufficient compliance with a 2016 Constitutional Court ruling that recognized the Atrato River as a legal entity with rights to protection and restoration. “Ten years have passed and we have seen that there has been insufficient implementation and compliance with the terms of that decision,” Marcos Orellana, the U.N. special rapporteur on toxics and human rights, told The Associated Press. “A big part of the problem stems from the presence of organized crime — smuggling mercury, smuggling gold, and corruption in military and police forces.” The Atrato River, one of Colombia’s largest waterways, winds nearly 500 miles from the western Andes to the Caribbean Sea through the lush jungles of Choco, one of the country’s most biodiverse yet impoverished regions. It’s home to predominantly Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities that rely on fishing and small-scale farming — livelihoods now imperiled by toxic pollution. Illegal gold mining is now among the main drivers of deforestation and pollution across many of Latin America's Amazon regions. Soaring gold prices and weak traceability systems have fueled demand for illicitly mined gold that often slips into global supply chains. The mercury used to extract the metal has devastated wildlife — including river dolphins and fish — and contaminated the food sources of Indigenous communities in remote areas of the Amazon. AP reporting last year showed how local residents — charged with safeguarding the river — act as watchguards of illegal mining and the health of the river, often under threat from armed groups. Orellana said the U.N. received evidence showing that more than a third of the population in the Atrato watershed has been exposed to mercury levels exceeding World Health Organization limits. He called the situation “incredibly concerning,” citing the metal’s extreme toxicity and its ability to cause neurological damage, organ failure and developmental disorders in unborn children. The 2016 court ruling was hailed globally as a milestone in environmental law, inspiring similar “rights of nature” initiatives elsewhere. But Orellana said political turnover, lack of funding and alleged corruption have undermined enforcement. “Complying with a court decision requires institutional commitment over the long term,” he said. “Politics can interfere, and reality kicks in when budgets don’t follow.” The letter — cosigned by the special rapporteur on the right to a healthy environment and the Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent — was sent to the Colombian government more than 60 days ago, Orellana said, but has not yet received a response. Under standard U.N. procedures, governments are given 60 days to reply to such communications before they are made public. “It is my expectation that the government will reply, giving effect to its obligations under international human rights law,” he said. Colombia’s presidential office and Environment Ministry did not immediately respond to requests for comment. In their communication, the U.N. rapporteurs described the mercury contamination as a violation of the rights to health, life and a clean environment. They urged Colombia to take “immediate and effective” steps to curb illegal mining, clean up polluted sites and provide medical care for affected communities. Mercury is commonly used in small-scale gold mining to separate gold from sediment, but when released into rivers it poisons fish and builds up in human tissue. Colombia banned mercury use in mining in 2018, yet enforcement remains weak — especially in conflict zones dominated by armed groups and criminal networks. Orellana said his office has received evidence of slavery like labor, forced prostitution and displacement linked to illegal mining operations in the Atrato region. “These forms of violence and violations of human rights accompany mercury contamination and must be treated as environmental crimes,” he said. He urged Colombia to take a leading role in strengthening international mercury controls under the Minamata Convention on Mercury, saying current global regulations have “gaps that need to be closed” to curb cross-border trade. Meaningful progress, Orellana added, would mean seeing a decline in the number of hectares being mined — which has increased since the 2016 ruling — and ensuring communities have access not just to testing but to specialized health care and clear guidance on how to reduce exposure. “The human rights of victims are at stake,” he said. “International law requires states to respect and guarantee rights — not for one day or for one week, but all the time.” © 2025 ABC News

People gather at a gas station due to a shortage in Bamako, Mali's capital, on Oct. 7. (Idriss Sangare/Reuters) Islamist extremists have taken this country to the brink A fuel blockade imposed by al-Qaeda-aligned militants has paralyzed the capital of Mali and roiled its repressive military government. By Rachel Chason The Washington Post BAMAKO, Mali — After years spent accumulating arms and influence in rural parts of this West African nation, al-Qaeda-aligned militants have shown their power now extends to the heart of the state — imposing a fuel blockade that has paralyzed the Malian capital and threatens its military government. Scores of humanitarian and commercial flights have been canceled or rescheduled. International embassies and nonprofits are stockpiling supplies and planning for worst-case scenarios. In Bamako, which has largely been spared the effects of the violence and instability gripping much of the rest of the country, frustrated residents spend hours searching for gas. Cars and motorcycles jostle for space in long lines snaking from the few open stations. Blackouts are spreading. “The emergency is here, and the situation is very, very critical,” said Bamako resident Aboubacrine Ag Ali, 62, in an interview last week. He has been mostly stuck at home for weeks, unable to afford taxi fares that he said have doubled since early September, when a spokesman for the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin militant group, or JNIM, declared it would block nearly all fuel imports into Mali. The United States recently stepped up intelligence sharing with the junta , hoping to stanch the militants’ momentum. But they are only getting stronger. “They are everywhere,” ag Ali said of the insurgents. “Everywhere.” Experts put JNIM’s fighting force across the Sahel at around 6,000, a seemingly small figure in a nation of nearly 25 million. But the group has managed to solidify its rule — and win popular support — across vast swaths of Mali and neighboring Burkina Faso, and now menaces coastal nations such as Benin, Togo and Ghana. The group’s crippling fuel blockade, according to Malian and Western officials as well as analysts, is an expansion of its strategic economic warfare — and its most significant show of strength to date. JNIM initially said the blockade was a response to government efforts to restrict fuel sales in areas it controls. In a statement Friday, the insurgents declared the siege would continue until the junta fell or agreed to apply “Islamic sharia law” nationwide. All women traveling outside Bamako, whether on public transport or in private cars, must wear the hijab, the statement decreed. Militant leaders have expressed some openness to negotiating with the government, three Malian and Western officials said, but only if such talks are made official, giving the group the legitimacy it has long sought. For years, as its fighters have battled state forces, JNIM has formed governance agreements with local communities, often with tacit, but never formal, approval from national authorities. Mali’s military leaders — who vowed to restore security when they took power in a 2021 coup d’état — have so far rejected the possibility of talks, the three officials said, speaking to The Washington Post on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters. Instead, they said, the regime seems committed to doubling down on its strategy of all-out war. The militants “want to paralyze the country, to turn the people against their state,” said Moussa Ag Acharatoumane, a member of Mali’s transitional government. “But the state will fight back.” In partnership with Russian mercenaries, first with the Wagner Group and now with the Kremlin’s rebranded Africa Corps, Malian soldiers have waged a scorched-earth campaign in areas controlled by JNIM, killing thousands of civilians , according to rights groups. The long-term objectives of the insurgency remain unclear, experts say. But the blockade has clearly demonstrated “both JNIM’s growing capacity — and the state’s incapacity in responding effectively,” said Héni Nsaibia, West Africa senior analyst for the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data project, or ACLED. Neither Mali’s military spokesman nor its Foreign Ministry responded to requests for comment JNIM’s pressure campaign in Mali has major ramifications for the rest of the Sahel, where other military regimes have proved similarly unable to contain the group and face additional threats from the regional Islamic State affiliate. “I have been covering these countries for a long time, and I have never been so worried about their futures,” said Ibrahim Yahaya Ibrahim, deputy director of the International Crisis Group’s Sahel project. “If one of these countries falls,” Ibrahim said, referring to Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, “the rest will be in trouble.” The war comes home In this usually lively capital city in Mali’s south, many residents were only dimly aware of JNIM’s strength, which is most pronounced in the sparsely populated north. “We had known terrorism was a problem,” said Seydou Touré as he pushed his motorcycle down the highway on a blisteringly hot Saturday afternoon in search of gas. “But this showed how capable they are,” he continued. “It surprised us.” The blockade officially began Sept. 3, when a JNIM spokesman announced in a video that the group would obstruct fuel imports from Senegal and Ivory Coast, the countries that provide landlocked Mali with the vast majority of its fuel, along with Guinea and Mauritania. The spokesman also said that citizens were prohibited from leaving Kayes, near the border with Senegal, and Nioro du Sahel, near the border with Mauritania. In the days that followed, militants kidnapped six Senegalese truck drivers on the Malian side of the border and repeatedly set fire to fuel trucks coming from Senegal and Ivory Coast. On Sept. 14, the group attacked a convoy of more than 100 fuel trucks escorted by the Malian army, according to ACLED, burning 51 trucks and killing a number of soldiers. The attacks have continued in recent weeks, with videos of blazing tankers circulating widely on social media. Outside Bamako, the effects were felt almost immediately, producing long lines at gas stations from Mopti , northeast of Bamako, to Kayes in the west. The United Nations — which runs flights across the country to support its humanitarian work — was forced to start pulling from the government’s emergency fuel stockpile in the third week of September, according to a person with direct knowledge of the supplies who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive situation. The price of jet fuel has more than doubled, the person said, contributing to a rash of canceled and delayed flights. Early this month, the shortages began to be felt in Bamako, a sprawling city built along the banks of the Niger River that is home to about 20 percent of Mali’s population. Most of the gas stations here have closed; cars and motorcycles throng the few that still have working pumps. A store owner said many of his shelves were empty because commercial truck drivers from Senegal are too scared to travel. Power outages — already a problem before the blockade — have gotten worse, he said, because there was not enough fuel to power the electrical grid. In Mopti, Mali’s third-largest city, three residents told The Post they had been without electricity for more than two weeks. The situation is “the worst I’ve seen,” the store owner said on a recent afternoon in Bamako, speaking on the condition of anonymity because he feared reprisals from Mali’s increasingly repressive military rulers. “And I fear worse is coming.” A stand with empty bottles selling gas on the side of the road on Oct. 7. (AFP/Getty Images) ‘Too much death’ JNIM was founded in Mali in 2017 as an umbrella organization combining four Islamist extremist groups, and its leaders pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda. Headed by Iyad ag Ghali — a diplomat turned militant from the north — and Amadou Koufa — a preacher from central Mali — it has largely focused its violence on military and government targets as opposed to civilians, helping it build grassroots support in far-flung communities neglected by the state. In the areas JNIM controls, it is now operating with increasing confidence and visibility, said Wassim Nasr, a Sahel specialist and senior research fellow at the Soufan Center. He pointed to recent propaganda videos showing well-armed combatants driving around a Malian town near the border with Burkina Faso in an easily identifiable car. Experts say JNIM has signed agreements with local communities across the Sahel, usually requiring adherence to the group’s strict interpretation of Islamic law — including paying zakat, or tax, in exchange for peace. Often, according to experts, the government is aware of these agreements and does not try to get in the way, an acknowledgment of its ever-shrinking power. Alioune Nouhoum Diallo, a former president of Mali’s parliament who has been involved in local negotiations with militant leaders, told The Post it is time for the government to consider engaging with Ag Ghali and Koufa in a national dialogue about the future character of the state. One possible outcome, he said, would be that Mali becomes an Islamic republic, like neighboring Mauritania. “There has been too much death,” Diallo said in an interview in Bamako. “And the solution the military has put in place has reached its limits.” While some diplomats in the capital fear a Taliban-style takeover of the country, others believe JNIM is more interested in a power-sharing agreement — or in bringing down the current government in the hope that it would be replaced by a friendlier regime, allowing the group to expand the already massive smuggling networks it uses to move drugs, weapons and cattle across West Africa. “I think everyone is stumped on the way forward,” said one of the Western diplomats. “But if this government goes down, it is not clear what other options there are.” Ag Acharatoumane, the member of Mali’s transitional administration, said the government is not yet willing to negotiate with JNIM. But in the long term, he said, “dialogue with those who wish to engage should be considered.” No escape Ag Ali, the Bamako resident, who fled from Timbuktu a decade ago as violence by Islamist militants and separatists racked the north, feels stuck. A musician and an artisan, he said life in the capital had been difficult, but at least his family was safe. Now, the blockade has disrupted their lives and thrown their future into doubt. His loved ones have been largely sequestered at home for weeks; traveling to other parts of the country to perform was out of the question. “To flee only to find you didn’t really flee,” he said, pausing. “I don’t know what to say. It is painful.” In interviews across Bamako, others gave voice to a similar mixture of fear, resignation and deep frustration — not just with the militants but with their leaders. Mali’s government has barred photography at gas stations, citing the “preservation of public order.” But residents saw it as the latest example of the junta’s crackdown on free speech and a futile ploy to salvage its public image. “What I will say is that things are not right,” said Mohamed Sylla, 25, choosing his words carefully. He had pushed his motorcycle taxi for six miles looking for fuel. The authorities, he said, “need to do everything they can to find gas.” A Malian analyst, speaking on the condition of anonymity because he feared reprisals by the state, said the government faced a deepening conundrum. Officials had few options left except to negotiate, he said, but worried negotiations would make them look even weaker. JNIM, he said, “has created a psychosis in this country.” Copyright 2025 The Washington Post

Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. The Independent Nigeria. The Sudanese Alliance for Rights has filed a legal case before the International Criminal Court (ICC) against four senior leaders of the Port Sudan Authority, including Chairman of the Sovereign Council Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, accusing them of using chemical weapons and committing serious violations against civilians. The lawsuit targets army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Yasser al-Atta, Shams al-Din al-Kabashi, and Major General Taher Mohammed, urging the ICC to launch an urgent investigation and hold the officials accountable, in collaboration with a team of international lawyers. This step comes after all efforts by the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to resolve the crisis peacefully have failed, as the Sudanese army refused to engage in any dialogue or adhere to peace agreements, prompting civil society to turn to international justice. The case also highlights continental concerns over the expanding influence of extremist militias allied with Sudanese authorities, which could pose a serious threat to border security and regional stability. Human rights experts emphasize that the initiative represents a proactive move to protect civilians and ensure accountability for military leaders before international justice, as violations continue unabated in conflict zones. © 2025 Independent. All rights reserved.

By Stuart Williams Inmates detained inside one of Iran's largest prisons have for the last two days staged a sit-in protest and a hunger strike against the growing number of executions in the Islamic republic, rights groups said Wednesday. Ghezel Hesar is notorious for the large numbers of hangings inside the prison. Photo: Wikimedia Commons The protest at Ghezel Hesar prison in the city of Karaj outside Tehran was triggered by the transfer of up to 16 inmates to solitary confinement ahead of execution, the Norway-based Iran Human Rights (IHR) and US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) said in separate statements. Prisoners in unit 2 of the prison have, since Monday, refused food rations and staged a sit-in outside their cells in the prison corridors, and were also joined by inmates in other wings, the groups said. Video, which IHR said was filmed from inside the prison, showed prisoners sitting down and chanting slogans including "no to execution". The protest has lasted two days but the situation early Wednesday was not immediately clear. Families of the prisoners also staged a protest outside the prison gates calling for a halt to the death sentences, another video showed. According to IHR, which monitors the number of executions daily, Iran has hanged 1,128 people this year, the highest figure since the group started taking records in 2008. Iran is the world's second most prolific executioner after China, which is believed to execute thousands each year although no precise figures are available, rights groups say. The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the political wing of the People's Mujahedin (MEK) which is outlawed by Iran, said that 1,500 prisoners were involved in the action. It was not immediately possible to verify the figure. It said prison authorities had met with prisoners' representatives to ask them to call off the hunger strike but they had insisted the action would go on until their demands were met. IHR said that two of the prisoners transferred to solitary confinement had been returned to the general ward, but the others remained under imminent threat of execution. "Our patience has run out from all this oppression and the taking of prisoners' and youths' lives. Every day and every week, we witness some of our fellow inmates being sent to the gallows, and many of us spend the night haunted by the nightmare of death and the gallows," said a statement in the name of the prisoners circulating on social media, which could not be immediately verified. Within Iran, the Fars news agency said "counter-revolutionary" media had broadcast video of a prison protest against the execution of inmates who were "extremely violent armed robbers". The judiciary's Mizan news agency said these inmates had already been executed "after the completion of legal procedures" and the video was part of a campaign to "defame Iran's prisons and spread false claims." Ghezel Hesar is notorious for the large numbers of hangings inside the prison. Inmates hanged inside the prison recently in high profile cases include Babak Shahbazi, who was executed on charges of spying for Israel in the wake of the June war with Israel, and Behrouz Ehsani and Mehdi Hassan, who were put to death in July on charges of belonging to the MEK. © 2025 Agence France-Presse

Protests have erupted in Morocco, driven by young people demanding change By: Sam Metz , Akram Oubachir Morocco Youth Protests. Copyright 2025 The Associated Press. Demonstrations in more than a dozen cities have jolted Morocco for weeks, with the young people behind them showing they can translate digital discontent into a real-world movement that authorities can’t ignore. The North African nation is the latest to be rocked by “Gen Z” protests against corruption, lack of opportunity and business as usual. New protests are expected Saturday. Similar movements have risen in countries such as Madagascar , Kenya, Peru and Nepal. They differ in origin but share a common refusal to go through institutions like political parties or unions to be heard. In Morocco, anger has boiled over contrasts between government spending on stadiums in the lead-up to the 2030 FIFA World Cup and a subpar health system that lags behind countries with similarly sized economies. Here’s what to know: Meet the protesters A leaderless collective called Gen Z 212 — named after Morocco’s dialing code — is the engine behind the protests. Members debate strategy on Discord , a chat app popular with gamers and teens. The core group has about 180,000 members, but spinoffs have also sprouted, organizing demonstrations in towns independently. Like other nations swept by Gen Z protests, Morocco is experiencing a youth bulge, with more than half of the population under 35. Yet, as the country pours billions into infrastructure and tourism, unemployment for Moroccans ages 15-24 has climbed to 36%. And with opportunity lacking, more than half of Moroccans under 35 say they have considered emigrating, according to a June survey from non-partisan research network Afrobarometer. When demonstrations turned violent earlier this month, officials said most participants were minors and rights groups said many detained were under 18. What they are protesting Morocco is Africa’s most visited country, appealing to tourists from around the world with its medieval palaces, bustling markets and sweeping mountain and desert landscapes. But not far from tourist routes, the daily reality for most of Morocco’s 37 million people includes soaring costs of living and stagnating wages. The North African Kingdom has made significant strides in lifting standards of living, but development has been uneven and critics say it has exacerbated inequities. Morocco boasts Africa’s only high-speed rail line and is constructing seven new stadiums and renovating seven others in preparation for the World Cup. It plans to spend more than $5 billion on infrastructure for the event, some from the private sector. Yet with a monthly minimum wage of around $300, many languish in poverty in areas where roads are unpaved, hospitals lack doctors and classrooms are underfunded and overcrowded. Morocco has only 7.7 medical professionals per 10,000 inhabitants and far fewer in parts of the south and east where protests have become most heated. The public health system provides more than 80% of care, but accounts for only 40% of spending, with the rest coming from private or out-of-pocket costs. Before Gen Z 212, localized protests against regional inequities and government priorities erupted, including in Al Haouz, where many remain in tents more than two years after a deadly 2023 earthquake. Anger boiled in September after eight women died giving birth in a public hospital in the coastal city of Agadir. Despite its renovated airport and reputation as a destination for tourists, the city is the capital of one of Morocco’s poorest provinces where residents have decried a lack of doctors and quality medical care. Protesters, angry over corruption, have likened the government to a mafia and targeted Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch and Health Minister Amine Tahraoui, his former business associate. Akhannouch, one of Morocco’s richest men, controls most of the country’s gas stations, and one of his companies recently won controversial government contracts for new desalination projects. Morocco’s business interests, including the royal family’s investment fund Al Mada, have also projected substantial profits from World Cup-related developments, including new stadiums, train lines and hotels, according to the magazine Jeune Afrique. Gen Z's key chants Protesters have chanted “Stadiums are here, but where are the hospitals?" in a jab at Morocco’s spending on spectacle projects for the World Cup and what many see as the government's blindness to everyday hardship. “Freedom, dignity and social justice" is another slogan carried over from past movements denouncing limited political freedoms and economic exclusion, without offering specific demands for reform. The protesters' demands Gen Z 212 published a letter addressed to King Mohammed VI asking him to dismiss the government and corrupt political parties, release detainees and convene a government forum to hold officials accountable. The political demands diverged from earlier nebulous calls for dignity and social justice, and reflected a broad sentiment that Morocco has not made serious strides to overcome problems that the king vowed to address during 2017 mass demonstrations. At the time, he acknowledged development had not adequately trickled down to benefit all. Though the king is the country’s highest authority, Gen Z protesters directed their ire at government officials and called on him to oversee reforms. Many on the streets shouted: “The people want the King to intervene." In an address to Parliament this month, the king defended Morocco’s vision for the future, arguing that large-scale projects and social programs can advance together. He mirrored some of the protesters’ grievances but didn’t address the movement directly. “Social justice is not a temporary priority,” he said. “There should be no contradiction or competition between major national projects and social programs, as both share the same goal: developing the country and improving the living conditions of citizens wherever they may be." How the government has responded Security forces have alternated between crackdown and retreat. Riot police and plainclothes officers arrested demonstrators en masse on the weekend of Sept. 27 and 28. Police in a small town outside of Agadir fired on demonstrators they claimed were storming one of their posts in early October, killing three, and a police van rammed into protesters in the eastern city of Oujda, injuring one. But elsewhere, security forces eased their presence, standing aside as rioters and looters set cars ablaze and smashed storefronts. Moroccan courts have handed down a string of convictions tied to the protests, with sentences ranging from four to 20 years for vandalism and incitement, according to Human Rights Watch. After the initial protests, Akhannouch and several of his Cabinet members said the government was open to dialogue with protesters and suggested fortifying existing hospitals with additional staff and opening new medical facilities. But as Moroccans watch stadiums being built in a matter of months, promised changes have rung hollow to many demonstrators since no official has yet proposed redirecting stadium funds to social services. “The government is taking patchwork measures to ease the pressure," Youssef, a 27-year-old demonstrator, said. "Their reforms will take years.” Copyright 2025 The Associated Press.

Morocco continues to gain international backing for its Autonomy Plan for Western Sahara. By: Sara Zouiten The initiative has been recognized by many countries as a realistic and peaceful framework for resolving the decades-long dispute. Rabat – Saudi Arabia and Togo have both renewed their strong support for Morocco’s Autonomy Plan as the most credible and realistic solution to end the regional dispute over the Western Sahara. The two countries voiced their positions on Monday during the sessions of the UN General Assembly’s Fourth Committee in New York. Speaking before the committee, Saudi Arabia ’s representative reaffirmed his country’s “support for the Autonomy Initiative in the Moroccan Sahara within the framework of Morocco’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” He emphasized that the proposal “aligns with international law, the UN Charter, and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.” The Saudi diplomat noted that the UN Security Council welcomed the initiative in successive resolutions since 2007. He also reiterated Riyadh’s backing of Morocco’s efforts to reach a political solution to the dispute, based on compromise and under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General. In a separate statement, Togo’s representative, Koffi Akakpo, echoed similar support, describing the Moroccan Autonomy Plan as “the most credible, realistic, and pragmatic basis” for achieving a lasting political solution. He said the plan “strikes a balance between local self-governance and respect for Morocco’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” adding that it remains “the best option for a negotiated solution guided by realism and a sense of responsibility.” Akakpo also spoke about the growing international support for Morocco’s sovereignty over its southern provinces, citing the opening of numerous consulates by Arab, African, American, and Asian countries in Laayoune and Dakhla, including one from Togo. These diplomatic representations reflect “increasing recognition of the Moroccan Sahara as a hub of development, stability, and regional cooperation,” he said. The Togolese diplomat further commended Morocco’s efforts to promote economic and social development in its southern regions, saying these initiatives have “improved living conditions, strengthened democratic participation, and consolidated regional stability.” He added that these steps demonstrate Morocco’s “clear determination to integrate its southern provinces into the country’s broader development and regional cooperation strategy.” Akakpo also expressed concern over the humanitarian situation in the Tindouf camps in Algeria, calling for “transparent mechanisms” to protect the rights of the camp’s residents and ensure regular humanitarian access. He commended Morocco’s respect for the ceasefire and its continued cooperation with the UN peacekeeping mission, MINURSO. He concluded by reaffirming Togo’s support for the UN-led political process and the efforts of the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara to advance dialogue and revive negotiations. Growing support for Morocco’s position Morocco has continued to gain international backing for its Autonomy Plan, which it first presented to the United Nations in 2007. The plan proposes granting the region broad self-governance under Moroccan sovereignty, an approach that has since been recognized by many countries as a realistic and peaceful framework for resolving the decades-long dispute. In recent years, dozens of countries have opened consulates in the cities of Laayoune and Dakhla to symbolize their recognition of Morocco’s authority over the territory. Several African and Arab nations, along with major global partners such as the United States, Spain, France, and the UK, have also expressed clear support for Morocco’s initiative. The US recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over the Sahara in 2020, while Spain described the autonomy plan as “the most serious, realistic, and credible” basis for resolving the dispute in 2022.  The UK is one of the latest additions to this list, having recognized Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara earlier this year. Morocco, for its part, continues to invest heavily in the development of its southern provinces. Projects in infrastructure, renewable energy, and education have transformed the region into a growing economic and logistics hub linking Morocco with sub-Saharan Africa. © 2025 Morocco World News

Guinea’s 6.7 million voters eligible to cast a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote on a new constitution. Sept. 21, 2025 A polling official holds referendum ballots at a polling station in Conakry, Guinea [Misper Apawu/AP] Guinea is holding a long-awaited referendum on a new constitution that could allow coup leader Mamady Doumbouya to run for president and would transition the African nation from military to civilian rule. Polls opened and will close later on Sunday for the 6.7 million eligible voters to cast a “yes” or “no” vote on a new constitution that would lengthen the presidential term from five to seven years, renewable once, and create a Senate, one-third of whose members the president would directly appoint. In the capital, Conakry, where political campaigning was banned on Friday and Saturday, people gathered at polling stations early on Sunday to cast their votes. Reporting from Conakry, Al Jazeera’s Ahmed Idris said the government has deployed security officers with a government statement outlining that “more than 40,000 security personnel have been deployed to provide security for this election”. “People are expecting that the referendum will result in the approval of the draft constitution that some people call impressive and progressive,” Idris said. “However, people who are opposed to this referendum are saying it will legitimise the current military rulership to participate in the election. The transitional charter said, in fact, no member of the current military government will participate, but a lot of people fear that the referendum will result in a constitution that will allow every member of this government to participate in the [next] election,” he added. Critics are closely watching the referendum, fearing that this is the latest attempt by the government to legitimise its rule on a continent where eight coups since 2023 in West and Central Africa have changed the political landscape. The referendum has also been criticised as a power grab by Doumbouya. His military-led government missed a December deadline it had set to return the government to civilian rule after he had seized power four years ago. A presidential election is scheduled to take place in December. While the military leader has not yet said if he would run in the presidential election, a transitional charter adopted by his government after it took power said coup members would be barred from standing in the next elections. Sunday’s vote is likely to pass as two of the prominent opposition leaders, Cellou Dalein Diallo and deposed former President Alpha Conde, have called for a boycott of the vote. Both Diallo’s and Conde’s parties are currently suspended with Human Rights Watch accusing the military government of disappearing political opponents, which it has denied. The results of the election are expected within the next two to three days, Idris said. © 2025 Al Jazeera Media Network

A long-awaited report commissioned by Senegal into the 1944 killing of dozens of African soldiers by French forces was to be handed to President Bassirou Diomaye Faye on Thursday. Officials hope it will clarify the disputed death toll from the Thiaroye massacre. Issued on:16/10/2025 A general view shows the graves of the Senegalese infantrymen killed on 1 December, 1944 by the French army at the Thiaroye military cemetery in Dakar, on 26 November, 2024. AFP - SEYLLOU The shootings took place at the Thiaroye military camp just outside Dakar after African troops who had fought for France in World War II protested against delays in pay. Many details remain unclear, including the number of soldiers killed, their identities and the burial sites of the victims. Those killed were not only Senegalese but also men from other West African countries. In April 2024 Senegalese authorities established a committee of researchers to create the report to submit to the government . A press release from the Senegalese Government Information Office on Wednesday said the white paper was “a product of rigorous research, documentation and focus” and aimed to “shed light on the circumstances surrounding the massacre, honour the memory of the victims, and promote shared historical recognition among the nations concerned”. Soldiers return to Dakar Around 1,600 soldiers from West Africa who had been captured by Germany while fighting for France were sent back to Dakar in November 1944. After arriving at the Thiaroye military camp, discontent mounted over unpaid wages and demands to be treated on a par with white soldiers. Some protesters refused to return to their home countries without their due. French forces opened fire on 1 December, killing at least 35 people, French authorities said at the time. Historians say the real death toll could be as high as 400. The Senegalese government accuses France of withholding archival documents that would shed light on the death toll. Earlier this year, Biram Senghor , the only known descendant of a Senegalese rifleman killed in Thiaroye, filed a legal complaint against the French state, accusing it of concealing mass graves and blocking justice. In July 2024, six soldiers killed at Thiaroye – including Biram's father M’Bap Senghor – were officially recognised as having "died for France", a symbolic gesture that Senegalese advocates say falls short of justice. France maintains that relevant archives have been opened, citing a  2014 pledge  by former president François Hollande. But critics say access remains complicated. Last November, France acknowledged the massacre the day before commemoration of its 80th anniversary, which Senegal marked on an unprecedented scale. © 2025 Copyright RFI

By: Republic of Croatia: Ministry of Justice, Public Administration and Digital Transformation On 8 October 2025, the training was presented at the premises of the Ministry of Justice, Public Administration and Digital Transformation as part of the joint project of the EU, the Council of Europe and the Ministry "Implementing the Barnahus Model in Croatia" The event brought together the first group of twenty experts, including advisers, judges and state attorneys at county and municipal levels throughout Croatia. This guided training is adapted to the Croatian legal framework and aims to strengthen the capacity of professionals working for and with children, and it contributes to Croatia's commitment to implementing the Barnahus model. It is a leading European model of response to child sexual exploitation and sexual abuse that seeks to coordinate criminal investigations, with all relevant services under one roof, in order to prevent secondary victimisation of children. This group will undergo a three-month personalised training run by tutor Lara Barberic and supported by High Criminal Court Judge Lana Petö Kujundžić and Zagreb County Court Judge Dijana Rizvić. The programme combines international and national standards with practical Croatian case studies. The objectives of the training are to: Improve the skills and competencies of professionals for detecting, responding to and preventing child sexual exploitation and sexual abuse in a child-friendly, gender-sensitive and rights-based manner. Promote better coordination between institutions involved in child protection - ensuring that legal, medical and social welfare responses are coherent and mutually reinforcing. Encourage consistent and effective application of international standards, in particular those established by the Lanzarote Convention, in all relevant institutions in Croatia. Foster a professional culture that does not see children as passive beneficiaries of protection, but as rights holders whose voices and best interests must be at the heart of any decision and intervention. In her introductory speech, Project Manager of the project ‘Implementing the Barnahus Model in Croatia’ Ana Kordej reiterated and highlighted the Croatian commitment to establishing Barnahus units. She was joined by Tomislav Briški, Secretary General of the Croatian Judicial Academy, and Zaruhi Gasparyan, Head of Cooperation and Capacity Building Unit at the Children's Rights Division of the Council of Europe, who emphasized the importance of training in the protection of children's rights.  Marlena Jukić, Croatian representative in the Committee of States Parties to the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (Lanzarote Committee) gave a keynote presentation on the Lanzarote Convention, highlighting the various monitoring rounds in which Croatia participated and country-specific recommendations issued. Copyright © 2025 Ministry of Justice, Public Administration and Digital Tranformation.

Israel said Palestinian militants attacked its forces across cease-fire lines and launched a wave of attacks on Gaza. Both sides still say they are committed to the truce. Smoke rising in southern Gaza after airstrikes on Sunday. Ramadan Abed/Reuters By Isabel Kershner October 19, 2025 Israel on Sunday launched its heaviest wave of attacks on Gaza since a fragile cease-fire took hold a week ago and said it was suspending humanitarian aid to the territory after accusing Hamas of firing on its forces and violating the truce. Israel said two of its soldiers were killed in combat in Gaza on Sunday. Gaza’s health ministry initially reported 14 Palestinian deaths across Gaza on Sunday. Both Israel and Hamas have now accused each other of violating the truce after repeated flare-ups of violence over the past three days. But both made clear on Sunday that they were still committed to maintaining the truce. The transfer of aid into Gaza has been halted until further notice, according to two Israeli officials who requested anonymity to discuss sensitive issues. Earlier in the day, the Israeli military said Palestinian militants had attacked its forces across cease-fire lines in Gaza, and it launched airstrikes in retaliation. It said the Palestinian fighters had fired an anti-tank missile at its troops and then shot at them in the Rafah area of southern Gaza that remains under Israeli control, according to the cease-fire agreement. The military called this “a blatant violation” of the truce. In response, the military said, Israeli forces struck in the area “to eliminate the threat” and dismantle tunnel shafts and other military structures. Later Sunday, the military intensified its attacks, saying it struck dozens of Hamas targets throughout the Gaza Strip. Hamas’s military wing said in a statement that it was “unaware of any events or clashes taking place in the Rafah area,” saying they had lost contact with their fighters there. Israeli forces also struck a group of people they identified as armed militants crossing the cease-fire line in northern Gaza, according to an Israeli military official who spoke on condition of anonymity under army rules. Although the military’s statement did not mention Hamas by name, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel blamed the group for the latest violence. He said he had consulted with his defense minister and security chiefs and had instructed them to act forcefully against militant targets in Gaza. It added that it has had no contact with its fighters in the Rafah area since an earlier, temporary cease-fire collapsed in March and therefore has “no connection to any events taking place in those areas.” A Hamas official, Izzat al-Rishq, in a separate statement on Sunday accused Israel of continuing to violate the truce and of fabricating “flimsy pretexts to justify its crimes.” On Friday, the Israeli military fired on a vehicle in northern Gaza , killing at least nine people, including four children, according to a Gaza rescue service that is part of the territory’s Hamas-run Interior Ministry. In relation to that episode, the Israeli military said that the vehicle had crossed over a demarcation line where Israel’s forces have withdrawn to under the terms of the cease-fire. The military added that its forces had fired on the vehicle, which it described as “suspicious,” after the vehicle ignored warning shots. The Israeli military has repeatedly warned civilians not to cross the new lines or approach its troops in the Israeli-held areas but many Gazans — either lacking internet, puzzling over unclear maps, or simply lost in the devastated enclave — have at times been unsure about whether they have entered a restricted area. After Sunday’s violence, members of Mr. Netanyahu’s hard-line government immediately called for a full resumption of Israel’s offensive against Hamas, the militant group that led the Oct. 7, 2023, attack against Israel that set off the war. Itamar Ben-Gvir, the ultranationalist minister of national security, called for a resumption of fighting “at full strength.” Any notions that Hamas would abide by the cease-fire agreement, he added, “are predictably proving dangerous to our security.” Mr. Ben-Gvir was among the far-right ministers opposed to the cease-fire in the first place, believing that Israel should have continued fighting until Hamas was fully defeated. Israel still controls about half the territory in Gaza and has accused Hamas fighters of operating out of tunnels beneath areas still under Israeli control. Israeli officials have also expressed frustration over the slow pace at which Hamas has been handing over the remains of deceased captives as part of the cease-fire deal. Hamas has freed the last 20 living Israeli hostages and turned over the bodies of 12 captives over the past week, according to the Israeli government. A 13th body that Hamas handed over to Israel was found by forensic experts not to match any of the captives. Israel has freed almost 2,000 Palestinian prisoners and sent the bodies of more than 100 Palestinians to Gaza. Israel identified two dead hostages whose bodies were handed over late Saturday as Ronen Engel, 54, and Sonthaya Oakkharasri, 30, a Thai citizen who had been working in agriculture in Be’eri, a border community. Mr. Engel was killed in Nir Oz, another Israeli border community ravaged during the Hamas-led attack on Israel in 2023. His body was taken to Gaza. The bodies of 16 other captives still remain in Gaza, according to the Israeli government. Hamas has said repeatedly that it will be difficult to locate and recover all of them. Some are buried deep under rubble and require heavy equipment to extract them. Reporting was contributed by Gabby Sobelman, Johnatan Reiss, Abu Bakr Bashir and Iyad Abuheweila. Isabel Kershner , a Times correspondent in Jerusalem, has been reporting on Israeli and Palestinian affairs since 1990. © 2025 The New York Times Company . All rights reserved.