The Government of Myanmar should immediately release and drop charges against two Reuters journalists arbitrarily detained since December 12, Fortify Rights said today. The trial against Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo is scheduled to begin on January 23. “Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo were arrested for doing their jobs and should be immediately released,” said Matthew Smith, Chief Executive Officer of Fortify Rights. “It’s not too late for the government to unconditionally drop the charges and let them go home to their families.” Wa Lone, 31, and Kyaw Soe Oo, 27, are charged with allegedly violating the Official Secrets Act and face up to 14 years in prison if convicted. Police arrested Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo in Yangon around 11:30 pm on December 12. Earlier that evening, the two journalists attended a dinner with police officials near the Battalion 8 compound north of Yangon. At the dinner, Captain Moe Yan Naing and Sergeant Khin Maung Lin reportedly gave the journalists documents related to the situation in Rakhine State. From December 12 to 26, the authorities held Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo in incommunicado detention at an unknown location, prompting worldwide calls for their release. The two journalists are now detained at Insein Prison, reportedly with the general prison population. The Insein Court is scheduled consider their application for bail on January 23. Following the arrest of Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo, Lieutenant Major Yu Naing of the Yangon Police Division filed a complaint against the two at the Htaukkyant Police Station on December 13. On January 10, the Insein Court formally accepted charges against Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo under Section 3.1(c) of the 1923 Official Secrets Act, a colonial-era law that makes it an offense to “obtain” or “collect” any material or information “calculated to be or might be or is intended to be…useful to an enemy.” Myanmar’s Ministry of Information claimed the authorities arrested the two journalists “for possessing important and secret government documents related to Rakhine State and security forces” and that the journalists “illegally acquired information with the intention to share it with foreign media.” At the time of their arrest, Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo were investigating a military crackdown against Rohingya civilians in Rakhine State, including an alleged mass grave in Inn Din village in Maungdaw Township. On January 10, the Myanmar military admitted in a statement that security forces and villagers captured and summarily executed 10 “Bengali terrorists” and buried them in a mass grave near Inn Din, claiming, “ethnic Buddhist villagers were threatened and provoked by the terrorists.” This marks the military’s first admission of wrongdoing against Rohingya in Rakhine State since major military operations began in October 2016. “The military’s admission demonstrates the culpability of soldiers and commanders in mass atrocities,” said Matthew Smith. “The arrest of Wa Lone and Kyaw San Oo was an ugly attempt to cover their tracks.” In a report released in November, Fortify Rights and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum found “mounting evidence” of the crime of genocide by state security forces against Rohingya in Rakhine State and documented information about mass graves. The arrest and ongoing detention of Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of liberty, Fortify Rights said. Arrest and detention are unlawful when individuals are arrested or detained for engaging in activity, such as exercising the right to freedom of expression, protected under international law. United Nations Secretary General António Guterres, United States Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and other government officials internationally have also called for the release of Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo. On January 8, former United States President Bill Clinton tweeted: “A free press is critical to a free society - the detention of journalists anywhere is unacceptable. The Reuters journalists being held in Myanmar should be released immediately." The Government of Myanmar has severely restricted independent media access to northern Rakhine State since October 2016, when attacks by Rohingya militants prompted Myanmar-Army led “clearance operations” against Rohingya civilians in northern Rakhine State. The military operations resulted in mass atrocity crimes against Rohingya men, women, and children and forced more than 700,000 civilians to flee to Bangladesh. “The world is united in its condemnation of Myanmar authorities, and for good reason, but governments are still failing to act,” said Matthew Smith. “The U.N. Security Council should refer the situation in Rakhine State to the International Criminal Court, and the U.N. General Assembly should create a mechanism for a criminal investigation to complement existing efforts. Survivors deserve justice. Impunity in Myanmar won’t end on its own.” http://www.fortifyrights.org/publication-20180111.html (c) 2018 Fortify Rights International

The Government of Myanmar should immediately release and drop charges against two Reuters journalists arbitrarily detained since December 12, Fortify Rights said today. The trial against Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo is scheduled to begin on January 23. “Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo were arrested for doing their jobs and should be immediately released,” said Matthew Smith, Chief Executive Officer of Fortify Rights. “It’s not too late for the government to unconditionally drop the charges and let them go home to their families.” Wa Lone, 31, and Kyaw Soe Oo, 27, are charged with allegedly violating the Official Secrets Act and face up to 14 years in prison if convicted. Police arrested Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo in Yangon around 11:30 pm on December 12. Earlier that evening, the two journalists attended a dinner with police officials near the Battalion 8 compound north of Yangon. At the dinner, Captain Moe Yan Naing and Sergeant Khin Maung Lin reportedly gave the journalists documents related to the situation in Rakhine State. From December 12 to 26, the authorities held Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo in incommunicado detention at an unknown location, prompting worldwide calls for their release. The two journalists are now detained at Insein Prison, reportedly with the general prison population. The Insein Court is scheduled consider their application for bail on January 23. Following the arrest of Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo, Lieutenant Major Yu Naing of the Yangon Police Division filed a complaint against the two at the Htaukkyant Police Station on December 13. On January 10, the Insein Court formally accepted charges against Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo under Section 3.1(c) of the 1923 Official Secrets Act, a colonial-era law that makes it an offense to “obtain” or “collect” any material or information “calculated to be or might be or is intended to be…useful to an enemy.” Myanmar’s Ministry of Information claimed the authorities arrested the two journalists “for possessing important and secret government documents related to Rakhine State and security forces” and that the journalists “illegally acquired information with the intention to share it with foreign media.” At the time of their arrest, Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo were investigating a military crackdown against Rohingya civilians in Rakhine State, including an alleged mass grave in Inn Din village in Maungdaw Township. On January 10, the Myanmar military admitted in a statement that security forces and villagers captured and summarily executed 10 “Bengali terrorists” and buried them in a mass grave near Inn Din, claiming, “ethnic Buddhist villagers were threatened and provoked by the terrorists.” This marks the military’s first admission of wrongdoing against Rohingya in Rakhine State since major military operations began in October 2016. “The military’s admission demonstrates the culpability of soldiers and commanders in mass atrocities,” said Matthew Smith. “The arrest of Wa Lone and Kyaw San Oo was an ugly attempt to cover their tracks.” In a report released in November, Fortify Rights and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum found “mounting evidence” of the crime of genocide by state security forces against Rohingya in Rakhine State and documented information about mass graves. The arrest and ongoing detention of Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of liberty, Fortify Rights said. Arrest and detention are unlawful when individuals are arrested or detained for engaging in activity, such as exercising the right to freedom of expression, protected under international law. United Nations Secretary General António Guterres, United States Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and other government officials internationally have also called for the release of Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo. On January 8, former United States President Bill Clinton tweeted: “A free press is critical to a free society - the detention of journalists anywhere is unacceptable. The Reuters journalists being held in Myanmar should be released immediately." The Government of Myanmar has severely restricted independent media access to northern Rakhine State since October 2016, when attacks by Rohingya militants prompted Myanmar-Army led “clearance operations” against Rohingya civilians in northern Rakhine State. The military operations resulted in mass atrocity crimes against Rohingya men, women, and children and forced more than 700,000 civilians to flee to Bangladesh. “The world is united in its condemnation of Myanmar authorities, and for good reason, but governments are still failing to act,” said Matthew Smith. “The U.N. Security Council should refer the situation in Rakhine State to the International Criminal Court, and the U.N. General Assembly should create a mechanism for a criminal investigation to complement existing efforts. Survivors deserve justice. Impunity in Myanmar won’t end on its own.” For more information, please contact: Matthew Smith, Chief Executive Officer, Fortify Rights, +1.202.503.8032 (in the U.S.), matthew.smith@fortifyrights.org; Twitter: @matthewfsmith, @FortifyRights David Baulk, Myanmar Human Rights Specialist, Fortify Rights, +95.979.311.1685 (in Myanmar), david.baulk@fortifyrights.org; Twitter: @davidbaulk, @FortifyRights (c) 2018 Fortify Rights

Myanmar’s admission that soldiers were involved in the murder of 10 Muslims in September was an important step and the United States hoped it would be followed by more transparency and accountability, the U.S. ambassador said on Thursday. The European Union and representatives of Muslim nations renewed calls for a broader international investigation into violence in the western state of Rakhine, after the military said on Wednesday its soldiers had killed 10 captured Rohingya Muslim “terrorists” at the beginning of September. It was a rare acknowledgment of wrongdoing by the Myanmar military during the operation it launched in northern Rakhine in response to Rohingya militant attacks on Aug. 25. Since then, more than 650,000 Muslim villagers have fled to Bangladesh. “The military’s acknowledgment that the security forces were involved in the killing of these 10 individuals is an important step,” Ambassador Scot Marciel said in a forum on media freedom with journalism students and reporters in the main city Yangon. “We hope it is followed up by more transparency and by holding those responsible accountable. I would stress this should be done, not as a favour to the international community, but because it’s good for the health of Myanmar’s democracy.” The United States has previously said the sweeping military counteroffensive amounted to “ethnic cleansing”. Myanmar denies that, saying its forces were carrying out legitimate “clearance operations” against insurgents. MASS GRAVE The military announced on Dec. 18 that a mass grave containing 10 bodies had been found at the coastal village of Inn Din, about 50 km (30 miles) north of the state capital Sittwe. The army appointed a senior officer to investigate. A statement from the office of the commander-in-chief on Wednesday said the military’s investigation had found that members of the security forces had killed the 10. The military said legal action would be taken against members of the security forces who violated their rules of engagement in killing the 10 suspected insurgents, and against ethnic Rakhine Buddhist villagers who were also involved. It said the 10 had been captured after security forces had come under attack from around 200 insurgents. The captives should have been handed over to police, the army statement said, but with militants mounting continuous attacks and destroying two military vehicles, “there were no conditions to transfer the 10 Bengali terrorists to the police station and so it was decided to kill them”. Myanmar’s civilian leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, has no control over the military, but has faced fierce international criticism for failing to do more to protect the Rohingya. Asked about Wednesday’s statement from the military, her spokesman Zaw Htay said Myanmar was committed to following the rule of law and took allegations of abuses seriously. “The government is not issuing blanket denials of accusations of human rights violations issued by the international community,” he said. “We need to get strong and reliable evidence so that we can investigate and take action according to the law.” CALLS FOR INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION The Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation said the admission substantiated allegations made by human rights groups and the United Nations of ethnic cleansing against “the most persecuted Rohingya people”. The EU and Norway said in a statement issued in Yangon that the killings at Inn Din “confirm the urgent need for a thorough and credible investigation into all violent incidents in northern Rakhine State to ensure the accountability of those found responsible for committing atrocities”. Myanmar’s armed forces have for decades been accused by human rights groups and Western governments of abuses in the country’s myriad ethnic conflicts, but it has been rare for soldiers to be held accountable. An admission by a top general in July 2016 that soldiers had killed five villagers during an interrogation in northern Shan State was seen at the time as unprecedented. Seven soldiers were subsequently jailed for five years with hard labor. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-politics-ukip/leader-of-britains-ukip-splits-with-girlfriend-after-appalling-markle-comments-idUSKBN1F40X7?rpc=401& (c) 2018 Reuters

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) condemns the confiscation of the entire print runs of eight Sudanese newspapers in the past two days because of their critical coverage of a big increase in the price of bread and the resulting social unrest. RSF is appalled by this blatant censorship and calls on the authorities to stop violating the freedom to inform. All copies of six newspapers critical of the bread price hikes were seized as they came off the presses on 7 January by the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) without any official explanation being given. Four of these newspapers – Al-Tayar, Al-Mustagilla, Al-Karar and Al-Assayha – are independent and two – Akhbar Al-Watan and Al-Midan – support opposition parties. Yesterday the NISS seized all the copies of the daily Al-Jareeda and the weekly Al-Bahth, which had covered protests against the price hikes in the capital, Khartoum, and in the Darfur and Blue Nile Regions. Al-Midan was again seized as it came off the press today because of its coverage of these protests, in which one person was killed. “The confiscation of newspapers with content that is not to the government’s liking has become a standard NISS practice,” RSF said. “Censoring media outlets that dare to cover social unrest and criticize government decisions not only contravenes international law but is also more than illusory as a way of ending popular discontent.” Akhbar Al-Watan editor Hanadi Al-Sidiq said she was not “notified of the reasons for the seizure,” which she said was probably a reaction to the “transparent, honest and professional reporting on the price increase and the high cost of living.” Sidiq was the target of intimidation by the NISS last December. The daily Al-Tayar is one of several newspapers that were repeatedly seized last year and its editor, Osmani Mirgani, was interrogated several times in connection with an article about Sudan’s illegal exports of radioactive material. According to the Sudan Tribune, “The NISS routinely confiscates newspapers either to prevent circulation of certain stories or to punish them retroactively on previous issues. The grounds usually given is the need to protect “national security.” RSF has pointed out in previous press releases that this practice has serious financial consequences for the targeted newspapers. Sudan has little chance of improving its position in RSF’s World Press Freedom Index, in which it is currently ranked 174th out of 180 countries. https://rsf.org/en/news/sudan-rsf-decries-sudanese-security-agencys-seizure-eight-newspapers (c) 2018 Reporters Without Borders

What’s the issue? As the seventh anniversary of the 2011 Tunisian uprising approaches, the country is drifting back toward its old authoritarian reflexes. Much of this is due to the failure of nationalist and Islamist partners in Tunisia’s coalition government to implement the January 2014 constitution. Why does it matter? The authoritarian drift is accompanied by nostalgia for ex-President Ben Ali’s misrule. Tunisia has a special responsibility to stand up to this tendency, to avoid new jihadist violence, to prevent a return to political polarisation and to sustain its role as the sole Arab state sticking to a peaceful, more democratic course since the 2011 Arab Uprisings. What should be done? To prevent potential violence, Tunisia’s leaders need to go forward, not backwards. They must refocus on strengthening institutions, the creation of a Constitutional court, the setting up of independent oversight bodies and the holding of much-delayed local elections in 2018. Executive Summary The ongoing efforts to maintain the parliamentary and government coalition be-tween the nationalist Nida Tounes and the Islamist An-Nahda are delaying the implementation of Tunisia’s constitution and weakening its institutions. As the economy falters, nostalgia is spreading for a strong state modelled on the former regime. But to strengthen the state and respond to unexpected turns of events, such as new large-scale jihadist attacks, out-of-control protests or the temporary or permanent absence of the president, the country must consolidate its institutions by respecting and implementing its constitution. The current drift toward authoritarianism has little chance of successfully establishing a Ben Ali-style regime, given the many socio-economic and political divisions and the newfound freedom enjoyed by the media over the past seven years. Any attempt to recreate an atmosphere of fear among the population would meet with fierce resistance. The government would not become any more effective and suppressed conflicts would end up resurfacing in more violent forms. Since the legislative and presidential elections of late 2014, the parliamentary and government coalition led by Nida Tounes and An-Nahda has greatly alleviated political polarisation. But these two pivotal parties must surmount a number of challenges if they are to keep their coalition alive. As former enemies turned partners, they are struggling to conserve their political identity and internal cohesion; conflicts surface in line with the strengthening or weakening of their respective powers of negotiation within the partnership. The resulting tensions, against a backdrop of mutual mistrust, are contributing to an indefinite postponement of the reforms promised by the constitution: the establishment of a new Constitutional court, independent constitutional authorities, elected regional councils and increasing parliamentary autonomy. Conversely, when the coalition is faring well, Nida Tounes and An-Nahda seek a political duopoly to the detriment of the parliament’s autonomy and existing independent administrative institutions. Rached Ghannouchi, An-Nahda’s president, and Béji Caïd Essebsi, the head of state and founder of Nida Tounes, who continues to stand in occasionally as party leader, are personalising the channels of political debate and crisis management. Essebsi in particular is presidentialising the regime and legitimising voices calling for amendments to the 2014 constitution to expand his prerogatives. Meanwhile, the implementation of essential aspects of the 2014 constitution continues to face delays. The Constitutional court, designed to play a crucial role in case of a political and institutional crisis, has not yet been set up. The independent authorities embodying the principles of integrity, impartiality and neutrality, conceived in the afterglow of the 2010-2011 uprising to address the public administration’s problems, are still non-existent, and the independent administrative bodies that have been established lack any real autonomy. Municipal elections likely to test the coalition (depending on the two dominant parties’ performance at the ballot box, abstention levels, and the possible emergence of new political forces) and significantly increase the number of elected representatives have been postponed four times. The decentralisation process has become bogged down: it should have led to the election of regional councils, but politicians and high-level public officials fear that it will weaken central government. As the gap widens between constitutional principles and the current political reality, any discussion of constitutional amendments – as proposed by the head of state with the support of a number of political figures – would lead to a resumption of antagonisms at a time when support is growing for authoritarian regimes both in Tunisia and around the world. Opposition by the Islamist party (the main parliamentary grouping) to all constitutional amendments that question the regime’s parliamentary nature would trigger a more violent polarisation than that seen in 2013. If it agrees to changes, the centralisation of power in the hands of the presidency could significantly harden the regime and create more problems than solutions. It is not worth opening this Pandora’s box. Tunisia is entering a period of electoral uncertainty, with municipal elections scheduled for 2018, and legislative and presidential elections for 2019. The current coalition, which theoretically could cede its place to a new majority, should accelerate the reforms planned as part of the constitution, while improving conditions for a peaceful handover of political power. It remains essential to: hold municipal elections in 2018 and, in the short term, to ensure the proper functioning of the Independent High Electoral Commission (ISIE), responsible for organising these elections, as well as the legislative and presidential elections in 2019; set up the Constitutional court as soon as possible; create fully empowered independent constitutional authorities; and increase parliament’s financial and administrative autonomy. Tunis/Brussels, 11 January 2018 An-Nahda and Nida Tounes: Cooperation in Competition In February 2015, a number of Nida Tounes militants and voters viewed the establishment of a coalition with the Islamist party An-Nahda as a betrayal, which, in their eyes, was incompatible with the identity of their political group. Initially, this weakened Nida Tounes, which split into two factions competing to control the party. On the one hand, there was the anti-Islamist-leaning faction led by Mohsen Marzouk, the electoral campaign manager of the president of the republic and leader of Nida Tounes, Béji Caïd Essebsi, who had been promoted to the post of minister-counsellor to the president at the beginning of January 2015. On the other, Hafedh Béji Caïd Essebsi, the president’s son, led the other faction, which supported both the alliance and consensus with the Islamist group.The party’s officials joined the latter group, believing that the president had broken his word by excluding them from the executive power. In January 2016, the latter faction won the struggle, resulting in the division of Nida Tounes, the departure of Mohsen Marzouk – who then founded his own breakaway political group (Machrou Tounes – Project for Tunisia) – and weaker political clout in Parliament for Nida Tounes, dropping from 89 MPs at the beginning of 2015 to 56 at the end of 2017. Unlike Nida Tounes, An-Nahda was not divided by its entry into the coalition, even historic splits resurfaced. Internal dissent increased as a result of its efforts to make its image more compatible with the “secularist” identity of the alliance, particularly under the influence of regional and international trends that were unfavourable to political organisations borne of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. An-Nahda was compelled to make a greater number of concessions than Nida Tounes and to demonstrate its loyalty to its coalition partner more actively. This generated numerous conflicts in the party, taking up both the time and energy of most of its officials. In May 2016, during its 10th congress, An-Nahda adopted a new strategy, bringing the party’s focus onto strictly political activities (ie on gaining power and exercising it), and theoretically delegating its cultural, social and religious activities to a series of associations loosely connected to its political core. The party stepped up the number of declarations it made concerning its move away from political Islam, its “separation of politics and religion” and its shift away from the “Islamist” label, adopting instead that of “Muslim democrats”. In order to make joint work at the Assembly and Council of Ministers easier, the Islamist party’s leaders handed higher-ranking posts in the party and government to more discreet and consensual activists over historic militants. The grassroots felt marginalised and constantly denounced the leadership’s frequently authoritarian attitude, its downplaying of the Islamist identity of the party, its subordinate stance to Nida Tounes and its eager engagement – and in some cases, collaboration – with representatives of the old regime who had been involved in the eradication of the party during the first half of the 1990s. The memory of ideological confrontations and repression between Islamists and anti-Islamists has fuelled the fears shared by both main parties of the coalition. In Nida Tounes, high-profile activists and intellectuals from the Arab nationalist far-left or from the Democratic Constitutional Rally (“RCD”, former President Ben Ali’s dissolved party), who had experienced the radical Islamist and “fundamentalist” period of An-Nahda during the 1980s, have fed these concerns. In An-Nahda, the trauma of mass arrests and torture – backed or endorsed at the time by individuals who are now members of Nida Tounes – is still very vivid, particularly among grassroots militants. These mutual preoccupations resurface dramatically whenever one or the other party increases its negotiating power in the coalition. Any imbalance of power between the two political organisations fuels the (often irrational) fear of a collapse of the alliance. Moreover, each party’s negotiating power – based on their respective electoral weight – varies depending on sudden incidents that disrupt the coalition’s normal operation. Thus, whenever a jihadist attack hits the country (as occurred three times in 2015), Islamist and anti-Islamist polarisation plays out in the media landscape, al­though ordinary citizens pay much less attention to it than they did during the second half of 2013. An-Nahda has fewer relays in the press than the anti-Islamists (far-left, Arab nationalists, Nida Tounes dissidents or even members of said party) do. With the backing of supporters of the coalition who are influential in the media, it has nonetheless managed to dampen the aftershock of every attack, countering accusations of laxity or even complicity with jihadist violence under the Troika (2011-2014), thus demonstrating the coalition’s ability to reduce polarisation. However, every campaign that accuses the Islamist party of bearing responsibility for jihadist violence puts it on the defensive. An-Nahda’s leader, Rached Ghannouchi, then taps into the fears of its grassroots militants to justify the need for the alliance, which “protects the existence of the party”, as well as the support for President Essebsi’s initiatives, presented as the last remaining bulwark against those wishing to eradicate the party. It is true that An-Nahda benefits from the lack of internal consistency and repeated crises in Nida Tounes, and sometimes even contributes covertly to them. Thus, at the beginning of 2016, the resignation of 22 members of Nida Tounes (out of a total of 86) from the party and parliamentary bloc caused it to lose its majority to An-Nahda at the Assembly (69 members). In the wake of this event, Ghannouchi, invited to the Nida Tounes congress, took the floor and compared Tunisia to a bird, with An-Nahda and Nida Tounes acting as its wings. Yet, despite the fact that An-Nahda’s leverage within the alliance nominally increased, it is limited by criteria defined by Essebsi in agreement with Ghannouchi, who “constantly fears that the head of state will turn against him”, as an opposition party official from Ettayar (“Democratic Current”) concluded. As its support from abroad seemed weak, An-Nahda has opted to protect its nepotistic and regionalist balance with the non-Islamist political forces, which provided it with a minority position in trade bodies, trade unions, the security forces, banking institutions, public enterprises and private oligopolies. An-Nahda’s leadership is indeed heavily affected by the degradation of the international and regional context for all political groups born of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. The election of Donald Trump in the U.S.; changes in the military balance in Libya, which had shifted to Field Marshall Haftar, supported by the United Arab Emirates and Egypt; the ‘wait-and-see’ stance of Turkey and Algeria, both focused on their domestic issues; and the diplomatic and economic offensive against Qatar, a close ally of the Islamist party, are just a few examples of these unfavourable geopolitical reconfigurations. Combined with national political constraints, these prevented An-Nahda from fully benefiting from Nida Tounes’ weaknesses, making that the party’s bargaining power remain below its electoral and political weight in the alliance. Despite their rivalry, as pivotal parties in the coalition, Nida Tounes and An-Nahda have sometimes acted as a duopoly. On several occasions, Ghannouchi supported the draft law of the president of the republic on economic and financial reconciliation, despite vivid criticism against the bill. In some municipalities, the two parties defined their polling lists so as to ensure only one of the two parties would win. They agreed to support a single independent list and in 2016, they discussed the option of openly establishing joint electoral lists. In addition, the two groups distribute posts in regional and local administrations (which are strategic in terms of patronage for the following electoral cycle) among themselves. Thus, at the end of 2017, three quarters of the country’s governors and delegates were either members or supporters of Nida Tounes. The rest was shared by An-Nahda activists or supporters, and to a lesser degree, independents and members of the main trade union confederation, the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT). The two parties also place loyal supporters at the head of public and semi-public companies and institutions, including at the public broadcasting service, where Nida Tounes and An-Nahda share the management of the various channels and are consequently able to influence their agenda. II.Weakening Institutions A.Reforms Adjourned Sine Die The tensions at the heart of the coalition and its component parties is significantly slowing down the implementation of reforms set forth in the constitution, thus weakening state institutions. Moreover, the bolstering of conditions for rotation of power is a laborious exercise for both parties in the coalition due to a lack of mutual trust. The parties struggled to set up the legal and institutional framework for the organisation of the upcoming electoral cycle (Electoral Law and Independent High Authority for Elections – ISIE). Indeed, they were, and still are, worried that as a result, their current partner will become their enemy, forming a majority and excluding them. An-Nahda supporters often feel concerned that Nida Tounes, by gaining power alone, would corner them into an opposition role and gradually erode its influence in collaboration with the security forces (in large part anti-Islamist). On the other hand, many Nida Tounes militants are preoccupied that An-Nahda will impose its ideological hegemony on a readily conservative Tunisian society and that it will disturb the socio-economic balance between the various regions of the country to the benefit of the emerging elite, namely from the south of the country. The disputes between An-Nahda and Nida Tounes have contributed to blocking the establishment of the Constitutional court, a pivotal institution in the event of a major crisis. The parliamentary majority has failed to strike a compromise on the nomination of four of its members to the Assembly and has been unable to elect the president of the High Judicial Council (CSM), entrusted with the selection of another four members. The Provisional Authority for the Review of the Constitutionality of Draft Laws is currently fulfilling the main role of the future Constitutional court, but it does not hold the court’s other prerogatives, which are fundamental in exceptional cases, ie, terminating the president’s term of office as a result of a clear violation of the constitution, arbitration in cases of conflicts of competences between heads of state and government, and determining the provisional or definitive vacancy of the post of president of the republic. Partisan friction has also contributed to delay the vote on the electoral law for municipal elections, initially scheduled for the end of 2016 but repeatedly postponed. Negotiations on the next regional council elections, aimed at pushing forward the decentralisation process, have also been adjourned sine die. A number of non-Islamist politicians and higher officials fear this process, believing that the central powers are too weak to support it. The local elections are politically important, which explains the disputes that they generate. In addition to strengthening democratic processes locally by significantly increasing the number of elected officials (approximately 7,150 in the entire republic), they may have a significant impact on the coalition members’ negotiating powers. If An-Nahda wins a high number of municipalities, it could request a ministerial reshuffle that would better correspond to its new electoral weight. Moreover, these elections would enable the winning parties to consolidate their patronage networks, and consequently their voter base, in order to fare better in the national election cycle at the end of 2019 (parliamentary and presidential elections). To be sure, they will not be able to launch true local development policies, due to the lack of financial autonomy and chronic shortage of means in the municipalities. But they could, for example, make use of the former RCD networks that are very powerful in rural areas, provide social housing and lease municipal farming land to their supporters or approve urban planning projects that raise the value of the surrounding land in their favour. In February 2017, an increase in the belief that Nida Tounes and several peripheral parties could win the elections in a large number of municipalities, as well as the reiteration of Algeria’s support of a “reconciliation” and “consensus” in Tunisia, permitted the adoption of the electoral law organising the municipal elections. The disputes then shifted to the control of the management of the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE). In May 2017, this pushed the ISIE’s president, Chafik Sarsar, to resign, which he attributed to excessive political pressure.His post remained vacant until 14 November 2017, date on which the Assembly elected a new and more consensual president, Mohamed Tlili Mansri. Consequently, in September 2017, the local elections were adjourned once more. An-Nahda accepted this, despite the discontent of its grassroots militants who had invested a great deal in the elections with the consent of their leaders, and the party even requested another adjournment to the ISIE with Nida Tounes in December 2017. Even if, officially, these adjournments were encouraged by smaller political parties who argued that the “Code of Local Authorities defining the mission and prerogatives of the future municipalities” had not yet been adopted and that the ISIE had no president, unofficially, the fact that An-Nahda was the favourite party was decisive. The Islamist party was indeed the only one that had been able to complete its lists before the December 2017 deadline scheduled in April 2017. It presented candidates in the 350 municipalities of the country, managing to respect diversity criteria set forth in the electoral law. “Even Nida Tounes wasn’t able to do so”, stated a party supporter. B.Partisan Control of the Independent Administrative Bodies An-Nahda and Nida Tounes are also distorting the roles of independent administrative bodies by placing their candidates there, who then defend partisan interests, giving fodder to criticism from the opposition parties and civil society, which claim there is a “return to authoritarianism”. Indeed, the constitution sets forth the creation of five independent constitutional bodies to uphold the principles of integrity, impartiality and neutrality that, in the aftermath of the 2010-2011 uprising, most political forces believed to be the antidotes against the ills of the public administration. Three provisional bodies founded in 2011 are already operational: the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE), the Independent High Authority for Audiovisual Communication (HAICA) and the National Authority for the Fight against Corruption (INLUCC). In 2011, in a revolutionary move, the two first administrative bodies were able to attack the foundation of two of the authoritarian regime’s pillars: the organisation of elections by the interior ministry at the service of the ruling party and the strict control of the media by the regime. Over time, the parliamentary majorities of the National Constituent Assembly (ANC) and of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People (ARP) have chipped away at these authorities’ independence, increasing their power over the composition of the bodies, their organisation and their supervision – thus going against the democratic trajectory launched by the departure of Ben Ali, and which the constitution is supposed to uphold. The three remaining independent administrative bodies set up outside the constitutional framework – the Truth and Dignity Commission (IVD) in charge of the transitional justice process, the Authority for Access to Information and the Authority for the Prevention of Torture (INPT) – have encountered similar problems. In September 2017, in an interview with the Tunisian press, President Essebsi criticised these independent bodies, stating that they represented a threat to “the existence of the state and its cohesion”. C.An Increasingly Presidential Regime Though his interventionism, which is incompatible with the spirit of the constitution but in line with his legitimacy as an elected official voted into office by universal suffrage, Essebsi is trying to monopolise the channels of political discussion, which is personalising crisis management mechanisms that are becoming increasingly dependent on his remaining the head of state. First, he continued to invest himself in his party, Nida Tounes, by playing the role of occasional mediator and increasing internal tensions by promoting the rise of his son in the party. He actively intervened on the balance and operation of the coalition. He took personal initiatives that had not been the object of a prior agreement in order to strengthen the alliance and keep the Islamist party, Nida Tounes’ main electoral opponent, under pressure. He sometimes promoted rivalry between Nida Tounes and An-Nahda by stressing Nida Tounes’ “modernist” political identity, especially in order to prevent a protest vote against these two pillars of the coalition in forthcoming elections. Even as he defended and promoted the stability of the alliance diplomatically, Essebsi is the instigator of the current national government of unity, which took office at the end of August 2016 and caught all political parties by surprise. This sabotaged the increasingly privileged relations between An-Nahda – which had gained in international credibility after its May 2016 congress – and Habib Essid, head of government at the time. Because Essid had demonstrated that he could act independently, in line with his constitutional prerogatives (as the top leader of the executive branch), the head of state demanded that he resign. Following the advice of his advisors, Essid sought to respect the provisions of the constitution and requested a parliamentary vote of confidence – which as expected he was not granted. Essebsi then managed to impose a new head of government, Youssef Chahed, a member of Nida Tounes but a rather marginal figure in the party, and exercised considerable influence on the composition of the ministerial cabinet. Since the first half of 2017, Essebsi is in latent conflict with the new head of government. He has tried to withdraw some of his prerogatives by increasing the power of the National Security Council, which he presides. Chahed had indeed begun creating a new political movement in view of the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2019, positioning himself as the centre of a new political axis that would be able to shift away from political corruption and attract the skills of “technocrats”, while at the same time joining forces with social powers (namely the trade unions). In this way, he hoped to exploit the weaknesses of the coalition and its pivotal parties, which displeased the head of state. Chahed also took advantage of the arrest of a controversial businessman, Chafik Jarraya, which several Tunisian political analysts have described as one of the main sponsors of Nida Tounes’ political bloc. He thus declared a “war against corruption”, which An-Nahda and Nida Tounes militants say serves his political interests. Moreover, Essebsi has been holding a rising number of closed meetings with the leaders of the main political powers and trade unions in order to position himself as the sole arbitrator along with Ghannouchi, who does the same on his side. A sociologist has noted that one of the aims is to “make the contents of negotiations less transparent, in order to deflect criticism and to avoid constantly having to justify the usefulness of the alliance or the strategic choices struck in a consensual and discreet manner”. The search for an upstream compromise between Ghannouchi and Essebsi, and to a lesser extent, between the coalition parties, tends to undermine and weaken the role of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People (ARP). The president of the ARP, Mohamed Ennaceur, member of Nida Tounes, “manages his parliament like a ministry”, noted the manager of an NGO in charge of capacity-building in the Assembly: The MPs’ interventions are all for show. Laws are adopted with few amendments. The MPs are disillusioned. They get involved in various projects but have no structure. They have no clear idea of their work. The legislative agenda is imposed on them at the last minute, they do not know it. All transactions between political parties are performed at the Consensus Commission. As a result, despite the democratic atmosphere that the opposition tries to preserve by triggering controversies, the parliament is at risk of becoming a rubber-stamping assembly for pre-arranged political decisions, as was the case under Ben Ali’s regime. Many MPs “change positions after receiving a phone call”, observed a former parliamentary assistant. For the majority, boosting the role of the Assembly is far from being a priority. On several occasions, Nida Tounes and An-Nahda have struck down the examination of a draft organic law by means of its financial administrative authority, which, according to several experts on parliamentary matters, would have allowed it to obtain the necessary means to operate de facto, in accordance with the constitutional framework. The gap between the constitutional principles drafted in a consensual fashion during the first transitional stage and the reality of the political scene today is becoming more and more obvious. By under-investing in the strengthening the democratic institutions, the political class is keeping the country in an endless state of transition, which is weakening the state. Essebsi and Ghannouchi, through their numerous secret meetings, are maintaining the coalition and reducing polarisation, but are also personalising the channels for political discussion and crisis management, thus increasing the likelihood of violent conflict if one of them disappear. Even if, in his New Year wishes for 2018, the head of state declared that the Constitutional court would be set up during the year, the absence of this institution – the only one with the power to determine the provisional or definitive vacancy for the post of president of the republic – creates the risk of an unconstitutional transition of presidential power. Such a scenario would strengthen the supporters of an authoritarian restauration. III.To Establish the Constitution or Rewind? A.The Dilemma of Political Decision-makers Political decision-makers face a very delicate problem when doubts appear as to the efficiency of democracy to overcome challenges. At risk of weakening the institutions and losing part of their international legitimacy, they must implement the constitution in accordance with the principles defined by the former parliament. At the same time, in January 2014, the revolutionary wave brought by the so-called “Arab Spring” was receding, the Islamic State had gained phenomenal ground in Syria and Iraq as from 2013, there was a coup in Egypt in July in 2013, and civil war broke out in Libya in July-August 2014. Simultaneously, political decision-makers must try their best to maintain a coalition which prevents polarisation between “pro-” and “anti-” An-Nahda, but whose current mode of operation is rather opaque and strengthens the opposition of the “revolutionaries” and nostalgia for the authoritarian regime. They must also manage day-to-day security issues, and most especially economic problems that threaten the stability of the country. Since 2016, the considerable degradation of economic fundamentals has increased the likelihood of uncontrollable riots, meaning that politicians are under pressure to take immediate action. Growth has remained weak (between 1 and 2 per cent). The Tunisian dinar has dropped by one third of its value in a year, without increasing the external competitiveness of national production or narrowing the trade deficit, which continues to rise. Public wages consume practically half the state’s budget, leaving little for development projects. Ordinary citizens suffer from price hikes and experience an inflation rate that is much higher than the official rate of 6.3 per cent. International bodies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have expressed their concern and regularly underscore their discontent at the situation. Since mid-2017, despite new regional opportunities, entrepreneurs from the established elite have suffered from an increase in tax audits that aim to “obtain revenue for the state coffers at any cost”. Businessmen from the informal economy consider that the war against corruption launched by the head of government in May 2017 is putting them under pressure. The relentless drop in the standard of living for the middle class is exacerbating tensions within the political parties, especially in An-Nahda, whose grassroot supporters suffer from price increases like any other ordinary citizen. This leads the militants to accuse their leaders of being incapable of improving the situation. Daily hardship, inflation and the relative degradation of public infrastructure (transport, health care, education) which are hitting the working-class areas are giving rise to nostalgia for the 1990s-2000s, ie when Ben Ali was in power, making the citizens more receptive to the nationalistic discourse of some representatives from the old regime. These figures are gaining visibility in the media, and they do not hesitate to equate democracy and the defence of human rights with the weakness of the state, support for jihadist terrorism and Western interference. B.Reviving an Authoritarian Regime: A Risky and Unrealistic Gamble The weakening of state institutions lends credence to “anti-Arab Spring” voices which are often nostalgic for the Ben Ali era. They implicitly posit that the only way to save the country is by centralising power and resources in the hands of an empowered executive with a homogenous ideology, and return an all-powerful presidency. Adherents of this reckless backsliding argue that the institutions created following the departure of Ben Ali are artificial, ill-suited to Tunisian political culture, and dysfunctional. From their perspective, the democratic transplant is not taking hold, as shown by the multiplication of centres of power and corruption and useless debates of politicians. This “background noise, according to which democracy is dysfunctional in Tunisia”, as one European diplomat put it, is becoming louder and encouraging some public intellectuals in the media to attack the Tunisian transition as a whole, and particularly the constitution, if only out of populism. Many politicians and public officials consider that the independent provisional administrative authorities (ISIE, HAICA, INLUCC) are weakening central government. In a sense this is true, if only as they lack the necessary technical and financial means to carry out the monitoring and regulatory duties they are supposed to carry out instead of the regular bureaucracy. As a high-ranking public official explains, echoing Essebsi’s accusation that these bodies pose a threat to “the existence of the state and its cohesion”: These institutions erode the state’s power. They represent a legal and administrative authority, but in fact they have no independence from the political parties or central government. They have exclusive areas of competence, but lack the means to apply them. By giving them a legal status that confers on them wide-ranging de jure prerogatives, yet without supporting their actual prerogatives, political decision-makers are undermining public administration. In turn, the latter is refusing to work with these authorities, which then defend their corporatist domain. The situation is comparable to the one paralysing the Assembly of People’s Representatives (ARP), subject to the bills proposed by the executive branch yet the necessary financial and administrative autonomy to achieve its role as enshrined in the constitution. In the view of some Nida Tounes dissidents and party members, since the current regime operates virtually on a presidential basis, this reality should be reflected in the constitution, as proposed by the head of state, and “move toward a system of majority voting that would have the benefit of a stable majority without needing to resort to a perverse coalition”. But given the latent polarisation between pro- and anti-An-Nahda factions, opening a debate on amending the constitution would be a risky gambit, creating the possibility that one of these groups will form a majority excluding the other. The constitution’s ambiguity about the prerogatives of the two leaders of the executive can be thought of as a peace treaty between political forces let loose by the 2010-2011 uprising. Attempts to alter it, as one civil society activist put it, “[when] it has not yet been implemented and given that politicians have not given the mixed parliamentary system the means to carry out its work”, may either rekindle ideological conflicts supposedly resolved during the constitutional process (2011-2014), or lead to an increasingly hardline regime. An-Nahda’s leaders, despite supporting parliamentarianism at the time of drafting of the constitution, are now divided on this issue. Some consider that the regime’s shift toward presidentialism, with all the risks it entails, is already underway and that negotiations are needed to ensure the party has a minority but stable role within an authoritarian regime in the making. An-Nahda would then wait for better days to take its helm, with many expecting that the 2019 presidential elections will be held during this more auspicious period. Others argue that a presidential regime would allow the dominance of a single leader or party over the future Constitutional court and independent constitutional authorities, and this would signal the end of democracy, a red line they say they are willing to cross “even if half of the party were to return to prison”, according to one party member. For the time being, the political class has not yet succumbed to this authoritarian temptation, observed by many international analysts and criticised as a “restauration” by various civil society activists who often exaggerate the point. Given the various socio-economic, political and administrative rifts, as well as the freedom of expression gained since 2011, reverting to a Ben Ali style regime appears unrealistic. It would imply that a political force or security coalition could lock down the country and reconstruct the system of surveillance and control over the population that rested upon the defunct RCD (the former hegemonic ruling party, dissolved some seven years ago and whose members are now scattered politically) and the now-fragmented interior ministry. For the time being this option remains technically impossible. In any case, even by expanding the executive branch and resuming an authoritarian regime, Tunisia would by no means overcome the structural security and economic challenges it faces. On the contrary, such a move would further aggravate political and social tensions. Tunisia would enter a spiral of repression intended to reinstate an atmosphere of fear among members of the opposition and civil society. Freedom of expression would be curtailed, making political decision-makers less responsive to large sections of society, lowering quality of life and heightening the sense of socio-regional discrimination and further increasing the likelihood of a revolt against the state. Reviving an authoritarian regime would also jeopardise the culture of negotiating and searching for peaceful compromise, an approach that has been strengthened since the former regime’s downfall. Even with a strong executive able to take expedient decisions, the result would most probably be to hollow out the reforms to increase the public administration’s efficiency (transparency, responsibility, improved government-citizen relationships). It would also restrict the initiatives and creativity required for business innovation to increase economic competitiveness. Finally, squandering the democratic credibility that Tunisia gained on an international scale would deprive the country of a significant part of the financial and political support it receives from abroad. IV.Conclusion Instead of making a futile attempt to recreate the institutions of the former regime, which would be tantamount to adventurism, Tunisia should consolidate its institutions by respecting and implementing its constitution. Even though the post-Ben Ali revolutionary euphoria has worn off and the coalition is spending more time trying to keep itself alive than implementing reforms, the country continues to move forward, albeit in a non-linear fashion. But for Tunisia to consolidate its transition and prepare itself for unforeseen challenges, the political class should avoid amending the constitution. Instead, it must find the necessary willingness to establish the Constitutional court as soon as possible, increase parliament’s autonomy, set up effective independent constitutional authorities, and hold municipal elections in 2018. Tunisia’s international partners should continue supporting these reforms, which are the only means of bolstering the state and maintaining long-term stability. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/tunisia/180-endiguer-la-derive-autoritaire-en-tunisie?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=9217b8dd71-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_01_11&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-9217b8dd71-359909997 (c) 2018 International Crisis Group

Foreign Minister AH Mahmood Ali today hoped there will be a new beginning with Myanmar through Rohingya repatriation. “With the repatriation of the Rohingyas under the arrangement signed on November 23, 2017, we hope to have a new beginning with Myanmar,” he said. The issue of Rohingya influx with Myanmar remained as an irritant in bilateral relations between the two countries, he added. Given the shared political, cultural, social, economic history over centuries, the foreign minister said India remains Bangladesh’s most important partner. State Minister for Foreign Affairs M Shahriar Alam and Chairman of BIISS Ambassador Munshi Faiz also spoke at the programme. As a natural connect between South and South-East Asia and beyond, he said Bangladesh will continue to pursue regional cooperation as an engine for sustainable growth and economic integration through Saarc, Bimstec, BBIN, SASEC, and BCIM. He said to secure economic benefits Bangladesh will continue to forge effective partnerships with other countries. "We've already developed such partnerships with India, China, Japan, the UK and the USA in recent years across mega infrastructure, power and energy sector projects, etc," he said. On realisation of sustainable development goals, Minister Ali said Bangladesh will continue to stretch its partnership in multiple fronts for realisation of sustainable development goals. He said human rights and fundamental freedoms are the keys to our existence. “After ending the culture of impunity through the trial of war criminals who committed genocide and crimes against humanity during our War of Liberation in 1971, we’re now focusing on international recognition of the 1971 genocide.” He said Bangladesh will continue to maintain a lead role in UN peacekeeping operations by contributing troops, police, including female peacekeepers. “We would also gradually bring more focus on peacebuilding activities,” he added. He said Bangladesh would employ mix tools and options at bilateral, regional and multilateral level to accomplish its objectives. “As we’ve done recently with the issue of Rohingyas, we'll continue to utilise our image in the multilateral forum to further our national interest,” Ali said. Over the past decade, he said, Bangladesh foreign policy has taken multiple retours keeping the basic principles of engagement intact. “Beyond our deeper engagement with Western Europe, our outreach to Eastern Europe, Africa, Latin America has been extended to explore new markets for our products and labour and thus to best ensure Bangladesh's economic security,” he mentioned. In the coming days, Minister Ali said, they will continue to work together to fulfill foreign policy vision and strategy under the normative guidelines of Vision 2021 and Vision 2041. “Drawing on our rich history and accomplishments, we’ll strive to demonstrate to the world why Bangladesh should matter. We all need to think innovative ways to accomplish that,” the minister said. In the coming days, he said, Bangladesh will continue to pursue its peace-centric and sustainable development focused approach in the international forum. At the domestic front, the development agenda will continue to take priority which will be furthered by regional integration and connectivity, said the Foreign Minister. He mentioned that the relationship with European countries will cover economic ties, democratic values as well as partnership in the areas of protection of environment. “With our maritime boundaries settled, we’ll continue to develop partnership in the maritime field for realisation of our 'Blue Economy’ pursuits,” he said. BIISS Director General Maj Gen AKM Abdur Rahman made a presentation in the seminar. http://www.thedailystar.net/rohingya-crisis/rohingya-refugee-repatriation-dhaka-hopeful-new-beginning-myanmar-bangladesh-foreign-policy-1517761 (c) 2018 The Daily Star

Al Jazeera has aired a lengthy and notable interview program (January 9, 2018), featuring two people in Khartoum; it provides and excellent overview of the situation on the ground in Sudan. The two people interviewed are Hafiz Mohamad, an economist and Director of Justice Africa in Sudan, and student activist Badreldin Salah (in hiding from NISS and speaking by Skype). There are some notable and unfortunate errors of fact by Al Jazeera—e.g., Omar al-Bashir has not been charged only with “war crimes” by the International Criminal Court (as Al Jazeera declares repeatedly) but massive crimes against humanity and genocide in Darfur; the date for the arrest warrants issued is not just 2009, as Al Jazeera would have it, but 2009 and 2010 (the latter date is when the arrest warrant charging al-Bashir with genocide was issued); the current inflation rate in Sudan far exceeds the “25%” that Al Jazeera repeatedly includes as background information to footage of demonstrations: this is simply the figure of the Central Bureau of Statistics and is credited by no one outside of the regime; see | http://sudanreeves.org/2018/01/09/sudans-economic-catastrophe-a-compendium-of-very-recent-reports/ ). But the program is a substantial and important contribution to international news reporting, which has been woefully inadequate. And film footage included as background is extraordinarily good and revealing: http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2018/01/anger-rising-price-bread-sudan-180109182616845.html Some still images from the footage: http://sudanreeves.org/2018/01/10/8407/ (c) 2018 SUDAN Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

Fresh call for UN Fact-Finding Mission to be given access to country ‘Such behaviour shows a contempt for human life which is simply beyond comprehension’ - James Gomez Following today’s admission by the Myanmar army that its soldiers and villagers summarily killed ten captured Rohingya people and buried them in a mass grave outside Inn Din, a village near the town of Maungdaw in Rakhine State, James Gomez, Amnesty International’s Regional Director for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, said: “This grisly admission is a sharp departure from the army’s policy of blanket denial of any wrongdoing. “However, it is only the tip of the iceberg and warrants serious independent investigation into what other atrocities were committed amid the ethnic cleansing campaign that has forced out more than 655,000 Rohingya from Rakhine State since last August. “It is appalling that soldiers have attempted to justify extrajudicial executions by saying they were needed as reinforcements elsewhere and did not know what to do with the men. Such behaviour shows a contempt for human life which is simply beyond comprehension. “Amnesty International and others have documented overwhelming evidence that far beyond Inn Din, in villages and hamlets across northern Rakhine State, the military has murdered and raped Rohingya, and burned their villages to the ground. These acts amount to crimes against humanity and those responsible must be brought to justice. “The full extent of the violations and crimes against the Rohingya and other ethnic minorities will not be known until the UN Fact-Finding Mission and other independent observers are given unfettered access to Myanmar, and in particular Rakhine State.” Attempted whitewash Myanmar’s armed forces have previously attempted to whitewash their role in crimes against humanity against the Rohingya in northern Rakhine State. Amnesty research has shown how, since late August, Myanmar’s security forces have unleashed a targeted campaign of violence against the Rohingya population, including through the widespread killing of women, men and children; rape and other forms of sexual violence against Rohingya women and girls; laying landmines; and burning entire Rohingya villages. This comes in the context of a longstanding state-sponsored apartheid regime against the Rohingya. Satellite images analysed by Amnesty from Inn Din clearly show how an area of Rohingya homes have been burned to the ground, while non-Rohingya areas alongside them appear to have been left untouched. Amnesty’s report My World is Finished from October includes the testimonies of seven Rohingya villagers from Inn Din. They described how the military and vigilantes raided the village over several days in late August, looting and burning homes and shooting people as they fled, as well as apparently targeting Rohingya men. Amnesty has not been able to determine the full scale of the killings in Inn Din. https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/myanmar-armys-admission-over-killings-only-tip-iceberg (c) 2018 Amnesty International

Despite the Myanmar government’s assurances to the international community that the country’s military is forbidden to use landmines, a number of Rohingya people have been killed by mines produced by the Army in northern Rakhine State in recent months, according to a new report. On Wednesday, Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, Myanmar Research Coordinator for Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, launched the group’s 19th report at the Royal Rose restaurant in Yangon. The anti-personnel landmine watchdog compiled casualty figures from medical assistance groups and non-governmental organizations, as well as information obtained by its own local researcher during visits to refugee camps on the Bangladesh border. A military crackdown against the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army in Maungdaw district in August 2017 caused around 660,000 Rohingya to flee to neighboring Bangladesh. Some of them walked into minefields while attempting to cross the border, according to the report. Moser-Puangsuwan played video footage during his presentation showing what he said were Rohingya refugees using a shovel and bamboo sticks to unearth an M-14 landmine. This anti-personnel weapon is produced by the Army at the Kapasa factory, a state-owned enterprise based in Ngyaung Chay Dauk in western Bago Division. He was unable to provide a precise estimate of Rohingya casualties. “You can see that one person is taking away the mine with a shovel, and eventually a person picks it up by the outside [edges of the device]. These mines were found on the Myanmar side of the border,” he said. He disclosed that Myanmar had abstained from voting in the UN General Assembly’s December 2016 resolution in support of its existing global landmine ban, despite senior Myanmar Army (or Tatmadaw) officials having told the watchdog that it and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were “seriously reviewing landmine policy”. The watchdog coordinator added that the commander-in-chief of the Defense Services last month sent a letter to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, an international anti-mine lobbying group, stating that “any use of landmines is forbidden.” The same month, the government delivered the same message to the president of a meeting of state parties to the mine ban treaty. Since December 2017, 162 countries — over 80 percent of all governments — have ratified the Mine Ban Treaty. Myanmar has refrained from doing so, however. According to the report, the group has also discovered aerial bombs in Kachin State and Abandoned Explosive Ordinance (AXO) in some ethnic regions. The group estimates total landmine casualties in Myanmar from 1999 to 2016 at 4,000, including 488 fatalities, 3,385 injuries and 118 unknown outcomes. He said that 1,080 people had been affected by landmine incidents in the six years since peace talks began. The group says that the actual number of casualties is likely higher than the figures in its report indicate. “Do we believe [that these figures represent a full accounting]? No. We get most of the information from medical assistance groups. Guess what. They don’t give medical assistance to dead people,” Moser-Puangsuwan said. According to the report, 71 townships from 10 states and regions of Myanmar are affected by antipersonnel mines. Shan, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Mon and Rakhine states are the worst affected. It said both the government and ethnic armed groups plant landmines in the areas under their control, adding that the issue of mine clearance had not been seriously addressed at peace negotiations. “We believe this is a humanitarian issue, not just a military one. And the landmines still in the ground today—even if you get a peace agreement tomorrow—will continue to produce war victims for many years,” Moser-Puangsuwan said. The timeline for mine clearance is still vague, as the signatories to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement are as yet still unwilling to give up what they see as a key defensive weapon. In terms of mine incidents in Maungdaw region, mine expert Moser-Puangsuwan explained that all of the devices confiscated by the Army are technically defined as remote-controlled bombs, which can be detonated by radio, among other means. A total of nine landmine monitoring organizations have applied to conduct mine-risk education activities in Myanmar, but only three of these have been granted permission to begin surveying in high-danger mine areas in 2018. They are prohibited from putting up fences or signs in areas deemed to contain mines. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/govt-hides-rohingya-landmine-incidents-intl-stage-devices-continue-used-home.html (c) 2018 The Irrawaddy

Myanmar’s military has admitted its security forces and Buddhist villagers killed 10 Rohingya Muslims whose bodies were found in a mass grave in a village in troubled Rakhine state. The statement is the army’s first public acknowledgement of wrongdoing since it launched “clearance operations” against Rohingya in August, prompting more than 650,000 to flee into neighbouring Bangladesh in what the United Nations (UN) has called “ethnic cleansing.” A statement on the military commander-in-chief’s Facebook page said the Rohingya found in the mass grave had threatened Buddhist villagers and were killed in retaliation. The UN and other groups have accused the military of widespread atrocities against Rohingya, including killings, rapes, and the burning of homes. But the military has previously denied any wrongdoing by security forces. The government of Buddhist-majority Myanmar has refused to accept Rohingya Muslims as a minority group, despite many families having lived in the country for generations. They are widely referred to as “Bengalis” and accused of migrating illegally from Bangladesh. The army described the 10 Rohingya Muslims found in the mass grave as ”Bengali terrorists”. Their bodies were discovered in December near a cemetery in Inn Din village. “It is true that both the villagers and security forces admitted they killed the 10 Bengali terrorists,” the military statement said. “The army will take charge of those who are responsible for the killings and who broke the rules of engagement. This incident happened because ethnic Buddhist villagers were threatened and provoked by the terrorists.” Tensions have simmered for decades between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya. Hundreds of the minority Muslims were killed in two bouts of violence in Rakhine in 2012, and 120,000 Rohingya remain in camps in the state. In the wake of the 2012 clashes, some Rohingya began organising a militant group, which killed nine border police officers in an attack in 2016. On 25 August last, known as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), launched wider attacks on Myanmar police and military outposts. The military responded with “clearing operations” that rights groups say have been accompanied by the rape and murder of Rohingya civilians, whose houses have also been burned down. About 100 Rohingya children are stranded in Myanmar without their parents after military operations drove 655,000 people into Bangladesh, according to the UN. Another 60,000 Rohingya children are languishing “almost forgotten” in disease-ridden camps inside Myanmar since being driven from their homes during violence in 2012, said UN children’s agency (UNICEF) spokeswoman Marixie Mercado said. She told reporters in Geneva on Tuesday that she spent a month in Myanmar’s Rakhine state and visited one camp where “shelters teeter on stilts above garbage and excrement” and four children died of disease within three weeks. “We hear of high levels of toxic fear in children from both Rohingya and Rakhine communities,” she said, referring to the ethnic Rakhine people, the state’s majority population. Myanmar government spokesman Zaw Htay told the Thomson Reuters Foundation that authorities were not aware of any children left alone in Myanmar following the exodus to Bangladesh in the last half of 2017. The government has rejected accusations of ethnic cleansing, blaming most of the violence on insurgents. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/rohingya-crisis-myanmar-security-forces-muslim-mass-grave-10-killing-army-chief-rakhine-bangladesh-a8151596.html (c) 2018 The Independent

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) reiterates its call for the immediate release of two Burmese reporters working for the Reuters news agency who appeared in court again in Yangon on Wednesday, when they were formally charged with breaching a colonial-era secrecy law. Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo have been held since 12 December, when they were arrested immediately after being handed documents by two mysterious policemen they met in a Yangon restaurant. The police later announced that they were “arrested for possessing important and secret government documents related to Rakhine State and security forces.” They are currently facing up to 14 years in prison under Myanmar’s Official Secrets Act, a 1923 law that is rarely used except to make the media understand that the military do not want to be the subject of investigative reporting. It was last used against four journalists in 2014. The pair will return to court on January 23 for legal arguments. “None of the claims made by the authorities in this case seems to be credible,” said Daniel Bastard, the head of RSF’s Asia-Pacific desk. “The two journalists had the misfortune to take an interest in what is happening in Rakhine State, where 650,000 members of the Rohingya community have fled to neighbouring Bangladesh to escape the army’s operations. “What with the lack of transparency, the failure to respect proper legal procedure and the fabrication of evidence, everything suggests that Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo are being used by the authorities as scapegoats in order to deter overly curious reporters.” The authorities said that the two policemen who gave the reporters the documents were also arrested under the Official Secrets Act at the same time. But the two reporters say the detained police officers were not the ones who gave them the documents. The authorities have not explained this glaring inconsistency. Ever since the Rohingya refugee exodus began in late August, journalists have been systematically denied access to the region, an issue that RSF raised with Myanmar’s leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, in September. In an extremely troubled situation that may have involved “elements of genocide,” according to the United Nations, it is essential that journalists should be able to go there and document what is happening. And now they should above all be free to cover implementation of the accord signed between Bangladesh and Myanmar on 23 November for the repatriation of Rohingya refugees, which is supposed to begin on 23 January. Myanmar continues to languish in the bottom third of RSF’s World Press Freedom Index and is currently ranked 131st out of 180 countries. https://rsf.org/en/news/rsf-urges-myanmar-free-two-reuters-reporters (c) 2018 Reporters without Borders

The 1871 book by Lewis Carroll, and sequel to Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland came to mind when Minister Angie Motshekga announced the 2017 matric results on the 4 January 2018. The Minister announced a year on year overall pass rate increase with results for 2017 standing at 75.1% with provincial breakdowns as follows: Free State: 89.8% Gauteng: 86% Western Cape: 84.4% North West: 82.1% Northern Cape: 77.6% KwaZulu- Natal:73.6% Limpopo: 67.4% Eastern Cape:65.8% The above, in another country or in another reality might have had the nation celebrate from the rooftops that the future was assured with so many young people producing spectacular results indicating a highly literate and numerate young nation. “Once again, I take my hat off to the Class of 2017, and I wish them the best in their future. I believe that you will continue to shine wherever you are”, said the Minister in a public statement. Minister Motshekga’s Alice-esque announcements failed to impress a cynical public. The sad reality belies the numbers above. The real pass rate, taking into account the almost 50% dropout, was closer to 37%, despite Minister Mokshekga’s huff and puff about year on year matric pass rate increases. The stark difference in numbers is mostly a result of a serious and perhaps deliberate distortion of throughput by students from early in the system, i.e. numbers of students who drop out along the way with many failing to reach matric and or not taking the exam for lack of preparedness. The Department of Basic Education’s Director of Exams, Priscilla Okubanjo, stated in a pre-exam press release that a total of 798 289 full and part time students would sit for the 2017 exams, 37 838 fewer than that of 2016. No plausible explanation was offered to explain why this was the case, in a demographic band that is growing and not shrinking in South Africa. Many education researchers and advocates like Equal Education were more strident in proffering its views on the 2017 matric results. Equal Education described the “matric pass percentage as a superficial and misleading indicator of public education quality. The pass rate reflects only the performance of those learners who managed to stay in school for 12 years and obscures how many dropped out along the way”. To get a grip on the real vs the manufactured, one must look at the following: Of the almost one million learners who entered grade 2, just close to 600 000 registered for matric in 2017 and about 534 000 sat for the exams. This puts a dropout rate at close to 45% of total enrolments. This is a staggering figure by most standards and its domino effect on the long-term prospects for the country is dire. Quality education with concomitant outcomes form the bedrock of vibrant, cohesive and growing societies and its converse entrenches inequality and social discontent. The latter well describes South Africa twenty-three years into democracy. Straight up global measures and local findings confirm that in terms of maths, science, numeracy and literacy the trends have moved backwards with a 2016 study revealing that at least 78% of Grade 4 learners in the country are functionally illiterate. This is an indictment with a price that will be paid for dearly. A crucial study was published in November 2017 proffering a detailed understanding of the nexus between access to quality education and the advancement of social mobility for the country’s most vulnerable citizens. A Society Divided-How unequal education quality limits social mobility in South Africa, by the Department of Economics at the University of Stellenbosch, makes the critical point that, “The majority of South Africans learners essentially follow a learning trajectory that ultimately leads to poor access to tertiary education and poor labour market outcomes, which in turn perpetuate a cycle of desperation for generations to come that is almost impossible to escape from through the education system in its current state. The persistence of deep inequality two decades after apartheid is a powerful indictment of the South African education system’s failure to overcome past injustices, despite considerable shifts in government spending to poor schools. It is therefor of utmost importance that South African addresses inequalities in educational opportunity as early as possible to promote social mobility for the poor”. The main findings of the Report reiterate what many have written of and which ails the education system in South Africa, including the following: • Education quality is still poor; • Large and early learning gaps exist; • Importance of post-matric education; • Centrality of school quality and • Unmet Expectations. It is the last mentioned that deserves pause for reflection. The role of quality education in social mobility and access to economic opportunities is profound and necessary to stymie the perpetuation of inter-generational inequality. There is the broadest consensus across the country that for a government that spends the largest item of its budget on basic education, the results are abysmal. There is no way to spin the issue. An honest glare in the mirror is needed lest we fail more young people. An alert, educated, curious and economically robust population of young people is a vital sinew to realising the dream of a country that prizes human dignity, equality, freedom, tolerance and national unity. A restive youth will corrode this dream. The imperative to build a reconciled South Africa and dismantle the political, economic and social culture created by a corrupt leadership, is vital as it is the time to renew the pursuit of shared values, including that of access to quality education for all. http://www.fwdeklerk.org/index.php/en/latest/news/725-through-the-looking-glass-matric-results-2017 (c) 2018 FW De Klerk Foundation