The most recent Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) offers up a familiar diet of truths, half-truth, and outright distortions and misrepresentations. It is a “feel good” document, designed to convince readers in the international community that while things are not ideal in Darfur, they are getting better. It helps that Guterres relies so heavily in reporting about UNAMID on the reporting of UNAMID itself, which has proved appallingly self-serving and grossly inadequate in previous reporting. Here is important to recall the egregious reporting failures—over more than a decade—of this failing mission (a particularly notorious case appears as Appendix A). Guterres’ Report and Sexual Violence in Darfur Shortcomings in reporting on cases of sexual violence are arguably the most disturbing and statistically dramatic example of UNAMID’s failure to provide the kind of information that would allow for an adequate assessment of human security in Darfur. Perhaps most notoriously, UNAMID failed to find any evidence of rape in Tabit, North Darfur (October 2014), following its belated investigation mission. In February 2015, Human Rights Watch published its authoritative report on Tabit: The 48-page report, “Mass Rape in Darfur: Sudanese Army Attacks Against Civilians in Tabit,” documents Sudanese army attacks in which at least 221 women and girls were raped in Tabit over 36 hours beginning on October 30, 2014. The mass rapes would amount to crimes against humanity if found to be part of a widespread or systematic attack on the civilian population. (Human Rights Watch, February 2015) And in fact, the rape of many tens of thousands of Darfuri non-Arab/African women and girls over the past fifteen years has been a primary weapon of war in the Khartoum regime’s genocidal counter-insurgency (see my brief monograph and data spreadsheet on sexual violence for the two-year period of January 2014 – December 2015 | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1QG/ ). Sexual violence continues to be dramatically under-reported and poorly investigated by UNAMID, which now operates at much reduced strength. The June 2017 Security Council resolution (2363) dramatically reduced UNAMID’s presence in Darfur: 44 percent of the troops strength is being withdrawn and 30 percent of the police force. This dramatic reduction in force size ensures that what has always been poor or non-existent reporting will decline in quality and quantity (the statistics cited by Guterres are virtually all from UNAMID and are transparently inadequate, particularly on questions of humanitarian access). As a counter-weight to the figures provided to the Secretary-General by UNAMID—and on which he relies without evident skepticism—Radio Dabanga just today reports: Figures from South Darfur on sexual violence against children in 2017 released this week paint a dismal picture, with four to six new cases reported to police in the state every day. Government sources acknowledge that the actual number might be far higher. According to official statistics released in the South Darfur state capital of Nyala, there were 1,800 reports of sexual assaults on children in the 21 localities of South Darfur during 2017. A government source said that 70 per cent of the complaints were filed by the newly established children’s court in Nyala, set-up in response to an increase in cases. Other reports have been filed to the police and prosecution as a result of incomplete investigations. An official source at the family and children’s office said the rate of sexual assaults on children ranged from four to six cases a day. “South Darfur: ‘Four to six reports of sex assault on children a day in 2017’” | Radio Dabanga, March 9, 2018 | Nyala ) This is from Khartoum’s own regional officials, and for children only—and only for South Darfur. Reading Guterres’ report one would never begin to understand the overwhelming scale of sexual violence in Darfur. Here he is entirely consistent with former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who in two of his mandated quarterly reports on UNAMID failed to mention sexual violence even once. A much better guide to the current situation is the recent statement by Gurerres’ Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Pramila Patten. I cite at length here her most important remarks from February 27, 2018, reported only by Sudan Tribune (February 27, 2018) and Radio Dabanga (March 1, 2018) (contextualizing commentary from Radio Dabanga): “A key observation from my visit to Sudan is the existence of a deep-seated culture of denial which enhances and feeds the culture of silence about sexual violence. Unlike victims of other crimes where perpetrators are condemned, it is usually the victims of sexual violence who are shamed or stigmatised. As a result, victims of sexual violence are very often fearful of reporting the crime or seeking assistance, further compounding their suffering. Because sexual violence is so vastly underreported, the lack of reported cases cannot be equated with the absence of violence. It deeply saddened me to hear interlocutors in Sudan doubting and questioning victims as well as the appalling nature of these crimes. The pervasive culture of denial is the most serious obstacle to eradicating this heinous crime.” Special Representative Patten observes in her statement that in many of her meetings, “senior government officials explained that there is no sexual violence in Sudan because such violence is strictly prohibited by the Islamic religion.” Patten argues that “no religion or faith, however, is immune from sexual violence. Paradoxically, religious institutions can provide much needed emotional and social support, but may also perpetuate silence when they use religion to deny that sexual violence occurred in the first place. I therefore call upon religious leaders in Sudan to speak out on the need to protect and support survivors, and to hold perpetrators accountable…” “During my brief visit, I learned that women continue to be raped while collecting water or firewood, or when they leave camps to pursue livelihood activities. I also heard from women who are unable to return to their pre-war homes due to the absence of security and fears of being raped. In addition, women told me about sexual violence committed in the context of inter-communal conflicts over land and natural resources…” “In El Fasher, I met with the Prosecutor General of the Special Court for Darfur, which has jurisdiction over conflict-related crimes committed in Darfur since February 2003. I was dismayed to learn that, to date, the Special Prosecutor’s Office has not investigated a single case of conflict-related sexual violence. In contrast, there continue to be references to conflict-related sexual violence in Security Council resolutions and reports relating to Sudan, including those of the Secretary-General, the International Commission of Inquiry established under UN Security Council resolution 1564 (2004), the Panel of Experts on Sudan established under UN Security Council resolution 1591 (2005) and the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women. I also learned that there are no female judges in any of the five states of Darfur. There is a need for female judges as well as more female police investigators and prosecutors.” “In Khartoum, I had the opportunity to meet representatives of NGOs, including women human rights defenders. I observed, however, that NGOs feel restricted from voicing their views or carrying out programmes on conflict-related sexual violence for fear of reprisal and other consequences. A society in which women human rights defenders have the freedom and space to be vocal and proactive is a society in which women flourish and participate in decision-making, and in which there is absolute intolerance for sexual violence.” Special Representative Patten underlines that “sexual violence in conflict ruins the lives of individuals, destroys families, breaks up communities and prevents societies from achieving sustainable peace. For too long, sexual violence in conflict has gone unacknowledged and unpunished. There must be no doubt that perpetrators of sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations will be held accountable. To this end, my office stands ready to support efforts to prevent and respond to conflict-related sexual violence. However, we can only do so where governments are genuinely committed to combatting conflict-related sexual violence and are willing to translate that commitment into concrete actions and results,” Patten concludes. How can such a damning assessment—reflecting what has been reported by human rights and humanitarian organizations for many years—be ignored by the UN Secretary-General, which is precisely what Guterres has done in his report on UNAMID, coming as it did in the midst of Patten’s assessment mission in Sudan (February 19 – 25)? How could he even presume to speak about UNAMID, Darfur, and sexual violence knowing such a consequential mission was underway? Patten’s statement gives new meaning to many of Guterres’ claims: “The overall security situation in Darfur has remained stable” (§2). If “stability includes “1,800 reports of sexual assaults on children in the 21 localities of South Darfur during 2017”—and South Darfur is no more or less “secure” that Central and North Darfur—what does this say about the status quo? How are we to make sense of Guterres’ statistical summary of UNAMID’s findings about sexual violence in all of Darfur: “There were 35 cases of sexual and gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence, in the form of rape and attempted rape, involving 43 victims, including 22 children (with one male minor)…”? Again, Radio Dabanga today reports, “South Darfur: ‘Four to six reports of sex assault on children a day in 2017.’” Guterres blithely reports: The Women’s Protection Network reported that two girls aged 12 and 13, and a 22-year-old woman were allegedly gang raped on 16 December 2017 by eight armed men at Kargo, 10 km east of Nertiti. The incident was reported to Sudan Police and one suspect was apprehended and is awaiting prosecution.” But Patten reports: “In El Fasher, I met with the Prosecutor General of the Special Court for Darfur, which has jurisdiction over conflict-related crimes committed in Darfur since February 2003. I was dismayed to learn that, to date, the Special Prosecutor’s Office has not investigated a single case of conflict-related sexual violence. The disconnect between the reality of sexual violence in Darfur, on the one hand, and UNAMID’s reporting on and Khartoum’s responding to that reality on the other, is simply shocking and reveals the deepest disingenuousness and/or culpable ignorance. Insecurity on Other Fronts Guterres’ assemblage of data from UNAMID about violence in other forms is of a piece with his reporting on sexual violence. In broadest terms, Guterres never squarely confronts the implications of 2.7 million persons remaining internally displaced in Darfur (the figure cited in the June 2017 Security Council resolution), and another 320,000 Darfuri refugees in eastern Chad (see the UN chart, reflecting UNHCR’s figure, in Appendix B)—more than three million Darfuris, overwhelmingly non-Arab/African. This is almost half the pre-war population of Darfur, and does not reflect the terrible mortality total from violence over the past 15 years (now in excess of 500,000 human beings, again overwhelming non-Arab/African (see | http://wp.me/p45rOG-AB ). Continued displacement reflects the judgments of those displaced that returning to their homes and villages and lands is simply too dangerous. Their farms have been largely violently expropriated by Arab militia groups and armed opportunists, and this fact more than any other accounts for whatever diminishment of violence we have seen in Darfur (for an account of this violent expropriation of farmland and its implications for any just peace in Darfur, see | https://wp.me/p45rOG-1P4 ). And yet Guterres barely touches on the issue, preferring instead to talk about the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) (July 2011) as if it were still a viable diplomatic vehicle. It is not, and any who are honest—including U.S. government officials and many other diplomatic observers—acknowledge as much, if only privately. The DDPD is a fig-leaf—an excuse for not finding a more effective diplomatic initiative. Guterres’ unctuous deploring of the absence of peace in Darfur takes no account of the failure of the DDPD, now representing almost seven years of failure and bad faith on the part of the Khartoum regime: It is regrettable, however, that no tangible progress has been made in finding a comprehensive political solution to the conflict in Darfur. The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur constitutes a viable framework for the peace process in Darfur and I call upon the rebel groups to demonstrate leadership and courage by engaging positively in its implementation for the benefit of the Darfuris. In this regard, I commend the continued efforts made by the African Union High-level Implementation Panel,supported by the African Union-United Nations Joint Special Representative, to bring the parties to the negotiation table. (§51) Guterres himself acknowledges that despite the almost seven years since the signing of the DDPD, the Khartoum regime has yet to implement key elements of the document in Darfur. And given the ongoing collapse of the Sudanese economy—something Guterres again glosses over, with only a few passing comments about the catastrophic 2018 budget—there is no way that Khartoum will expend the resources required to fulfill its obligations under the DDPD. Guterres simply ignores this basic reality. Nor does Guterres acknowledge the flaws built into the DDPD, including an almost total absence of participation in or acceptance of the agreement by Darfuri civil society, or the major rebel groups on the ground. The DDPD was the expedient contrivance of the Qataris, Muamar Gadhafi, U.S. special representative for Sudan Scott Gration, and the Khartoum regime, which controlled the agenda and the participants in the negotiations. No agreement based on such flimsy construction and participation can possibly succeed. And Guterres celebration of the work of a corrupt and inept Thabo Mbeki and his “African Union High-Level Implementation Panel” (i.e., implementation of Mbeki’s 2009 “Roadmap to Nowhere,” which was also dead on arrival) is simply expedient and disingenuous. Guterres, like his predecessor UN Secretaries-General, simply refuses to acknowledge that peace will not come to Darfur without a fundamentally different regime in Khartoum. The present National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime—fighting for its life amidst the economic disaster it has created—has no incentive to change tactics. It will not rein in the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which have been implicated in far more instances of violent assaults on civilians than Guterres acknowledges. Indeed, the savage RSF remains the primary “military muscle” exercised by the regime in Darfur, and its brutality in carrying out the “disarmament campaign” is given only exceedingly slim acknowledgement by Guterres. (On the character of the RSF, see | “Men With No Mercy”: Rapid Support Forces Attacks Against Civilians in Darfur, Sudan,” Human Rights Watch | September 9, 2015 .) Moreover, Guterres has nothing to say about Khartoum’s repeated, increasingly insistent threats to dismantle the camps and compel displaced persons to return to their “homes,” which no longer exist or are hopelessly insecure. He has far too little to say about the violence directed against the camps by Khartoum’s regular and militia forces. And he has nothing of use to say about the essential issue for peace in Darfur, a full and just addressing of the need for land restitution. Lands seized violently by Arab militias on Khartoum’s behalf (and of course opportunistically) must be returned to their rightful owners. The DDPD does nothing remotely adequate on this score, nor does Mbeki’s worthless “Roadmap for Peace in Darfur.” Until this fundamental diplomatic truth is acknowledged, Darfur will remain a cauldron of suffering and destruction—in which UN Secretary-General Guterres has now made himself complicit. Appendix A: UNAMID and the Tabarat Massacre There have been few examples more revealing of UNAMID impotence and cowardice than the Tabarat (North Darfur) massacre of September 2011—coming just three months of the signing of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. The singular news dispatch (Tabarat was never accessed by UNAMID) came from prize-winning journalist Opheera McDoom for Reuters: Darfur attack survivors tell of brutal killings | KHARTOUM | Fri Sep 17, 2010 (Reuters) Darfuri men were shot dead at point blank range during a surprise Arab militia raid on a busy market this month in which at least 39 people were killed and almost 50 injured, eyewitnesses said on Friday. The attack on civilians was reminiscent of the early years of the counter-insurgency operation in Sudan’s west, which took up arms against the government in 2003, complaining that the region had been neglected by Khartoum The International Criminal Court in The Hague has since issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir for genocide and war crimes in Darfur, charges he denies. Details of the September 2 attack on the market in the village of Tabarat have not previously come to light. The government prevented peacekeepers from visiting the site until days later. But five survivors of the attack told Reuters that heavily armed Arab militia had targeted male victims and shot many at point blank range. One diplomat said the militia were likely from among those armed and mobilized by the government to quell the rebels. Those militia, known as Janjaweed, were responsible for mass rape, murder and looting. Many of the tribal militia still support the government but Khartoum has lost control over some. In Tabarat, men were rounded up by militia wearing military uniforms who rode into the market on horses and camels pretending to be buying goods before spraying the shops with gunfire. Then vehicles mounted with machine guns and carrying militia fighters appeared and rounded up some of the men, survivors said. “They laid them down and they came up close and shot them in their heads,” Abakr Abdelkarim, 45, told Reuters by telephone from the town of Tawilla, where many of the victims had sought refuge and medical help. “(Those killed) were all men and one woman—some men were tied with rope behind the cars and dragged until they died.” RUN FOR HIS LIFE Adam Saleh said he had run for his life and hidden in nearby fields to watch from afar. “They were targeting men—all of them were shot in the head and chest, only those who were running away got shot in their legs and arms.” Nour Abdallah, 45, said the attackers let most of the women run away. She could not escape and so lay face down in the dirt. “They told me not to lift my head up or I would be shot too.” Saleh and others said after the attack they had gone to the joint UN-African Union (UNAMID) peacekeeping base in Tawilla to ask peacekeepers to come to Tabarat but they had refused. “They also refused to come and help us recover the bodies,” Saleh added. UNAMID has said both rebels and the government prevented it getting access to the area. [The claim by UNAMID that it was prevented by “rebels” from accessing Tabarat is almost certainly a self-exculpating lie—ER]. A UNAMID spokesman said he could not comment on the witness reports but an internal document seen by Reuters showed UNAMID had received similar witness reports of men being executed. The only aid agency working in Tawilla, Médecins Sans Frontières said it could confirm 39 people died and it had treated 46 injured, many with “serious gunshot wounds.” “We saw only men,” said MSF head of mission Alessandro Tuzza. He said he could not comment on how the victims were shot but that MSF was still negotiating with the government to get access to the area in North Darfur province. The witnesses said they had buried 41 bodies in common graves but more were still in the bushes around the market. Sudan’s army denied involvement in the attack and said the local government was investigating. “The North Darfur government have formed a security committee to investigate this.” Presidential adviser Ghazi Salaheddin visited the area on Friday on a fact-finding mission. Kidnapping and violent banditry have become frequent in Darfur where years of impunity and the ready availability of arms have fueled a breakdown in law and order, with foreign workers targeted for abductions even in the main towns. Bashir expelled 13 of the largest aid agencies working in Darfur after the ICC arrest warrant last year and many gaps in the humanitarian operation have yet to be filled. http://sudanreeves.org/2018/03/09/report-on-unamid-in-darfur-by-secretary-general-antonio-guterres-more-misrepresentations-than-truth/ (c) 2018 SUDAN Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

Developments on the Korean peninsula have been dizzying, from talk of war, to hints of diplomacy, to symbolic gestures and now this: the acceptance by U.S. President Donald Trump of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) leader Kim Jong-un’s invitation to direct talks. Coming on the heels of the announcement of the first inter-Korean summit in a decade and of Pyongyang’s decision to freeze nuclear and missile tests, this represents an important opening for diplomacy that should not be wasted. At a minimum, prospects of a meeting (the first between an incumbent U.S. leader and his North Korean counterpart) can lower tensions on the Korean peninsula and, critically, mitigate risks – for the time being at least – of the U.S. and North Korea sliding toward a catastrophic confrontation. In the best-case scenario, it might pave the way for a longer-term solution to the decades-old Korean crisis. But optimism and hope must be tempered by caution: serious preparation by all sides will be required ahead of talks to calibrate and align expectations, and to prevent a failed summit that could quickly take the crisis back to the brink. The 8 March announcement follows the latest round of talks between North and South Korean officials, including a dinner hosted by Kim, during which he expressed willingness to meet the U.S. president and in return freeze tests of nuclear and ballistic missiles, while turning a blind eye to U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises. South Korean National Security Adviser Chung Eui-yong, who led the South Korean delegation to those talks, conveyed Kim’s message to U.S. officials, including President Trump himself. The North Koreans’ willingness to meet a U.S. president is not new; that long has been their goal. Nor is their willingness to put denuclearisation on the table novel; part of the regime’s mantra for years has been that denuclearisation is tied to an end to U.S. threats, a standard as hard to define as it will be to meet. Rather, what is new is that the U.S. president accepted the invitation, and that North Korea appears willing to take several steps to make this happen. The announcement was all the more unusual insofar as it appears to have been preceded by little direct diplomacy between U.S. and North Korean officials – indeed, by little preparation within the U.S. administration itself, where most officials seem to have been taken by surprise. Now, urgent tasks are at hand to maximise chances that this high-stakes summit is successful. To begin, South Korea and the U.S. should work as closely as possible, in consultation with China, Japan and Russia, to develop a realistic agenda for engagement between Washington and Pyongyang. For the U.S., a first step will be to appoint a credible team to prepare for the meeting, drawing on the rich pool of expertise in the country on both sides of the partisan divide. Initial goals would have to be modest: reestablishing U.S.-North Korean contacts, building relations between officials on both sides, and ensuring that expectations as to the desired result of the summit meeting are understood and shared in advance. That will be no easy feat: the U.S. is asking for concrete steps toward total denuclearisation; North Korea conditions this on steps to guarantee its security, ultimately including the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear umbrella from South Korea. Adjusting and aligning those expectations ahead of the meeting will be essential to its success. Concrete gestures of goodwill in advance of the talks also would help. Pyongyang could actively facilitate the search for remains of U.S. Korean War dead on its territory. Washington and Seoul could stress that any forthcoming joint military exercises are solely designed to ensure force readiness, and they should avoid provocative drills such as those simulating invasions of North Korea or the killing of DPRK leaders. Restarting the reunion of families separated by the Korean War – which has been on hold since October 2015 – is not only the right thing to do but would generate positive sentiment toward the dialogue process among South Koreans. In 2000, when then South Korean President Kim Dae-jung decided to visit Pyongyang, several of his advisers cautioned against it, saying that insufficient practical progress had been made elsewhere, and that the pageantry of a summit ought to wait. Today’s situation, while different in important respects, shares similarities. One risk is that Kim will offer little in return for the meeting, while portraying it as evidence that his nuclear weapons programme has forced the U.S. to treat him as an equal. There is another risk: that Trump will expect too much from the meeting, notably steps toward immediate denuclearisation, which will set the stage for a return to sabre-rattling and brinkmanship when that goal is unmet. Those dangers are far outweighed by the potential benefits of U.S.-North Korean dialogue. But they mean that groundwork for the talks will be critical. Undoing decades of hostility and complex strategic dilemmas takes time. Ambition and hope need to come hand in hand with patience and realism. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/korean-peninsula/cautious-hope-ahead-us-north-korea-meeting?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=e40f5971ed-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_03_09&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-e40f5971ed-359909997 (c) 2018 International Crisis Group

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) condemns the sentences ranging from two to seven years in prison that 25 Turkish journalists received on 8 March in a political mass trial in Istanbul targeting opposition journalists. Only one of the 26 journalists on trial was acquitted. The sentences were issued late yesterday after the 25 journalists were convicted of supporting or being members of the movement led by US-based Muslim preacher Fethullah Gülen, regarded by the Turkish government as a “terrorist organization” and blamed for an attempted coup in July 2016. “We condemn these sentences as an act of political despotism, not an act of justice,” RSF secretary-general Christophe Deloire said. “After this trial, we must conclude that no vestige of the rule of law remains in Turkey. Once again, we call for the immediate release of all journalists convicted arbitrarily.” Nine of the journalists – Ahmet Memiş, Ali Akkuş, Orhan Kuloğlu, Mustafa Erkan Acar, Oguz Usluer, Davut Aydın, Ufuk Şanlı, Yetkin Yıldız and Cuma Ulus – were sentenced to seven years and three months in prison on a charge of “membership of a terrorist organization.” Fourteen other journalists were sentenced to six years and three months in prison on the same charge. They were Cihan Acar, Bünyamin Köseli, İbrahim Balta, Bayram Kaya, Cemal Azmi Kalyoncu, Habip Güler, Büşra Erdal, Mutlu Çölgeçen, Ünal Tanık, Yakup Çetin, Seyid Kılıç, Hüseyin Aydın, Abdullah Kılıç and Gökçe Fırat Çulhaoğlu. Atilla Tas, a columnist for the Meydan daily newspaper, was sentenced to three years, one month and 15 days in prison for “support for a terrorist organization without being a member,” while the journalist Murat Aksoy was sentenced to two years and one month in prison on the same charge. The court ordered the immediate arrest of Ali Akkuş, the former editor of the Zaman daily newspaper, to begin serving his sentence. Akkus was granted a conditional release during the trial. Most of the other journalists spent more than 18 months in provisional detention pending the trial’s outcome. The only journalist to be acquitted was Muhterem Tanik. Turkey is ranked 155th out of 180 countries in RSF’s 2017 World Press Freedom Index. The already worrying media situation has become critical under the state of emergency proclaimed after the July 2016 coup attempt. Around 150 media outlets have been closed, mass trials are being held and the country now holds the world recordfor the number of professional journalists detained. https://rsf.org/en/news/istanbul-trial-ends-jail-sentences-25-turkish-journalists (c) 2018 Reporters Without Borders

Amnesty International, ARTICLE 19, European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, PEN Belgium/Flanders, PEN Nederland, PEN International and Reporters Without Borders continue to follow the criminal proceedings against the reporters and other staff ofCumhuriyet newspaper with great concern. Several international observers will also be present at the sixth hearing, taking place on Friday 9 March 2018. ‘This trial is a chilling illustration of the steep deterioration of freedom of expression and the rule of law in Turkey since the attempted coup of July 2016’, said Gauri van Gulik, Amnesty International’s Europe Director. ‘Murat Sabuncu, Ahmet Şık and Akın Atalay have been held in pre-trial detention for over a year now on baseless charges and not a shred of credible evidence has been provided to prove their guilt. This is punishment of the very essence of journalism.’ Cumhuriyet journalists and staff are facing criminal charges of supporting terrorist organisations, based primarily on a misreading of articles that appeared in the newspaper and insignificant contacts between journalists and sources. ‘The unconvincing testimony of prosecution witnesses and lack of any credible evidence presented at previous hearings have underscored the absurdity of the charges. Effectively, legitimate journalism is on the docket. We continue to call for the immediate and unconditional release of Murat Sabuncu, Ahmet Şık and Akın Atalay and the dismissal of the charges’, said Erol Önderoglu, Turkeyrepresentative of Reporters Without Borders. International observers have repeatedly stressed the lack of independence and impartiality of the court in the case. Defence lawyers have been excluded from hearings without proper justification. Ahmet Şık was also expelled from the court while attempting to deliver his defence statement. ‘From the start, proceedings have been marred by violations of the right to a fair trial’, said Carles Torner, Executive Director of PEN International. Isabelle Rossaert, Vice President of PEN Belgium/Flanders added that ‘an all-time low was reached at the previous hearing in December, when the judge interrupted Ahmet Şık’s defence statement and subsequently expelled him from the court room for allegedly disrupting the proceedings. We hope that going forward, the rights of the defence will be respected.’ At the December hearing, which was cut short when defence counsel requested the recusal of the judges following Şık’s expulsion, the judges ruled to continue the pre-trial detention of the four Cumhuriyet staff, although Emre İper was eventually released a few days later as a result of an interim decision. ‘We are dismayed that Murat Sabuncu, Ahmet Şık and Akın Atalay remain imprisoned, and continue to call for their immediate and unconditional release, as well as all other journalists in Turkey who are behind bars for having exercised their right to freedom of expression’, said said Nora Wehofsits, Advocacy Officer of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom. Ahmet Şık’s application to the European Court of Human Rights concerning his prolonged pre-trial detention is among the journalists’ cases given priority status in April 2017 and is still pending. ‘The ideal outcome is of course that the Turkish courts release the defendants and drop all charges at Friday’s hearing;’ said Katie Morris, Head of Europe and Central Asia Programme at ARTICLE 19, ‘But the fact that the lower courts have not implemented Constitutional Court rulings in other cases of journalists shows that the role of the European Court of Human Rights is more important than ever. Swift rulings on all the cases of detained journalists will be crucial.’ https://rsf.org/en/news/international-human-rights-and-free-speech-organisations-express-grave-concerns-cumhuriyet-trial (c) 2018 Reporters without Borders

Dear Leaders of Congress, We, the undersigned 83 human rights organizations, scholars and leading activists, write to urge you to sign the attached bipartisan MOC letter to Secretary Tillerson regarding U.S. policy on Sudan. Since Sudan’s president, Omar al-Bashir, staged a coup in 1989, over 3 million people have lost their lives due to state sponsored violence, including genocide, and over 6 million have been forcibly displaced from their homes. The radical Islamic ideology guiding the Bashir regime and its allies in terrorist networks worldwide is the greatest threat to international peace and security. The Sudan regime has not changed. While it remains focused on changing the demographics of Sudan and stealing the resources of the country, we urge Congress and the U.S. Administration to remain just as focused on supporting the people of Sudan and their right to freedom, justice and equality. Please consider signing the attached letter. We understand the deadline has changed to Friday, March 9th. Sincerely, Act for Sudan, Eric Cohen, Co-Founder, Boston, MA Adil Taha, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Independent Movement Organization, Fairfax, VA African Freedom Coalition, Al Sutton M.D., President, New York, NY American Friends of the Episcopal Church of the Sudans (AFRECS), Richard Parkins, Executive Director Brooklyn Coalition for Darfur & Marginalized Sudan, Laura Limuli, Coordinator, Brooklyn, NY Christian Solidarity International-USA, The Rev. Heidi McGinness, Director of Outreach, Denver, CO Cody U. Watson, Jr., Associate Director, Presbyterian Frontier Fellowship, Birmingham, AL Colorado Coalition for Genocide Awareness and Action, Roz Duman, Executive Director, and Linda Farb, Vice-Chair of Board, Denver, CO Concerned Citizens for Change, Gene Binder, Member Steering Committee, Bronx, NY Darfur and Beyond, Cory Williams, Co-Founder, Phoenix, AZ Darfur Interfaith Network, Martha Boshnick, Co-Chair, Washington, DC Dr. Gregory H. Stanton, Founding Chairman, Genocide Watch, McLean, VA Dr. Paul Slovic, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR Dr. Robert K. Hitchcock, Professor, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM Dr. Samuel Totten, Professor Emeritus, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Author of Genocide by Attrition: Nuba Mountains, Sudan, Editor of Sudan's Nuba Mountains, People Under Siege: Humanitarian Accounts from the Battle Zones, Fayetteville, AK Ellen J. Kennedy, Ph.D., Executive Director, World Without Genocide at Mitchell Hamline School of Law, St. Paul, MN Empower One, Mike Congrove, Executive Director, Dallas, TX Eric Reeves, Senior Fellow, Harvard University’s François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights, Northampton, MA Ernesto Verdeja, Ph.D., Executive Director, Institute for the Study of Genocide, New York, NY Help Nuba, Rabbi David Kaufman, Des Moines, IL Henry C. Theriault, Ph.D., President, International Association of Genocide Scholars, Associate Vice President for Academic Affairs, Worcester State University, Worcester, MA Henry Y. Lejukole, PhD, Chairman, United Sudanese and South Sudanese Communities Association (USASSCA), Coordinator, US South Sudanese Academics and Professionals (USSSAP), Des Moines, IA, Idaho Darfur Coalition, Marilyn Griep, Co-Founder, Boise, ID Institute on Religion and Democracy, Faith McDonnell, Director, Church Alliance for a New Sudan, Washington, DC International Justice Project, Monica Feltz, Esq., Executive Director, Newark, NJ Investors Against Genocide, Susan Morgan, Co-Founder, San Francisco, CA Ipswich Community Action, Lakshmi Linda Sirois, Co-Founder and Co-Administrator, Ipswich, MA Jews Against Genocide, USA, Sharon Silber, Co-Director, New York, NY John H. Weiss, Associate Professor of History, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY Joining Our Voices, Slater Armstrong, Founder/Director, Baton Rouge, LA Kentuckiana Taskforce Against Genocide, Phil L. Nippert, Co-Chair, and Robert Brousseau, Co-Founder, Louisville, KY Massachusetts Coalition to Save Darfur, William Rosenfeld, Director, Boston, MA Mustafa Sharif, PhD., College Station, TX Nehemiah Initiative, Gavin Gramstad, Executive Director, Washington, DC Never Again Coalition, Lauren Fortgang, Co-Founder, Portland, OR New York City Genocide Prevention Coalition, Staci M. Alziebler-Perkins, Convener, New York, NY New York Coalition for Sudan, Eileen Weiss, Co-Founder, New York, NY Nuba Christian Family Mission, James Spencer Flournoy, Director, Englewood, CO Nubia Project, Nuraddin Abdulmannan, President, Washington, DC Operation Broken Silence, Mark C. Hackett, Executive Director, Memphis, TN Our Humanity in the Balance, Terry Nickelson, Executive Director, Deming, NM Philip Tutu, Human Rights Activist, Kansas City, MO Rev. Dr. J. Austin Watson, United Methodist Church, Hendersonville, NC Rabbi Abraham Cooper, Associate Dean, Simon Wiesenthal Center Rights for Peace Foundation, Osman Naway, Director, Kansas City, MO Salva Ken, Scholar, University of Rochester, New York, NY San Diego Lost Boys of Sudan, Karen Richards, President, San Diego, CA Shine A Ray of Hope, Carmen Paolercio, Founder, New Rochelle, NY STAND: The Student-Led Movement to End Mass Atrocities, Savannah Wooten, Student Director, USA Sudan National Forum in California Sudan Unlimited, Esther Sprague, Founder and Director, San Francisco, CA Sudanese Community Church, Episcopal Diocese in Colorado, The Rev. Ayyoubawaga (Oja) B. Gafour, PhD., Vicar, Denver, CO The Elsa-Gopa Trust, Nell Okie, Director, Madison, CT The Rev. Timothy Oslovich, Pastor, Trinity Lutheran Church, Vernon, CT The Reverend Ronald D. Culmer, Rector, St. Clare's Episcopal Church, Pleasanton, CA Unite for Darfur Organization, Bahar Arabie, CEO, Gaithersburg, MD Use Your Voice to Stop Genocide RI, Sandra Hammel, Director, Portsmouth, RI Victoria Sanford, PhD, Visiting Scholar, Institute for the Study of Human Rights, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, Professor & Chair, Department of Anthropology, Lehman College, Director, Center for Human Rights & Peace Studies, Doctoral Faculty, The, City University of New York, New York, NY ACROSS, Elisama W. Daniel, Executive Director, Juba, South Sudan Akulia Foundation, Lita Muki, Chairperson, Juba, South Sudan Albaqir al-Affif Mukhtar (PhD), Kampala, Uganda Al Khatim Adlan Center for Enlightment & Human Development (KACE), Albaqir al-Affif Mukhtar (PhD), Director, Uganda BOFRAST, Martha Michael, Executive Director, Bentiu, Unity, South Sudan Collectif Urgence Darfour, Dr. Jacky Mamou, President, Paris, France Darfur Community Association, Mohammed Esmail, Chairperson, Cape Town, Western Cape, South Africa David Alton, Professor the Lord Alton, Independent Crossbench Peer, London, UK Dialogue on South Sudan/Sudan Forum, David Mabior Atem Kuir, Chair, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada Dr. A. M. Girshab, Human Rights Consultant, ME NA Region, Khartoum, Sudan Elhag Ali Warrag Sidahmed Warrag, Editor in Chief, Hurriyat Sudan, Egypt Face Past for Future Foundation (FP4F), Abdelrahman Gasim, Chairperson, Kampala, Uganda Gill Lusk, Writer on the Sudans, London, UK Hamid E. Ali, PhD, Associate Professor, Department of Public Policy and Administration, The American University in Cairo, New Cairo, Egypt Magdi Elgzouli, Human Rights Activist, Malmoe, Skane, Sweden Majid Maali, Human Rights Lawyer, Human Rights Defenders Project, Kampala, Uganda Mohaned Elnour, Human Rights Lawyer and Director, Justice Centre for Advocacy and Legal Consultations Nuba Now, Claire Vera, UK Seed for Democracy for South Sudan, Hustin Laku, Sr., Ottawa, ON, Canada Skills for Nuba Mountains, Lazim Suleiman Elbasha, Director, Kauda, South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains, Sudan Society for Threatened Peoples - Germany, Ulrich Delius, Director, Göttingen, Lower Saxony, Germany Sudan Democracy First Group (SDFG), Anwar Elhaj, Executive Director, Kampala, Uganda The Baroness (Caroline) Cox, House of Lords, UK Parliament, CEO, HART (Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust), London, UK The Council of Dams Affected Communities, Ali Askouri, Chairman, London, UK The MagkaSama Project, Max Dana, Founder, Paris, France

Today, in honor of International Women's Day, we would like to commemorate women from all around the world for their strength and bravery. But today, as we celebrate the resilience of women, their drive, and determination, we need to bring our attention to the plight of women in Darfur. Women in Darfur are still facing an incredible challenge. For the last fourteen years, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir has been carrying out a genocidal attack in the region. His tactics include burning down villages, looting property, killing innocents, even using chemical weapons against a civilian population, and using rape as a weapon if war by systematically raping women and girls. As a result of the unrelenting attacks, over 3 million Darfuris were forced to leave their villages for Internally Displaced Persons (IDP)and refugees camps located in Chad. Over 80% of these people are women and children, who live with limited access to humanitarian assistance, education, and protection. The women of Darfur have been victim to systematic rape and sexual violence, and these tactics show no sign of stopping. Women in Darfur are bearing the burden of the genocide. Countless women and girls are subjected to brutal rape, humiliation, beating, starvation, and disease on a daily basis. Rape and sexual violence in Darfur are not mere byproducts of war. They are well-planned and deliberately orchestrated attacks intended to tear apart families, break down leadership structures and rip the fabric of society, leaving communities with physical and emotional scars. Rape and sexual violence are often unreported because many women fear that reporting will lead to either further harm by perpetrators or ostracization from their communities, meaning that often rape and sexual violence continue with total impunity. The UN and the international community has done little to address the problem adequately. There has been no formal research into how widespread the problem is, and there is not adequate health care for victims. Proper healthcare is crucial to helping the physical and emotional wounds that rape leaves, as well as vital to stopping the spread of disease. Also, the lack of accountability only fuels and increase the crime. The perpetrators of this crime have not been brought to justice, and until there is, justice will have been denied to the women and girls in Darfur. We must speak up and demand action! The international community has been warming relations with Sudan, despite the number of women and girls who are subjected to such a brutal crime. We must demand that the US stop enabling Sudan’s inhumane behavior. Please join us and use your voice to speak up for the women of Darfur! • Share our statement on social media and use the hashtag #StopRapeInDarfur • Donate to our organization to support our “Women Empowering Women” project to raise U$ 10,000 by the end of March. • Organize a screening of our “Violence Against Women” video to educate more people. Contact us, and we will send you a link! • Organize a fundraising event for DWAG. We will give you all the tools to help us reach our fundraising goals. • Invite DWAG to speak at your school, congregation or community center to educate more people about the situation in Darfur and enable them to become a voice for women in Darfur. • Join our Rapid Responders network and help us get a representative in each of the 50 states in the next 50 days. • Write letters to your local or favorite media outlet and ask that they do more to cover the situation in Darfur. • Call your congressman and demand the US stop rewarding a genocidal regime by lifting Sudan’s name from terrorist sponsor countries or normalizing relation Thank you for joining us and for speaking up for women in Darfur Your voice can make a difference With Gratitude, Niemat Ahmadi President and Founder www.darfurwomenaction.org (c) 2018 Darfur Women Action Group

Syria’s civilians have suffered tremendously through the country’s seven years of conflict. Now, as the Syrian government and its allies prepare to retake Damascus’s Eastern Ghouta suburbs, hundreds of thousands will be caught in the crossfire once more. The humanitarian corridors announced by Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu for Eastern Ghouta, and proposed for the Rukban camp on the border with Jordan further east, are unlikely to substantially mitigate that suffering. To be sure, any means for civilians to safely and voluntarily escape the violence in besieged Eastern Ghouta is positive and welcome. But the corridor announced unilaterally by Russia and the Syrian government through the Wafideen camp lacks the sort of guarantees that would allow Ghouta’s nearly 400,000 residents to use it or other concerned parties, including UN Security Council members, to endorse it. First of all, residents would have to be able to reach the corridor without fear of being targeted en route. Daily ceasefires of five hours, still punctured by intermittent shelling, are too narrow a window. Prior experience with Syrian ceasefires has generated a deep sense of distrust. It would take quite some time without any violations for people to trust that this one is different. These five-hour windows also fall short of the cessation of hostilities and durable humanitarian pause demanded by UN Security Council Resolution 2401, which Russia supported. People in Eastern Ghouta also harbour a deep-seated fear of what would happen to them once they reach government-controlled territory. Compulsory military service for male family members is a concern regardless of political orientation. Retaliation by the security state is a threat for anyone who has – or whose loved ones have – a record of opposition to the regime. In Eastern Ghouta, that may include nearly everyone. Thus, for most, an unconditional return to areas of government control is not a safe or realistic option, as evidenced by the miniscule numbers who left thus far. State media have claimed that the armed groups prevent people from leaving, holding them as human shields for all practical purposes. Such accounts are impossible to verify, but without credible guarantees, little if any coercion would be required to prevent departures. Rather than saving lives, the corridor may even serve as a cover for further military escalation. As time elapses, the argument will gain ground that those still inside are either in cahoots with, or held back by, insurgents – with the implication that neither government forces nor their Russian allies are to blame for casualties from shelling and bombing the densely populated area indiscriminately. Eastern Ghouta requires a negotiated resolution, not a military victory that would be disastrous – for Ghouta’s residents first and foremost, but also for Syria’s future. Hundreds of thousands of people cannot be crushed militarily and then successfully reintegrated into Syria’s state and society. A non-violent alternative is possible: Russia has negotiated with Eastern Ghouta’s non-jihadist rebel factions in the past. For Moscow, these are known interlocutors, with whom it is possible to reach an agreement. Rukban’s situation is different. With no fighting ongoing in the area, residents there can leave the U.S.-policed zone around the Tanaf military base and return to their homes, no corridor needed. It is just that these homes are not safe. Last year, hundreds of Rukban residents returned to the town of Qaryatein near Homs, only to have the Islamic State (ISIS) overrun the town and massacre its civilians. Most of Rukban’s current residents are from Syria’s central Badiya desert and the country’s east, areas where ISIS has been defeated but which are not yet sufficiently secured. They would also need clarifications regarding their legal status when they return to areas of state control. In the meantime, more should be done to deliver humanitarian assistance. Delivering aid across military lines from Damascus presents special challenges, including coordination with the U.S.-led coalition through de-confliction channels and with U.S.-backed militias inside the Tanaf zone. Still, Russia should work to secure Damascus’s approval for what would be a critical humanitarian lifeline to this community – a community the U.S. and Jordan have mostly failed to aid via the Jordanian border – rather than declaring an evacuation corridor that is unnecessary. Humanitarian corridors as proposed by Russia do not offer solutions for either Eastern Ghouta or Rukban. Yet both areas present opportunities for Russia to work toward something genuinely stabilising and life-saving, if Russia is willing to sway its ally in Damascus. Pushing for a full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2401, which could provide an opening for a negotiated resolution in Eastern Ghouta, and securing humanitarian access to Rukban would greatly enhance Russia’s credibility as a mediator in Syria and, critically, spare more bloodshed. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/russia-should-go-beyond-humanitarian-corridors-syria?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=72c61b9027-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_03_02&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-72c61b9027-359909997 (c) 2018 International Crisis Group

During a discussion in Myanmar’s Lower House of Parliament on 5 March, a lawmaker representing Sagaing Region’s Min Kin Township referred to Islam as “a cancer” afflicting the country. Elected Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) MP U Maung Myint’s remarks came while discussing a motion he introduced which opposes the relocation of internally displaced ethnic Kaman Muslims to the commercial capital Yangon. He instead called for them to be returned to their “places of origin.” The motion was intended to “urge the Union government to reconsider its decision regarding the relocation of 55 Kaman IDP families from Kyaukphyu, Pauktaw and Ramree [in Rakhine State] to Yangon.” “I think it will be more appropriate if we treat the cancer that is occurring in Rakhine State in the Rakhine State itself. Otherwise, if we send the cancer to the country’s commercial hub Yangon, it is like allowing the cancer to spread to across the country,” U Maung Myint said in the legislative discussion. While speaking to reporters after the meeting, U Maung Myint said he feared that Muslim populations from Rakhine State would spread to other parts of Myanmar. Lower House Speaker Win Myint of the National League for Democracy (NLD) has not opposed U Maung Myint’s motion, which was backed by MP Dr. Maung Thin of Meiktila, who argued that the relocation of Muslims to the other parts of Myanmar could spark religious riots. The Speaker did not condemn the MP for describing Islam as cancer. While acknowledging to the Parliament on Monday that the Kaman are recognised citizens of Myanmar, Dr. Maung Thin of the military-backed USDP said that they could still potentially contribute to the so-called “Islamisation” of Myanmar. MPs have unanimously agreed to continue their discussion on the motion. Burma Human Rights Network’s (BHRN) executive director, Kyaw Win, links the deeply rooted anti-Muslim sentiment among Burmese political leadership to the ongoing genocide of the Muslim Rohingya minority in Rakhine State. “The international community has long been isolated from this reality, and it has now reached very dangerous levels. Muslims in Burma are being treated as unwanted human beings, as third class citizens,” he said, adding that the rising levels of discrimination appear to face no opposition as they spread from the Parliament to the public. Dr. Maung Thin, the Meiktila MP, said on Monday that Muslims from Mandalay Region’s Kyaukpadaung Township were once relocated to his constituency following riots, and blamed them for unrest in Meiktila in 2013 that killed at least 40 people and injured more than 60, and led to the closure of seven of the city’s 12 mosques. Meiktila is experiencing increased nationalist activity as the five-year anniversary of the anti Muslim pogrom approaches on 20 March, including threats of renewed violence if authorities do not ban annual summer training courses on Islamic religious practices. In late February, Meiktila Township administration officials visited Islamic religious schools and ordered the closure of these courses in Yadanar Man Aung, Thiri Mingalar, and Chan Aye Thar Yar quarters, citing a failure by the host institutions to obtain “official permission” to run the classes. Permission requests were sent by 28 February by the heads of 18 Islamic schools where trainings are conducted. BHRN has been informed that they have yet to receive a government response. There are several mosques and Islamic religious school have been locked since many years across Burma and authorities do not permit to reopen them. Background on the Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN) Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN) is based in London, operates across Burma and works for human rights, minority rights and religious freedom in Burma. BHRN has played a crucial role in advocating for human rights and religious freedom with politicians and world leaders. Media Enquiries Please contact: Kyaw Win Executive Director of the Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN) E: kyawwin78@gmail.com T: +44 (0) 740 345 2378 W: www.bhrn.org.uk (c) 2018 Burma Human Rights Network

Prosecutors have requested a death sentence for Mahmoud Abou Zeid, an Egyptian photojournalist known as Shawkan who has been held for four and a half years. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) condemns the complete disproportionality of the proposed sentence and reiterates its call for his immediate and unconditional release. The photojournalist Mahmoud Abou Zeid, alias Shawkan is one of the more than 700 defendants in a political mass trial in Cairo for whom the “maximum penalty” – death by hanging – was requested by the prosecution on 3 March. Arrested in connection with an anti-government protest in Cairo’s Rabaa al-Adawiya Square in August 2013, they are all accused indiscriminately of charges that include murder, attempted murder and membership of a banned organization (the Muslim Brotherhood). “Seeking the death penalty for a photographer who simply covered an opposition demonstration is a political punishment, not an act of justice,” RSF said. “Shawkan’s only crime was trying to do his job as a photographer. He must be freed at once.” Shawkan was arrested on 14 August 2013 while on assignment for the British photo agency Demotix, covering the use of force by the security forces to break up the Rabaa al-Adawiya Square protest by supporters of deposed President Mohamed Morsi. His detention is regarded as arbitrary by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. https://rsf.org/en/news/egyptian-prosecutors-seek-death-sentence-photographer (c) 2018 Reporters without Borders

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) calls on UK Prime Minister Theresa May and other senior officials to raise press freedom concerns and call for the release of jailed journalists in their meetings with Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman during his visit this week to London. Prince Mohammed is set to visit the UK from 7 to 9 March to sign a series of bilateral agreements, reportedly worth more than $100 billion, and is expected to join the Queen for dinner at Windsor Castle. But whilst Prince Mohammed is receiving the royal treatment in the UK, the situation is bleak for his critics at home in Saudi Arabia, a country with one of the world’s worst records on press freedom. At least four journalists and seven citizen journalists are currently serving prison sentences in Saudi Arabia, and at least 15 others have been arbitrarily held in a wave of arrests that started in September 2017. Harassment of journalists has been on the rise since last June, and in November, a new terrorism law was adopted that could easily be used to prosecute journalists and activists. In December, the Saudi media were urged to display more “patriotism”. Blogger Raif Badawi is among those behind bars in Saudi Arabia. Winner of the 2014 RSF Press Freedom Prize, Badawi has been jailedsince June 2012 and was brutally flogged in January 2015 as part of his sentence to 10 years in prison and 1,000 lashes on charges of insulting Islam. Badawi’s lawyer Waleed Abu Alkhair is also imprisoned, serving a 15-year sentence on a range of charges related to his work defending freedom of expression. Turad Al Amri, a famous journalist and commentator, is believed to have been detained since November 2016, although the authorities have never confirmed this. Journalist Saleh Al-Shehi was sentenced just last month to five years in prison on charges of insulting the royal court. “Prince Mohammed must not be given a pass on press freedom issues in his meetings here in London. Continued silence on this free expression clampdown sends the wrong signal about the UK’s priorities in its relations with Saudi Arabia. Theresa May should ensure this visit does not become another missed opportunity to call for the release of Raif Badawi and the other journalists and citizen journalists unjustly jailed in Saudi Arabia”, said RSF UK Bureau Director Rebecca Vincent. https://rsf.org/en/news/saudi-crown-prince-must-not-be-given-pass-press-freedom-during-uk-visit (c) 2018 Reporters without Borders

When the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the rebel movement led by Paul Kagame, captured control of Rwanda and halted the genocide in July 1994, it inherited not so much a state as a cemetery. In the preceding 100 days, 800,000 people out of a national population of seven million had been murdered, the majority by their neighbors and other civilians. Seventy percent of all Tutsis, the ethnic minority that had been the target of the Hutu génocidaires, were dead, along with 30 percent of all Twas, the smallest of Rwanda’s ethnic groups. Throughout Rwanda, roads, rivers, and pit latrines were clogged with rotting corpses. The infrastructure of the country—houses, roads, hospitals, offices, schools, power stations, and reservoirs—lay in ruins. Nearly all government workers—politicians, judges, civil servants, doctors, nurses, and teachers—had died or fled. Looters had emptied the banks, leaving the national treasury without a single Rwandan franc. The genocide reverberated across central Africa. Two million Rwandan refugees, mainly Hutus, escaped into neighboring countries in one of the largest exoduses of the twentieth century, producing a humanitarian crisis in cholera-infested refugee camps across the region. The camps in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) provided the conditions for Hutu militias to regroup and plot a return to Rwanda to finish the job of exterminating all Tutsis. As this rebel threat expanded in the borderlands and thousands of genocide perpetrators roamed freely throughout Rwanda, there was no police force to ensure security. Small numbers of distraught RPF soldiers who had arrived to find their loved ones murdered and entire villages wiped out committed revenge killings. In the most prominent case, in April 1995, the RPF killed hundreds, possibly thousands, of Hutu civilians in a refugee camp in Kibeho, in southwestern Rwanda. Meanwhile, the Tutsi-dominated RPF began rounding up tens of thousands of genocide suspects and transporting them to prisons around the country. By the end of 1995, around 120,000 genocide suspects were languishing in jails built to hold only 45,000 inmates. The national atmosphere of anger and revenge—coupled with the threat of disease and the massive loss of agricultural labor—threatened another bloodbath. Yet in the 23 years since the genocide, Rwanda has experienced no further large-scale violence. Instead, it has enjoyed two decades of peace, stability, economic growth, and rising living standards. More than three-quarters of the people originally imprisoned on suspicion of participating in the genocide—as well as 300,000 additional suspects identified after the initial roundup—have been reintegrated into their communities and live side by side with genocide survivors on densely populated hills. No other country today has so many perpetrators of mass atrocity living in such close proximity to their victims’ families. Although that might seem to raise the risk of renewed violence, most Rwandans instead have chosen to get on with life rather than settle old scores. Understanding why they have done that requires examining the immense steps that Rwanda—at the national, community, and individual levels—has taken to deal with the genocide. One of the most striking features of Rwanda’s approach has been the state’s concerted effort to heal old wounds. Indeed, substantial government intervention has been the key to the country’s recovery—a point reinforced by comparison with neighboring Burundi, Congo, and Uganda, where the absence of systematic official responses to mass atrocity has allowed deep societal divisions and violence to persist. And yet by intervening so heavily in people’s lives, the powerful Rwandan state has sometimes hindered citizens’ attempts to truly come to terms with the past. A TIME TO REMEMBER Beginning shortly after the genocide, with the RPF having transitioned from rebel group to ruling party, but accelerating after Kagame became president in 2000, the Rwandan government undertook a four-pronged strategy to heal the country. This comprised commemoration, civic education, socioeconomic development, and reconciliation through justice. Over the last 15 years, I have conducted more than 1,000 interviews with everyday Rwandans, including interviews every 18 months with the same 20 respondents from a variety of backgrounds—and across the ethnic divide—to understand how they view this effort and to gauge changes in their circumstances and perceptions. What these conversations have revealed above all is that the government’s top-down strategy has largely succeeded, allowing everyday Rwandans to deal with the effects of the genocide. But they have also shown that many Rwandans feel overwhelmed by the government’s barrage of post-genocide programs, leading to widespread fatigue and a desire to be left alone to address the past in more personal and local ways. Most often cited in this respect is the annual genocide commemoration, a 100-day period of mourning commencing on April 7, the date the killing began. The accompanying ceremonies revolve around an annual theme that reflects the government’s current priorities and forms the centerpiece of Kagame’s speech at Amahoro Stadium, in the capital, Kigali. In 2013, for example, the commemoration theme was self-reliance—a core message of the RPF throughout the post-genocide period. More immediately, it was a call for citizens to contribute to a national development fund called Agaciro (named after the Kinyarwanda word for “dignity”), which the government had just launched to help cover the economic shortfall that resulted when international donors suspended aid to Rwanda over its backing of rebels in eastern Congo. As part of its response to the genocide, the government has also leaned heavily on civic education, principally to construct a postethnic national identity of Rwandanness. Today, nearly every Rwandan adult has passed through one of the state’s ingando education camps. There, they learn about the main causes of the genocide, Rwanda’s abandonment by the international community in 1994, the importance of Rwandanness as a means to regain the sense of unity destroyed by the Belgian colonizers who ruled the country until 1962, and the centrality of punishment of the genocide perpetrators for future peace and reconciliation. Many of these themes also feature in the government’s secondary school curriculum. For years, the government and school administrators were deadlocked over how to teach the causes of the genocide to the post-1994 generation. It took until 2008 for the charged subject to be taught systematically through a nationwide curriculum. And even so, as the Rwandan scholar Jean Léonard Buhigiro has documented, high school teachers across the country still struggle with the topic. They tend to skirt over some of its most controversial elements, including the role of ethnicity, whether the burden of responsibility should be borne by Hutu political and military elites or by the thousands of peasant perpetrators, and how to discuss Hutu victims (killed either during the genocide itself for harboring Tutsis or during subsequent revenge attacks by the RPF) without propagating the erroneous “double genocide” claim that the mass killing of Tutsis was followed by an orchestrated mass killing of Hutus. Recognizing that socioeconomic inequality was a key driver of the genocide, the government also embarked on an ambitious development program, focusing on rural health care and education. Many of my Hutu interviewees admit that although they remain suspicious of the Tutsi-dominated government in Kigali, they have been pleasantly surprised by the RPF’s cross-ethnic development policies. From 2000 to 2015, Rwanda managed to cut its child mortality rate in half—the biggest reduction worldwide during that period and an accomplishment that UNICEF described as “one of the most significant achievements in human history.” Although rural Rwanda remains extremely poor, a far cry from the gleaming office towers and conference centers of Kigali, peasants tend to compare themselves to their neighbors. And from that viewpoint, Hutus see that the government has assisted them as much as it has Tutsis, helping redress some of the deep grievances that have bedeviled local communities for decades.Nearly every Rwandan adult has participated in most aspects of this government-led recovery process. Perhaps the most ambitious—and most controversial—of the Rwandan government’s responses to the genocide was the prosecution of 400,000 genocide suspects in 12,000 community courts called gacaca, a process that took place between 2002 and 2012. These courts, which sat every week under trees and in village courtyards across Rwanda, heard more than one million cases and were overseen by lay judges who could hand down sentences as severe as life imprisonment (although most consisted merely of community service). Underpinning the gacaca system was the belief that justice is indispensable to reconciliation, that without a public acknowledgment of crimes and the punishment of all levels of perpetrators, anger and resentment would fester and could lead to further mass violence. When the gacaca system was announced, international organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch predicted that it would inflame tensions and fuel mob justice. The actual consequences, however, were a vital cross-ethnic dialogue about the causes and impact of the genocide and the successful reintegration of perpetrators who had served their sentences. MOVING ON Nearly every Rwandan adult has participated in most aspects of this government-led recovery process. Its core messages—particularly the need to remain vigilant about ethnically divisive propaganda and the importance of delivering justice for past crimes—have sunk deep into the public consciousness and formed the basis for a more peaceful society. But Rwandans have grown exhausted from the constant summoning up of the traumatic past. In 2012, when the gacaca courts finished their work, the most common reaction among suspects and survivors alike was a sense of relief that the trials had finally ended. Many complained that the heavy schedule of government programs—including one day lost per week during the decade of gacaca trials—was keeping them from getting back to their farms to provide for their families and rebuild their lives. The last five years, since the end of the gacaca courts and with the slowing of the ingando camps (as almost all of the population has now been educated), have brought some respite. The government has begun to tone down the annual genocide commemorations, holding fewer spectacular ceremonies in stadiums around the country in favor of smaller, quieter events at the community level. More broadly, it has started to shift away from a policy agenda designed explicitly to address the legacies of the genocide, toward one focused on modernizing the economy, integrating regionally, and reducing dependence on foreign aid. As the government has stepped back, the population has been freed to address the effects of the genocide in less formal but equally powerful ways. Beginning in 2002, communities across the country formed dialogue groups aimed at discussing issues arising during the gacaca hearings. Often, these groups have been facilitated by churches, which remain a principal mobilizing force in a society that is 57 percent Catholic, 26 percent Protestant, and 11 percent Seventh-day Adventist. When the gacaca trials and the ingando camps were at their peak, these dialogue groups focused on the local causes of the genocide, debates over national versus ethnic identity, justice, and reconciliation. Today, they emphasize more immediate concerns, such as improving food distribution, protecting communities’ security, containing outbreaks of disease, and resolving family disputes. The shift shows that people have moved on from the past yet remain vigilant about the types of local inequalities and conflicts that have historically fueled mass violence. Indeed, Rwanda’s most popular radio soap opera, Musekeweya (New Dawn), listened to by millions of people across the country, now relies less on gacaca-related plot lines and has begun exploring broader issues of trauma, trust, and community-based conflicts, especially those concerning land. Many communities have also formed economic cooperatives, incorporating both Hutus and Tutsis, to pool resources such as seeds or fuel. They have started these not only out of economic necessity but also in the hope that working together will start to mend historical rifts. This is a crucial development, because in the past, many Hutus viewed Tutsis—who were heavily favored under Belgian colonialism—as unjustly wealthy, and many who participated in the genocide did so to capture Tutsi land and livestock. As one leader of a cooperative of widowed potters in western Rwanda recently told me, “Among our members, we have people whose relatives were génocidaires and others whose relatives are survivors. What we have in common is during the genocide, we all lost our husbands and everything we owned. That unites us and motivates us to share what we have.” Or, as the head of a coffee-grinding cooperative in eastern Rwanda put it: “For reconciliation, words are easy. Actions are what count. Long hours performing hard work together tell you everything that’s in people’s hearts.” Rwandans’ views on the impact of the genocide and the nature of their country today vary substantially. Nearly all the rural respondents I have interviewed, however, describe peaceful but still uneasy community relations. In tight-knit communities, perpetrators, survivors, and witnesses confront one another daily. They attend the same churches, send their children to the same schools, and plow the same fields. What they tell me is that the nature of these local relations is the ultimate gauge of the extent of reconciliation, rather than government indicators such as the Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer, a public opinion survey conducted every five years, which routinely reports that more than 90 percent of Rwandans believe their communities have fully reconciled. In some communities, people report that Hutus and Tutsis now intermarry at the same rate they did before the genocide and attend each other’s weddings and funerals as often as they did before. They also actively cooperate in subsistence agriculture, sharing seeds, food, milk, and labor when sickness or other misfortune strikes. In some communities, such simple deeds laden with meaning are widespread; in others, they are much less so. Across all communities, however, another message resonates: despite continued trauma and complex local relations, no one expects a return to mass violence. Given how recently the genocide occurred, that is a remarkable development and bucks the trend of cyclical conflict elsewhere in the region. When prompted to explain this view, Rwandans tend to highlight two factors: the gacaca courts provided a release valve for people’s anger and resentment, and the reduction in socioeconomic disparities between ethnic groups has taken the sting out of historical antagonisms. THE HEAVY HAND OF THE STATE Inevitably, in a society recovering from such intimate and all-encompassing violence, major challenges persist. In a 2017 article, the Rwandan researcher Emmanuel Sarabwe reported that new forms of conflict are now widespread in the country, including domestic and sexual violence and intrafamily feuds. Many of these stem from the genocide (for example, due to the remarriage of women whose spouses were imprisoned as genocide suspects) and from the psychosocial trauma that is endemic throughout the population. Even though there has been a nationwide focus on addressing the direct harm of the genocide, these less visible legacies within households are often ignored. What’s more, many Rwandans have grown increasingly concerned about the slow progress of democracy at the national level. Throughout the RPF’s time in power, the party has displayed little tolerance for dissent. Numerous opposition leaders and dissidents have been harassed, exiled, or assassinated. As Kagame’s second—and, according to the constitution, final—term wound down, the government organized a petition to hold a national referendum in 2015 that would allow him to run for a third term. Ninety-eight percent of the electorate voted in favor of the measure, and in the presidential election held this past August, Kagame won nearly 99 percent of the vote. Because the referendum led to constitutional amendments that do not come into effect until 2024, Kagame could seek two additional five-year terms—potentially keeping him in office until 2034. During the petition, the referendum, and the election, the government regularly intimidated voters and undermined opposition parties by infiltrating their ranks, harassing their leaders, and sometimes barring their registration. In a fair fight, the RPF would probably win presidential and parliamentary elections by substantial margins anyway, thanks to its successful record in promoting development and providing security—not to mention the population’s recognition that, historically, no change in leadership in Rwanda has occurred without major bloodshed. Even so, the RPF decided to use a range of heavy-handed tactics to guarantee its electoral success, an approach that has generated widespread resentment. In the coming years, the major challenge for the RPF will be to balance the need for a strong state to provide security and prosperity—a difficult task in an increasingly volatile region—with the need to afford citizens more political and social autonomy. A greater sense of freedom would enable the population to more fully enjoy the fruits of the country’s post-genocide renewal while deepening the individual and community healing that can only happen in quieter, more private spaces. Rwanda’s impressive recovery from the genocide has stemmed from not just a highly coordinated government response but also the resilience and creativity of the local population. For the latter to flourish now, the government will need to give its citizens much more latitude to define their own futures. © 2018 | Foreign Affairs

On the seventh anniversary of the Syrian conflict, this commemorative event will examine ongoing atrocities against civilians and highlight the strength and resilience of the Syrian people in the face of these crimes. Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster, US National Security Advisor, will provide a keynote address. Please join us for this important conversation on March 15 at 1 p.m. Thursday, March 15, 1 p.m. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Joseph and Rebecca Meyerhoff Theater 100 Raoul Wallenberg Place SWWashington, DC The seven years of violence in Syria have cost the lives of nearly 500,000 Syrians and displaced more than 13 million people—more than half the population—in the largest humanitarian crisis since World War II. Syrians are the victims of widespread atrocities and crimes against humanity. During the first months of 2018, Syrians have experienced an escalation of violence from multiple actors, with civilians continuing to bear the brunt of the conflict. A panel of Syrian and diaspora leaders will discuss how Syrian civil society is responding to the violence and anticipate what might come next. Learn more about the conflict in Syria at ushmm.org/syria. Keynote Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster, US National Security Advisor Speakers Dr. Samer Attar, Assistant Professor of Orthopaedic Surgery, Northwestern Medicine, Member, Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS) Rafif Jouejati, Co-Founder and Director, FREE-Syria ​Representative from the Syrian Civil Defense (White Helmets)​ This program is free and open to the public but you must register to reserve your seat. For more information, please contact Janelle Roberts at202.314.7851 or jjohnson@ushmm.org. This event will be livestreamed at ushmm.org/watch/. Photo: A man walks on rubble at a damaged site after an air strike on February 9, 2018, in the besieged town of Douma in the Eastern Ghouta area of Damascus, Syria. Bassam Khabieh/Reuters (c) 2018 The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum