Overview [all emphases in bold and orange bold have been added; all commentary is in blue italics followed by my initials–ER] | http://wp.me/p45rOG-27X Blue Nile continues to face a dire humanitarian situation with thousands displaced by violence and flooding. Initial estimates put the number of internally displaced around 27,000, over a third of the population. Heavy rains and displacement threatens the 2018 harvest in Blue Nile, creating a very poor food security outlook. Active fighting and human rights concerns continue in and around Blue Nile, more assistance is badly needed to address the ongoing conflict. New details from Kaw and Warni suggest the shrinking population faces a dire humanitarian situation. Food Security and Agriculture South Kordofan Overall food security improved throughout the SPLA-N controlled Central Region and Western Jebels as the early harvest continued. As previously reported, the 2017/2018 harvest will likely improve over the last year’s for these areas, though is expected to fall short of the ten-year average. Rainfall was sufficient but sporadic during the growing season, with periods of abnormally low rainfall and episodes of flooding which damaged some crops. As there is no cease-fire or peace agreement substantial portions of agriculture along frontlines remain inaccessible to the population. This has depressed agricultural output for many communities throughout the central and western regions, reducing overall potential output for the region. The impact of this will be felt throughout 2018. This conflict related food insecurity was most pronounced in Heiban county, which faced the heaviest fighting and hosts the greatest number of displaced persons. Severe food insecurity was 27% in this county, per the latest FSMU report [This should be the most urgent concern to the international community and UN humanitarian agencies in particular; tragically, it is not–ER] .[1] The SKBN CU was able to conduct a series of key informant interviews with residents of Warni, Kaw, Fungor, and Nyaro payams to provide an overview of the humanitarian situation in this difficult to reach area. This region, often referred to as Kaw-Warni has been completely isolated by conflict. Cut off from refugee camps in South Sudan, lacking the ability to cross into Government of Sudan areas, and unable to travel to any other SPLA-N region, little is known of this region but the situation is fear to be among the worst in Sudan and South Sudan. The population inside is now estimated to be less than 25,000 people. This is a reduction of more than half since the outbreak of the conflict. This group of people have largely lost access to farmland after the outbreak of the conflict in 2011 and live on swampy land, generally unusable for agriculture. The small agriculture which is possible typically only provides enough food to last until late March of each year. This results in a six-month gap between food stores depleting and the following harvest. [1] FSMU July/August 2017 Food Security Brief With few coping strategies available people are forced to either subsist on wild foods like leaves and roots of trees, or risk crossing multiple frontlines to reach assistance. There were reports of hunger related deaths and malnutrition is reportedly endemic. [This is the direct result of Khartoum’s continuing, barbaric humanitarian embargo on the region–and the international community accepts this in the interest of rapprochement with the genocidal Khartoum regime–ER] Blue Nile Blue Nile remains in a crisis with a substantial portion of the population displaced by conflict. A recent assessment by the CU indicated there were at least 27,000 individuals displaced as during September. This correlates closely with the previous assessment by FSMU showing 39% of the population severely food insecure. This group of people are facing a dire situation. Many have completely lost access to agriculture. With 11% of the population at the highest level of food insecurity (6 out of 6 on the Household Hunger Scale), urgent help is needed. [It is simply outrageous that there is no international response to this level of malnutrition and food insecurity–ER] As crossing to refugee camps remains very dangerous, displaced people in need of assistance face a challenging choice to risk their lives to cross to the refugee camps of South Sudan. Agreements between warring parties to end the conflict are desperately needed to bring aid to a population in dire need. It remains unclear exactly how much agriculture was lost to conflict or flooding, and staple prices remain high as commodities in markets are still in short supply. Prices vary throughout the region, but have generally reached untenable levels for the population.[2]Without access to cash to encourage trade within the region it is unlikely external food will enter local markets in sufficient quantities. Health and Nutrition South Kordofan Consistent with seasonal norms, cases of malaria appear to have substantially increased in September. Local clinics reported being overwhelmed by cases of malaria in all locations the CU was able to assess. Access to trained medical staff and appropriate drugs is highly limited for most of the population, and currently there are not adequate statistics on specific needs of the population. More medical capacity is sorely needed to address the needs of nearly a million people in SPLM/A-N areas of South Kordofan. [Again, this is the direct result of the continuation of Khartoum’s humanitarian embargo on the region–now of more than six years duration–ER] Cases of acute watery diarrhea, caused by the Vibrio Cholera bacteria, continue to kill people throughout the southern portion of Sudan. [3] This presents a particularly concerning threat to the Western Region, where a recent survey showed access to medical care as practically nonexistent. [Outrageously, the UN agencies most responsible–the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) continue to refuse to use the world “cholera” in describing the disease, even as they report its “decline”–a moral disgracing of these UN agencies and all they purportedly represent–ER] Immediate and chronic malnutrition is a major challenge in South Kordofan remains a serious problem. As previously reported, global malnutrition and severe malnutrition based on height for weight were 23.9% and 8.4% in the Central Region and slightly worse in the Western Jebels at 29.2% and 9.3% respectively.[4] [2]SKBN CU August 2017 field monitoring activities [3]http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article63762 [4]SKBN CU SMART Survey Report Blue Nile Reports of Acute Watery Diarrhoea just north of the SPLA-N and Government of Sudan frontline increase concerns of the illness spreading into the region. [The disease is cholera–ER] This is an immediate concern as access to health care in Blue Nile is highly limited and few clinics have the needed drugs to deal with such an outbreak. Health facilities in Blue Nile already faced many challenges to serving the population, and this is likely exacerbated by the needs of a newly displaced population as a result of the conflict. The fighting within the SPLA-N continues to inhibit access to humanitarians and threatens the population’s access to medical services external to Blue Nile. People remaining inside will have little ability to move to better equipped clinics in the Maban refugee camps due to conflict, and will have highly limited access to medical care inside Blue Nile. Desperately needed drugs are unlikely to be available in the region while malaria and water-borne disease are expected to increase during the rainy season. Children are also at risk of treatable diseases, with very low immunization rates and poor access to primary health care in both the Central Region and Western Jebels.Acute watery diarrhoea, malaria, skin and eye infections were the main identified health risks to children in a recent SKBN CU rapid assessment. Animal Health South Kordofan The local Secretariat of Animal Health continues to report hundreds of cases of the dangerous disease sheeppox. This disease is often fatal and can spread quickly. Without access to vaccines or veterinarian care this could spread and affect thousands of animals. [The humanitarian embargo imposed by Khartoum includes denial of desperately needed vaccines for livestock–ER] Blue Nile Little is known about this sector. The local Secretariat of Animal Health has not been functioning since the conflict broke out. The CU has received reports of thousands of livestock killed or stolen in the conflict, but without full access to the region it has been impossible to fully assess the impact of the conflict on this important livelihood. Water South Kordofan Rains continued into September roughly consistently with seasonal norms, though access to clean water remains a significant issue. Water-borne illness still threatens a community without sufficient access to healthcare. More boreholes or treated water distribution centers are badly needed. Blue Nile Heavy rains and severe flooding exacerbated the already challenging displacement situation in Blue Nile. With thousands displaced and no access for humanitarian relief, people have suffered from contaminated water, lack of shelter from rains, and an increased risk of illness. The main market in the region was flooded, causing an unknown amount of property damage. Improved water sources are desperately needed for the same reasons as stated for South Kordofan. Investment in this area is now more challenging as a new conflict has restricted access for potential humanitarian actors. [None of these issues can be addressed so long as Khartoum’s humanitarian embargo continues–and with the lifting of U.S. economic sanctions, the regime sees little incentive to “improve humanitarian access,” a key condition for the lifting of sanctions–ER] Education South Kordofan Schools have been out of session and little has changed in the last month. Teacher training opportunities are rare and generally under-resourced, meaning the months away from classes could not be used to build capacity in most of the region. Investment in education is badly needed. There are approximately 255,000 school age children [5] in the region and very little access to trained teachers or well-equipped schools. Blue Nile Resources for education in Blue Nile are scarce, likely creating a situation worse than South Kordofan for boys and girls. Added to this, the current conflict has the potential to affect boys of potential military stature. Progress made to keep children under 18 out of the military needs to be maintained, and educational opportunities created. There are currently no education opportunities offered to provide these children an important alternative, support to this sector is desperately needed. Protection and security situation update South Kordofan September saw relative calm and minimal insecurity along front lines. This is progress which needs to be built upon to address cycles of violence and revenge between communities. Isolated incidents of killing still occurred, and cross line activities remain flashpoints for violence. Dedicated effort is needed to bring communities together. There is still no peace deal or cease-fire which spans the growing season, meaning farming presents a serious risk of loss for potential farmers. A large amount of agricultural land is still not accessible, and reports of households attempting to prepare their traditional farmland dangerously close to frontlines are common. Blue Nile Conflict in Blue Nile continued into September, further exacerbating an already crisis level humanitarian situation. Urgent action is needed to bring an end to this conflict and allow the population to resume agriculture or access humanitarian assistance. With an estimated 27,000 currently displaced and an unknown amount of damage to homes and property, the situation for Blue Nile is likely to get worse. The CU has received numerous reports of destroyed homes, burnt or looted shops, theft of livestock, and destruction of farmland. Alleged human rights violations have also occurred during the fighting. It is not possible with current resources to fully assess the impact of this violence. The CU has received further reports of tribal violence against person moving from Blue Nile to refugee camps in South Sudan. Further assistance is desperately needed to bring an end to this cycle of violence. [5] Based on an approximately 27% of population, ages 6 to 17. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 SUDAN Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) condemns the latest attack on press freedom in Afghanistan, in which militants armed with guns and grenades stormed the headquarters of Shamshad TV in Kabul today, killing one guard and wounding at least 20 employees. “Gunmen carried out a suicide attack at 10 a.m., in which two guards were killed,” Kabul police spokesman Basir Mujahid said. “After entering the premises, they began to fire on personnel.” According to Shamshad TV’s Twitter feed, at least 20 journalists and other employees were wounded in the attack, which forced the TV channel off the air for several hours. The Taliban denied any involvement. “We offer our condolences to the families and colleagues of the victims and we remind the state, the police, and the security services that they have a duty to protect the media and journalists,” said Reza Moini, the head of RSF’s Iran/Afghanistan desk. “The primary objective of these press freedom predators is to deprive the population of independently-reported news and information by creating a climate of terror that reduces the media to silence.” Launched in 2004, privately-owned Shamshad TV is a very active Pashto-language TV channel. For the past few days, there had been an exhibition about 24 years of mine clearance in its building, which it shares with the Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR). Afghanistan is ranked 120th out of 180 countries in RSF’s 2017 World Press Freedom Index. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Reporters without Borders

“Our people won’t let a girl study beyond the third grade (eight or nine years old). But this girl here cries and says: ‘I want to learn’. And I love her so much that I have no choice but to send her away from our village, because no education is available here beyond primary school level. She will go to the big city and she will learn and be the first one in the family”. I hear these words from a Pakistani father about his daughter back in the early 2000s, on my second research assignment for the International Crisis Group. I am travelling in Balochistan, an area affected by a decade-old insurgency. I am seeking to unpack the causes of militancy and conflict through meetings with former militants, political workers, rights activists and religious leaders. The eagerness of a little girl to defy the odds against her studying still resonates for me, as does her father’s sympathetic support, despite all the obstacles of tradition. They epitomise countless testimonies I hear throughout my travels. Not only do they influence how I work, but they guide my understanding of Pakistan and of how people – especially but not only women and children – experience its violence and multiple conflicts. Addressing Security Concerns to Advance Gender Equality in Pakistan Crisis Group's South Asia Project Director Samina Ahmed talks about the importance of security for the advancement of gender equality in Pakistan. CRISIS GROUP Unheard Voices, Invisible Forces On this pivotal day for me in Balochistan, a region tucked up against Iran and Afghanistan, I am planning to meet liberal, secular political activists, opponents of the Islamist Taliban. The meeting at this house, sitting cross-legged on the floor are only men, with one exception: a little girl. Responding to my questions, her father explains her determination to go to school and praises her character and tenacity to fulfil her dream. He then proposes that I speak to other women from their community to hear their perspectives and experiences of the situation in the province. Such an opportunity in a part of the country where men and women live segregated lives is rare for any outsider. I jump at the chance and am escorted to the part of the house where women of the family live, off-limits to all men barring close relatives. A large group of women greet me, well-dressed for the occasion. They gather round, excited at the chance to meet an outsider. They start by asking questions. How can a woman do the job I do? How can I work alone? How do I travel long distances freely? Except for family visits once a year, they say, they never venture beyond the walls of their home. They begin sharing their experiences and life stories. Some tell me that they would like to be educated and to have a job. There is anger and frustration in their voices. They know what they want, but believe it beyond their reach. This meeting has a profound effect on me. I am a longstanding women’s rights activist, and was a member of the Women’s Action Forum in the 1980s during military rule. Having studied in universities in Pakistan and abroad, and worked in several countries, I am comfortable standing up for myself in a man’s world. But experiencing real, well-articulated frustration on both male and female sides of a traditional Pashtun household makes me start to think anew about the gender divide. I begin to understand the importance of integrating gender power dynamics into my conflict analysis by listening to women and girls in conflict-affected areas, even if they are publicly invisible. I come to realise that being a female researcher is a definite plus, as it gives me access to women as well as men. That day I make a conscious choice: I will redouble efforts to interview women as well as men, understand how they experience violence and their perspective on ending it and harness their potential to help build a more peaceful society. The Remotest Reaches of Pakistan In my years at Crisis Group I travel throughout Pakistan, from the slums of its largest city, Karachi, on the Indian Ocean to the hamlets of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa along the border with Afghanistan. I talk to people of all walks of life, especially the unheard and invisible parts of society. These include not just the voices of girls and women, but also those of political party workers, fishermen and farmers struggling for survival in often harsh and inhospitable terrain. As a female researcher, I face no resistance while at work. The challenges are those faced by every woman travelling in Pakistan. The absence of public toilets for women, for example, poses not just a health but also a security hazard. Overall, though, during my trips, including times when I am the only woman staying in hole-in-the-wall hotels, I find that people are especially anxious to ensure that I am comfortable and safe. Being a professional, at times people forget that I am a woman. They rarely treat me as an outsider, or a woman not conforming to local norms. The exception is in urban centres where I visit more conservative madrasas or mosques, though even there, people do not stop or openly rebuke me. Only very occasionally does someone ask me to cover my hair, as normally expected of a Muslim woman in Pakistan. Through their demeanour, however, people can convey that they are at least uncomfortable if not hostile to independent women like myself. Of course I am conscious that not all Pakistani women think like me. This strikes me most forcefully one day on a visit to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. I attend a session of the local parliament, where the ruling Islamist Party has a large number of female parliamentarians. Yet it is the men who talk, while the women simply sit there in silence. “Aren’t you going to take part in the debate?”, I ask one of the women from the Islamist Party. “No, my male leaders will talk on my behalf”, she retorts. Providing a public platform to women is sometimes not enough to ensure that they themselves express their views and needs. In some cases, women in public life may also serve as proxies for other interests. And yet I also see women and girls, like that little girl in the remote household in Balochistan, who want to speak out, who want to learn, who want an education, and whose menfolk are sometimes willing to listen to them. The Madrasa Paradox Women are not the whole story, since men are also changing, sometimes almost without being aware of it. I become conscious of this during my research on madrasas, or religious schools, a truly male preserve that I initially do not even connect to women. I cannot enter madrasas, so a male Crisis Group colleague must talk to male students there. But I can meet the leaders of the religious parties that run much of the madrasa sector. I approach one Islamist party leader, who runs what is possibly the largest and most extreme group of madrasas, where almost nothing except the strictest interpretation of the Quran is taught. Surprisingly, he invites me to his home. Clearly, he doesn’t consider me as a threat as a woman. His young son is even present. “Well sister”, the party leader says, “please tell my son he should study hard”. “Maulana, what does the young boy study?” I ask. “English, mathematics and computer sciences”. “But Maulana”, I shoot back. “Why isn’t he in your madrasa?”. And he replies: “Sister, times have changed”. Giving Women a Chance In 2005, I travel to Swat in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to get a sense of what is happening in the countryside. A guide, who is an ex-fighter wounded on battlefronts in both Afghanistan and in Kashmir, invites me home to meet his family. His house lies in a small, beautiful mountain village where he lives with his young daughters. His biggest problem: the obstacles he faces in giving these girls a formal education. “You know”, he says, “for me the most precious thing now is their lives. And their futures. But what do I have to offer them? There is no school here. Without that, they can’t be ever like you, educated. And that’s what I want”. Then the girls cluster round and I speak with them about what they believe the village most urgently needs. Their answer is simple: water, because they have to travel long distances just to get enough water for the house. And education. Through the years, I often hear this refrain. Schooling comes up again when I try to explain Crisis Group’s conflict prevention work to one fifteen-year-old girl in Balochistan’s Gwadar city, a major naval base and now the hub of the Pakistan-China Economic Corridor. She responds with frustration and anger. “You know, we are sick of the UN and you NGOs. You come here, you talk, you preach, you write, over and over again, but you don’t do anything for us”. “What you think needs to be done?”, I ask. “Look, I don’t want to be a teacher. I want to be a scientist. But in my school, there is not even a science teacher!”, she says. “I will never be a scientist unless we have what you had, the privilege of a good education”. I learn my lesson right there. I want to do something about the lack of opportunities offered to her. Pakistani society may seem conservative about women’s education, but under the surface, currents for change are building momentum. My research across Pakistan illustrates the impact that insecurity has on girls’ ability to seek an education. Every person interviewed ­– not just young girls, but also their fathers and brothers – said that if their daughters or sisters could travel without risk to a nearby school, they would send them there. In much of the countryside, however, people often live far from schools; in rough urban districts, the daily trip to school may pose a physical threat. “We can’t risk them going long distances. It’s too unsafe”, is a complaint I hear often. It challenges my previous notion that cultural and social restrictions alone prevent girls from accessing education in Pakistan’s conflict zones. These insights lead me to write two reports on girls’ education in Pakistan. The first one, Pakistan: Reforming the Education Sector, published in October 2004, warns that Pakistan’s deteriorating education system and a curriculum that promotes religious intolerance fails to equip young people with the skills necessary for a modern economy, and, in some cases, creates foot soldiers for jihadist groups. I return to the subject ten years later, publishing Education Reform in Pakistanto show that millions are still out of school, the curriculum remains unreformed, and the education system remains alarmingly impoverished. That report also raises the problem of safe access to schools for girls, as well as the need to change the curriculum to protect against religious extremism and sectarianism. A Mutual Interdependence I am humbled again and again by human rights activists, humanitarian aid workers, and women’s rights leaders across Pakistan who risk their lives to promote positive changes in the country. By interviewing them and writing about their views, I take their voices to senior decision-makers in Pakistan. A leading champion of women’s rights, Pakistan’s first woman Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, lauding the recommendations of our reports, told her party leaders that they should be essential reading. Unlike me, though, many of the people I interview are physically threatened and attacked. Yet every time I meet them, they thank me. I always feel it should be the other way around. The interdependence of my work and theirs is driven home to me one day in Punjab. I meet a lawyer who says he distributes photocopied versions of our reports among the members of his bar council to build consciousness of the legal changes Pakistan needs, especially to open new opportunities for women. I voice my surprise when he adds that he buys the reports ready-bound in a bookshop, even though they are available for free on our website. He sums up the relationship between Crisis Group, with our research and policy advocacy, and dedicated activists. His group is ready to distribute our work this way because, he says: “We have learned as much from these reports as you have learned from us”. In 2016, writing about different layers of criminal, jihadist and ethno-religious violence in Karachi, I take my insights on what is holding schoolgirls back and test how they may apply to society more broadly. I look into gender-based violence where women are regularly subjected to sexual harassment on the streets as they go to work. Like girls trying to gain a formal education, I find that women from poor and marginalised communities in this mega-city, Pakistan’s economic hub, have few options to travel safely to their place of work. What women fear most is violence as they travel from their homes to earn a living and support their families. By incorporating the perspectives of women and girls into my research, amplifying their voices and analysing how they experience the violence endemic to parts of Pakistan, Crisis Group’s work aims to provide a richer understanding of violence and conflict in my home country and encourage the government to take meaningful steps to address the simple problem of safety. Every woman who can leave her house each day to school or work represents a step forward. _________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Group

A North Korean soldier stands guard at the entrance of a women’s prison near Chongsong, North Korea, May 31, 2009. © 2009 Reuters (Geneva) – The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women should press the North Korean government to stop security officials and prison guards from physically and sexually abusing female prisoners, Human Rights Watch said today. On November 8, 2017, the UN committee will meet with North Korean government officials during its 68th plenary session. In April 2016, the North Korean government submitted a combined report, encompassing its required second, third, and fourth reports, that covers the period of 2002 to 2015. Since North Korea ratified the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 2001, this is only the second time the government has reported to the CEDAW committee. In written replies to the committee, North Korea claims that “all legal proceedings are carried out in full compliance with the law.… The process of investigations and preliminary examinations is tape-recorded or video-taped, interrogation of the examinee is conducted with the attendance of a clerk and if need be, two observers, thus preventing investigators and preliminary examiners from committing abuse of power or violations of human rights. Prosecutors exercise strict supervision of detention rooms and reform institutions to ensure that no human rights violations are committed.” However, Human Rights Watch has interviewed eight women who experienced psychological, physical, and sexual abuse while in detention during the reporting period covered by the CEDAW committee review. Abusers include police interrogators from the People’s Security Agency (PSA), State Security Department (SSD, or bowibu) agents, and prison guards in detention facilities. “The CEDAW committee needs to ask the toughest questions about North Korea’s whitewashing of the treatment of women in prison,” said Heather Barr, senior researcher on women’s rights. “There is clear evidence that women are being physically and sexually abused with impunity, no matter how vigorously Pyongyang denies this.” The flexibility of sentences for many offenses – which women said typically range from approximately six months at a short-term forced labor camp (rodong danryeondae) to five or seven years at a long-term “ordinary crimes” prison camp (kyohwaso), with the latter option involving a lengthy investigation and highly stigmatizing public trial in their hometown – increases the vulnerability of female prisoners to sexual coercion and abuse. North Korean women told Human Rights Watch of abuses including: A female farmer, who escaped North Korea in 2015, told Human Rights Watch that an interrogator from the SSD raped her in a pretrial detention facility (kuryujang), where she had been sent after China forcibly returned her to North Korea in late 2012 following a prior attempt to escape. Another former farmer, who was sent back from China to North Korea in the spring of 2010, said that the PSA agent in charge of questioning her in a police pretrial detention facility near Musan city, in North Hamgyong province, touched her body underneath her clothes, raped her several times, and asked her repeatedly about the sexual relations she had with the Chinese man to whom she was sold. She said: “My life was in his hands, so I did everything he wanted and told him everything he asked. How could I do anything else?” She added, “Everything we do in North Korea can be considered illegal, so everything can depend on the perception or attitude of who is looking into your life.” Other women who had been prisoners said that male SSD agents or police officers questioned them alone in closed-door rooms without witnesses, and touched their faces and bodies, including their breasts and hips, over or sometimes inside their clothes. The women often felt unable to resist unwanted touching because interrogators largely determined the women’s future; the next steps in their criminal case depended on how the interrogators reported their crimes in their file. Women who escaped the country after 2011 following abuse in detention as well as former high-ranking North Korean officials told Human Rights Watch that women detained by authorities are sometimes sexually abused or raped by officials, who engage in these abuses with impunity. The North Koreans interviewed said that when government officials sexually harass or assault women in custody, the women have no effective way to demand accountability or stop the abuse, despite North Korea’s written claims to the CEDAW committee that “complaints and petitions machinery is put in place in reform institutions,” and that such institutions “are required to receive complaints and petitions” and “settle them in a fair manner.” The interviewees also said that if such abuse becomes publicly known, the women – not the abuser – face social stigma and shame. Human Rights Watch’s interviews with women who have experienced abuse in prison are part of broader research into gender-based abuses against women in North Korea. In 27 interviews, North Koreans described the prevalence of stereotyped gender roles, and the widespread acceptance of acts of violence against women and girls in the family and wider society. Interviewees also said gender-based discrimination forces many women to engage in quasi-illegal market activities to sustain their families, putting them at heightened risk of arrest and detention, as well as sexual coercion by government officials. Women often face criminal sanctions after being forcibly returned by China to North Korea. Two former inmates at Chongori prison camp (kyohwaso), who left North Korea after 2013, told Human Rights Watch that by 2010, up to 80 percent of the 1,000 female detainees in their prison were being held for illegally leaving North Korea. Many of the women in the prison were forcibly returned from China to North Korea, after being sold to Chinese men in forced marriage arrangements in order to bear children, or trafficked into the commercial sex industry. The North Korean government denies that women forced to return to North Korea are subjected to punishment: “Between 2005 and 2016, there were a total of 6,473 women who returned after travelling abroad without valid travel permits. It was found upon their return that the majority of them illegally crossed the border because of economic difficulties they were suffering at that time or as victims of plots of human trafficking groups. Therefore, they were not subjected to any legal punishment and are now enjoying stabilized life thanks to the all-embracing, benevolent politics of the State.” “Lack of access to the country and the difficulties of escaping North Korea limit the number of interviews Human Rights Watch can conduct, but our research and the voices of women who have suffered these grievous violations provide an alternative to the delusional picture put forward by the North Korean government,” Barr said. Human Rights Watch’s findings also echo those of a 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) report on human rights in North Korea that found crimes against humanity were committed against persons detained in political prison camps (kwanliso) and ordinary prison camps (kyohwaso), as well as women who had been forcibly returned by the Chinese government. Such crimes include torture and physical abuse, sexual molestation and humiliation, rape, and forced abortions and infanticide of women who became pregnant while in China. The COI also found that “sexual and gender-based violence against women is prevalent throughout all areas of society.” The CEDAW committee is a body of 23 independent experts that reviews the compliance of each state party with its obligations under the treaty. The CEDAW treaty defines discrimination as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.” The convention is intended to provide the basis for realizing equality between women and men by ensuring women’s equal access to, and equal opportunities in, political and public life, as well as education, health, and employment. States parties agree to take all appropriate measures, including legislation and temporary special measures, so that women can enjoy all their human rights and fundamental freedoms. All states parties are required to submit an initial report one year after ratifying the convention, and regular reports every four years to the committee on how they are complying with the requirements of the convention. The committee examines each report, which is followed by alternative report submissions by civil society and national human rights commissions, a pre-sessional working group meeting, drafting of a list of issues, a written response from the state party, a plenary session to discuss all information with the state party, and concluding observations addressing concerns and recommendations by the committee at the end of the session. “Women face dire abuses in North Korea, often at the hands of government officials,” Barr said. “The UN should pressure North Korea to respect the rights of women and girls, and not let Pyongyang get away with refusing to even acknowledge that abuses are occurring.” ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Human Rights Watch

The failed UN/African Union “hybrid” Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)—which has shamelessly and with gross inaccuracy celebrated its success for the almost ten years during which it has been charged with protecting civilians and humanitarians—continues (per its most recent reauthorization by the UN Security Council | June 2017) to draw down its forces on a scale ensuring that what exceedingly limited protection the Mission has offered will be greatly reduced. 44 percent of military personnel are now deploying out of Darfur and 30 percent of the policing personnel. The knock-on effects of withdrawing this hopelessly misconceived, demoralized, ill-equipped, and badly led Mission are many. Some of the greatest consequences will be a reduction in humanitarian access; for example, since the UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) flies only to areas militarily protected, locations abandoned by UNAMID troops will no longer be accessible. This is especially perverse since a condition for the permanent lifting of U.S. economic sanctions by the Trump administration was the improvement of humanitarian access in Darfur. The UN’s current estimate of the number of people in Darfur in need of humanitarian assistance is 3 million. Tragically, the greatest consequence of UNAMID’s deployment out of Darfur are the continuation, and in some places acceleration, of daily ethnically-targeted attacks on civilians throughout Darfur, primarily by Arab militias controlled or sanctioned by Khartoum. Non-Arab (African) civilians continue to be—as they have been for more than fourteen years—subject to murder, rape, displacement, and loss of property and goods. There is good reason to believe that we will see in the reports from Darfur (conveyed primarily by Radio Dabanga) continuation, even expansion, of these attacks. Only the fact of previous vast destruction of African villages and the violent expropriation of farmlands, and the massive concentration of displaced persons (some 2.7 million in Darfur itself, another 320,000 in eastern Chad refugee camps) limits the scale of attacks. Moreover, we should remember that some 600,000 people have been killed as a direct or indirect result of violence over the past fourteen years: this approaches ten percent of the pre-war population in Darfur (see | http://sudanreeves.org/2017/01/05/quantifying-genocide-darfur-mortality-update-august-6-2010/). As a crude barometer of the scale of violence, I will be assembling weekly a brief compendium of foreshortened dispatches (all with sources on the ground). For surveys covering more extensive periods the violent expropriation of African farmlands (November 2014 – November 2016) and the rape of girls and young women (for the years 2014 and 2015), see: http://sudanreeves.org/2016/02/17/changing-the-demography-violent-expropriation-and-destruction-of-farmlands-in-darfur-november-2014-november-2015/ http://sudanreeves.org/2017/03/07/continuing-mass-rape-of-girls-in-darfur-the-most-heinous-crime-generates-no-international-outrage-january-2016/ Herewith the third (bi-weekly) compendium of violence reported from Darfur during the withdrawal of UNAMID. The dispatches are all from Radio Dabanga, although several of the links I provide in my commentary are to related dispatches from Sudan Tribune. All emphases in bold are mine; the emphases in orange bold are of particularly significant highlights or passages: • “Raids and siege tactics” to be used in North Darfur arms and vehicle collection | October 25, 2017 | KHARTOUM / KUTUM / KABKABIYA The Chairman of the High Committee for the collection of weapons and unlicensed vehicles has said in the Khartoum that “the forced collection of weapons through raids and siege will be carried out decisively in all the targeted states in the coming days.”This was announced yesterday by Ahmed Abdallah El Naw, chairman of the High Committee after the regular meeting of the committee at the Republican Palace under the chairmanship of Sudan’s Vice-President Hassabo Abdelrahman. [During the fearsome assaults on the populations of East Jebel Marra and the Jebel Marra massif itself, Hassabo referred to the non-Arab/African populations of these areas as “insects,” and that “none should be left alive”—ERhttps://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/sudan0915_insert_lowres_with_cover.pdf/] El Naw said that the imposition of the prestige of the state is a primary objective of the weapons collection, which will be “carried out decisively, especially in the areas of Kabkabiya and Kutum after the attack carried out by a group led by El Safana which was defeated. El Naw was referring to an incident that closed the market of Kutum on Monday, when a group of rebel militants led by Ali Rizgallah El Safana allegedly took goods from a shop and did not pay. The attackers fled when a large force of paramilitaries of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) entered the town. [Intra-Arab fighting has been one of the least reported features of violence in Darfur over the past fourteen years; but its prominence is assured by the increasingly ferocious battle over the spoils of genocidal counter-insurgency, as well as control of the Jebel Amir gold mining area of North Darfur; see below the report on Musa Hilal’s Revolutionary Awakening Council —ER] El Naw stressed that “the military security committee has all the means to start the second phase of the collection of weapons.” [It is clear the Khartoum’s collection of weapons in Darfur—where they exist in almost incomprehensibly large numbers—will now be undertaken violently (with the passing of the “voluntary” phase of weapons collection). Darfur’s IDPs will often be caught in both the intra-Arab fighting as well as the efforts to dismantle camps, where Khartoum insists—with no proof—that large quantities of weapons are hidden. There will be more bloodbaths of the sort we have seen repeatedly at Kalma camp and at Nierteti earlier this year—ER] In total, 12,500 Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militiamen have been deployed to North Darfur with the purpose to assist in the forced collection of illegal weapons from civilians and the control of illegal vehicles. The deadline for people to voluntarily hand in their weapons ends tomorrow. [The RSF has clearly been given the job of creating the “security” Khartoum envisions in the “new Darfur; given the role of the RSF in Darfur’s genocidal violence over the past several years, this is ominous in the extreme—ER] The arrival of the paramilitary force, operating with the title ‘New Dawn’, may lead to an explosion of the situation in North Darfur, claimed the Revolutionary Awakening Council (RAC) led by the former janjaweed leader Musa Hilal. “The militias of the ‘New Dawn’ arrived in Kutum yesterday. But they do not intimidate us, and we are ready to confront them if they attack our sites,” the movement announced last week. [This makes clear the inevitability of large-scale violence in North Darfur in the near term—ER] • “Khartoum intends to dismantle Darfur camps by force”: Abdelwahid | October 23, 2017 | PARIS [I try not to rely on the assessments of rebel leaders and spokesmen, since they have so often proved unreliable in the past. But here Abdel Wahid al-Nur is exactly right: see my extended account explaining why I think so | October 23, 2017—ER] • Two dead, man’s hand hacked-off in Darfur robberies | November 3, 2017 | NYALA / KUTUM / GULDO A displaced man was killed, and his brother’s hand hacked-off on the road between camp El Salam and Kalma camp near Nyala, South Darfur on Tuesday evening. In separate incidents, a man was shot dead in North Darfur, and a woman seriously injured in Central Darfur. [This is all too characteristic of the violence reported regularly in Darfur—violence the radically reduced and already militarily incompetent UNAMID cannot halt—ER] Yagoub Furi, Coordinator of the Darfur Displaced and Refugees Association told Radio Dabanga that on Tuesday evening four gunmen attacked brothers Suleiman and Hassoun Abdallah while they were on their way from camp Kalma to camp El Salam for a visit of some relatives. The gunmen opened fire on Hassoun and killed him instantly. They then cut-off the hand of Suleiman with a knife, took the amputated hand with them and fled. He explained that the incident was reported to Beleil police and Suleiman Abdallah was taken to Nyala Hospital. Kutum locality Gunmen shot dead Siddig Suleiman, resident of Kassab camp in Kutum locality in North Darfur at noon on Wednesday. A camp sheikh told Radio Dabanga that gunmen riding camels attacked Siddig Suleiman while he was winnowing grain on his farm at Jumbo area north of the camp. They tried to take his grain and when he refused, they fired two bullets at him which killed him instantly. [This inability to farm or return to farms they once owned is the most deadly legacy of fourteen years of violent destruction and expropriation of the assets (land, cattle, valuables) of non-Arab/African populations throughout Darfur—ER] Displaced people and residents of Fata Borno of Kutum locality in North Darfur have complained about continued attacks by the militias against the residents and their cattle trespassing the farms by force of arms. Yesterday displaced persons and residents of Fata Borno told Radio Dabanga that large numbers of militias after being driven out of Kutum by the rapid support forces have moved to Fata Borno and stationed there. A farmer said that 10 days ago these militias began taking their livestock to graze in the farms by force of arms and assaulting the residents in the market, the camp and the districts of Fata Borno. The farmer demanded government forces to speed up removal of these militias from the area. Guldo A woman named only as Amina was wounded in a shooting at Guldo in Jebel Marra in Central Darfur on Thursday. One of Amina’s relatives told Radio Dabanga that one of the herders shot her while she was trying to drive the camels from her farm. He said the shooting caused serious wounds to her thigh, abdomen and shoulder and that she was taken in a serious condition to Guldo Hospital. • South Darfur displaced call for UNAMID protection after Sudan government show of force | November 3, 2017 | KALMA CAMP [See my extended commentary on the implications of this terrifying episode for the IDPs at Kalma camp, which has been violently attacked previously by both regular and militia forces of the Khartoum regime—ER] • “Enforced Darfur arms collection enters second phase”: Vice President [Hassabo] November 1, 2017 | KHARTOUM / NYALA [The second phase, of course, is forcible confiscation of weapons, or declaring such confiscation to be the goal in attacks on IDP camps, this as part of the effort to dismantle the camps, something that Hassabo has long championed—ER] • Displaced in South Darfur’s Mershing to demonstrate against herder attacks | October 31, 2017 | MERSHING The residents of the camps for the displaced in South Darfur’s Mershing plan to stage a demonstration on Wednesday against attacks by herders on farmers in the locality. The demonstration against the killing of Mohamed Abakar and Adam Hassan on Saturday will move from the mourning tent to the locality’s headquarters, a camp sheikh told Radio Dabanga. The two displaced farmers were shot dead by militant herders when they were trying to drive livestock from their land near Mershing on Saturday afternoon. A number of other farmers were wounded. [Until non-Arab/African farmers can resume, with security, their traditional farming lives—in large numbers—the violent tensions that plague all regions of Darfur will not end. This basic point seems lost on those international actors—including especially the U.S.. the European Union, the UN, and the African Union—who have fashioned the various peace “processes” and “agreements” that manage to exclude the voices of Darfuri civil society—ER] Military troops managed to capture three of the alleged attackers, who are now being held in the prison of Menawashi. Market vendors closed their shops on Monday for the second day in a row in protest against the frequent herders’ attacks on farmers in the area. The camp sheikh said that the protesters plan to hand a memorandum to the authorities of Mershing demanding that “the perpetrators will escape trial on the pretext that they belong to government militias such as the Rapid Support Forces or the Border Guard as happened so many times in the past.” [It is difficult to overstate the significance of this quiet impunity after arrest of those who have served in Khartoum’s militias: giving the appearance of “justice,” the arrests are typically a complete hoax—ER] • Displaced woman shot in North Darfur camp | October 31, 2017 | KUTUM A woman was shot during a rape attempt at her home in Kutum camp in North Darfur on Sunday. A relative of victim told Radio Dabanga that a gunman raided the shelter of Halima Ahmed in Kutum camp on Sunday evening with the intention to rape her. “When she resisted, he shot her in her chest and thigh,” he said. “She is now being treated in Kutum Hospital.” Camp residents and policeman set up a search posse that managed to apprehend the attacker. • North Darfur: RSF troops shoot two, shave Mahameed girl’s head | October 31, 2017 | KUTUM / DAMRAT EL SHEIKH Two people were wounded when members of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia opened fire on a vehicle in Kutum in North Darfur on Monday. The vehicle was carrying a Mahameed tribesman and his daughter from Damrat El Sheikh, who were on their way to Kutum to complain that militiamen had shaved the girl’s head. Member of the North Darfur parliament Adam Manan told Radio Dabanga that RSF militiamen opened fire on the commercial vehicle carrying the 13-year-old Mahameed girl and her father. He said that El Haj Zakariya and another passenger named Juma sustained bullet wounds. They were rushed to Kutum Hospital. The MP condemned the militiamen for shaving the girl’s hair after they learned she belonged to the Mahameed tribe [the clan of the (Arab) Northern Rizeigat to which Musa Hilal belongs—ER], and called on them not to discriminate against people on the basis of their tribe. [Here we have a clear picture of what kind of “authority” Khartoum has given preeminence in Darfur—ER] He said that the girl and her father arrived safely in Kutum where they had a meeting with the commander of the Kutum military garrison. “An RSF legal administration officer arrived today [Monday] from El Fasher, who said they will investigate the incident and bring the offenders to trial.” The girl was accosted by RSF militiamen while taking livestock for grazing near Damrat El Sheikh in Kutum locality on Friday.When they learned she belonged to the Mahameed clan, headed by Musa Hilal – a janjaweed leader who turned against the government during the last years – they shaved her head and released her. Hafiz Mohamed, a cousin of the victim, told this station that the incident aroused huge resentment among the victim’s relatives. “We consider it a straightforward provocation.” He said that members of UNAMID, including a human rights defender, accompanied by RSF officers, visited the family of the victim in Damrat El Sheikh on Saturday. “They promised to investigate the incident and punish the perpetrators.” [It is difficult to imagine a more absurd or unlikely prospect than UNAMID investigating and prosecuting a crime committed by a member of the RSF—ER] • Gunmen wreak havoc in Darfur’s East Jebel Marra | October 31, 2017 | DERIBAT Militiamen have free rein killing and robbing people in the area of Deribat in East Jebel Marra without any action buy authorities to stop them, according to several residents. “On Saturday and Sunday, groups of militiamen plundered three shops at the Deribat market, stole 10 donkeys from market visitors,” a shop keeper reported to Radio Dabanga from the market. “The price of a donkey exceeds SDG 10,000 (close to $1,500),” he added. He said that the security situation in the area deteriorated despite the presence of government forces guarding the market. “They are doing nothing against militia attacks, although they weekly collect SDG 10,000 protection fees from each shopkeeper.” [We should expect to see a great deal more extorted protection monies of this sort, by the RSF and other elements of Khartoum’s “security” forces—ER] He called on UNAMID to establish a base in Deribat and protect the residents and their property. [It is deeply painful to see the people of Darfur, year after year, put their faith in the failing and rapidly collapsing UN/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID),the greatest peacekeeping failure in UN history—ER] • West Darfur Koran student abducted by Chad soldiers | October 31, 2017 | SIRBA A group of Chadian soldiers abducted a Koran student in West Darfur’s Sirba locality on Sunday. Speaking to Radio Dabanga, a fellow student told Radio Dabanga that a group of Chadian troops in a Land Cruiser stopped in front of the Holy Koran Institute in the area of Soni in Sirba at about 4 pm on Sunday. They raided the premises, seized Adam Osman (45) at gunpoint, and took him with them in the direction of Chad. “Nobody understands why this happened,” he said. “We have informed the authorities in Sirba, but they have not taken any action so far.” [Far too many violent actions in Darfur have no clear cause—or resolution—ER] • Herders attack, kill farmers in South Darfur | October 30, 2017 | MERSHING / GIREIDA / KHARTOUM Two displaced farmers were shot dead in the area of Mershing on Saturday. On Sunday, herders attacked and injured two women farmers near Gireida… “About 20 herders on camels opened fire on farmers because they were trying to remove livestock from their land near Mershing on Saturday afternoon,” a resident of Hashaba camp for the displaced reported to Radio Dabanga. “Mohamed Abakar from Tuntubaya camp and Adam Hasan from Hashaba camp were killed instantly.” The farmers formed a search team that traced the herders, and found them in a nomad settlement in the area of Kerengo, seven kilometres from Mershing, on Sunday morning. “The janjaweed then opened fire on the team members. This prompted a military force to go out to the settlement. After an exchange of gunfire with the herders, they captured three of them and took them to the Mershing police station,” the source said. The people of Mershing closed the town market in protest against the repeated attacks by herders on farmers. In an attack by herders on farmers in Gireida on Sunday, two women farmers were injured. An activist told this station from Gireida that 10 herders wearing military uniforms grazed their cattle on farms in the area of Sennar, seven kilometres south of Jokhana. “When the women attempted to chase the livestock from their land, the herders fired in the air to intimidate them. They then began to beat Khadija Adam, and broke her right hand. Her sister Hanan sustained head injuries. They were both taken to the Jokhana Health Centre.” He cited a previous incident at Donki Sagur, 30 kilometres south of Gireida, where a group of seven gunmen ambushed farmers and robbed them of their mobile phones, a horse, and 20 goats. [This is the grim legacy of fourteen years of unrestrained genocidal counter-insurgency, in which Khartoum’s militia forces were “paid” with the booty of attacks on non-Arab/African farms and villages. Until the issue is recognized and addressed, peace will not come to Darfur, despite various unctuous pronouncements by European diplomats—see in particular my comments on the recent disingenuous and expedient comments of EU Ambassador to Sudan, Jean-Michel Dumond | October 31, 2017—ER] • Villagers robbed a month after voluntary return to Darfur’s East Jebel Marra | October 28, 2017 | EAST JEBEL MARRA At least five people, including a young woman, were wounded and many others are missing after an attack and robbery by militiamen on the area of Leiba in South Darfur’s East Jebel Marra on Friday. Hundreds of livestock and villagers’ belonging were stolen. A village elder complained that the government troops stationed in the area did not intervene to protect the people: “They only fired into the air to protect themselves and to avoid attack by the militiamen.” [This failure to protect any but themselves will be the hallmark of Khartoum’s “security” forces in Darfur going forward—ER] Fleeing villagers told Radio Dabanga that militiamen in three vehicles mounted with dushka machineguns, and others riding camels and horses, attacked the area of Leiba on Friday morning and fired heavily into the air during the attack. They pointed out that the people, who were previously displaced by hostilities, moved back to the area of Leiba just a month ago in the context of voluntary return. Gisma Adam (18), Abdelhalim Yahya (35), Abdelrazek Yousef (55), Kaltoum Abaker (62), in addition to a girl named Hikma are listed as injured, but callers cautioned that there might be more casualties as several people are still missing or unaccounted for. • Coal miners abducted in North Darfur | October 28, 2017 | TAWILA A man and a woman have been forcibly abducted from a coal mine north of Tawila in North Darfur on Friday. A relative of the abductees told Radio Dabanga that four armed militiamen driving a Land Cruiser attacked Abdelhalim Suleiman and Adam Hamed in the afternoon while they were working in a coal mine near Dubet Neira seven kilometres south of Dubo El Omda. They seized Suleiman and Hamed at gunpoint and have taken them to an unknown destination. The motive behind the abduction is still unclear, and relatives have no received any demands for ransom. [Yet another of countless examples of the random and unstoppable violence that Khartoum has loosed upon Darfur and which the international community has proved helpless to halt—ER] • RSF raid on Darfur gold mine nets weapons, motor cycles | October 27, 2017 | JEBEL AMER / JEBEL MARRA Large formations of Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in dozens of armed vehicles entered Jebel Amer gold mine in North Darfur, carried out a large-scale search campaign, confiscated weapons and motor cycles and removed kadamols [face-covering masks or scarves—ER] from faces while the opposition militants reportedly fled the mine. At the same time, the same forces carried out another raid at Ghurra area during which they seized weapons and motorcycles. Witnesses told Radio Dabanga that one of the militia members at Ghurra area refused to remove his kadamols and drew a knife, but the soldiers opened fire, wounded him on the leg and then shaved his hair. Colonel Abdelrahman El Jaali said that the forces at Ghurra area managed to seize a large number of motorcycles used by the militias in stealing property of citizens. [Khartoum’s most valued militia force—the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—are not concerned with legal niceties or indeed capable of any restraint; they will provoke increasing violence in North Darfur and engage in ruthless acts of extortion, murder, and rape as they see fit—ER] Request for EU support In Khartoum, the Sudanese government asked the European Union for political and technical support for the arms collection process in Darfur and the rest of the states. The government’s request came during a meeting between the Vice President of the Republic, Hasabo Abdelrahman and the European Union Ambassador to Khartoum, Jean-Michel Dumond at the presidential palace yesterday. [Let’s be clear what Vice President Hassabo is asking for, and all too likely to receive from the EU: support for the RSF and its actions in “securing” Darfur. Yielding to Khartoum’s request will mark a high-point in European expediency in its rapprochement with the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime—ER] • Vaccination team injured by gunfire in North Darfur | October 26, 2017 | BIRKAT SERIA Three members of a child immunisation team of the Ministry of Health in North Darfur were seriously wounded by gunfire by militants at Birkat Seira area in Saraf Omra locality on Tuesday evening. Callers from Birkat Seira told Radio Dabanga that at 9:00 p.m. on Tuesday, two militants riding a motorcycle and wearing kadamols opened fire on a rickshaw at Bargo valley in the Birkat Seira area. “El Haj Abdallah, Yagoub Adam, and Nureldin Mohamed were seriously wounded, and taken first to Saraf Omra Hospital and then to El Sareif Beni Hussein Hospital. The attack on the team reportedly took place as they returned from the Malika area east of Birkat Seira after the completion of a vaccination campaign for nomadic children. [There are no limits to the chaotic violence the Darfur genocide has loosed—ER] • Marauding militants rob and rustle in Darfur | October 26, 2017 | DARFUR Three people were shot dead and three others were wounded in an attack by militants on Fara village in Tullus locality in South Darfur on Tuesday. The attackers stole a number of cattle. In a separate incident, militants intercepted two vehicles at Bismillah gate near Mellit in North Darfur on Tuesday and robbed the occupants at gunpoint. At Um Geigou area south of El Fasher, militants stole 30 camels belonging to a trader, while a number of farmers were injured in a clash with the herders at Azum area of Central Darfur on Wednesday. A woman and a man were taken to Ronga Tas Hospital. East Jebel Marra A number of people were wounded, three of them in serious condition in an attack by gunmen on Fogni village north of El Malam in south Darfur’s East Jebel Marra on Tuesday night. Witnesses told Radio Dabanga that at 7:00 p.m. on Tuesday night gunmen on camels and horses attacked Fogni village, opened dense fire in the air during the attack and wounded a number of people. Three of them were seriously wounded including: 12-year-old Hawa Younes Ibrahim, Aisha Mohamed Ibrahim and Musa Hamid Ibrahim. Witnesses said the gunmen seized money, property and livestock of the villagers. They pointed to the displacement of a number of the villagers to El Malam in East Jebel Marra locality, and and Dubo El Omda in Tawila locality in eastern Jebel Marra. [This is life for the people of Darfur; the victims of these attacks continue to be, overwhelmingly, of non-Arab/African ethnicity—ER] • Grazing livestock destroy tracts of Darfur food crops | October 22, 2017 | KUTUM / FORO BARANGA Farmers in North Darfur’ Kutum locality complain that large tracts of farmland have been destroyed by herders driving livestock onto farms, while their complaints to the police and UNAMID go unanswered. Several farmers independently told Radio Dabanga that they are powerless to prevent the armed herders from driving their livestock including camels and cattle onto farms. They say that especially in Si Janna, Folo, Wadi Zuma, and Wadi Tali, fields of millet, sorghum, okra, watermelon, and Faggous cucumber have been destroyed. This represents a major loss, as the crops are ready to be harvested. [This agricultural destruction will add to the widespread malnutrition in North Darfur: a 2014 UNICEEF report—leaked but unpublished because of pressure from the Khartoum regime—indicates that North Darfur is especially prone to malnutrition, and especially among children. UNICEF reported at the time: 28 percent acute malnutrition among children in North Darfur 35 percent chronic malnutrition (“wasting”) among children in North Darfur] They said they have filed several complaints to the authorities and UNAMID without any response. UNAMID’s lack of responsiveness to such complaints is entirely in character and of longstanding—again, the Mission represents the greatest failure in the history of UN peacekeeping, a failure to which the African Union leadership has contributed mightily, even while celebrating UNAMID as an “exemplar” for future peacekeeping missions in Africa, a self-congratulating assessment that defies comprehension—or forgiveness—ER] West Darfur Farmers of Foro Baranga of West Darfur have also complained of armed herders driving sheep and goats onto their farms by force of arms. The farmers demanded that the authorities to intervene to protect them and their farms against violations and abuses by herders _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________(c) 2017 SUDAN Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

A Rohingya refugee family cross the Naf River at the Bangladesh-Myanmar border in Palong Khali, near Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh November 1, 2017. © 2017 Reuters/Adnan Abidi The United Nations Security Council should refer Burma to the International Criminal Court (ICC) because of Burma’s failure to investigate mass atrocities against ethnic Rohingya, Human Rights Watch said today in releasing a new question-and-answer document. UN member countries should also pursue processes for gathering criminal evidence to advance prosecutions in the ICC and other courts. Burmese authorities have failed to credibly investigate security force operations since late August 2017 that have resulted in mass arson, killing, rape, and looting, destroying hundreds of villages and forcing more than 600,000 Rohingya Muslims to flee to neighboring Bangladesh. Human Rights Watch field research found that Burmese military abuses amount to crimes against humanity. “Justice is desperately needed for the Rohingya population targeted by the Burmese military’s campaign of ethnic cleansing,” said Param-Preet Singh, associate international justice director. “The UN Security Council should refer the situation in Burma to the ICC, which was created precisely to address situations in which grave crimes were committed without consequences.” The Burmese government’s support both for the military operations against the Rohingya and its repeated discounting and dismissal of alleged abuses make it extremely unlikely that the government will press for the credible investigation and prosecution of crimes against humanity. Historically, courts in Burma have tried soldiers for human rights violations only infrequently and have never held soldiers to account for war crimes. Civilian courts have rarely had jurisdiction over soldiers implicated in criminal offenses. In April, the UN Human Rights Council created a Fact-Finding Mission for Burma because of credible and serious allegations of human rights abuses. While the Fact-Finding Mission will document patterns of abuse, it does not have the mandate to investigate abuses to a criminal standard, though its findings could be used in eventual prosecutions. The ICC is a court of last resort and only acts when there are grave crimes and national authorities are unwilling or unable to prosecute and try those responsible. But the ICC only has jurisdiction over crimes committed by states parties to its founding treaty, the Rome Statute, and Burma is not a member. Only the UN Security Council can refer the situation to the ICC for further criminal investigation. Achieving an ICC referral in the current political environment in the council will be difficult, notably because of China and Russia’s likely opposition to referring the situation in Burma to the court. This difficult landscape highlights the importance of also pursuing parallel tracks to bring justice to victims of atrocities in Burma. In the face of Security Council deadlock on justice in Syria and in North Korea, the UN General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Council have each created bodies to collect information about human rights violations and to prepare case files for eventual prosecution in courts with jurisdiction to try these crimes. UN member countries should consider a similar initiative for Burma. “UN member countries should explore concrete measures to build criminal files against those responsible for major crimes in Burma for eventual prosecution,” Singh said. “Identifying perpetrators can help raise the political cost of abusive military operations, and bring victims closer to the justice they deserve.” ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________- (c) 2017 Human Rights Watch

Rohingya families arrive at a UNHCR transit centre near the village of Anjuman Para, Cox’s Bazar, south-east Bangladesh after spending four days stranded at the Myanmar border with some 6,800 refugees. © UNHCR/Roger Arnold In Bangladesh, UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, and our partners are providing urgent aid and seeking shelter for Rohingya refugees who arrived from Myanmar yesterday and on Wednesday. According to the Bangladesh border guards, some 3,000 refugees arrived through the Anjuman Para border crossing between Wednesday evening and Thursday morning. They waited in the paddy fields near the border, where Action Contre la Faim sent food and UNICEF distributed water from a boat. Médecins Sans Frontières identified and brought in people who needed urgent medical attention. UNHCR distributed tokens for relief supplies to be collected further inland when they find a place to settle. As of this morning, more than 2,000 of them have moved towards UNHCR’s transit centre near Kutupalong camp, including some vulnerable refugees who were taken by bus. This comes as our staff just relocated over 400 recent arrivals to a new extension to Kutupalong camp. At the transit centre, the new arrivals have been given health checks, food, water and basic supplies for a few days before they are relocated to Kutupalong Extension. New arrivals who spent the night near the border are being directed towards Kutupalong Extension site today. UNHCR’s Assistant High Commissioner for Protection Volker Türk concluded on Wednesday a visit to Myanmar, during which he reiterated UN calls for unrestricted humanitarian access to all communities in need in Rakhine State. Türk stressed the right of return of refugees who fled from Rakhine State to Bangladesh over recent weeks and appealed for their safe, voluntary, and sustainable return home necessitating safety, protection and peaceful coexistence of all communities in Rakhine State. UNHCR also emphasized the importance and the need for the robust and early involvement of development actors to engage and invest in community-based programmes in Rakhine State that create conditions that enable sustainable reintegration of returning refugees and benefit all communities in need. Türk arrived to Bangladesh this morning where over the next four days he will visit refugee settlements in Cox’s Bazar and meet with Bangladeshi authorities in Dhaka. For more information on this topic, please contact: In Cox's Bazaar, Vivian Tan, tanv@unhcr.org, +880 17 0836 7884 In Geneva, Andrej Mahecic, mahecic@unhcr.org, +41 79 642 97 09 In Geneva, Duniya Aslam Khan, khand@unhcr.org, +41 79 453 25 08 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (C) 2017 UNHCR

Leonard Sebarinda and Jeanette Chiapello have been reunited after 23 years (Picture: Cyril Ndegeya) A father has finally been reunited with the daughter who was put up for adoption during Rwanda’s genocide. Jeanette Chaiapello was mistaken for an orphan when Rwanda was gripped by the horror of the genocide. Leonard Sebarinda, now 70, has now been reunited with his daughter 23 years after they were torn from one another’s lives. Jeanette (who was originally called Beata Nyirambabazi) was found alive among piles of bodies when she was just two-years-old. The youngster had been taken to church with her twin sister and brother by her mother, who thought they would be safe there. Her mum and siblings were killed when Hutu fighters threw grenades and spears, killing worshippers. The family were torn apart in the Rwandan genocide(Picture: Cyril Ndegeya) Leonard was hiding in a different location with his three other, so he was separated from his young daughter. Vincent Twizeqimana, one of Jeanettes’s brothers set to work finding her a decade ago. She rejected his initial attempts, claiming she was an orphan and couldn’t be his sister. She later reached out to him over Facebook and a DNA test proved that they were family. Accompanied by her Italian husband, Jeanette visited surviving members of her birth family who welcomed her in a traditional ceremony. ‘It took me until I was an adult to start reflecting on my African roots and biological parents,’ she said. The family welcomed her back with a traditional ceremony (Picture: Cyril Ndegeya) During the Rwanda genocide in 1994, dozens of children were sent to Europe for their own safety. Three years later, 92 children were returned to Rwanda from Italy due to the intervention of the UN, though some stayed put despite personal appeals for their return. A Hutu guard keeps the crowd back June 24, 1994 at the Nyarushishi Tutsi refugee camp on the Zaire border in Gisenyi, Rwanda (Picture: Getty) _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Metro News

Iraq is not capable of trying atrocities committed by Islamic State during the battle for Mosul so it must find other routes to justice such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), a U.N. human rights report said on Thursday. FILE PHOTO: Cars burnt and destroyed by clashes are seen on a street during a battle between Iraqi forces and Islamic State militants, in Mosul, Iraq March 16, 2017. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani/File Photo At least 2,521 civilians were killed during the nine-month battle including 741 people who were executed, the report said. Most died as a result of Islamic State (ISIL) attacks. It cited testimonies of mass abductions by Islamic State, as well as killings, the use of human shields, and deliberate targeting of civilians and their homes. ISIL planted “a huge number” of improvised explosive devices and used drones to drop explosives in Mosul, a city of 1.5 million, as well as setting fire to sulphur fields and oil wells, it said. Its forces desecrated religious sites and last June blew up the al-Nuri mosque from which its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had declared the caliphate spanning parts of Iraq and Syria in 2014, it said. “Iraqi courts and tribunals do not have jurisdiction over international crimes (such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes) - and prosecutors, police investigators and judges lack capacity to ... (investigate), charge and try persons in relation to such crimes,” the report said, calling for it to amend domestic law. Iraqi law did not do enough to guarantee due process or fair trials, it said. Accepting the jurisdiction of the Hague-based ICC and finding other ways to ensure crimes were tried by a competent court “would reassure the international community that Iraq is serious” about getting justice, which was key to rebuilding trust and reconciliation, it said. At least 74 mass graves have been discovered since June 2014 in areas previously held by ISIL in Iraq, the U.N. report said. These included in Sinjar, the northwestern city where the U.N. has said Islamic State committed genocide against the Kurdish-speaking Yazidi religious minority whom the Sunni militants view as infidels. Iraq and the international community have a duty to ensure those crimes are prosecuted, Syracuse University professor and former war crimes prosecutor David Crane said on Wednesday in a separate report into the genocide, issued by his law school’s Syrian Accountability Project. “Bringing ISIS to justice for genocide against the Yazidi community, at the domestic or the international level, will depend on the strategic preservation of forensic evidence,” Crane’s report said. The U.N. report also called on Iraqi authorities to investigate crimes allegedly committed by Iraqi-backed forces during the operation, including mass abductions and unlawful killings. It called for a separate investigation into air strikes by the international coalition. It said the U.N. had recorded 461 civilian deaths from air strikes during the most intensive phase of the battle for western Mosul, from Feb. 19. ________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Reuters

Claims of kingpins in charge of well-planned crime operations with connections in government, highly trained hit squads using children to secure intelligence in farm attacks, occasional acts of intimidation to force land owners off their property and inhuman physical trauma inflicted on victims of such heinous crimes speak of the evil that characterises incidents committed against inhabitants of some of the remotest locations in South Africa. Limpopo is no exception and when embarking on research into farm attacks University of Limpopo (UL) research assistant Cristopher Gumbi couldn’t possibly have been prepared for unearthing the sorrow bottled up in recollections of physical trauma shared by victims of such crimes. Shedding tears with survivors as they revisited the horrors of the past, he got a glimpse of a form of crime that threatens food security and, in turn, the economy of the country. His findings were consolidated in a 117-page thesis for a Master of Arts degree from the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at UL, which he obtained in September this year. Gumbi’s investigation of the motivational factors for farm attacks and its consequential injurious phenomena looks into such crimes committed in parts of Limpopo and Mpumalanga between 2005 and 2015, bringing him into contact with 23 individuals and groupings who have all been survivors. Before getting started with the interview Gumbi pointed at his predominantly monotone outfit in solidarity with scores of South Africans commemorating Black Monday, the countrywide action commemorating lives lost in farm attacks and survivors thereof. From the study the reader gets varying perspectives of the situation as Gumbi delves into a decade of attacks through conversations with survivors from both genders, who varied in age from 38 to 88 years. Harrowing accounts made him question, among others, the need for inflicting physical trauma upon victims during the orchestration of attacks, he remarked during the interview. “The violent nature of attacks is amply demonstrated by such actions as beatings, tying victims down with cable ties, threats of burning victims with hot water or poisoning them and shooting at first sight,” he notes in his study. Without exception all respondents stated that attacks which occurred on their farms were well-planned, mentions Gumbi. “There is a clear indication that attackers conduct thorough surveillance of their target and surroundings before they pounce. This shows the high amount of intelligence and patience they put in, in making sure their plan succeeds.” He quotes a victim who stated that the assailants were picked-up by a vehicle after the attack. “This confirms the idea of a hit squad and a getaway car as a form of organised attack,” he states. He further writes that all of the surviving victims mentioned that the attacks against them were linked to a crime syndicate, with the chief aim of robbing farmers of their money, valuables and weapons in order to fund their operations. In one instance he quotes a victim saying “One of the attackers informed my son that he is part of a crime syndicate and that they cannot remain in custody… These cell groups have kingpins in every town who use kids for stealing because the kids cannot be prosecuted… This is a well-planned operation involving Police, public prosecutors, judges, magistrates to high ranking officials of the government…” Attackers with military training Some of the victims maintained the belief that their attackers were a mix of South African and Zimbabwean with military training, according to the information contained in the study. In one incident a victim recalled that the attackers collected all spent cartridges on the scene. In another attack the assailants allegedly ran more than 4 km while carrying rifles to their getaway vehicle and changed clothes in order for them not to be recognised. Gumbi reaches the conclusion that an attack on a farmstead from four sides during one such incident, which resulted in the farmer being shot in the head, indicated a form of formal training on the part of the assailants. In 47% of the cases money and jewellery were not targeted while 65% of the respondents stated that their attackers were not very interested in other items but their weapons. What the researcher had established though, was that attackers always knew the arrangement of the targeted farmsteads, where the safes were and the weapons kept. It led to the inference that the attacks should have been orchestrated with the help of insiders, who allegedly included teens living on farms. Attacks believed to be form of intimidation According to Gumbi’s research 78% of the respondents who reported farm attacks related a form of intimidation, aimed at driving farmers off their land. A female victim informed him that she had believed the attack on her farm was a form of intimidation, because the attackers never stole anything but just started firing through the windows of the house without prior warning. “More than 60 shots were fired. My husband shot back with a .38 revolver. He (name withheld) tossed (the) phone to me to call for help. They shot him (name withheld) in the head. They never came inside. The attackers shouted that they will kill all…” A farmer who reported that he was attacked by twelve men informed the researcher that one drew a gun and started shooting. “When asked what their primary objective of attacking the farm was, they responded that it was not about cattle, money, guns or jewellery, but about taking control of the farm.” Thirty-nine per cent of the respondents stated that they knew the attackers. A respondent who was attacked twice, in 2007 and 2014, said his wife knew one of the attackers because she recognised his voice during the initial attack. Gumbi quoted survivors who were asked whether farms with poor security were singled out for attacks as saying “Poor security is not a contributing factor; it is all about brutal revenge and financial purposes” and “I don’t think poor security is the point here. These attacks are orchestrated by some leader somewhere who wants to drive farmers off their land.” Gumbi further remarks that farmers do not feel that they are receiving the necessary service delivery from the South African Police Service. From the responses it is clear that the Police are not doing enough to assist the farmers during and after an attack, he writes. “Negligence and dereliction of duties are evident from the responses of respondents. Serious allegations concerning negligence with firearms raise concerns.” Farm attacks need to be addressed holistically hence, the researcher concedes, more role players such as all government departments and non-profit organisations need to play a more active role in improving security on farms to protect food security. Gumbi points out that unless security on farms is made a national priority, farm attacks will continue to increase. He recommends that it gets prioritised and discussed as part of South Africa’s national agenda, particularly in Parliament. He also recommends that racial stereotypes in farming urgently get addressed. “The South African justice system needs to recognise farm attacks as a criminal charge of its own with a strict mandatory minimum sentence applied; this will serve as a form of deterrence to attackers.” Gumbi expresses great concern over farm attacks in South Africa not being given the necessary attention by the government, considering the effects such crimes have on the economy and the well-being of victims, families and communities. According to him South Africa has the responsibility to view farm attacks as a violation of human rights and a threat to the country’s economy and food security. “The rural farming community contributes substantially to the growth and development of the South African economy.” __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Polokwane Observer

Advocates from across the country gathered to protect and preserve Christians and religious minorities in the Middle East. Last week, IDC concluded its Fourth Annual 3-day Summit on Thursday, October 26, 2017. The Summit which was entitled, “American Leadership and Securing the Future of Christians in the Middle East,” began on Tuesday, October 24. Over 1000 IDC members, advocates, clergy, and press attended the summit, where policy makers and proponents gathered together to advocate for persecuted Christians in the Middle East. A keynote speech was given by the Vice President of the United States Mike Pence. The summit was held in partnership with the Philos Project, the Armenian National Committee of America and the Institute on Religion and Democracy. On October 24, IDC's National Press Conference was held at the National Press Club. Policy and human rights experts engaged the national media in pressing for a way forward for Christians and other ethno-religious minorities in the Middle East based on IDC’s 5 point policy agenda. The event also focused on the importance of national security in helping minorities in the Middle East, a population which has historically served as a bridge builder. The Ecumenical Prayer Service for Christians in the Middle East took place at Saint Matthew’s Cathedral, where several faith leaders gathered together to pray for persecuted Christians in the Middle East and peace around the world. Internationally Acclaimed Lebanese Singer Abeer Nehme gave a moving performance singing ancient chants in Aramaic, Armenian, Byzantine and Arabic, and the service featured an inspiring reflection given by Reverend Johnnie Moore. On October 25, IDC gathered for a policy symposium day where panels focused on the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon, the civil war raging in Syria, the United States’ interest in protecting religious minorities in the Middle East, and on U.S. policy toward its allies who persecute their minorities. The panels included: Lebanon and Syria: Security and Stability Post Conflict, How to Advance U.S. Interests by Protecting Religious Minorities in the Middle East, and finally Lunch and Panel: Who Are America’s Allies and Enemies in the Middle East? A Hard Look at Turkey, Iran and the Gulf States. In the evening, IDC summit attendees gathered to listen to Vice President Mike Pence’s Keynote Address at IDC's fourth Solidarity Dinner where he announced that the US would provide support directly to persecuted communities through USAID. The Vice President stated that "In the mountains of Syria, the valleys of Lebanon, on the plains of Nineveh, the plateaus of Armenia, on the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates, the delta of the Nile, the fathers and mothers of our faith planted seeds of belief. They've blossomed and borne fruit ever since. But now that garden of faith, generations in the making, is under threat. It’s under threat of persecution and mistreatment. Many of the Christian communities that first embraced the message of Christ are today the targets of unspeakable acts of violence and atrocities." On October 26, the IDC community took over one-hundred advocates ,who represented delegations from twenty-six states, to Capitol Hill to meet with their members of Congress and advocate for policies critical to the existence of Christian communities in the Middle East. Our advocates heard from seventeen members of Congress and visited around four-hundred House and Senate offices, meeting with members and staff to build support for—a stable Lebanon (House Resolution 252), the need for immediate genocide relief for Iraq and Syria (H.R. 390), and to call for a recognition of the Armenian Genocide (House Resolution 220). IDC is a non-profit, non-partisan 501 (c) (3) organization that seeks the protection and preservation of Christians and Christianity in the Middle East through raising global awareness, mobilizing international support, and educating policymakers toward constructive international policies on their behalf. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 IDC

A lengthy Radio Dabanga dispatch today manages to capture an extraordinary amount of the bad faith, disingenuousness and culpable ignorance on the part of those actors who are most responsible for allowing Darfur’s agony to continue for over fourteen years. Some 3 million people still displaced from their homes, villages, and lands, and some 600,000 have died from the direct and indirect causes of violence loosed my the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party Khartoum regime in its ethnically-targeted counter-insurgency throughout Darfur, extending into eastern Chad. The Radio Dabanga dispatch in its unedited entirety appears at the end of this analysis; but immediately below is a detailed, parsing analysis of the perverse pretenses, lies, understatements, and willful ignorance that are cited throughout the dispatch. I would begin my noting that nowhere in the comments from European Union, UN, and African Union actors is there anything approaching an honest acknowledgement of the costs of many years of violent expropriation of no-Arab/African farmlands—by Khartoum’s various Arab militia allies (some non-Sudanese), by proxy forces, and by those armed groups that continue to operate without fear of arrest by Khartoum. For all the expedient talk about the transition from humanitarian assistance to development assistance, there is nothing from the EU Ambassador to Sudan or others about this critical obstacle to returns by the displaced. [For a detailed, data-driven analysis of the issue, looking at Darfur as a whole from November 2014 – November 2015, see my monograph: “‘Changing the Demography’: Violent Expropriation and Destruction of Farmlands in Darfur, November 2014 – November 2015″ | December 1, 2015 | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1P4/] Instead of acknowledging this central problem in any meaningful and lasting peace agreement for the people of Darfur, we have only glib acknowledgement of challenges still facing “voluntary returns”: “There are some tough and hard nuts still to crack in Darfur—this is beyond doubt,” said [EU Ambassador Jean-Michel Dumond]… But instead of solutions to difficult problems, Ambassador simply changes the subject: “The climate change is a reality,” Dumond continued. “Demographic pressure is there. If the right to return is to be respected, we also know that many of the displaced people will not return to their villages. That is why we are considering new programmes focusing on the creation of job opportunities for the displaced people in urban dwellings around the big cities in Darfur.” [all emphases in bold in quoted text have been added—ER] There is no doubt that climate change has had an influence on demographic issues and tensions in Darfur, although these began well before the explosion of violence in 2003; and demographic pressures have long been felt in Darfur. But the notorious statement by then chief Janjaweed militia leader Musa Hilal in August 2004 is of considerably more relevance than Ambassador Dumond’s in explaining why so many non-Arab/African people can’t return to their villages, why Khartoum is so clearly intent on dismantling the camps for these displaced persons, and why farming is not in their future: The ultimate objective in Darfur is spelled out in an August 2004 directive from [Janjaweed paramount leader Musa] Hilal’s headquarters: “change the demography” of Darfur and “empty it of African tribes.” Confirming the control of [Khartoum’s] Military Intelligence over the Darfur file, the directive is addressed to no fewer than three intelligence services—the Intelligence and Security Department, Military Intelligence and National Security, and the ultra-secret “Constructive Security,” or Amn al Ijabi. (Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, Darfur: A Short History of a Long War, Zed Books, 2005) Dumond’s notion that somehow this attitude does not still prevail is finally a form of mendacity, deliberately distorting the truth about what is possible, and what Khartoum is and is not willing to commit to salvage the lives and livelihoods that it has for fourteen long years attempted to destroy. The vast majority of non-Arab/African Darfuris cannot return to their villages because the have been destroyed or because insecurity is intolerably great. The same is true of the 320,000 overwhelmingly non-Arab/African Darfuri refugees in eastern Chad. The EU’s Partner in Sudan The savage irony of Khartoum’s Second Vice-President leading Khartoum’s efforts in the “operationalisation of the humanitarian-development nexus” is either lost on Dumond or all too conveniently forgotten. Just how much concern about “development” possibilities for the displaced—overwhelming non-Arab/African—can we expect from Vice President Hassabo Mohammed Abdel Rahman? It was Hassabo who spoke so bluntly to Rapid Support Forces and other militia elements before the 2015 campaign in East Jebel Marra I write about in “Changing the Demography”: Ahmed, a 35-year-old officer in the Border Guards, spent two weeks at a military base in Guba in December 2014 before being sent to fight rebels around Fanga… Ahmed said that a few days prior to leaving for East Jebel Marra, Sudanese Vice President Hassabo Mohammed Abdel Rahman directly addressed several hundred army and RSF soldiers: “Hassabo told us to clear the area east of Jebel Marra. To kill any male. He said we want to clear the area of insects. … He said East Jebel Marra is the kingdom of the rebels. We don’t want anyone there to be alive.” (“‘Men With No Mercy’: Rapid Support Forces Attacks Against Civilians in Darfur, Sudan,” Human Rights Watch | September 9, 2015) The overwhelmingly non-Arab/African populations that were subject to massive violence in East Jebel Marra in 2014 – 2015, and the “demographically” comparable population of the Jebel Marra massif itself in 2016, are likened to “insects,” even at Hutus likened Tutsisto “cockroaches” in Rwanda in 1994. “We don’t want anyone there to be alive”: does Ambassador Dumond really need this to be glossed? Moreover, it is Hassabo who has served as point-man for the regime in pronouncing on the “disgrace” and embarrassment of IDP camps in Darfur, and the need for them to be dismantled—a process that is likely to accelerate with the dramatic drawdown of UNAMID military and police personnel (44 percent and 30 percent respectively): In a speech delivered before the representatives of former rebel groups and IDPs in El-Fasher, North Darfur on Monday, [Second Vice-President Hasabo Mohamed Abdelrahman] said Darfur has “completely recovered from the war and is now looking forward to achieve a full peace, stability and development.” “IDP camps represent a significant and unfortunate loss of dignity and rights of citizens in their country” he said and called on the displaced “to choose within no more than a month between resettlement or return to their original areas.” He further reiterated his government’s commitment to take all the measures and do the needful to achieve this goal, stressing that “the year 2016 will see the end of displacement in Darfur.” Abdel Rahman told the meeting that he has just ended a visit to Karnoi and Tina areas in North Darfur, adding the two areas which were affected by the conflict have totally recovered. He said his visit with a big delegation to the two areas “is a message sceptics in the fact that security and stability are back in Darfur”… (Sudan Tribune, December 28, 2015 | El Fasher, North Darfur) The mendacity here is of course fantastic. What 2016 “saw” was large-scale violent displacement, attacks on IDP camps, and the continuing widespread rape of non-Arab girls and women. The Jebel Marra offensive displaced some 200,000 people in Central Darfur and was accomplished in part with the use of chemical weapons—something that neither Ambassador Dumond, nor any of his EU colleagues, nor any UN agency, nor any voice in the African Union demanded be investigated. And yet the Amnesty Internationalreport provides overwhelming—and in my view indisputable—evidence of chemical weapons use (“Sudan: Scorched Earth, Poisoned Air: Sudanese Government Forces Ravage Jebel Marra, Darfur,” September 29, 2016 | AFR 54/4877/2016 | https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr54/4877/2016/en/): “Babies screaming with pain before dying, young children vomiting blood. The images we have seen are truly shocking.” (Tirana Hassan, Amnesty International’s Director of Crisis Response) The Obama administration was silent, as was the Government of Canada. Collectively the effect—with only silence coming from the EU, AU, and UN as well—was that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), instead of investigating, welcomed the Khartoum regime to its Executive body. Yes, Ambassador Dumond, “There are some tough and hard nuts still to crack in Darfur—this is beyond doubt.” But telling the truth about Darfur’s agony seems an even greater challenge, and not only for Dumond. Fortunately for him and others there is a ready substitute for the truth, and that is the articulation of principles that are daily flouted in Darfur on a vast scale: “For the EU it is vital that return or local integration of the displaced people, are carried out on a voluntary, informed and dignified basis, and in a conducive environment. An impartial, credible and participatory intention survey has to be conducted.” Mere rhetorical flatulence. There is nothing “voluntary,” “informed,” or “dignified” about the life of Darfuri displaced persons and refugees—nor is there ever an escape from the supremely oppressive insecurity that defines their lives and places of habitation. The recent assault on Kalma camp near Nyala has no place in Dumond’s characterization or vision of Darfur, but it has an all too persistent reality. Days after the attack by Khartoum’s security forces on Kalma, Radio Dabanga reported: The death toll among the victims of the demonstration near Kalma camp for displaced people on Friday “has now reached nine as more people died due to bullet wounds sustained during the attack,” according the Swiss Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre (DRDC). “The number of victims of injuries that currently need medical attention stands at over 30 people, some of them in critical health condition… At present, the security forces are besieging the main entry points to Kalma camp thus preventing free movement of people to and from the camp.” Despite the overwhelming brutality of Khartoum’s security forces in Darfur, despite that continuing assaults on IDP camps—extending back to 2004—despite the arrests of those who speak out honestly about conditions on the ground, Dumond speaks blandly about Darfuri voices being heard: “Hence, our very strong request and proposal to make sure that the outputs and the results of these locality-level consultations are heard, and become part of the wider and higher political peace talks on Darfur.” “Wider and higher political peace talks on Darfur”—but between which parties? Radio Dabanga correctly points out that the EU remains, incomprehensibly, a supporter of the utterly irrelevant Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD; July 2011), which has achieved nothing, yielded none of the results that Dumond speaks of, and no longer guides even U.S. thinking about a peace process for Darfur. The DDPD is the consummate diplomatic “dead letter,” representing no buy-in from either the militarily significant rebel groups or Darfuri civil society. Indeed, Khartoum insisted that the latter not be meaningfully represented in Doha (Qatar), a fact that seems not to trouble Dumond or others from the EU, the UN, or AU. Dumond goes even further into the history of irrelevant Darfur peace negotiations and declares EU support for “a sustainable cessation of hostilities on the basis of the road map defined by the African Union High Implementation Panel.” He is here referring to the meaningless, unimaginative, and ill-informed “road map” promulgated by the corrupt Thabo Mbeki, head of the original African Union Panel on Darfur, in 2009—now eight years ago, and similarly unencumbered by the views of Darfuri civil society or the demands of the rebel groups. Absurdly, the African Union High Implementation Panel remains the major diplomatic actor, despite the fact that Mbeki has colluded with the Khartoum regime and that the “implementation” giving name to the AU diplomatic task force has been as irrelevant and useless as the “roadmap” Mbeki concocted (a 100-page document with no citations or references). Clearly Dumond and the Europeans simply don’t care about meaningful peace negotiations, which must include meaningful Darfuri civil society representation to have any chance of success. Fine words, disingenuously selective history, tendentious claims about current realities—this is the essence of the European diplomatic response to the current situation in Darfur. It is difficult to recall that in September 2004 the Parliament of the European Union declared in a virtually unanimous statement that human destruction in Darfur was “tantamount to genocide.” What we see now from the EU is an example of how genocide can be elided by specious words, vague promises, and a lack of real moral commitment. On issues of humanitarian access and civilian protection, Dumond and the EU are similarly disingenuous and misleading. Dumond declares: “The EU is keen to see the mandate of UNAMID [UN/African Union “hybrid” Mission in Darfur] fulfilled; especially as regards a political agreement, and the protection of civilians. We need to see progress in these areas in order to proceed with an exit strategy discussion.” But of course the countries of the EU on the UN Security Council voted, with broad European support, in June 2017 to renew UNAMID’s mandate, though only after acceding to Khartoum’s demand that the already badly compromised Mission be essentially gutted: as noted above, currently 44 percent of the military personnel are deploying out of Darfur (and turning their bases over to the Khartoum regime to be used as these génocidaireswish) and 30 percent of the police personnel are being deployed out of Darfur, critically weakening security in many IDP camp locations. The “mandate” of the Mission, particularly with respect to the protection of civilians, is being abandoned at a rapid pace. Moreover, the withdrawal of military personnel will have an enormous impact on humanitarian access. As one operational INGO recently stressed to me, the UN’s “Humanitarian Air Service” (UNHAS) will fly only to areas where there is military protection; withdrawing UNAMID military personnel greatly diminishes the number of areas to which UNHAS can fly, often the only way to transport humanitarian personnel and resources, especially during the rainy season. There will be no “discussion” of an “exit strategy,” as Dumond disingenuously suggests, if Khartoum can simply compel the UN Security Council to gut UNAMID on an annual basis with “re-authorizations” that entail further large cuts to UNAMID personnel. Moreover, as Dumond should certainly know, Khartoum has regularly flouted from the beginning of UNAMID’s deployment the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed by the regime in January 2008. The free movement by ground and air assets of UNAMID was denied from the very first and there was no pushback by the UN—and certainly not by the likes of EU Ambassador Dumond. All too predictably, in the Radio Dabanga dispatch we also hear from the current UNAMID Joint Special Representative, Jeremiah Kingsley Mamabolo—who joins his grossly incompetent and corrupt AU predecessors in his assessment of UNAMID: UNAMID Joint Special Representative Jeremiah Kingsley Mamabolo further underscored the importance of this process for the sustainability of peace in Darfur in line with the DDPD, “We remain committed to the facilitation of humanitarian access and the protection of civilians in addition to supporting all mediation efforts in Darfur,” he said. Again, the DDPD is simply a diplomatic irrelevancy, something frankly acknowledged by those in the U.S. government who actually know something about Darfur. And as for UNAMID’s “commitment” to “humanitarian access and the protection of civilians, this is a commitment without meaningful resources or will. The failure of UNAMID to fulfill its mandate quickly became evident following its official deployment in January 2008—and by 2014 was notorious. The evidence of incompetence, ineffectiveness, mendacity, corruption, and a total breakdown in leadership and morale had been gathering for years, but with the revelations by Colum Lynch in Foreign Policy(April 7, 2014) and others, including Aicha Elbasri, former spokeswoman for this disastrous mission (Radio France Internationale interview, January 24, 2014), there was simply no possible doubt of its failure to protect the civilians and humanitarians in Darfur—its primary mandate. Indeed, it is worth recalling the degree of hostility to UNAMID the Khartoum regime has long expressed in various forms. Reuters reported in January 2011: UNAMID spokesman Kemal Saiki confirmed the bombing [of civilians] was by “the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) air force.” Later on Wednesday [January 26, 2011], a group of 200 Sudanese government soldiers in 40 vehicles arrived at UNAMID’s camp in the nearby settlement of Shangil Tobay [North Darfur], UNAMID said. “(The soldiers) surrounded the team site’s exit as well as the adjacent makeshift camp, where thousands of civilians recently displaced by the December 2010 clashes have settled,” read the statement. The Sudanese army detained four displaced people at the camp, said UNAMID. “The SAF commander at the scene … then threatened to burn down the makeshift camp and UNAMID team site, if the peacekeepers continued to interfere.” (Reuters [Khartoum], January 27, 2011) [See also “Darfur and Human Security: UNAMID’s failure forces the essential and inescapable question,” Sudan Tribune | Eric Reeves, 1 August 2014 | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1nF/] Further, the various attacks on UNAMID by armed elements in Darfur can virtually all be definitively traced back to Khartoum’s militia forces. See | • Killing UN Peacekeepers: A Ruthless Proclivity of Khartoum’s SAF, Militia Proxies | 9 May 2013 | http://wp.me/p45rOG-11S • The Killing of Seven UNAMID Peacekeeping Personnel in Darfur: a terrible tragedy, a clear warning | 14 July 2013 | http://www.sudanreeves.org/?p=4122 ] • Attack on UNAMID Forces in Darfur: The Khartoum Regime is Responsible | July 12, 2008 | http://wp.me/p45rOG-zN • Human Security in Darfur, Year’s End 2012: North Darfur | 17 January 2013 | http://wp.me/s45rOG-3736 None of this really matters to Dumond and the Europeans. Instead of pressing urgently for greater humanitarian access and resources—supplies of food and medicine are inadequate (in some locations grossly so); there are no specific resources for girls women who have suffered extreme sexual violence; and the unacknowledged cholera epidemic continues to rage, exacerbated by poor sanitation in many locations—the EU is now parroting the demands first made by the Khartoum regime in its cynical “New Strategy for Darfur” (September 2010), viz. that the international humanitarian organizations in Darfur move from humanitarian assistance to development work that simply isn’t possible under prevailing conditions in most of Darfur. [See my contemporaneous analysis of this “New Strategy” in “Accommodating Genocide: International Response to Khartoum’s ‘New Strategy for Darfur,'”Dissent Magazine (on-line), October 8, 2010 | http://wp.me/p45rOG-AN Europe’s Real Interest in Darfur and Accommodating Khartoum What accounts for this bizarrely accommodating EU stance on Darfur? It is only when the subject turns to African migration to the European continent that we catch a glimpse of what the real concern is: The EU ambassador referred as well to migration, “an important element of our engagement with the Government of Sudan (GoS). “There are considerable flows of cross border migrants emanating from or passing through Darfur.” The EU is seeking to work with the GoS on this issue, in particular with the Sudanese Migration Coordination Mechanism, which is yet to be fully constituted. This work will be carried out in full respect of International Conventions and Human Rights, and in accordance with the robust EU accountability mechanisms. “Our support, as is the case for all our work in Sudan, will be channelled via relevant UN organisations, EU Member State Agencies and Non-Government Organisations in close coordination with the Sudanese government, Dumond concluded his speech. What does this vague language mean? In May 2016, Germany’s Der Spiegel published a remarkable exposé based on leaked EU documents: “Questionable Deal: EU to Work with [Sudan’s] Despot to Keep Refugees Out” http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/eu-to-work-with-despot-in-sudan-to-keep-refugees-out-a-1092328.html/. It began by stating all too accurately: In an effort to help keep refugees from Africa at bay, the EU is planning to deliver personal registration equipment to Sudan, whose president is wanted on war crimes charges. Germany is leading the way. Speaking specifically of Sudan’s grim record of genocide, gross human rights abuses, and support for international terrorism, the Der Spiegel article thoroughly belies the claim by German leader Angela Merkel that the interest is in helping “improve peoples’ living conditions.” Minutes from the March 23 meetings and additional classified documents obtained by SPIEGEL and the German public television station ARD show “Report Mainz” show that the focus of the project is border protection. To that end, equipment is to be provided to the countries in question [including Sudan and the Khartoum regime]. War Crimes and Torture The International Criminal Court in The Hague has issued an arrest warrant against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir on charges relating to his alleged role in genocide and crimes against humanity in the Darfur conflict. Amnesty International also claims that the Sudanese secret service has tortured members of the opposition. And the United States accuses the country of providing financial support to terrorists. Nevertheless, documents relating to the project indicate that Europe want to send cameras, scanners and servers for registering refugees to the Sudanese regime in addition to training their border police and assisting with the construction of two camps with detention rooms for migrants. The German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development has confirmed that action plan is binding, although no concrete decisions have yet been made regarding its implementation. The German development agency GIZ is expected to coordinate the project. The organization, which is a government enterprise, has experience working with authoritarian countries. That “experience working with authoritarian countries” is an important qualification in coordinating the project would seem indeed to make GIZ the perfect “project” coordinator. But even within the EU, the Der Spiegel dispatch points out, the plan is “controversial”: The “risks” listed in the action plan includes the fact that equipment financed by the Emergency Trust Fund could be abused by repressive regimes and used in the oppression of the civilian population. A general with Sudan’s Interior Ministry told SPIEGEL and ARD that technology would not just be used to register refugees, but also all Sudanese. The regime’s goal appears to be the absolute surveillance of its people. Experts like [Marina] Peter [an expert on the Horn of Africa region at the German relief organization Bread for the World] also express doubts about whether Sudanese leader al-Bashir is prepared to take serious action against migrant smugglers. Human Rights Watch has claimed in reports that the Sudanese regime itself works together with criminal networks. The report alleges that the police and military have sold refugees to human traffickers. The European Commission, meanwhile, has warned EU ambassadors in a classified memo that Sudan is primarily interested in polishing its image abroad.Germany and the other EU member states nevertheless seem determined to push ahead with their pact with the despot. Sudanese authorities say there have been numerous visitors from Germany in recent weeks who were there to discuss the construction of closed camps. When questioned about its role, Germany’s GIZ issued a written reply that there were no concrete plans in the country yet. Let’s be clear about what these “closed camps” are: they are camps in which people are incarcerated, from which they will not be able to leave without permission from the Khartoum authorities, and in which people will inevitably be “concentrated” on the basis of ethnicity, place or country of origin, and perhaps religion. Germany, of all countries, will be building what are literally “concentration camps” in Sudan, overseen by Khartoum’s security services, newly outfitted with European high-tech surveillance and registration equipment. Little wonder that EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Federica Mogherini was worried at the time about maintaining the secrecy of these efforts: The ambassadors of the 28 European Union member states had agreed to secrecy.“Under no circumstances” should the public learn what was said at the talks that took place on March 23rd, the European Commission warned during the meeting of the Permanent Representatives Committee. A staff member of EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Federica Mogherini [and certainly representing her views] even warned that Europe’s reputation could be at stake. This should mark an especially embarrassing moment in Der Spiegel’s revelations, but all too predictably we see no signs of that embarrassment in the recent remarks of EU Ambassador Dumond. The UN: Not to be Outdone One would never know that ethnically-targeted violence and intimidation continues on a region-wide basis in Darfur after hearing the comments of UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative Marta Ruedas, who “hailed the collaboration between various stakeholders supporting the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation (DIDC) process.” But how full is such collaboration likely to be when the DIDC has made no serious attempt to address the central issue of violent expropriation of non-Arab/African farmland, the continuous assaults on and harassment of IDP camps, and the steady reports of serious violence across Darfur? On this score, see my two very recent compendia: • As UNAMID deploys out of Darfur: ethnically-targeted violence continues on a wide scale | A weekly compendium, No. 1 | October 14, 2017 | http://wp.me/p45rOG-27b • As UNAMID deploys out of Darfur: ethnically-targeted violence continues on a wide scale | A weekly compendium, No. 2 | October 21, 2017 | http://wp.me/p45rOG-27p Ruedas, in a fatuous and highly inappropriate political assessment, praised the Trump administration decision to lift economic sanctions on Khartoum, suggesting that these have been the obstacle to resolving the severe economic crisis in Sudan. As an economic analysis, her claim that the lifting of sanctions “will provide a solid platform for the sustainable development of the country” is simply idiocy, betraying a total ignorance of why the Sudanese economy—in all sectors—is in permanent decline. She says nothing about the fact that the ruling junta governs Sudan as a kleptocracy, with disastrous consequences. Nor does she seem even vaguely aware of the scale of economic decline or its origins in the misguided policies of the regime, its failure to invest in the agricultural sector or in infrastructure that has decayed badly during the 28 years of NIF/NCP tyranny. Ruedas’s disgraceful commentary finds an echo in another highly politicized UN figure, appointed by the UN’s notoriously corrupt “Human Rights Council,” specifically “Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of the unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights,” Idriss Jazairy. His October 24, 2017 account of the effects of U.S. sanctions, and the causes of Sudan’s economic distress, is simply ludicrous, revealing in every claim a preposterous ignorance or mendacity. He clearly knows nothing about the history of Sudan’s economy over the past 28 years and is simply offering a politically useful statement. Jazairy, an Algerian national with this absurdly tendentious title, is just another cog in the vast and hopelessly corrupt UN political bureaucracy. His commentary on the lifting of U.S. economic sanctions gives all who are skeptical about the future of this bloated, inefficient, and hopelessly corrupt bureaucracy—and the Human Rights Council in particular—yet greater doubt reason to doubt that meaningful reform is possible. Who Is Speaking Here? The last paragraph of the Radio Dabanga dispatch (again, immediately below in its entirety) contains the followed remark: “The Darfuri-Darfuri dialogue is the main pillar for achieving peace and economic recovery in Darfur. This dialogue presents a better alternative to communities. Instead of bearing arms, voices and concerns of individuals are being heard.” Is this Ambassador Dumond speaking? Some other representative of the EU? Perhaps someone from the UN? Of course any of these is a distinct possibility. But in fact the statement comes from Khartoum’s point-man on the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation, namely Vice-President Hasabo Abdelrahman. Here I close by recalling from above Hassabo’s comments earlier in his tenure as regime Vice-President: • “Hassabo told us to clear the area east of Jebel Marra. To kill any male. He said we want to clear the area of insects. … He said East Jebel Marra is the kingdom of the rebels. We don’t want anyone there to be alive.” (a defecting militiaman to Human Rights Watch | September 9, 2015) • In a speech delivered before the representatives of former rebel groups and IDPs in El-Fasher, North Darfur on Monday, [Second Vice-President Hasabo Mohamed Abdelrahman] said Darfur has “completely recovered from the war and is now looking forward to achieve a full peace, stability and development.” “IDP camps represent a significant and unfortunate loss of dignity and rights of citizens in their country” he said and called on the displaced “to choose within no more than a month between resettlement or return to their original areas.” He said his visit [to two areas in Darfur] “is a message sceptics in the fact that security and stability are back in Darfur”… (Sudan Tribune, December 28, 2015 | El Fasher, North Darfur) The EU and UN seem eager to believe the latter Hassabo statement even as they refuse to recognize the import of the former statement. ******************************************* “EU committed to sustainable development, peace in Darfur”: Ambassador | Radio Dabanga | October 30, 2017 | KHARTOUM | https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/eu-committed-to-sustainable-development-peace-in-darfur-ambassador Sudan has become a pilot country for the European Union (EU) regarding the operationalisation of the humanitarian-development nexus. Darfur is one of EU’s target regions for this, EU Ambassador Jean-Michel Dumond said in his speech at the review conference of the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation (DIDC) in Khartoum today. The results of the second stage of the DIDC were made public in the presence of Sudan’s Second vice-President Hasabo Abdelrahman, key national partners, and representatives of the international community. As the EU is a strong partner for the Darfur Development Strategy (DDS) and the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), the head of the EU Delegation to Sudan reflected on the achievements of the DIDC process that has been supported by the EU with a contribution of EUR 800,000. “In accordance with our commitments to the DDS and the DDPD, the EU is eager to see a change in our involvement in the region from one focusing primarily on vital humanitarian assistance to longer term sustainable development,” Dumond stated in his speech published by the EU today. Voluntary return More than two million Darfuris are still displaced, including at least 97,000 displaced and verified in 2016, and 8,000 new displaced in 2017, which is clearly less than in 2016, Dumond stated. “For the EU it is vital that return or local integration of the displaced people, are carried out on a voluntary, informed and dignified basis, and in a conducive environment. An impartial, credible and participatory intention survey has to be conducted. “There are some tough and hard nuts still to crack in Darfur – this is beyond doubt,” said the ambassador. “The EU believes that these issues can and must be tackled—through dialogue, consultation, outreach and compromise. [..] Hence, our very strong request and proposal to make sure that the outputs and the results of these locality-level consultations are heard, and become part of the wider and higher political peace talks on Darfur.” He pointed to the EU’s commitment to sustainable development and peace in Darfur.“Indeed, the EU is convinced that we cannot have one without the other. We support all efforts aiming at a sustainable cessation of hostilities on the basis of the road map defined by the African Union High Implementation Panel.” “The current portfolio of the EU and EU Member States support to Darfur is significant. Today, the total engagement from EU institutions for peace and development in Darfur is circa EUR 35 million. Our support is aligned with the Darfur Development Strategy. The EU focuses on peace-building, rural development, management of natural resources, as well as health and education. “The EU also reaches out to support Sudanese Civil Society Organisations. A major challenge for all EU actors and our partners is the issue of access. We have seen some positive developments in this regard in 2017. However, as recalled recently by the European Commissioner for Humanitarian Assistance, Christos Stylianides, when he visited Sudan last week on 22 and 23 October, unhampered access is critical for our efforts to reach and support the vulnerable populations in Sudan; and in Darfur in particular.” The ambassador further stressed EU’s strong support of a continued presence of the joint UN-AU peacekeeping Mission (Unnamed) in Darfur. “The EU is keen to see the mandate of UNAMID fulfilled; especially as regards a political agreement, and the protection of civilians. We need to see progress in these areas in order to proceed with an exit strategy discussion.” Pilot country Sudan is “a pilot country for the EU as regards operationalising the humanitarian-development nexus,” the ambassador confirmed. “However, conditions for what many see as a transition, although this can be discussed, are yet to be met. There is still a need for humanitarian assistance as new refugees have been arriving and are in dire need.” “The climate change is a reality,” Dumond continued. “Demographic pressure is there. If the right to return is to be respected, we also know that many of the displaced people will not return to their villages. That is why we are considering new programmes focusing on the creation of job opportunities for the displaced people in urban dwellings around the big cities in Darfur.” Migration The EU ambassador referred as well to migration, “an important element of our engagement with the Government of Sudan (GoS). “There are considerable flows of cross border migrants emanating from or passing through Darfur.” The EU is seeking to work with the GoS on this issue, in particular with the Sudanese Migration Coordination Mechanism, which is yet to be fully constituted. This work will be carried out in full respect of International Conventions and Human Rights, and in accordance with the robust EU accountability mechanisms. “Our support, as is the case for all our work in Sudan, will be channelled via relevant UN organisations, EU Member State Agencies and Non-Government Organisations in close coordination with the Sudanese government, Dumond concluded his speech. Darfur Internal Dialogue Between January 2015 and October 2017, a total of 77 Community Outreach and Public Awareness initiatives and 67 Locality-level consultations took place across the Darfur region. The DIDC, facilitated by the African Union, UNAMID, Qatar, and supported by theUNDP and the EU, is one of the critical components of the Doha Peace Agreement (DDPD) and remains a corner stone in soliciting the opinions of Darfur grass root communities, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in Sudan stated in a press statement today. “Acknowledging the Darfur-wide internal dialogue and consultations, the DIDC’s significance stems from its impact in promoting inter-tribal and inter-communal peace, reconciliation and harmonious co-existence in the states of Darfur by addressing key issues such as resource-based tribal clashes through an inclusive and continuous multi-stakeholder engagement,” the statement reads. “Owned by all Darfuris” According to Siddig Adam, Chairman of the DIDC Implementation Committee, the dialogue process is owned by all Darfuris who contributed and participated in the consultations. “It has brought Darfuris’ concerns forward but this still the beginning and there is still more to accomplish.” UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative Marta Ruedas hailed the collaboration between various stakeholders supporting the DIDC process, “In this platform, I want to appeal to all stakeholders and partners working in Darfur to connect to the voice of people of Darfur. I understand that the challenges are immense, but together we can overcome these obstacles,” she said. AU Deputy Ambassador Wuyi Omitoogun reaffirmed the AU’s commitment to supporting the ongoing process. UNAMID Joint Special Representative Jeremiah Kingsley Mamabolo further underscored the importance of this process for the sustainability of peace in Darfur in line with the DDPD, “We remain committed to the facilitation of humanitarian access and the protection of civilians in addition to supporting all mediation efforts in Darfur,” he said. “Main pillar” According to Vice-President Abdelrahman “The Darfuri-Darfuri dialogue is the main pillar for achieving peace and economic recovery in Darfur. This dialogue presents a better alternative to communities. Instead of bearing arms, voices and concerns of individuals are being heard.” “I am very pleased with what has been achieved so far but this is only the beginning. We need to ensure that these needs and demands voiced here today are being implemented and we remain committed to achieve that goal.” The next stage of the consultative process involves consultations with the Darfuri living abroad, with refugees and displaced people, followed by state and regional level deliberations. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 SUDAN Research, Analysis, and Advocacy