Myanmar authorities should drop the charges against two ethnic Kachin Baptist community leaders who have been arbitrarily detained since December 24, 2016, Fortify Rights and Human Rights Watch said today. The Lashio District Court in northern Shan State has announced that it would deliver a verdict today, October 27. “Two Kachin religious leaders are being prosecuted for exposing the military’s crimes,” said Matthew Smith, chief executive officer of Fortify Rights. “They should never have been locked up on these grounds in the first place.” Police in the town of Myo Ma charged Dumdaw Nawng Lat, a 67-year-old assistant pastor with the Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC), and Langjaw Gam Seng, a 35-year-old KBC youth leader, under article 17(1) of the Unlawful Associations Act for allegedly supporting the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). Dumdaw Nawng Lat was also charged with criminal defamation under section 500 of the Myanmar Penal Code for providing information about the Myanmar military’s alleged airstrikes to Voice of America during a phone interview on December 1, 2016. Police brought the charges after the two men assisted visiting journalists documenting damage allegedly caused by airstrikes near a Catholic church and other civilian structures in Muse Township, northern Shan State, in late 2016. Following the publication of photos of the damaged church on December 15, Maj. Kyaw Myo Min Latt of Myanmar Army Battalion 99 arrested Dumdaw Nawng Lat and Langjaw Gam Seng at Byuha Gon military base on December 24, 2016. From December 25 to January 19, the Myanmar military detained the men incommunicado at Kalaya 123 military base in Nampaka Township, northern Shan State, and interrogated them repeatedly. After an international outcry calling on the army to reveal the men’s whereabouts, the military handed the two over to the Myo Ma police on January 20, 2017. The military also transferred to the police statements signed by the two men during military interrogation that they supported the KIA. Those statements are the sole evidence of the unlawful association charge provided by the prosecution during the trial. The defendants’ legal team says that the men signed these statements under severe duress and urged the judge to throw them out as inadmissible. Dumdaw Nawng Lat’s purported statement also said that he had provided information about the Myanmar military’s alleged airstrikes during a phone interview with Voice of America. Human Rights Watch and Fortify Rights oppose use of criminal defamation in all instances. If convicted of unlawful association, Dumdaw Nawng Lat and Langjaw Gam Seng each face up to three years in prison and a fine. Dumdaw Nawng Lat faces an additional two years in prison and a fine if convicted for defamation. “Myanmar’s government should be prosecuting military personnel who are responsible for serious abuses—not activists who are bringing those abuses to light,” said Phil Robertson, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Myanmar’s military has for decades violated the rights of the country’s ethnic minorities without ever having to fear being brought before a court.” The prosecutions of Dumdaw Nawng Lat and Langjaw Gam Seng violate their rights to freedom of expression and association, Fortify Rights and Human Rights Watch said. In her September 8 report to the United Nations General Assembly, the UN special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, Yanghee Lee, recommended that the Myanmar government “ensure that the numerous and continuing cases of alleged serious violations of human rights by all parties to the conflict in Shan and Kachin States are impartially and independently investigated.” Her report states:, “The people of Myanmar also have a right to know the truth.” In March, the UN Human Rights Council passed a resolution establishing a Fact-Finding Mission to investigate human rights abuses in Myanmar as a step toward holding perpetrators accountable. The Myanmar government has repeatedly stated that it will not cooperate with the mission. “The outrageous prosecution of the two religious leaders for reporting on abuses shows the need for international inquiries in Myanmar,” Smith said. “The UN Fact-Finding Mission is critical to uncovering the truth in all of Myanmar’s conflict areas.” For More Information, Please Contact: Phil Robertson, Deputy Asia Director, Human Rights Watch, +66-85-060-8406, RobertP@hrw.org, Twitter: @Reaproy Matthew Smith, Chief Executive Officer, Fortify Rights, +66.85.028.0044, matthew.smith@fortifyrights.org; Twitter: @matthewfsmith, @FortifyRights David Baulk, Myanmar Human Rights Specialist, Fortify Rights, +95.979.311.1685 (Myanmar), +66.92.489.0106 (Thailand), david.baulk@fortifyrights.org; Twitter: @davidbaulk, @FortifyRights _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Human Rights Watch | Fortify Rights

Wednesday marks the two-month anniversary of attacks in Burma, carried out by a small band of Rohingya militants, that triggered a massive and indiscriminate retaliation from the Burmese military and the exodus of most of the Muslim minority ethnic group from the country. Some 604,000 people, mostly Rohingya, have fled to neighboring Bangladesh since Aug. 25, where they have joined more than 300,000 who fled in earlier waves of ethnic violence over the past three decades. With thousands still crossing the border each day, the total number of Rohingya refugees is expected to cross the 1 million mark in the coming days or weeks. Roughly half a million Rohingya are thought to still be in Burma, where many live in camps for displaced people. Human rights organizations have documented the wholesale incineration of Rohingya villages across three townships (akin to counties) of Burma's Rakhine State, where the majority of Rohingya once lived. In interviews in Bangladesh refugee camps and over the phone while still in Burma, Rohingya have offered searing testimony of extensive crimes against humanity carried out by the Burmese military. An elderly Rohingya Muslim woman, Shona Mehar, who spent four days in the open after crossing over from Burma into Bangladesh, is carried by her grandson Mohammad Qasim, left, and son Mohammad Haleem, after they were allowed to proceed toward a refugee camp at Palong Khali, Bangladesh, on Oct. 19. (Dar Yasin/AP) Journalists and aid agencies have been largely prevented from accessing areas where Rohingya once predominated in Rakhine. On Wednesday, Reuters reported a new version of a story that has been repeated numerous times over the past two months: Aid workers were hounded away from a camp for displaced Rohingya by people from the local Buddhist majority. “The simple fact here is that lifesaving aid is being blocked from reaching vulnerable people who desperately need it, including children and the elderly,” Pierre Peron, spokesman for the United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Burma, told Reuters. While the Burmese military campaign has subsided, food shortages and widespread hostility are prompting remaining Rohingya to leave for Bangladesh. Buddhists in Rakhine are suspicious of foreigners and accuse them of aiding and abetting a Rohingya insurgency. The United Nations has called the Burmese military's campaign in Rakhine a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing,” and numerous world leaders, including U.S. senators, have termed it genocide. Earlier this week, the U.S. State Department announced that it was weighing targeted sanctions and that it was rescinding military-to-military engagements between the United States and Burma, also known as Myanmar. “The government of Burma, including its armed forces, must take immediate action to ensure peace and security; implement commitments to ensure humanitarian access to communities in desperate need; facilitate the safe and voluntary return of those who have fled or been displaced in Rakhine State; and address the root causes of systematic discrimination against the Rohingya,” the State Department said in a statement issued Monday night. The Trump administration has stopped short of concurring with the United Nations in calling the crisis an ethnic cleansing. Nurij, 65, an exhausted Rohingya, receives water after she is carried to a port in Teknaf, Bangladesh, after crossing from Burma, on Oct. 25. (Hannah McKay/Reuters) On Tuesday, Bangladesh and Burma reached an agreement to “form a working committee” that would seek ways to facilitate the return of some Rohingya to Burma. The Burmese government has warned in the past that it will only allow those Rohingya with proof of land ownership in Burma to return — documents that most Rohingya do not have, or lost in the chaos of the crackdown. With hundreds of Rohingya villages reduced to ashes, the question of where Rohingya would live once they returned looms large. With aid being blocked to camps in Burma, and Buddhists across Burma unified in their antipathy toward the Rohingya, the sprawling tent cities in Bangladesh may seem to many the better option. In the 1990s, the Bangladeshi government resorted to forced repatriation for Rohingya refugees, but there are no indications they would do that again. Reports in Burmese state media seem to indicate that the Burmese government plans on appropriating land vacated by the Rohingya and may even harvest unattended crops. Rohingya Muslim children, who crossed over from Burma into Bangladesh, wait to receive food handouts distributed by a Turkish aid agency at Thaingkhali refugee camp, Bangladesh, on Oct. 21. (Dar Yasin/AP) What's most important from where the world meets Washington Most of the 604,000 new arrivals in Bangladesh are children, thousands of whom are unaccompanied. Many are acutely malnourished. On Monday, at an international conference in Geneva, international donors pledged around $340 million to the United Nations-led response. The U.N. had asked for about $100 million more than that. Doctors Without Borders has called the camps in Bangladesh a “time bomb ticking toward a full-blown health crisis” as sanitation and medical services and distribution of clean water have struggled to keep up with refugee arrivals. Rohingya Muslims carry their children and belongings after they were allowed to proceed toward a refugee camp, at Palong Khali, Bangladesh, on Oct. 19. (Dar Yasin/AP) Bangladesh is already the world's most densely populated large country. It is also one of the poorest. The government and civil society have nevertheless provided a massive amount of aid. The long-term viability of the camps in Bangladesh relies on continued international support, however, and the presence of nearly 1 million penniless refugees in southeastern Bangladesh is straining what was already very underdeveloped public services such as roads and hospitals. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 The Washington Post

Cameroon has been officially at war with Boko Haram since May 2014. Despite a gradual lowering in the conflict’s intensity, which peaked in 2014 and 2015, the continuing violence, combined with the sharp rise in the number of suicide attacks between May and August 2017, are reminders that the jihadist movement is by no means a spent force. Since May 2014, 2,000 civilians and soldiers have been killed, in addition to the more than 1,000 people kidnapped in the Far North region. Between 1,500 and 2,100 members of Boko Haram have reportedly been killed following clashes with the Cameroonian defence forces and vigilante groups. The fight against Boko Haram has exacerbated the already-delicate economic situation for the four million inhabitants of this region – the poorest part of the country even before the outbreak of the conflict. Nevertheless, the local population’s adaptability and resilience gives the Cameroonian government and the country’s international partners the opportunity to implement development policies that take account of the diversity and fluidity of the traditional economies of this border region between Nigeria and Chad. The Far North of Cameroon is a veritable crossroads of trading routes and cultures. Besides commerce, the local economy is based on agriculture, livestock farming, fishing, tourism, transportation of goods, handcrafts and hunting. The informal sector is strong, and contraband rife. Wealthy merchants and traditional chiefs – often members of the ruling party and high-ranking civil servants – are significant economic actors. Up until the 1980s, the region’s different ethnic communities were engaged in specific economic activities depending on their respective geographic zones, climates and traditions. Before the arrival of Boko Haram, desertification and poverty had already debilitated these specialisations, such as fishing for the Kotoko, livestock farming for the Choa Arabs, agriculture for the Mafa, with the exception of trading in the case of the Kanuri. Forced to move, people have taken their traditional skills with them and diversified their sources of livelihood: in the Logone and Chari, the Kotoko, who were formerly fishermen, now also farm rice and exploit natron deposits; and many Choa Arabs, traditionally livestock breeders, are now involved in commerce and agriculture. Over the past four years, the struggle against Boko Haram has further destabilised people’s lives and shaken up traditional socio-economic roles. In response, local communities have come up with everyday survival and resilience strategies, which the government and international partners should integrate into their development policies. This briefing is based on documentary research and some sixty interviews conducted from January to September 2017 in Yaoundé and the Far North. It stresses the need to move from an emergency approach to a pro-development approach, and recommends adapting development policies to local socio-economic realities. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Group

On Saturday, October 28 (8am to 4pm), and Sunday, October 29 (9am to 4pm), Darfur Women Action Group (DWAG) and partners will present a unique forum where hundreds of anti-genocide activists, women's rights advocates, artists, survivors from various crises, experts, and concerned leaders will come together to address the forgotten genocide in Darfur, analyze its impact on women, and define effective strategies for prevention and sustainable change. On Monday, October 30, a group of citizens will be heading to Capitol Hill to express their concern to representatives and demand that they make Darfur and Sudan a priority for the US government. The symposium is organized by DWAG in partnership with Jewish World Watch and the George Washington University's African Student Association, and co-sponsored by the Institute for African Studies, Women Thrive Alliance, George Mason University's Genocide Prevention Program, and Genocide Watch. The event will feature outstanding speakers and keynote addresses, among them former United States Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice Stephen Rapp, who has exceptional expertise in International Justice and is a leading figure in formulating US policy toward prevention and accountability for mass atrocities and genocide. Also, Mukesh Kapila, one of the first whistleblowers on brutal crimes committed against civilians in Darfur. Additionally, Aicha Elbasri, the former spokesperson for the United Nations/African Union's Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), who broke the silence about UNAMID's deliberate and systematic cover-up and the lack of reporting of crimes against humanity committed by the Sudanese government. Other speakers include distinguished genocide scholars and experts from the academic communities, such as Professor Greg Stanton, author of "The 8 Stages of Genocide", Elisa von Joeden-Forgey and Dr. Daniel Rothbart, who have both written extensively on the topic of genocide and Darfur, and Dr. Douglas Irvin-Erickson, who recently wrote a biography on Raphael Lemkin. In its core, the symposium will give a platform for women survivors of genocide and mass atrocities to share testimonies on their first-hand experiences, resilience, and leadership. "Our symposium is unique in its scope and context. It's the only forum where survivors and policy makers talk face to face with experts, activists, advocates, and students; where they can passionately deliberate, debate and develop strategies for effective approaches to empower affected communities, confront genocide and mass atrocities, and end violence against women. It has been an incredible journey for the last six years; a great movement of committed individuals and an effort DWAG has tirelessly worked to sustain," said Niemat Ahmadi, founder of the symposium and a veteran human rights advocate who suffered several attempts on her life for speaking up against the genocide in Darfur. Ms. Ahmadi founded DWAG in 2009 and hosted the first Annual Symposium on Women and Genocide Symposium in the 21st Century in 2012. Since then, the event has taken place every year in October, and attracted speakers and participants from diverse backgrounds from all over the world. The goal is to ensure that genocide and the use of rape as a weapon of war are not ignored. Through the event, DWAG has expanded its partnership to educate and empower ordinary citizens to speak up and hold leaders accountable. We believe that with our collective effort abolishing genocide in the 21st century is possible. During the symposium, speakers, advocates, and survivors will be available for media interviews. For more a detailed list of speakers, please check here. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ © Copyright 2017 Darfur Women Action Group

The long road of persecution for the Rohingya _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Former Head of Myanmar Military Intelligence | UN | Media

Wolfgang Blam saved lives during the genocide in Rwanda, while the rest of the world looked the other way. This hero is now depicted as a charlatan by students of VU University in Amsterdam. Twenty-five years ago, the ‘Innocence’-project was launched in New York, set up to help the victims of miscarriages of justice in America. Since then, hundreds of wrongly convicted people have been released. This success led to similar initiatives in other countries. An example from the Netherlands is the student project ‘Reasonable Doubt’ at the Vrije Universiteit (VU University) in Amsterdam. The most recent project of ‘Reasonable Doubt’ is the case of Joseph Mpambara. Mpambara is serving a life sentence in the Netherlands for his part in the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda by Hutu-extremists, and for terrorising a German-Rwandan family during the same period. The results of the research were published in the book A Rwandese House of Cards (in Dutch: Een Rwandees Kaartenhuis). “Vampires” Unlike the ‘Innocence’-Project, ‘Reasonable Doubt’ does not search for new evidence to prove the innocence of the convicted person. In this case the students are mainly limited to analyzing the judicial files, as provided by the former defence lawyer of Mpambara. The students received additional information from a handful of other lawyers of genocide suspects, and from Mpambara himself. The postscript of the book was written by one of the advisers: Mpambara’s current lawyer. This guidance from interested parties reveals a major weakness of the book. The VU-students criticize the manner in which the criminal investigations were carried out by the Dutch authorities, but they forget to contact those responsible. The only government official who is listed as a source tells me by phone that the information he provided is largely ignored in the book. No independent genocide experts or victim associations were contacted either. The logical consequence is that many questions remain unanswered, forcing the students to speculate. A risky approach. “It’s a useful book with a lot to learn from, but hardly scientific,” says Martin Witteveen, an examining judge who has interrogated dozens of witnesses in Rwanda. “Much of its content is open to question. It’s more like a plea that was never made.” Whether this plea is sincere remains to be seen, however, as several of the advisers of the project are controversial. One of the lawyers has infuriated Africa-experts by referring to Tutsi- witnesses as “vampires” and to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) as “the International Hutu Meat Mill.” A few years ago another one disturbed an international art project about the genocide. And a third source was heavily criticized by Genocide Watch last summer for denying the genocide. So, in addition to the vested interests of the consulted lawyers, these sources display some dubious sentiments that will not have contributed to the objectivity of their information either. No compassion It is unclear why the VU-students accepted the Mpambara case. The book states that Mpambara has always denied his role in the genocide against the Tutsi minority in Rwanda, but he also claims that he had not been aware of ethnically motivated killings, only of skirmishes with rebels in his area. The District Court in The Hague regarded this “cynical denial” of the genocide as a blatant lie and contempt for reality. There is a lot to be said for this harsh judgment, because the genocide couldn’t have been clearer in Mpambara’s home region. His village is situated on the border of two Communes (local councils), Gishyita and Rwamatamu, where 26 percent and 20 percent of the total population, respectively, were killed. The war with the rebels, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), never reached this part of the country and cannot possibly serve as an explanation for the violence. According to witness statements at the ICTR, Mpambara’s family provided shelter to soldiers and militia members during the genocide. Mpambara himself has been identified in several ICTR cases as one of the perpetrators, and as one of the leaders of a meeting where attacks on Tutsis were planned. Although the book suggests otherwise, those statements date back to years before the Netherlands had started their criminal investigation against him. A Rwandan House of Cards ignores all these aspects. The apologetic attitude towards Mpambara is even more remarkable if we consider that the students have read the verdict of 2009, which states “[…] that the defendant had remarked in the courtroom that the court should not only ask whether Hutus killed the Tutsis but also ‘what the Tutsi had done to deserve death’.” The judges concluded that Mpambara’s statements can only be understood as a continued adherence to the anti-Tutsi ideology. Two years later, the Court of Appeal confirmed this by noting that Mpambara had not withdrawn his extremist remarks and still did not show any compassion towards the victims. Slandered heroes The witnesses who have testified against Mpambara cannot count on the same leniency in the book The VU-students target the witnesses from Rwanda, but also a German doctor who is given the pseudonym “Bauer”. In reality, this witness is Dr Wolfgang Blam, who was working for the German Development Organisation (DED) in Rwanda when the genocide began. According to the Court of Appeal in The Hague, it has been legally proven that Dr Blam and his Rwandan wife Jacqueline Mukandanga were held captive by Mpambara – and terrorised by him – on 27 April 1994. But the VU-students do not trust the story. They even suspect the German doctor of having falsified a letter used as documentary evidence. A handwriting analysis has refuted this suggestion, but the motive Blam might have had for framing Mpambara, the book does not tell. The remarkable story of doctor Blam is well known from publications by historians and human rights organisations. He was employed at the hospital of Kibuye, a town in western Rwanda, when the genocide started in early April 1994. A few days later, when all the foreigners were evacuated, Blam stayed behind together with his wife and child, because he was already hiding ten people by then. Together with his colleague Dr. Leonard Hitimana, Blam defied the extremist militias for weeks. The doctors collected injured victims in the streets, concealed entire families and supplied threatened refugees with the most basic necessities. After a massacre in a school, Blam managed to save a couple of children who had been left for dead in a huge pile of dismembered corpses. But despite their brave resistance, the doctors were powerless when they were forced to stand by when the militias finally captured and slaughtered people they had saved before. Three weeks later virtually all Tutsis in Kibuye were dead. When the personal threat to the family became untenable, they tried to flee. Guarded by a gendarme, they set out in the hospital ambulance towards the border with Congo. They did not get very far. The ambulance was stopped at a roadblock in Mugonero, the village of Mpambara, who, according to Blam, acted as the leader of the local militia. Blam suspected it was a trap, set for them by the prefect of Kibuye. Although the latter had issued a travel permission to get to the border, they recognized a militiaman from Kibuye at the roadblock. The man disappeared shortly after their arrest. The couple and their two months old baby were taken to the store of Mpambara’s father, where Jacqueline was subjected to death threats and insults for several hours. The brave gendarme prevented worse. Hours of negotiations followed, until Mpambara sent the driver of the ambulance with a letter to Charles Sikubwabo, the Mayor of Gishyita, asking him to come and decide on the fate of Jacqueline. Unexpectedly, the reply of Sikubwabo saved her life. “Send them back to Kibuye because we do not know if they are officially married,” the Mayor wrote on the back of the letter. “We shall carefully examine the matter of this woman. We can check the records. Be careful not to damage the relationship with Germany.” The “wrong” Mayor The VU-students are very sceptical about this story. They are especially puzzled by the correspondence between Mpambara and Sikubwabo, the Mayor of Gishyita. Mpambara’s store was not located in Gishyita, but just across the Communal border in Rwamatamu. In the minds of the students, this meant that the letter had been addressed the wrong mayor, a mistake that Mpambara – or any other Rwandan citizen – would not have made. The mystery of the “wrong” Mayor is nevertheless easily solved. Jacqueline was registered in Gishyita, not in Rwamatamu. The outcome of the negotiations with Mpambara depended on whether Jacqueline and her child should be considered as ordinary Tutsis, or as members of a German family. Only the Mayor of her native Commune was in a position to decide on this matter. Shortly after the incident in Mugonero, Dr Hitimana – Blam’s colleague – paid Sikubwabo a visit to arrange a marriage certificate for the couple, which supports this interpretation. Incidentally, Sikubwabo, a former soldier and a powerful militia leader, did not restrict his activities during the genocide to the boundaries of his Commune. The misunderstandings about the Mugonero-incident are not yet finished. The students conclude the story with this critical remark: “An interview with Léonard [Hitimana] might have produced clues about the identity of Pierre [the driver] and the gendarme and their place of residence. It is unknown why Léonard was never questioned.” There is an obvious answer to this problem as well. Doctor Hitimana has been missing since 2003. The circumstances of his disappearance have never been cleared up, but may very well have a political background as he was a member of parliament at the time. The Dutch police investigators did not arrive in Rwanda until 2006. This, of course, ruled out the possibility of questioning Hitimana. False statements The misunderstandings about Dr Blam are typical for the gaps in the students’ research, although the information is not that difficult to find. Blam’s story was first published in November 1994, shortly after the genocide, and includes a reference to the disputed letter. Leonard Hitimana was interviewed by African Rights for their book Tribute to Courage. The travel document issued by the prefect can be found in the judicial archives of the ICTR. And the disappearance of Dr Hitimana has been widely reported by Amnesty International and Rwanda critics. Although the students and their professor, Peter van Koppen, do not respond to my questions, one of the supervisors, Annelies Vredeveldt, explains that they usually do not consult any publications besides the case file. But, as the examples below will demonstrate, this is not true for the Mpambara case. Additional material was used for other aspects of the case. For example, the book devotes ample attention to the case of Jacques Mungwarere in Canada of 2013. Like Mpambara, Mungwarere was accused of participating in the massacre of 3,000 people in a hospital complex near Mugonero. Based on information from Canada, the VU- students believe that most of the witnesses who testified in both cases are unreliable. Their assumption is based on three anonymous witnesses who stated during the trial in Canada that they had invented incriminating facts about Mungwarere. Other witnesses had done the same, so they claim. However, the reason behind their sudden repentance has not been investigated, even though one of them had to relocate out of fear for Mungwarere’s relatives. Moreover, two of the three witnesses claim to have told the truth about Mpambara. According to Martin Witteveen, the possible influence of the unreliable witnesses on the Mpambara case is very limited. More than a hundred statements have been collected in eight different countries. “Many witnesses have pointed him out,” says Witteveen. “The evidence did not depend on the disputed witnesses.” Academic literature Other arguments presented by the students to challenge the reliability of the witnesses are made with reference to the academic literature. This presents a well-known dilemma. For every point to prove there is a scientific study out there that can be used to support it. If necessary, information from research papers can be manipulated to suit a purpose. A Rwandese House of Cards contains some illustrative examples. One of the cited studies is about recognition. According to the book, the study has determined the maximum distance at which one can still accurately recognize somebody else: fifteen meters. This implies that eyewitnesses who identified Mpambara from a greater distance can’t be trusted. However, the quoted study focuses on something else: the ability to distinguish between people who look very similar. In the experiment, the portrait pictures of celebrities such as Bill Clinton and Bruce Willis were put next to pictures of lookalikes. Without a lookalike next to it, the distance was not fifteen, but more than sixty meters. More recent research further shows that physical characteristics and movement play a greater role in recognition than the face. People were still recognized when their faces had been made invisible. According to the scientists, there is a logical explanation. Being able to tell a friend from an enemy from a safe distance is clearly an evolutionary advantage. The book also cites a study about the influence of stress on memory. Genocide victims have been traumatised so their memories about the perpetrators would be less reliable, the VU- students argue. But again the selected study is not particularly relevant to the Mpambara case. It was designed to investigate how well victims identify an unknown perpetrator. But in the Mpambara case most eyewitnesses had known him for a long time. They did not need to remember a ‘new’ face. Ironically, the students appear to have forgotten the influence of stress on memory formation when they examine contradictions in the testimonies. These mainly concern trivial details, such as the colour of a car, the point where someone got in or out, which clothes the perpetrator wore, etc. However, details that were not relevant to the victims when the crimes were committed are understandably not as well remembered as a perpetrator or the weapons involved. A lack of inconsistencies in the statements would in fact have been more suspicious, especially if one considers the time that has passed. One-sided plea A Rwandese House of Cards shows how difficult it is to establish facts that took place many years ago, in a faraway country with a different culture. This poses many challenges, not only to the judges, but to the VU-students as well. Regrettably, the latter do not seem to have taken this into account. The students try their best and do in fact present some valid points of criticism. Examples are the lack of opportunity for the judges to address witnesses directly (there was no video link with witnesses abroad), and a lack of clarity about a list of witnesses who mentioned Mpambara during a general investigation in 1999 (referred to in the book as the Cyangugu file). Calling these shortcomings miscarriages of justice seems rather excessive. But the one-sided orientation of the students, and their lack of basic knowledge about the genocide, backfires each time when the facts are unclear and their imagination gets the better of them. These flaws translate into conclusions that are hardly substantiated in the text. The VU- students conclude, for example, that the Dutch authorities have been deceived by a ploy of the Rwandan government. The Rwandan police supplied the witnesses, the students argue, and may have influenced their statements. A possible motive is not included. In another part of the book we read that Mpambara was not under investigation in Rwanda when the Netherlands submitted a request for judicial cooperation. As an individual, he was not of any political significance either. Furthermore, the judgement of the District Court states that eight witnesses were initially traced on request and interrogated by the Rwandan police, but the other witnesses were traced by the Dutch investigators. Martin Witteveen is not impressed by the conclusions of the students. “There have never been signs of influence,” he firmly states. “It does not seem likely. Besides, there is no evidence to back it up. There is only the suggestion that influence may have taken place, but that’s as far as it goes.” Even in the frequently cited trial in Canada the judge found no credible evidence for the alleged influence of the Rwandan government. According to the verdict, there was in fact more evidence to the contrary. Such nuances are, although relevant, not mentioned anywhere in the book. That’s a shame, because the affiliation with VU University suggests a certain level of scientific objectivity. Instead, the students appear to have allowed themselves to be exploited by a group of stakeholders. The Mpambara case was submitted to ‘Reasonable Doubt’ by someone who is not only well acquainted with Mpambara, but is also, like various advisers of the project, friends with a political rival of the Rwandan president. An interview by email reveals a strong belief in conspiracy theories. It looks like the students were primed by all this. Likewise, anyone taking the book of ‘Reasonable Doubt’ on good faith will risk being deceived by the one-sided plea in A Rwandese House of Cards. ___________________________________________________________________________________________ Copyright 2017 CPCR

What’s happening?  On 26 October, Kenya is scheduled to hold repeat presidential elections following the Supreme Court’s annulment of the previous vote held on 8 August. Proceeding in current conditions risks escalating the political crisis. Why is the vote contentious?  President Uhuru Kenyatta says he is ready for the vote, while opposition leader Raila Odinga refuses to participate, citing the lack of electoral reform since 8 August. The election commission chairman has said that he cannot deliver a credible election on 26 October. Why does it matter?  The risk of clashes between rival supporters or between security forces and protesters seeking to block the vote is high. New violence would be devastating for Kenya, the economic hub of East Africa. What should be done? The election commission chairman should petition the Supreme Court for an election postponement of 30 to 45 days, which would permit a delay without violating the constitution. All parties should contest the new vote, accept the outcome or pursue complaints through the courts. I.Overview The rerun of Kenya’s presidential elections, scheduled for 26 October, threatens to provoke a serious political crisis. Opposition leader Raila Odinga has declared he will not participate; an Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) commissioner recently resigned and fled the country; and the IEBC chairman has signalled that he cannot guarantee a credible vote within the expected timeline. The risk of deadly clashes between the two main parties’ supporters, or between security forces and groups seeking to block the vote, is high. Proceeding under current conditions would deepen Kenya’s ethnic cleavages and prolong a stalemate that has already claimed dozens of lives and come at a high economic cost. Kenyan institutions and political leaders should consider a short delay; Odinga in turn should pledge to take part; business elites as well as Kenya’s neighbours and donors should help promote such an outcome. II.A Contested Electoral Process Kenya’s Supreme Court 1 September annulled the presidential election held on 8 August. It did not find evidence of widespread fraud or question the outcome – according to official results Kenyatta won 54 per cent to Odinga’s 45 per cent – but found irregularities and illegalities during the IEBC’s results transmission and announcement of tallies. It ordered the electoral body to conduct a new vote within 60 days “in strict conformity with the constitution and applicable election laws”. As Crisis Group noted shortly after the court decision, the manner in which political leaders have responded to the judgment has hindered preparations for a new poll. Members of Parliament from President Kenyatta’s Jubilee Party have used their majority in the National Assembly to push through contentious electoral reforms. These include provisions that declare that an election cannot be annulled on the basis of a failure to relay or record tallies electronically – key grounds for the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the 8 August ballot. As the European Union (EU) and other observers have indicated, passing such legislation so close to election day runs against global best practice. Parliament endorsed the amendments on 11 October but Kenyatta is yet to sign them into law. For his part, Raila Odinga responded to a court decision that appeared to vindicate many of his complaints about the election’s administration by drawing up a list of conditions for his participation in a new vote. On 10 October, the IEBC wrote to Odinga saying that it would implement some of his requested changes, including improvements to its IT management and security protocols. The Commission also gave party agents and observers further access to key aspects of the electoral process, including to its IT systems, within the limits permitted by its security protocols. Other demands, it said, such as replacing the service providers for the IT vote management system and using another company to print ballots and returns forms, were not feasible in the time remaining before the vote. That same day, Odinga withdrew from the election. His statement some days later that “no election” would take place on 26 October was interpreted by diplomats, media commentators and the government itself as an implicit threat of violence. Tensions, already high, have further intensified. Several parliamentarians from Odinga’s coalition, the National Super Alliance (NASA), have been arrested for assaulting election officials and disrupting IEBC training seminars in NASA strongholds. On 20 October, Odinga called on his supporters to end attacks on electoral staff and Jubilee supporters. He also reiterated his intention to boycott the vote and promised to address the nation on the “way forward” on 25 October. Political disagreements are not the sole impediment to the repeat election. Just as before the 8 August vote, court cases filed by politicians and others and the rulings on those cases may have had a bearing on preparations for the new vote. An 11 October High Court judgment, for example, ruled that all eight candidates in the 8 August vote – not just Kenyatta and Odinga as initially planned – could contest the fresh election. The IEBC has indicated that it has insufficient time before 26 October to reconfigure the electronic results transmission kits to include all candidates. The IEBC itself is in disarray. Disagreement among commissioners over how to handle the court’s decision and the refusal by some to entertain a postponement were among the reasons cited by IEBC commissioner Roselyn Akombe for her resignation and departure to the U.S. on 18 October. A day later, with public pressure mounting, IEBC chief executive officer Ezra Chiloba, whose departure Odinga has demanded, departed, reportedly on leave. Kenyan media outlets report he will play no role in the repeat election. III.Delaying the Election Rerun Kenya has made remarkable progress since the violence after the disputed 2007 elections, notably in the adoption of a new constitution in 2010. But the zero sum calculations of political elites persist. Such calculations are driving Kenya towards a crisis that could imperil both the country’s and the region’s stability. A way forward that can address concerns of both sides and settle the political stalemate sensibly should reflect the following principles: The IEBC chairman should publicly confirm the position he took during an 18 October media conference that holding a credible election on 26 October under current conditions is impossible. He should petition the Supreme Court for a limited extension of 30 to 45 days, which would allow the election to be rescheduled without violating the constitution. Precedent for this exists: the High Court in January 2012 delayed elections by six months, which helped ensure a credible and peaceful vote. The Supreme Court should favourably consider such an extension given the IEBC chairman’s own acknowledgment that the commission cannot guarantee a credible vote within the allotted timeline. Because only parliament or the Supreme Court can allow a postponement, and given that parliament would need a minimum of two weeks to debate and pass a bill extending the 60-day window for a new vote, such a call at this point only could come from the court. Should it grant a delay, the court ought to state clearly that President Kenyatta would remain in office pending the fresh vote. The constitution is silent on who holds power in the event no election is held within 60 days of the annulment of the previous vote. But insofar as the court, in its 1 September decision, concluded that the president had committed no offence leading up to the 8 August election, he should remain in office until the new balloting occurs. Such a clarification would assuage the concerns of some in his camp who fear the constitutional ambiguity on this point could encourage legal challenges to his position. If the court rejects such a petition, Odinga should accept the decision of a court he praised not so long ago and urge his supporters to abide by the judges’ orders. Odinga should participate in a delayed vote without additional conditions. He should renew the welcome public pledge against violence that he made on 20 October. He also should rein in and hold accountable supporters who have attacked election officials, made inflammatory threats to disrupt the election or otherwise broken Kenyan law. He should stress that disputes should be resolved by Kenya’s institutions and not through violence. If Odinga nonetheless decides to boycott a postponed election, he should encourage supporters to stay home rather than disrupt balloting, attack voters or otherwise stoke trouble. Both President Kenyatta and Odinga should publicly commit to supporting the IEBC if a new poll date is set and accept the results or take complaints to the courts. The Kenyan police chief should issue clear instructions to officers to restrain and arrest – not shoot – demonstrators breaking the law. In light of the extreme breakdown of trust between both camps and to avert a protracted political crisis, the African Union should help nudge the parties to accept a short delay under the conditions described above to allow the commission to ready itself, and crucially, seek assurances from President Kenyatta and Raila Odinga that they will accept the vote’s outcome. Many Kenyans are exhausted by the extended election drama, one that already has damaged the economy and further polarised the country. But faced with two bad options – proceeding with a vote despite the boycott of a candidate who won some 45 per cent of votes the last time round; or accepting a limited delay – the latter option is the better one. The IEBC should seek a limited postponement to allow sufficient time to prepare for an election that both main parties contest. Kenya’s political leaders should support such an extension and commit to participate in a new vote. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Group

As Burundi becomes the first country to leave the International Criminal Court (ICC) this week, the withdrawal is a test case for the commitment of the international community to global justice. Will there be consequences for the country? The first ever member state is about to leave the ICC silently. About a year ago the Burundian government decided to withdraw from the Rome Statute, the ICC's founding treaty. It notified the United Nations, where the treaty is deposited, and now, one year later on 27 October, the withdrawal comes into effect. Burundi's withdrawal is particularly critical because the ICC had opened a preliminary examination to determine whether the court should intervene in the on-going political violence. Despite a constitutional two-term limit, president Pierre Nkurunziza decided seek a third term in April 2015. Since then, violent protests and repression by authorities killed hundreds and forced more than 418.000 people to flee the country. The ICC's Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has not requested permission from the judges to open a formal investigation. When the withdrawal takes effect this Friday, the ICC looses its jurisdiction. Only if it were to open an investigation before the withdrawal, the court could prosecute crimes committed in Burundi. So far ICC prosecutor Fatou Bensouda has remained silent on the situation in Burundi. At her latest briefing of the diplomatic corps in The Hague earlier this month on the activities of her office, she did not mention the country. Given the scope and gravity of the crimes, and compared to other countries, it could be a conscious decision to let Burundi go and instead focus on conflicts with quantitatively larger patterns of violence, such as Libya and the Central African Republic. Letting Burundi leave could have a severe impact on the whole system, some say. Civil society organizations warned Burundi could set a precedent which undermines the ICC. “The Burundian case might suggest to other states that face (or will face) a preliminary examination that it would be sufficient to withdraw immediately from the Rome Statute so that the initiation of an investigation could be effectively avoided,” said the Burundian Coalition for the International Criminal Court. While this point of view is understandable with regard to the ICC system, it ignores that other avenues at the international level remain open. For example, the Human Rights Council established the UN Independent Investigation in Burundi (UNIIB) and the Commission of Inquiry (CoI) on Burundi which published its final report recently. Both bodies documented grave human rights abuses and called on the international community – most notably the African Union, the Human Rights Council and the UN Security Council – to take action. The response of the international community will be decisive for future withdrawals and will reveal its true commitment to the ICC and global justice in general. If the international community lets Burundi go silently and without consequences, the case might indeed set a precedent for others. If governments would decide, however, to strengthen other bodies or step up their activities in the prosecution and prevention of international crimes in Burundi, it would send a clear signal that the decision to leave the ICC does not mean that accountability ends. The ICC is only one of several possible mechanisms after all. The case of Burundi is a possibility to show that a withdrawal from the ICC does not mean a country can escape all justice. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Justice Tribune

The failed UN/African Union “hybrid” Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)—which has shamelessly and with gross inaccuracy celebrated its success for the almost ten years in which it has been charged with protecting civilians and humanitarians—is (per its most recent reauthorization by the UN Security Council | June 2017) drawing down its forces on a scale ensuring that what exceedingly limited protection the Mission has offered will be greatly reduced. 44 percent of military personnel are being deployed out of Darfur and 30 percent of the policing personnel. The knock-on effects of withdrawing this hopelessly misconceived, demoralized, ill-equipped, and badly led Mission are many. Some of the greatest consequences will be a reduction in humanitarian access; for example, since the UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) flies only to areas militarily protected, locations abandoned by UNAMID troops will no longer be accessible. This is especially perverse since a condition for the permanent lifting of U.S. economic sanctions by the Trump administrationwas the improvement of humanitarian access in Darfur. The UN’s current estimate of the number of people in Darfur in need of humanitarian assistance is 3 million. Tragically, the greatest consequence of UNAMID’s deployment out of Darfur are the continuation, and in some places acceleration, of daily ethnically-targeted attacks on civilians throughout Darfur, primarily by Arab militias controlled or sanctioned by Khartoum. Non-Arab (African) civilians continue to be—as they have been for more than fourteen years—subject to murder, rape, displacement, and loss of property and goods. There is good reason to believe that we will see in the reports from Darfur (conveyed primarily by Radio Dabanga) continuation, and most likely acceleration, of these attacks. Only the fact of previous vast destruction of African villages and the violent expropriation of farmlands, and the massive concentration of displaced persons (some 2.7 million in Darfur itself, another320,000 in eastern Chad refugee camps) limits the scale of attacks. Moreover, we should remember that some 600,000 people have been killed as a direct or indirect result of violence over the past fourteen years: this approaches ten percent of the pre-war population in Darfur (see | http://sudanreeves.org/2017/01/05/quantifying-genocide-darfur-mortality-update-august-6-2010/). As a crude barometer of the scale of violence, I will be assembling weekly a brief compendium of foreshortened dispatches (all with sources on the ground). For surveys covering more extensive periods the violent expropriation of African farmlands (November 2014 – November 2016) and the rape of girls and young women (for the years 2014 and 2015), see: http://sudanreeves.org/2016/02/17/changing-the-demography-violent-expropriation-and-destruction-of-farmlands-in-darfur-november-2014-november-2015/ http://sudanreeves.org/2017/03/07/continuing-mass-rape-of-girls-in-darfur-the-most-heinous-crime-generates-no-international-outrage-january-2016/ Herewith the second weekly compendium of violence reported from Darfur during the withdrawal of UNAMID; I also include the most revealing medical news of the past week, particularly about the continuing cholera epidemic, denied to exist by the regime, even when labeled “Acute Watery Diarrhea,” the medical euphemism of choice by both the regime and the UN’s key humanitarian agencies, WHO and UNHCR. All emphases in bold are mine; the emphases in red bold are of particularly significant passages: VIOLENCE IN DARFUR • USA renews Sudan travel warning | Radio Dabanga | October 19, 2017 | WASHINGTON | https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/usa-renews-sudan-travel-warning The US Department of State today issued a new travel warning to US Citizens of the risks of travel to Sudan. “US citizens should avoid all travel to the Darfur states, Blue Nile state, and South Kordofan state and consider carefully before planning travel to other areas of Sudan due to the risks of terrorism, armed conflict, and violent crime.” The latest warning replaced one issued at the end of March. It states that “the US Embassy’s ability to provide services outside of Khartoum is extremely limited. Terrorist groups are present in Sudan and have stated their intent to harm Westerners and Western interests through suicide operations, bombings, shootings, and kidnappings. Violent crimes targeting Westerners, including kidnappings, armed robberies, home invasions, and carjacking can occur anywhere in Sudan, but are particularly prevalent in the Darfur states. Several aid workers and private citizens have been kidnapped and held hostage for ransom in the Darfur states over the last year.” “Significant reduction in conflict” “Despite a significant reduction in the past year in military conflict between the Government of Sudan and opposition forces in Darfur, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan states, tensions in the Darfur states, along the border between Chad and Sudan, and in areas that border South Sudan, including the disputed area of Abyei‎ remain high and violence continues. In addition to risking injury or death, US citizens who go to these areas without the permission of the Sudanese government may be detained by security forces. Armoured vehicles The Embassy warning instructs “US government personnel in Sudan to use armoured vehicles for official travel, and prohibits most travel outside of Khartoum without advance permission and extra security precautions. • U.S. warns citizens against travel to Sudan’s Two Areas, Darfur | Sudan Tribune | October 19, 2017 (KHARTOUM) | http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article63794 The United States warned its citizens on Thursday against the risk of terrorist and criminal attacks in Sudan troubled areas, saying should avoid travelling to the Darfur states, Blue Nile state, and South Kordofan. “Terrorist groups are present in Sudan and have stated their intent to harm Westerners and Western interests through suicide operations, bombings, shootings, and kidnappings,” said the State Department in a travel warning released on Thursday. • Market dealer killed, three Darfuri students wounded in West Kordofan armed robbery | Radio Dabanga | October 19, 2017 | EL FULA | https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/market-dealer-killed-three-darfuri-students-wounded-in-west-kordofan-armed-robbery A man was shot dead El Hadi El Tijani Abdallah was shot dead and three others were wounded in an armed robbery in a house in El Fula in West Kordofan on Wednesday morning. One of the wounded, Abu Bakr Yahyaa, who hails from Garasila in Central Darfur and is a student at El Salam University told Radio Dabanga that they were surprised while they were sleeping at 4 am on Wednesday by four armed men, three of them in military uniform, in the rented house where he lives with seven other students. He explained that the gunmen asked El Hadi El Tijani Abdallah who is from Thawani area in east Jebel Marra, a graduate and a dealer at El Fula market, to hand them all of his money. When Abdallah told the gunmen that he had no money they shot himand killed him instantly. Yahyaa said the gunmen continued to fire, wounding him in his leg, while his colleagu e Ibrahim Mohamed Nur from El Fasher was wounded too. • 25 dead as Chad camel raiders clash with West Darfur posse | Radio Dabanga | October 19, 2017 | KULBUS / KABKABIYA | https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/25-dead-as-chad-camel-raiders-clash-with-west-darfur-posse At least 25 people were killed and an unknown number wounded when armed camel rustlers from Chad clashed with a local rescue team in West Darfur this week. The situation in the area is reportedly still tense. Sources told Radio Dabanga that the incident began on Monday when gunmen from neighbouring Chad stole camels belonging to Mattar Midkheir Awad at El Hatata area north of Kulbus in West Darfur. A local rescue team managed to recover the camels on Tuesday after a clash that resulted in the death of three of the raiders. The thieves then launched a counter-attack; 15 raiders were killed, as well as eight members of the rescue posse. Callers for the area say the situation as dangerous and tense, as there is no a large gathering and mobilisation of armed men in the area, but no government forces have responded. They appealed to the police, government forces, and Unamid to intervene to avoid even more bloodshed. Kabkabiya At least six people were killed and three were wounded in clashes between militiamen in Kabkabiya in North Darfur. The incident led to the closure of Kabkabiya market for the whole of Tuesday as Rapid Support Forces (RSF) support at Kabkabiya market and its streets. [See comment on presence of the RSF by Governor of North Darfur below—ER] Sources told Radio Dabanga that the incidents were sparked when an armed group allegedly murdered two members of the Mahariya tribe and stole their motorcycles, five kilometres north of Kabkabiya on Tuesday evening. • Students injured, arrested as police storm study hall in Sudan capital | Radio Dabanga | October 18, 2017 | KHARTOUM | https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/students-injured-arrested-as-police-storm-study-hall-in-sudan-capital [Assaults on Darfuri students, especially in the Khartoum/Omdurman area, have become increasingly common over the past few years; Darfuris face “ethnic profiling” by the National Intelligence and Security Services and—despite the immense and growing population of displaced Darfuris in the Khartoum urban areas—often face intense abuse, discrimination, and violence—ER] At least four students were injured and five arrested during an attack by police on students in the study hall at the Faculty of Education of the University of Khartoum on Tuesday. Students from the Faculty of Education told Radio Dabanga that the incidents came after the students entered into a sit-in from study and examinations because of the administration’s dismissal of three of their colleagues who had earlier called for reform of the university environment. The students said that the university police, in an attempt to break the sit-in, took a number of students to the examination hall and forced them to sit the exam on Tuesday morning. They added that the police then assaulted the students who refused to take the exam and caused injuries to Muawia Adam, Yasin Ishag, El Fateh Eisa and Jeili Ali Jeili. A student told Radio Dabanga that the university police transported the injured students to the hospital and then were transferred after treatment to the police department of Wad Nubawi north where they were held in custody. The students also pointed to the police arrest of student Abdelrahman Fadul, this along with a number of students still missing whose fate is not yet known. • Grenade blast kills gunman in North Darfur city | Radio Dabanga | October 17, 2017 | 2017 EL FASHER | https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/grenade-kills-gunman-in-north-darfur-city A man was killed when the grenade he carried detonated in downtown El Fasher city on Sunday night, in front of the security squad chasing him. Several security officers were wounded. According to government sources in the capital of North Darfur, the man was being hunted down by the security service after he had fired live bullets in Abdelrahman El Rashid Park. The security force chased the gunman, who happened to be armed with a grenade. In his attempt to throw it at the security force, the grenade exploded in front of him and tore his body into pieces. The source said that the explosion led to the injury of several members of the security force, who were transferred to hospital. [The weapons collection] campaign is also expected to lead to new conflict and internal fighting between militias in Darfur. Ahmed Hussein Adam, associate researcher at the University of London School Of Law, explained that it is a strategy to rid the militias after exhausting their purposes, by igniting internal sedition and fueling conflict between its social cisterns. Adam referred to the need for the government to settle their dispute with Musa Hilal, head of the Revolutionary Awakening Council, and chief of the Mahameed clan. [Ahmed Hussein Adam makes a particularly important point here, one clearly not considered by UNAMID or those who made the decision to withdraw UNAMID—ER] • Early grazing: Three farmers attacked in West Darfur | Radio Dabanga | October 17, 2017 | KEREINIK / EL GENEINA | https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/early-grazing-three-farmers-attacked-in-west-darfur The attack on three women farmers in Kereinik locality, West Darfur, has raised calls for the arrest of the perpetrators and the collection of illegal weapons in the region. Hanab Mohamed Adam, Mariam Abdallah and Nadifa Ahmed have been transferred from Um Tjona village in Kereinik to the hospital in El Geneina for further medical treatment, after they were shot by herders on Sunday. One of the relatives of the wounded women told this station that three armed herders took their livestock to graze at the farms near Um Tjona. They chased the farmers out of the farms. The herders subsequently headed for the village where they opened fire and seriously wounded three women. She reported that the herders also burned four houses at the village… The period for grazing in the Darfur region does not start until February and herders who let their livestock graze the farmlands prematurely is known to cause tension with farmers each year. [This early grazing of livestock by Arabic nomadic herders poses an extreme threat as it becomes increasingly common—ER] Recently, people in Gireida in South Darfur also complained of raids on farms and roads. Last week two farming women were seriously wounded west of Gireida. Witnesses told Radio Dabanga that three militiamen opened fire on the sisters Halima Musa and Khadija Musa, who were working on a farm in Um Asal. • UNAMID hands over three more team sites in Darfur | Sudan Tribune | October 17, 2017 (KHARTOUM) | http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article63781 The hybrid peacekeeping mission in Darfur (UNAMID) has handed over three team sites in South and West Darfur states to the Sudanese government. In a brief statement seen by Sudan Tribune on Tuesday, the Mission said it handed over its “Forobaranga team site, in West Darfur, to the Government of Sudan…” The Mission on Sunday officially handed over its team site in Tulus, South Darfur, to the Sudanese government. “The event took place in Tulus locality, some 80 kilometers south-east of Nyala, and was attended by the Joint Special Representative (JSR), Jeremiah Mamabolo, the Acting Wali (Governor) of South Darfur, Sabeel Ahmed Sabeel, government officials and UNAMID staff” said the Mission on Monday. It is noteworthy that the Mission last Thursday officially handed over its team site in Eid Al Fursan, South Darfur, to the Sudanese government. Last June, the African Union and the United Nations decided to draw down the UNAMID by withdrawing the military personnel by 44% and that of the police component by 30%, the closure of 11 team sites in the first phase and the withdrawal of the military component from another 7 team sites in the second phase. But at the same time the Council decided the opening of a temporary operating base in the Jebel Marra town of Golo. Last month, the Mission closed four team sites including Malha, Mellit and Um Kadada, North Darfur, and Muhajeria, East Darfur. The remaining four team sites which would be closed as part of phase one include Abu Shouk, Tine, Habila, and Zam Zam. It is the world’s second-largest international peacekeeping force with an annual budget of $1.35 billion and almost 20,000 troops. • North Darfur sets ultimatum for voluntary handover of illegal arms | Sudan Tribune | October 15, 2017 (EL- FASHER) | http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article63765 The locality of El-Fasher, North Darfur capital said next Thursday would be the last day for the voluntary handover of illegal arms before the start of the forcible collection of weapons. The commissioner of El-Fasher locality Al-Tijani Abdallah Salih Sunday told reporters that they have assigned three centres for the voluntary handover of weapons within the locality… Last August, the Sudanese government launched a six-month disarmament campaign to eliminate weapons in the conflict-affected areas in Sudan, particularly in Darfur region. The Sudanese authorities say the spread of weapons among the rival tribes in the region is one of the main causes of Darfur’s instability. However, some tribal leaders, such as Musa Hilal refuse to hand over their arms and defy the government. Observers fear that the mandatory phase of the campaign would generate armed clashes in the region between his militia and the government forces. [This will almost certainly occur, with massive spillover effects affecting humanitarian access in Darfur—ER] North Darfur state recently witnessed a recrudescence of violence and kidnapping of foreign aid workers Last week, North Darfur Governor Abdel Wahid Youssef Nahar welcomed the arrival of 10,000 elements from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in his state saying the will contribute to establishing security in the troubled state. The 10,000 militiamen are also expected to participate in the mandatory phase of the weapon collection operation. [Given the grim history of violence on the part of the RSF, this is deployment is ominous in the extreme—ER] • Policeman robbed of weapon in North Darfur attack | Radio Dabanga | October 16, 2017 | KABKABIYA | https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/policeman-robbed-of-weapon-in-north-darfur-attack A policeman sustained gunshot wounds when he was fired upon by unknown assailants as he made his way to work on in Kabkabiya locality in North Darfur state on Saturday. MEDICAL NEWS: CHOLERA • Minister to declare Sudan ‘watery diarrhoea’ free | Radio Dabanga | October 20, 2017 | EL FASHER | https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/minister-to-declare-sudan-watery-diarrhoea-free The Sudanese Minister of Health, Bahar Idris Abugarda, announced Sudan to be clear of the acute watery diarrhoea epidemic. His ministry completed all arrangements to declare Sudan free of the disease…. [More importantly, the dispatch reports: In spite of numerous independent confirmations (conducted according to WHO standards) that the disease currently ravaging Sudan is indeed cholera, the Government of Sudan and several international organisations still refuse to refer to it by this name [“Acute Watery Diarrhea”]. Doctors and affected people in Sudan, but also human rights and civil society organisations have urged the WHO to mobilise its efforts to provide patients with the necessary treatment and protection. But the apparent unwillingness of Khartoum to declare the epidemic severely affected national and international efforts to provide proper treatment and protection. Sudan’s first cases of cholera were recorded in Blue Nile state in August last year. Since then, the disease spread in eastern Sudan, and later to the Northern State and central Sudan’s El Gezira. In April, sources in White Nile state reported a rapid spread of cholera. The disease then spread to North Kordofan, and fully hit Khartoum in May. • Acute diarrhoea kills 800 in Sudan | Sudan Tribune | October 14, 2017 (KHARTOUM) | http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article63762 An Acute Watery Diarrhoea (AWD) outbreak in Sudan has killed 800 people since a year ago, according to the latest update from WHO and the Sudanese ministry of health. The Sudanese government denies a cholera epidemic and insists that it is an infection spread through contaminated food, drinking water, or person-to-person as a result of poor hygiene. According to the WHO, the Cholera is an acute diarrhoeal infection caused by ingestion of food or water that is contaminated with bacterium [Vibrio cholera]. [There is very good reason to believe that these figures significantly understate the number of cases as well as the number of fatalities; reporting of cholera cases on a systematic basis (as cases of “Acute Watery Diarrhea”) is controlled by the Khartoum regime, which has great incentive to downplay the scope of the cholera epidemic–indeed, the same incentives which have led to the refusal to use the word “cholera” and intimidation of the UN’s World Health Organization and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to refrain from using the accurate medical term for the disease—ER] “The total number of reported AWD cases across 18 states of Sudan has reached over 35,000—including 800 related deaths since August 2016,” said the UNOCHA Sudan in its latest bimonthly bulletin. OCHA further stressed that “Active transmission of AWD is ongoing” in all the country [NB: the phrase here reflects UN complicity in the refusal to name the disease, which the UN admits does exist in South Sudan, with a border of more than 1,000 miles with Sudan; there is a great deal of cross border movement—ER], in the West Kordofan and Northern states. Supporting the government point of view, the UN agency said: “the source of infection is believed to be contaminated open water sources combined with poor sanitation and hygiene practices. [The bald lie by Sudanese Minister of Health, Bahar Idris Abugarda, that Sudan is “clear of the acute watery diarrhoea epidemic,” i.e., cholera, is belied by a host of dispatches from the ground in Darfur and elsewhere in Sudan. From the past month: • Cholera still scourge in Sudan; new disease claims 12 lives in North Darfur capital | Radio Dabanga | October 5, 2017 | NYALA / SINKAT • 16 cholera dead in West Darfur camp | Radio Dabanga | October 3, 2017 | MURNEI / SINKAT • WHO urged to take leadership in addressing Sudan cholera epidemic | Radio Dabanga | September 27, 2017 | GENEVA • Cholera returns to Sudan’s Red Sea state | Radio Dabanga | September 21, 2017 | SINKAT • Dozens succumb to cholera across Darfur | Radio Dabanga | September 20, 2017 | DARFUR MALARIA [The inability of the regime to import adequate supplies of critical medicines makes this year’s especially acute outbreak of malaria extremely dangerous to Sudanese without resources; gross mismanagement of the economy and corruption on a fantastic scale have drained Sudan of the Foreign Exchange Currency necessary for critical imports of medical supplies, wheat for bread, and other staples; see highlighted passages below—ER] • Surge in malaria cases crowds West Darfur health facilities | Radio Dabanga | October 15, 2017 | SIRBA / EL GENEINA / MURNEI | https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/surge-in-malaria-cases-crowds-west-darfur-health-facilities Health facilities in West Darfur are struggling to handle a surge in Malaria cases, brought on by the rainy season. In Sirba, the hospital must accommodate patients three to a bed. The Coordinator of the Sirba camps for the displaced told Radio Dabanga that a basic school teacher and a basic schoolgirl died in Kendebe on Wednesday. He told Radio Dabanga that the spread of the disease is due to the rainy season and pointed to the rise of incidences of malaria in Kereinik, Beida, and Foro Baranga localities. People in Murnei have also complained of the outbreak and spread of malaria. • Malaria in East Darfur, Kassala: ‘More than 50 cases in hospital each day’ | Radio Dabanga | October 17, 2017 | ED DAEIN / KASSALA / DELLING | https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/malaria-in-east-darfur-kassala-more-than-50-cases-in-hospital-each-day East Darfur has seen a surge in malaria cases. The hospital in the state capital receives between 50 to 70 cases each day. On Monday, a medical source at Ed Daein Hospital told Radio Dabanga that 50 to 70 new malaria victims visit the hospital on a daily basis. “Let alone the number of malaria patients in other clinics in the state.” A doctor at the Ed Daein emergency department reported that the there are cases of normal type malaria, in addition to cases of cerebral malaria that affects the brain. “Of this type we receive between 10 to 12 cases a day.” Medicines to treat malaria have seen a significant price increase in pharmacies outside of the capital, with the price of coartem reaching SDG75 ($11.15),while the price of injections against malaria from SDG70 to SDG90 ($13.40). Doctors in West Darfur have reported a surge in the number of malaria patients starting September, crowding health facilities. Kassala In eastern Sudan, the Ministry of Health of Kassala has recognised the spread of malaria and typhoid fevers in the state, and denied the prevalence of dengue fever. South Kordofan Medical sources in Tima in the northern part of Delling locality, South Kordofan, announced that more cases of malaria have appeared, especially among children. Speaking to Radio Tamazuj on Thursday, an aid worker in Tima said that there are frequent complaints from locals about the growing spread of malaria among residents, amid an acute shortage of medicines. Kucho Shaine Abajo, director of a local charity organisation working on peace building in the Nuba Mountains region, confirmed to the station that there are no health services in the area. One of the victims of Khartoum’s military assault on Kalma camp last month; when the camps are dismantled, as Khartoum has repeatedly promised it will undertake as soon as possible, these people will be without the protection of UNAMID or even the minimal safety in numbers that camps provide _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 SUDAN Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

Happy half-way through the semester! Dropping you a note from the middle of my 2-day long "Fall Break" to remind you about our Lobby Weekend coming up on November 12 and 13. The conference will take place at Impact Hub DC in Washington D.C. and will start on Sunday with a day of educational panels and activities (read: fun!). We'll teach you all you need to know to take action on the behalf of groups facing atrocities in Burma and Yemen and break down President Trump's recent refugee quota so that you're prepared to speak about it in your meetings on the Hill. We'll also prep you to advocate for the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act & teach you how to design an advocacy campaign in your home community. We'll practice constituent meetings in advance of our Lobby Day on the Hill. On Monday, we'll all attend meetings in our home Senators’ and Representatives’ offices to advocate for our priorities as students interested in atrocity crime prevention and conflict resolution. In a nutshell, you'll get to learn about some of the most pressing ongoing conflicts in the world, design your own campaign and action strategy, and have face-to-face interactions with staffers working on these issues on the Hill. Have I mentioned STAND members are also **really cool** and **really nice** and **really fun**? Registration details can be found here and our Penny Pinching Guide to D.C. (if you, like me, are on a #budget) can be found here. See you in 24 days! As always, Sav - Savannah Wooten Student Director University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill '18 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 STAND

Horrific accounts of rape and other forms of sexual violence have been widely reported. © UNFPA Bangladesh/Naymuzzaman Prince “My sister was killed after gang rape in front of me, and they threw hot water on my body,” Fatima*, 30, told a case worker at a UNFPA-supported women-friendly space in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. Almost 600,000 Rohingya refugees have crossed the border since 25 August, escaping brutal violence amid the escalating crisis in Myanmar’s Rahkine State. They’ve joined the 300,000 Rohingya refugees who had already fled into Bangladesh, compounding one of the fastest-growing humanitarian crises in recent times. Horrific accounts of rape and other forms of sexual violence have been widely reported among the refugees. UNFPA – the lead UN agency on addressing gender-based violence in emergencies – currently operates nine women-friendly spaces in Cox’s Bazar District, where refugee women and girls can safely receive a range of services, including referrals to health care and counselling. More than 10,000 new arrivals have been reached at these spaces, including nearly 900 reporting gender-based violence. Still, this is likely just the tip of the iceberg. “For every woman who seeks treatment or speaks out about her ordeal, many others do not because of concerns survivors have regarding safety, confidentiality, shame and stigma,” said Saba Zariv, a UNFPA expert in responding to gender-based violence. “This is what makes it challenging to come up with an accurate count of gender-based violence survivors.” “My life is a nightmare” When she started attending the women-friendly space, Fatima at first refused to speak. But after several visits, she shared her story. “I can't sleep. My life is a nightmare,” she said. “I can't bear the pain of losing my sister.” She now regularly receives support and services at the space, which she calls “shanti ghar” – a safe haven. Shelters and camps are overcrowded and lacking in privacy. Women and girls fear attack on their way to latrines and bathing points. © UNFPA Bangladesh/Naymuzzaman Prince Shakila*, too, arrived at a women-friendly space in Cox's Bazar in need of help. She had been sexually assaulted, and her husband and baby daughter were murdered in front of her. The 36-year-old received urgent medical services from UNFPA-trained health personnel. But the trauma of her experience was acute, and much more support is required. Needs are enormous The refugees’ cumulative needs are staggering. Hundreds of thousands require shelter assistance, according to the latest reports. And those living in shelters are enduring overcrowding and lack of privacy. Women and girls fear attack on their way to latrines and bathing sites. UNFPA is helping to organize community watch groups to improve the safety of displacement camps. UNFPA has also distributed more than 6,000 dignity kits with essential hygiene items such as sanitary napkins, as well as clothes and torches to help women and girls navigate at night. Safe pregnancy and childbirth are also major concerns. In response, UNFPA is supporting health centres and mobile clinics. Thirty-four UNFPA’ midwives are working in Cox’s Bazar. They have so far screened 60,000 new arrivals. They have also provided antenatal care to roughly 12,000 pregnant women, postnatal care to 1,000 women, and attended around 300 deliveries. Many of the midwives are also trained in the clinical management of rape. Much more to be done UNFPA has thousands more dignity kits in the pipeline, and 30 more midwives are will soon be deployed. There are plans to have 35 women-friendly spaces established by February. But United Nations agencies, including UNFPA, are struggling to raise the funds necessary for these and other life-saving responses. Humanitarian organizations are seeking $434 million to meet the needs of all Rohingya refugees and their host communities – an estimated 1.2 million people in total – in the months ahead. UNFPA alone needs an additional $10 million for just the next four months. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 United Nation's Population Fund

What happened?  On 14 October 2017, twin truck bombings in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, killed upwards of 300 people. Al-Shabaab, an Islamist insurgency, was almost certainly behind the attack, but has not claimed responsibility. Why did it happen?  Al-Shabaab has been fighting the government since 2007. The targets of the attack are unclear, though may have been government buildings and the base of African Union forces fighting Al-Shabaab. Why does it matter?  The attacks have united Somalis in disgust at Al-Shabaab and may shore up support for Somali President Farmajo’s government. They also illustrate the challenges he faces: not just Al-Shabaab’s resilience, but chronically weak security forces; escalating friction between the government and federal states, which the Saudi-Qatar spat has worsened; and longstanding clan disputes, all of which Al-Shabaab exploits. What should be done?  The first priority is to care for victims and cope with the attacks’ aftermath. President Farmajo and his government should also improve relations with federal states and address disputes underpinning political infighting. Cleaning up corruption in the security sector and local reconciliation remain priorities. I.Overview The devastating twin truck bombings in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu on Saturday, 14 October 2017, mark the deadliest attack in that country since the current phase of its war began in early 2007. It almost certainly was perpetrated by the Islamist insurgent movement Al-Shabaab, though there has been no claim of responsibility. The death toll most likely will exceed 300, the vast majority ordinary Somalis, including dozens of children, going about their daily business. The immediate priority is to care for victims and deal with the aftermath. Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmajo”, his government and its foreign partners should also redouble efforts to mend the divisions in Somali society and the chronic weaknesses in the security sector that make Al-Shabaab such a persistent threat. The first and deadliest bomb exploded at the Zoobe Junction in Hodan – a bustling commercial mini-district close to the Red Crescent office and ministries of education and foreign affairs (the foreign minister was grazed by flying glass and debris). Whether the principal targets were the government buildings, as some reports suggest, or a nearby military training camp recently built by the Turkish government, is unclear. A second and smaller blast, that killed twelve, occurred at Ceel Qalow near Halane, the base of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). Al-Shabaab, an insurgent group fighting to overthrow the Somali government since 2007, is the only organisation with the capability, motive and experience to pull off anything on this scale. That it has neither denied nor claimed responsibility may reflect its reluctance to take responsibility for an attack that has provoked unprecedented anger and revulsion (it similarly avoided claiming a 2009 attack on a graduation ceremony in Mogadishu) and/or its hope that rumours and conspiracy theories – most peddling the idea of security forces’ collusion – continue to sow confusion. Despite having suffered military setbacks since 2011 at the hands of AMISOM, Al-Shabaab remains resilient (see Crisis Group Commentary, “Somalia’s Al-Shabaab Down but Far from Out”, 27 June 2016). It controls tracts of rural south central Somalia and supply routes between towns, pursues a steady campaign of car bombings, assassinations and other attacks in Mogadishu and has targeted and in some cases overrun isolated AMISOM and Somali army bases. According to multiple sources, the attack at Zoobe Junction involved an ageing TM (Bedford) truck – a model formerly used by the Somali army and ubiquitous in the country – converted for civilian use as a cargo transporter and packed with explosives. It reportedly originated from the Shabelle Valley and is thought to have passed several checkpoints manned by Somali soldiers on the Afgoye-Mogadishu road. The explosives may have been concealed by cargo, and thus harder to detect without thorough screening or specialised detectors (attempts to introduce sniffer dogs at checkpoints have run aground because many Somalis view the animal as unclean under Islamic law, though such dogs are now used at the airport). It is also plausible that soldiers were bribed to allow the truck through. Although full responsibility for the horrific attacks lies with their perpetrators, a number of recent trends may have contributed to Al-Shabaab’s ability to mount an operation of this scale and should inform the response of President Farmajo’s government and its foreign partners. II.Losing Territory around Mogadishu Al-Shabaab recently recaptured several areas in the Shabelle Valley, including the town of Bariire, only 45km outside Mogadishu and on a major route to the capital. Those areas fell to the movement after government forces pulled out early this month, in protest that some had not received salaries for three months. Averting attacks in Mogadishu is ever harder when surrounding districts revert back to Al-Shabaab control or when communities, incensed by government corruption and dysfunction or by civilian deaths during counter-terrorism operations, provide the movement tacit backing. Al-Shabaab consistently plays on anger at officials’ graft – Somalia is ranked the world’s most corrupt country by Transparency International – to win support. The government’s efforts to secure Mogadishu largely involve mopping up illicit weapons, reigning in clan militias and putting up barriers on arterial roads into the city. But these measures are not enough. Corrupt, unpaid soldiers and discontented clans on the city’s peripheries enable Al-Shabaab operatives to infiltrate. The organisation’s elite Amniyat (intelligence) cells for years have been active in the city, pe netrating state security structures, gathering intelligence and assassinating government officials and informants. III.Infighting among Security Forces The Somali army and other branches of the security services have been under considerable recent strain. Rising factionalism and clan tensions triggered skirmishes in September, when a Somali army unit and elements of the newly-established Mogadishu Stabilisation Unit engaged in a firefight that left six soldiers dead. Such clashes often involve competition for control of turf, checkpoints and other sources of revenue. They undermine morale and cohesion in the security forces, erode the military’s effectiveness and make it more likely that troops or factions collude with the enemy. The defence and army chiefs recent resignations, as well as the army’s retreat from parts of the Shabelle Valley, may have been related to such problems. Until the tragic attacks, Mogadishu’s overall security this year had seen gradual if modest improvements. Assassinations and car bombings have been less frequent and deadly than in past years (of which 2016 was the deadliest) and Somali security forces have foiled several attempted vehicle-borne improvised explosive devise attacks. Better training, vehicle checks and patrols on major urban roads have almost certainly helped. But the endemic wrangles between official security forces appear to have allowed insurgents an opening to mount a major attack. IV.Political Tensions Mounting tension between Mogadishu and Somalia’s federal states has also impacted security. The rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, on one hand, and Qatar on the other, has aggravated such friction. As the Saudis and Emiratis develop direct links with federal states and undermine their relations with the federal government, tensions have grown over which side of the Gulf dispute to back. This also diverts attention from security problems in Mogadishu. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi also have stopped direct budgetary support to Somalia, affecting the federal state’s ability to pay soldiers, police and intelligence officials. Saudi Arabia in October agreed to release $50 million to the Somali government, but sources say this is a one-time donation, not a resumption of its previous budgetary support. So long as Mogadishu remains “neutral” – ie, refuses to explicitly back the Saudis and Emiratis in their dispute against Qatar – Riyadh is unlikely to resume its prior assistance. Yet, with Qatar and its ally Turkey also major donors, the Somali government is understandably reluctant to pick sides in this dispute between its partners. V.Priorities for the Government The next weeks will be crucial for President Farmajo’s government. Fury on the street at Al-Shabaab could shore up support for the government and provide momentum for efforts to overcome divisions in Somali society. But there is also a risk that the president’s opponents, especially those in the federal states, could attempt to capitalise on the crisis with the goal of ousting him and his government. Even in the weeks before the attacks, rumours of plans by regional governments to introduce a no-confidence vote in parliament were intensifying. The federal states’ formation of a caucus and issuance of a critical communiqué at the end of an 11 October meeting in Kismayo only deepened speculation. Such upheaval could easily play into the insurgents’ hands. Of course, the government must cope with the aftermath of the attacks and ensure victims receive necessary support. But it also should work quickly to improve relations with federal states and address the constitutional questions that lie at the roots of much of the political infighting, especially those related to resource sharing and devolved powers. The government has invited the federal state presidents to discuss main points of disagreement, including the Gulf crisis, over the coming weeks. This is positive and ought to be supported. Reforming and cleaning up the security sector is another imperative. Unless the Somali leadership prioritises such efforts, the significant external investment in that sector will fail. Present rates of corruption fuel insecurity. For its part, AMISOM has made significant inroads in reversing Al-Shabaab’s territorial control, but it is overstretched and struggles to fight a non-conventional war against a resilient insurgency that feeds off local conflicts and, frequently, the heavy-handed tactics of its enemies, whether African, Somali or U.S. forces. Somali forces’ inability to secure and govern areas taken, often with heavy losses, by AMISOM saps morale. Partly in an effort to force the government to prioritise security sector reform, some troop contributors now threaten to wind down operations in the next two years. While Somali forces must gradually assume more responsibility, a hasty AMISOM withdrawal would be disastrous, almost certainly ceding larger parts of the country, including main towns, to Al-Shabaab. Political divisions – between the government and federal states and among clans – pose a grave obstacle to reforms. Redoubling efforts to address such divisions, including through clan-level reconciliation, are critical in themselves but also a prerequisite for security forces’ coherence and motivation. If not built on solid political foundations, training and arming units in the Somali forces could end up aggravating instability. In this light, a bottom-up, national reconciliation process and political settlements between the government and federal member states, and among those federal states, should be a top priority. Somalia’s key partners, the European Union (EU), UK, U.S. and the African Union (AU) should continue to promote such efforts. In tandem, federal states, supported by Mogadishu, should launch grassroots initiatives to reconcile clans and make local governance more inclusive. Somalia’s Western partners could accompany this process by supporting state administrations to boost their role in intra- and inter-clan reconciliation and help reinforce local security forces. __________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Group