Executive Summary The peace process with Colombia’s largest and longest standing guerrilla group has defied its detractors and brought 11,200 ex-combatants to the cusp of civilian life, but the aftermath of war has not been safe for all. Since the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) withdrew from their rural heartlands to gather in cantonments in early 2017, rival armed actors have taken their place, waging a battle for spoils: control of isolated communities and territories, many rich in illicit business. In the Pacific cocaine hub of Tumaco, in hamlets of Chocó, or in contraband zones on the Venezuelan border, established armed groups and new insurgent breakaway factions have attacked state forces, intimidated communities and vied to become undisputed local overlords. Grassroots security is crucial to assure the success of the peace process with the FARC as it shifts from a UN-monitored weapons handover to deeper structural reforms of politics and society. Efforts to combat remaining armed outfits are essential, but in so doing the government must not alienate the population and exacerbate poverty in ways that would aggravate the conditions that propel these groups’ growth. Most of these armed factions now cluster in coastal and border areas. Around 1,000 FARC dissidents, who disown the peace deal for various reasons, are de facto rulers of disparate territories, several of them dependent on the drug trade. Colombia’s second main guerrilla force, the National Liberation Army (ELN), has brokered a temporary ceasefire with the government despite looking to conquer new territories, especially along the Pacific coast. The Gaitanista Self-defence Force, currently the largest neo-paramilitary group in the country, combines a vertical military hierarchy centred in the country’s north west with a web of subcontracted local gangs. It is now the country’s leading drug trafficking organisation. Thriving illicit businesses – booming coca plantations, illegal gold mines, extortion rackets and contraband – account for the survival and expansion of many of these groups. But economic interests alone do not explain their support within some communities. By resolving disputes and defending illicit livelihoods from law enforcement, these groups have crafted a rudimentary, authoritarian form of local political leadership. The Colombian state has responded through a nationwide “Victory Plan”, deploying 80,000 soldiers and police officers to occupy vacated FARC territory. Yet even if security forces could seize all disputed territory, coercion alone cannot establish bonds of trust between the state and local citizens; instead, they need to be persuaded that there is a better alternative to the summary justice and social discipline meted out by illegal groups. The next phase of reforms under the peace accord aims precisely at building such trust between state and citizenry. It includes a more plural democratic system, reintegration of ex-FARC fighters, justice for conflict victims and a coca substitution program. But its implementation faces myriad difficulties. Comprehensive reintegration plans are on hold. Voluntary coca substitution, one of the accord’s flagship programs, will require a long-term commitment from the state and far more international political and financial backing. Corruption debilitates the government’s campaign against armed groups, and must be countered by stronger and more independent agencies operating within and outside the military and police. Urgent consideration also should be given to the design of new judicial approaches that might encourage other armed groups to lay down their weapons and follow the FARC’s path to peace. The initial accord’s defeat in a 2016 plebiscite demonstrated the public’s mistrust of the peace process, raising the risk that the 2018 elections could bring a government to power that is intent on rewriting or gutting the agreement. Implementation of the accord is threatened both by an opposition that believes it pandered to FARC guerrillas, and by armed factions that regard the deal either as a fraud or an opportunity to expand. The combination of local armed activity and divisive national politics could decisively weaken public support for the accord unless the results of the peace process defy expectations once again. For that to happen, the government must aim its sights at both local insecurity and the broader weaknesses of local governance that underpin it. Recommendations To improve the security situation in Colombia and wrest territorial control from other armed groups: To the government of Colombia: Increase permanent presence of police and army in prioritised isolated hamlets, using the army as a stop-gap force in clearly identified areas that police cannot reach until later, but with specific timelines for handover to police. Increase navy control along key rivers and oceanic deltas, especially along the Pacific coast, creating a new “river force” in the region with members from the Infantry Marine shifted away from land forces. Strengthen local justice by both providing economic incentives to and improving training for conciliators, evaluating police mediation for possible future use in conflict-affected areas, and expanding systems of local justice. Continue crop substitution efforts, prioritising prompt payments and coordination with larger development efforts, especially the Territorial Development Plans (PDETs) for post-conflict rural areas. Allow members of organised armed groups and FARC dissidents to demobilise and take part in individual reintegration programs. Pass a law on judicial negotiations with organised armed groups that includes lowering sentences in exchange for the fulfilment of truth and reparations commitments, provision of information on illegal economies and handover of illegally obtained assets. To the FARC: Continue efforts to bring dissident fronts back into the peace process, offering access to protection measures and inclusion in the reincorporation process while also providing information to the authorities regarding dissidents who reject these offers. To the government and the FARC: Accelerate design and implementation of reincorporation projects for FARC fighters in cantonments, with differentiated gender, rank and ethnic approaches. To the government and the ELN: Extend ceasefire agreement to last until after Congressional elections in March 2018. To the international community: Continue funding key monitoring organisations such as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Organization of American States’ Mission to Support the Peace Process and humanitarian bodies; and explore avenues to fund coca substitution efforts. To the UN mission: Improve coordination and information sharing among various state agencies charged with implementing security measures. Bogotá/Brussels, 19 October 2017 I.Introduction The Colombian government is suffering the backlash of successfully ending decades of war with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). With the signing of the peace agreement in November 2016, FARC fighters moved to 26 cantonments and in June 2017 handed over their weapons. While this has improved security in some conflict-affected regions, it has allowed armed groups in others to fill the void created by the FARC’s withdrawal, seizing the opportunity to reap illicit revenues and assert local political authority. This makes implementing the peace accords even more challenging since their success depends on tangible improvements in security. Colombia as a whole is experiencing its lowest homicide rates since the 1970s; in the areas most deeply affected by conflict, security conditions also improved during 2016. However, murder rates and forced displacement in these areas have risen again in 2017 (see Appendix D). Also, about 51 local social leaders were killed in the first half of the year, up from 26 during the same period in 2016. Dissident FARC groups have established territorial control in some areas and are seeking to do so in others. Despite ongoing peace talks, the country’s remaining guerrilla force, the National Liberation Army (ELN), has increased violent attacks in its historic theatres of operation, while expanding elsewhere. Different organised crime groups are active across Colombia, and have established control over illicit economic activities while looking to infiltrate local politics. The government has not been idle. It has begun to implement its “Victory” and “Safe Communities” plans, under the aegis of the army and police respectively. It plans to strengthen the rural police to protect post-conflict communities. It has also started to carry out strategies to “stabilise” priority territories, improve local justice and replace illegal with legal crops and other licit industries. These efforts, though, have had limited effect in most conflict-affected areas. Political polarisation, meanwhile, continues to impinge on the peace process. Opposition leaders focus on the accord’s perceived failings and allegedly leftist ideology, while government officials downplay evidence of new security threats. This is reminiscent of what happened following the paramilitary demobilisation a decade ago, when the government failed to adequately recognise the emergence of new “criminal groups”, or bacrim. What is now Colombia’s largest neo-paramilitary organisation, the Gaitanistas, was born during that period. This report examines security challenges in the Colombian periphery, strategies designed to confront them and how the international community could help cement the peace. It focuses primarily on FARC dissidents, the ELN and key drug trafficking organisations, which have gained local territorial control by offering dispute resolution mechanisms, providing a semblance of protection for local people and preserving local illegal economies. In some cases, civilians – trapped between clashing armed groups – are being exposed to alarming levels of violence. In-depth fieldwork was carried out in Tumaco, Guaviare, Chocó, Norte de Santander and Putumayo, including more than 100 interviews with community leaders, local authorities, members of the international community, government and the Catholic Church officials, members of FARC dissident groups, and members of the FARC currently taking part in the peace process. Additional research in Bogotá included interviews with experts on security, justice and the drug trade. Ten meetings were held in communities to discuss coca crop substitution, local justice mechanisms, perceptions of the state and what would be necessary to improve those perceptions. Senior Analyst for Colombia Kyle Johnson and Latin America Program Director Ivan Briscoe travel to the field to discuss the implementation of the peace agreement with locals.CRISIS GROUP II.Armed Groups at the Grassroots Armed groups with varying levels of internal organisation, military capacity, economic resources and political capital currently lay claim to parts of rural Colombia. Three stand out for their size and the threats they pose to peace: dissidents from the FARC, the ELN, and organised criminal groups. The Colombian government divides criminal groups into three sub-categories: those that meet the standards set by International Humanitarian Law (IHL) as parties to an internal armed conflict; organised crime groups, which have important roles in illegal economies but do not control territory; and common criminals. Those considered parties to the armed conflict are Colombia’s leading neo-paramilitary group, the Gaitanista Self-defence Forces of Colombia , the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) and the Puntilleros. Each of these groups has different goals, but they share common methods for imposing territorial control, offering protection, resolving disputes among residents and preserving local illegal economies. They compete with a state perceived as distant and indifferent for the control of physically isolated regions, border areas and key rivers, which are seen as the highways of Colombia’s periphery. A.FARC Dissident Groups At least nine FARC dissident groups continue to carry out violent attacks, refusing to assemble in the 26 cantonments and hand over their weapons.Their numbers are estimated to range from 800 to 1,000 and they operate across the country, principally in the departments of Nariño, Cauca, Caquetá, Guaviare, Vaupés, Guainía and Meta. While differing considerably in size, origin and military muscle, they share four traits: they represent only a sub-set of their original FARC units (to date no complete front has left the FARC); they all are involved in illegal economic activities; they seek to consolidate territorial control; and they operate in areas where they were active during the armed conflict, often expanding outward. The motivations of these dissidents are difficult to establish, though evidence points to a variety of shifting interests. Remnants of the First Front in Guaviare are deeply involved in the cocaine trade, but also defend their activities by pointing to alleged flaws in the peace process: “the dialogues in Havana only look to demobilise the guerrillas …. These agreements do not represent real changes”. Gentil Duarte, commander of the Seventh Front in Meta, argued that the government could not be trusted to honour its commitments. The United Guerrillas of the Pacific (GUP, in Spanish) in Nariño, have an interest in controlling the drug trade, though they also seek to ensure a level of public order in the communities they dominate. Both the dissidents and the communities where they operate depend on criminal revenues. In Guaviare and Meta, First and Seventh Front dissidents attack soldiers and police to protect the coca trade, actions that locals regard as protection for their livelihood from what they consider an insensitive state. In this way, the dissidents are simply continuing to operate as they did before the peace agreement: fighting coca eradication efforts, resolving disputes, controlling trafficking corridors, carrying out targeted attacks on security forces and generally ensuring local public order. For example, fighters with the dissident Seventh Front act both as political bosses and as a local economic power. Their leader, Gentil Duarte, still receives residents who want him to resolve problems in their communities. Elsewhere his group demands exorbitant extortion payments. Dissidents are also taking advantage of the support base they built during the conflict. The First Front has expanded from its traditional strongholds in Guaviare toward the regional capital, San José del Guaviare, into south-east Meta and parts of Vichada and Caquetá. Seventh Front dissidents remain in their pre-accord areas of operations, however, as do the GUP in Nariño, the 40th front in Meta, and dissidents in Cauca and Putumayo. Despite their origins, many dissident groups are more abusive than their FARC predecessors as they compete among themselves, sometimes brutalising local communities to maintain control. In the city of Tumaco, a cocaine trafficking hub on the Pacific coast, two groups of dissident FARC militia fighters vied for control, leading to an increase in murders in the first six months of 2017. FARC breakaway commanders sowed so much terror in the rural hamlet of Pital de la Costa, on the Pacific coast of Nariño, that they lost control of the town, which is now under control of the navy, itself accused by the local population of tolerating the presence of a local neo-paramilitary outfit. Tensions have grown in Guaviare over the First Front’s recent selective killings of civilians. The dissidents undermine the peace process both nationally and locally. Opposition leaders maintain that their existence proves the guerrillas never truly handed in their weapons or gave up their illicit assets, but instead use the breakaway fronts to pursue an armed campaign and criminal activity. These arguments are likely to intensify as elections approach in 2018. Their presence also undermines implementation of the peace agreement, which can only prosper under stable security conditions. Ongoing insecurity would deprive peripheral populations of any peace dividend while perversely confirming dissident claims that the state never intended to fulfil its promises to rural Colombians. Insecurity also strengthens the appeal of these groups. The murders of 23 FARC members or relatives since the signing of the peace agreement may push some to join dissident forces out of fear or anger. Frustration at the slow progress of the peace agreement, especially the lack of a reincorporation program or opportunities for mid-level commanders to move up within the FARC, is alleged to have prompted Cadete, an important FARC commander, into joining the dissidents in September 2017. Since the start of the year, originally independent dissident factions have begun to unite, and will probably continue to do so in the near future in response to the central government’s captures or killings of dissident leaders, especially in Guaviare, Nariño and Caquetá. The 62nd and Fourteenth Fronts are now part of the Seventh. In Nariño, the GUP includes four different dissident groups created in July 2016. The First Front includes fighters from the First, Sixteenth and Acacio Medina fronts, as well as individual deserters from numerous other units. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that the largest dissidents have united yet. First, Seventh and 40th Front dissident groups, all of which operate in eastern Colombia, do not represent a single structure led by Gentil Duarte, although members from these groups did meet in June 2017 to discuss coordination around certain matters. The FARC leadership has tried to maintain some contact with dissidents to convince them to return to the peace process. Alexander Mojoso, who led a dissident group in Caquetá, demobilised in March 2017 and was accepted back into the FARC in April. B.The ELN: Between Peace and War Even while negotiating with the Colombian government in Quito, the National Liberation Army or ELN has solidified its control of traditional strongholds and expanded into new areas. Since the FARC’s demobilisation in early 2017, the 1,800-strong ELN has surfaced in areas where its previous presence had been negligible, such as northern Chocó, northern Cauca, the Pacific coast of Nariño, Buenaventura and southern Córdoba. It also has strengthened its control in territories formerly shared with the FARC, such as Arauca, Bajo Cauca Antioqueño and southern Chocó. Since 2016, it has carried out attacks in 23 more municipalities than it did between 2012 and 2014; the armed forces have also carried out operations against the ELN in more municipalities than before. The ELN killed sixteen members of the armed forces or police in the first eight months of 2017. The ELN remains ideologically committed to fighting against what it calls a repressive oligarchy that responds to foreign masters and multinational companies at the expense of poor rural communities. The group, whose membership has included Catholic priests, most notably Camilo Torres and former leader Manuel Pérez, retains an affinity for liberation theology and opposes the commercial exploitation of natural resources, especially oil production and large-scale mining. ELN sabotage of oil pipelines has caused major environmental damage over the past three decades. Incapable of amassing large contingents, it sends small bands to carry out most operations, but occasionally groups of ten to 25 fighters attack government forces or other armed groups. The National Liberation Army (ELN) looks to create “parallel political power” structures to compete with the state in areas where it has long operated, such as Arauca department on the Venezuelan border, where it applies its own justice, controls economic activity, and seeks to steer communities toward its political ideology. The group also believes in a strategy of local armed resistance, where winning the war is no longer the goal. Resisting suffices to justify its existence, the ELN argues. Increasingly, the ELN acts as a federation of regional fighting units responding to general guidelines from the group’s leadership. Each regional war front commander enjoys substantial decision-making autonomy and the national leadership seeks majority support when making key decisions. Decisions imposed from above are not the norm in the ELN, which partly explains its reluctance to unilaterally halt kidnappings and the variable yet deepening involvement of certain units in drug trafficking, something the group used to prohibit. Regional autonomy also means some units may reject the terms of a negotiated peace. Different ELN units also exercise different levels of violence against the civilian population, despite claims to offer protection. Each regional commander acts according to strategic decisions based on his or her perception of the local military, political and economic context, as well as relationships with members of the central command. The ELN’s Western War Front in Chocó department, which is engaged in a bitter conflict for territory and resources with the neo-paramilitary Gaitanistas, has abused the civilian population by planting landmines and forcibly recruiting children. This front is also close to a member of the ELN central command known as Pablito, who reportedly opposes the peace process, and is seen as more economically motivated and lacking in ELN “identity”. Pablito also retains influence over the Eastern War Front, which he previously commanded. This front currently is carrying out an assassination campaign in Arauca against those accused of petty crimes or collaborating with the armed forces. But the ELN acts differently elsewhere. Despite the presence of Gaitanistas in southern Bolívar department, ELN units there engage in very little violence. The Darío Ramírez Castro War Front, close to both Gabino, the ELN leader, and Pablo Beltrán, its chief negotiator in Quito, is noticeably less violent toward the civilian population than other ELN units, despite facing a fierce military offensive. This front has not recently increased the use of landmines nor does it carry out economically motivated kidnappings, though it is still accused of forced recruitment. The ELN is more active in drug trafficking than in previous years, especially in Nariño, Chocó, Cauca and Catatumbo. While it previously taxed and purchased coca paste, the discovery and destruction of cocaine laboratories in ELN territory suggests the group is increasingly connected to trafficking networks for the more valuable, fully refined drug. This enhanced role has led to clashes with other armed groups, especially in Chocó and Nariño. C.Organised Armed Groups The Colombian government has identified three “organised armed groups”, which it argues qualify as parties to an internal armed conflict under international standards: the Gaitanistas, EPL and Puntilleros. On this basis, the government assumes the legal right to target these groups with lethal force under the laws governing the conduct of war. 1.The Gaitanistas Founded in the Urabá region of Antioquia department in 2006, the Gaitanistas have expanded along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, and to a lesser extent into the eastern plains. It is by far the largest of the three armed groups, claiming some 8,000 members, though the government estimates there are about 2,000. More independent assessments put the figure at between 3,000 and 3,500, including subcontracted gang members. Gaitanistas fall into two categories: full-time fighters and subcontracted criminals. The armed, uniformed combatants operate in rural areas, such as Urabá, southern Córdoba, Bajo Cauca Antioqueño, Chocó and southern Bolívar, where they seek territorial control, and are organised in blocs and fronts led by regional and front commanders. The subcontractors are members of local gangs who are hired by regional commanders and coordinators, allowing the organisation to gain indirect influence over territory. They operate in Nariño, Antioquia, and along the Atlantic coast and the Venezuelan border. The organisation has a central high command, made up of regional commanders, and a political wing. Beneath the leadership stands a vertical hierarchy with various levels of control, including squadrons, sections, groups, companies, fronts and blocs. This hierarchy has allowed the Gaitanistas to survive and expand despite the loss of key leaders, such as its founder Don Mario who was captured in 2009, and his replacement Giovanni, killed in 2012, as well as withstand some internal divisions in Antioquia. The group claims it was “obliged” to take up arms given the “poorly done peace process”, in reference to the paramilitary demobilisation slightly more than ten years ago, and argues that it defends its territory from the ELN. The Gaitanistas also state they enjoy “legitimacy and political representation”, a claim that seems true in parts of north-west Colombia. But in areas where the Gaitanistas compete with other armed groups, such as the ELN in Chocó or the GUP in Nariño, violence against civilians is common. The group has killed sixteen police officers so far this year, while the government claims the group is behind many recent killings of social leaders, although the evidence for this is not categorical. The Gaitanistas are mainly interested in criminal rackets, principally drug trafficking, illegal gold mining and extortion. The group transports cocaine along the Atlantic coast and charges other traffickers for permission to cross areas under its control. It has also started to buy coca paste in a possible bid to dominate the whole of the drug trade in parts of the north west. Gaitanistas profit from criminal and informal mining in areas such as Bajo Cauca Antioqueño, Córdoba and Chocó, where they manage mines directly, demand fees from local minors or demand extortion payments from those who use backhoes to search for gold. More broadly, they extort large sums from local businesses and farms. 2.The EPL The second organised armed group identified by the government, the Libardo Mora Toro Front of the EPL, with about 200 fighters, operates in Catatumbo, on the border with Venezuela. Since 2016 the EPL has expanded out of its historical communities into areas formerly controlled by the FARC, such as parts of Tibú, El Tarra, Sardinata, Teorama, and Abrego, in Norte de Santander province, where it has announced its presence through pamphlets, attacks against state forces, and violence against civilians. The EPL has ratcheted up control over the local population, including prohibiting road travel at night, increased surveillance in urban areas, threats and selective killings. Its leader for years was Victor Ramón Navarro, also known as Megateo, an enigmatic figure who, besides organising the drug trade in Catatumbo, built a sizeable civilian following. Since Megateo was killed in October 2015, the group has suffered the loss of two other top leaders. According to police intelligence, two leaders are now fighting for control, though local observers believe the group maintains its internal cohesion. The EPL is also likely incorporating FARC deserters, who are generally more disciplined than its own fighters. Views differ as to whether the EPL is a guerrilla group, as locals in Catatumbo believe, or an organised crime syndicate, as the government contends. The group has some popular support, which it has tried to strengthen by arguing that, unlike the FARC and ELN, the EPL will not “betray” the people by handing themselves in to the government. Some communities in Catatumbo respect the EPL as the only force to have fought paramilitary groups in the early 2000s.The Marxist-Leninist Colombian Communist Party claims the EPL as its armed wing, and the latter still distributes the party’s newsletter. The group also compels farmers to grow coca rather than take part in crop substitution programs, which has helped it gain support from coca producers while also demonstrating its stakes in the coca trade. III.The Lure of Illicit Economies The ability of Colombia’s armed groups to profit from criminal businesses has helped them survive a long asymmetrical conflict with state forces. As the FARC withdraws from its revenue-generating activities, various armed groups are vying to take its place, competing for control of drug production, illegal mining, contraband and extortion both in the interior and along the country’s weak borders, especially with Venezuela. In several areas, this competition has resulted in rising violence. Local communities that depend on illegal activities for their precarious livelihoods often see these armed groups as defending them from government forces. This relationship of exploitation and protection gives local armed actors considerable social support and political power. A.Drugs Colombian coca cultivation and cocaine production have grown sharply since 2013. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) detected 146,000 hectares of coca crops in 2016, up from 48,000 hectares in 2013 (see Appendix F); the U.S. reports that these crops reached 188,000 hectares, up from 80,500 hectares.Much of this growth is explained by a reduction in eradication, perverse incentives created by the peace agreement, and increases in farm productivity. The government is now under intense domestic and international pressure to bring coca production down fast. Under point four of the peace agreement, the FARC withdrew from illegal drug trafficking. The guerrilla group had been directly or indirectly involved in the coca paste trade since at least the 1980s, participating in its purchase and trafficking, and regulating or taxing third parties. In some parts of Colombia, the FARC also was involved in cocaine trafficking. The effects of this withdrawal vary across regions. In Putumayo, where according to UN estimates 25,000 hectares of the crop were grown in 2016, the illicit market has undergone drastic changes. The FARC purchased coca paste and leaves directly while also charging taxes on transactions by other buyers. It also trafficked in coca, working with a local crime outfit known as the Constru. Now the Constru and a newer group, Los Comuneros, have moved into rural areas to take over the trade, though with limited success so far. FARC militia members were still buying coca paste in some towns in early 2017, while new buyers from outside the region have been killed by unknown perpetrators, according to local sources. In Guaviare and Meta, dissidents have increased their involvement in and control over the drug trade, whereas in Cauca the ELN has taken over most of the trade. Contrary to much public and political opinion in Colombia and elsewhere, there is no direct, linear relationship between the volume of coca crops and the levels of violence suffered in any region. Where only one armed group currently has hegemonic control, violence against civilians tends to be low: this is the case under the rule of FARC dissidents in Meta. At the other extreme, Chocó, perhaps Colombia’s most violent region, is devoid of coca crops though it is home to numerous trafficking routes. However, where there is competition among various armed groups for control of territory used by the drug trade, along with the formation of new alliances between traffickers and armed groups, there are spikes in violence. A major reconfiguration of power has been underway in the municipality of Tumaco, a Pacific coast port and narcotics trafficking hub. FARC structures formerly taxed the drug trade while working with large-scale traffickers to move the product to international markets. The FARC’s old role is being filled by the GUP, enabling the drug trade to continue without major impediment. The Gaitanistas, through a local group led until recently by a figure called Cusumbo, have also expanded along the coast, leading to a three-way fight between the Gaitanistas, the GUP and ELN. In Catatumbo, the threat of violence is latent as the EPL and ELN currently continue to cooperate in the drug trade, though the former remains largely in control of cocaine trafficking in alliance with armed groups on the other side of the Venezuelan border. Yet this cooperation is straining due to EPL expansion into ELN territories. In some areas where FARC guerrillas were strongest, their withdrawal caused a temporary hiatus in business and a drop in prices. In others, the EPL moved in quickly to buy coca paste, paying farmers immediately in cash. B.Criminal Mining Illegal mining, mainly of gold, is another basic source of revenue for armed groups. Early evidence suggests homicides are higher in illegal gold mining areas, probably due to disputes among armed actors in regions once controlled by the FARC. About 60 percent of the mines using heavy machinery to dredge river beds for gold had no license in 2014, according to the UNODC. Armed groups profit from illegal mining in various ways. Perhaps the most common is by forcing mine operators and miners to pay for permission to pan for gold or dredge it up from the river bed using heavy machinery. They also take a percentage of the gold produced by large-scale miners. Some armed groups directly invest in mining operations, import gold or buy and sell it through third parties. The territorial control exercised by illegal armed groups offers miners protection against government raids in return, although somewhat ineffectively since these operations have risen in number since 2014. Furthermore, both armed groups and drug traffickers use illegally mined gold to launder money. Small-scale, artisanal miners can sell gold without proving it came from a licensed mine, making its real origins hard to detect. By producing or buying gold, an internationally traded commodity that is difficult to trace, drug traffickers and other criminals can turn illicit money into legal assets. C.Contraband The threadbare state presence on Colombia’s borders has allowed contraband to flourish since at least the 1850s. Historic smuggling routes later would be used by marijuana and cocaine traffickers. The economic asymmetries between Colombia and its neighbours, above all Venezuela, create incentives for illegal trafficking and contraband, making borders a magnet for expansionary armed groups. The border with Venezuela is the most problematic. In August, Colombian authorities estimated that about 1,000 Venezuelans emigrated each day across the official border crossing near Cúcuta. The porous 2,200km-long frontier, much of it over rugged terrain, also has some 200 informal crossing points, many located in territories controlled by illegal armed groups. Coca paste and cocaine flow easily across the border, reportedly aided by corrupt officials on both sides. Venezuela’s expulsion of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration in 2005 (by the late President Hugo Chávez) and the government’s indifference to armed actors along the Colombian border are said to make it especially attractive to traffickers seeking to send drugs abroad. Gasoline costs pennies per gallon in Venezuela, but is worth USD$2-$3 per gallon in Colombia. Smuggled gasoline is sold in plain sight along the highway in border regions. Those participating range from individuals seeking to make a living to transnational criminal organisations. In 2013, the Colombian government estimated that one million gallons of gasoline crossed the border every day. Corruption in both countries allows the trade to continue, though authorities are also reluctant to fight a business that has become so important to the population living along the border. Arms trafficking is also big business along the border. The FARC, ELN, EPL and organised crime groups have obtained weapons from Venezuela for years. Demand for weapons remains high as the EPL expands in north-eastern Colombia the ELN fortifies its military might to strengthen its leverage in peace negotiations. Between August and November 2016, Colombian authorities seized almost 500 weapons along the border. The border between Colombia and Ecuador is another hive of illicit activity. With hundreds of informal border crossings, movement from one side to the other is fluid. Illegal armed groups in the region, such as La Constru and Los Comuneros, cross the border along the San Miguel river with relative ease. Coca paste from the regions of Nariño and Putumayo, which together accounted for almost half of all Colombia’s coca crops in 2016, is often transformed into cocaine in Ecuador and then trafficked to Central America. Ecuador has long been an important drug transit country; Mexican cartels since 2012 have increased their participation, working both with Colombians and Ecuadorians to ship cocaine north. IV.Security Policy and State Presence Colombia must consolidate security gains and thwart the expansion of armed groups to show a doubting public that the accord has been a success, and to build the conditions for lasting peace in its countryside. The Colombian government has tried before to extend its reach into the long-neglected periphery, however. In the late 1980s, the government launched a National Rehabilitation Plan to integrate the “poorest communities and strata of society”. And in 2006, then Defence Minister Juan Manuel Santos and his deputy Sergio Jaramillo embarked on what they called “Territorial Consolidation Plans”. Current approaches are essentially the same as those in previous plans, with one main difference. The peace process with the FARC should (in theory) leave most territories open to an enhanced military and police presence, which in turn will allow the government to strengthen civilian institutions. Local economic development efforts, formally known as Territorial Development Plans (PDETs), should also help buttress state authority. Two sets of obstacles now stand in the way of these initiatives. First, the Colombian state needs to consolidate swiftly the rural presence of the various central institutions created to implement the peace process, above all in the field of security, reintegration of former fighters, rural development, coca substitution and local justice. The fragmentation of these bodies, and the slow progress of peace-related legislation through Congress, have frustrated implementation of the accord on the ground. Second, even though a military and police presence are required to expand state authority in the short term, they risk provoking resentment among local populations further down the road. How security agencies relate to these communities – and whether the state can provide the services that armed groups purport to provide, above all protection, maintaining local economies and offering local dispute resolution – will determine the effectiveness of these latest efforts to bring public authority to its periphery. A.Confronting Security Threats Extending coercive control over conflict-affected territories is a central tenet of government strategy. The Defence Ministry’s budget has increased at a time of fiscal austerity because of the need to consolidate peace and security and fight organised crime with “all of the state forces’ capacities”. The main strategy, which the military calls its “Victory Plan”, involves sending 65,000 soldiers and 15,000 police officers to 160 priority municipalities. Planning began two years before the peace accord was signed to ensure the state would be the first armed force to move into territories vacated by the FARC. The government publicly calls the strategy a success, but admits that in some places implementation has not been as “quick” as expected. Independent verification of the plan’s results is difficult. Some priority municipalities formerly under FARC control, including those in southern Tolima, Huila and parts of Caquetá, have not suffered incursions by new or different armed groups. In most, however, other armed groups have strengthened or expanded. In many conflict-affected rural areas, it is still rare to see military or security forces. Army officers in private concede progress is slow. Colombian and international officials offer multiple explanations for these mixed results. One is corruption: military officers allegedly accept bribes to allow illicit businesses to function and turn a blind eye to certain armed groups. Some senior officers maintain the military has not captured armed actors for fear criminally complicit local judges will free them, or that they themselves could face legal proceedings for alleged abuses or use of excessive force should they take strong action. In addition, the army has been trained to mobilise, hit a specific target and leave, rather than establish a permanent presence.Finally, the army and police have dedicated most of their personnel to protecting areas around the 26 cantonment sites, remaining static to avoid incidents during the ceasefire with the FARC. Some regional commanders were reportedly concerned that other areas were still under clandestine FARC armed control, making them reluctant to go on the offensive due to the possible political and human costs. The navy’s role in extending state authority is also critical. At present, it is focusing on strengthening its presence along rivers. A priority for the navy should be control over the rivers and deltas feeding into the Pacific Ocean, which could be achieved using existing marine forces focused on land operations in western Colombia, and equipping them with a coast guard unit. Both the army and the navy nevertheless have mixed records of convincing war-weary communities that they can protect their interests. Information from various parts of the country suggests military efforts to win over locals have faltered, and that the armed forces still see many communities as “guerrilla towns”. In Chocó, for example, indigenous leaders have been detained for “rebellion” but were later released for lack of evidence. Indigenous communities there accuse state forces of working with the Gaitanistas in certain regions and have demanded the army and navy not enter their territory. Greater police presence in rural areas is also essential to consolidate grassroots security. The Defence Ministry plans to strengthen the rural police force known as the DICAR (Dirección de Carabineros y Seguridad Rural), which has roughly 10,000 members but lacks sufficient personnel and infrastructure to cover the entire countryside. The ministry is now focusing on basing more rural officers in urban centres and near former FARC cantonments. Police intend to recruit 50,000 new members over the next decade, but will not be able to cover all key territories immediately. In the meantime, the army will have to act as a temporary stopgap in rural areas, with clear timelines for handing over control to the police. In addition, large-scale police-led operations, with military participation, have captured or killed criminal leaders, especially in Urabá. An elite police unit created by the peace agreement is now operating in Buenaventura and Tumaco. But removing leaders does not necessarily affect a criminal group’s power or wealth, as subordinates have quickly taken over organisations with strong vertical hierarchies, such as the Gaitanistas or the EPL. Given that the drug trade still has huge economic incentives for those involved, and makes use of wealthy clandestine investors to fund drug runs, dismantling an armed group tends to produce only an ephemeral reduction in drug trafficking. Plans to strengthen the police, meanwhile, could be impeded by financial constraints and limited political commitment. The current national budget would only enable the rural police to build one station per year until 2018.In the short term, the Defence Ministry budget might need to remain comparatively high to reinforce security in the periphery and increase buy-in from mid-level military officials who have misgivings about the peace process. Extending the state’s military and security presence, whether through the Victory Plan or other police or naval initiatives, will also require addressing alleged official collusion with criminal actors and building trust with communities. Sources in Tumaco, for example, claimed the navy was linked to drug trafficking; in March 2017, fifteen employees of the attorney general’s office were arrested for suspected connections with drug traffickers in Tumaco. Tackling corruption will require continued high-level political pressure and oversight to avoid creating perverse incentives to abuse power or obtain false results, for example by detaining people without hard evidence of connections to illicit activity. The current approach of strengthening anti-corruption bodies that are part of the same armed or police forces whose wrongdoing they are meant to fight raises the risk of collusion between investigators and the targets of investigation. Oversight by independent anti-corruption bodies and civil society organisations is essential in such cases. B.Reintegration and Justice Coercion by itself is not sufficient. Other initiatives are needed to integrate former combatants back into civilian life, curb further recruitment, and generate long-term alternatives to crime and violence. The peace agreement with the FARC emphasises the “reincorporation” program to help former combatants adapt to civilian life, which began in August 2017 after the group handed over its weapons. The newly minted Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN), formerly the Colombian Reintegration Agency, is overseeing the process. Although the agency has built a solid reputation for reintegrating individual ex-combatants, including paramilitary members and FARC deserters, the current process poses a tougher test. Many former FARC combatants, now clustered in cantonments, want to remain in these isolated regions to engage in collective enterprises, especially farming, despite appalling infrastructure, limited access to markets, and the presence of illegal businesses. It will be difficult in this context to make the reincorporation program economically sustainable. Differences between the FARC and the government over whether such projects are viable have severely hindered progress. The National Reincorporation Committee, created by the peace agreement and which includes FARC and government representatives, has not been able to date to design a general FARC reincorporation plan. The naming of María Lorena Gutiérrez, a close Santos ally, to coordinate the committee may give it more impetus. But it will be hard to overcome differences between the guerrillas, who are politically committed to cooperative projects, and government officials, who remain highly sceptical. Unless they reach to an agreement, reincorporation efforts could remain limited to ad hoc development and education projects, including literacy training, and the payment of monthly benefits. Keeping ex-FARC fighters in their former cantonments to preserve the cohesion necessary for collective reintegration will be a challenge in these circumstances. Mid-level commanders, with experience in controlling territory and trafficking drugs, as well as certain rank-and-file FARC members, could abandon the organisation entirely. Some frustrated FARC members have reportedly already left cantonments in the wake of delays in framing the reincorporation plan. Many will be tempted to join the remaining FARC dissidents, the ELN or the EPL unless ex-fighters can look forward to an alternative livelihood. Differential approaches based on gender, rank and ethnicity could help make reincorporation more attractive, given the FARC’s internal makeup. Furthermore, FARC leaders should continue trying to convince dissidents to rejoin the peace process, while providing the state with information on those who resist the offer. Similar plans to demobilise Colombia’s other armed groups are also essential. The Gaitanista leader, Otoniel, recently stated that his forces would be willing to surrender to the judicial system, while demanding some guarantees of leniency. But the process is far from simple. It is also not clear how much of the organisation Otoniel controls, given internal divisions and the Gaitanistas’ use of both uniformed fighters and subcontracted gangs. The process would also need to be complemented by a strategy to ensure the Gaitanistas’ territory and illegal activities are not captured by other armed actors. To speed the process, the Colombian government should fast track the passage of a law detailing what such armed actors can expect if they turn themselves into the justice system. Since the Gaitanistas are considered party to an internal armed conflict, commitments similar to those used in transitional and restorative justice processes would be appropriate, such as reduced prison sentences in exchange for handing over illicitly obtained assets, information on the drug trade and a commitment to truth-telling about and reparations for the group’s victims. None of these would mean giving the Gaitanistas political status. The case of the EPL is different. Given its political ideology and local reputation as a guerrilla organisation, the force is unlikely to submit to Colombia’s judicial system. Second-generation disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) schemes, such as weapons for development, should be considered. An offer to the EPL to disarm, tell the truth, face reduced judicial punishment and contribute to reparations for victims, in exchange for economic and political development initiatives in Catatumbo, would put pressure on the group to prove it is not just a drug trafficking organisation. The government would also avoid direct political negotiations; it is adamant that it will not carry out a peace process like that with the FARC with either the EPL or Gaitanistas. As a general rule, the government should base such strategies on the identity of each armed group, the territory where it operates, its relationship with local communities and internal cohesion. Focusing on armed groups’ identity and territorial footprint would allow the government to offer enticements tailored to each group, such as specific initiatives in areas where that group operates. Understanding how these groups interact with communities can strengthen plans by ensuring they fill any potential void in local economic and political power. Finally, ensuring plans are adapted to each group’s level of internal cohesion can help set more realistic expectations regarding potential security gains from a submission to justice initiative. C.Taking on Illegal Economies Colombia’s fight against illegal economies is integral to its stability. The success or failure of efforts to combat both coca production and illegal mining, therefore, will have major security implications. In principle, both should enable local populations to shift from illegal activities protected by non-state armed actors to legal work and increased dependence on the state. 1.Crop substitution The Colombian government intends to substitute legal crops for 50,000 hectares of coca this year. Under close scrutiny from the political opposition and the U.S. government, which has threatened to decertify Colombia for failing to combat drug supply, the government also has promised to forcibly eradicate another 50,000 hectares. In August 2017, speaking alongside U.S. Vice President Mike Pence, President Santos stated that 27,000 hectares had been forcibly eradicated since January and 12,000 hectares removed through voluntary crop substitution. The crop substitution program offers farmers who grow coca, marijuana or poppy two-year voluntary agreements. Signatories will receive around $12,000 for immediate needs as well as technical support for long-term farming projects and short-term initiatives if they uproot their illegal crops between the first and second stipend payments. Officials are pushing to increase the number of families who receive payments to reach the goals for coca reduction before the end of 2017. But the program faces several hurdles. First, there is a mismatch between the short timeline for coca reduction and the longer timeline needed for rural reform. The peace accord stipulates that the success of the two-year coca substitution program partially depends on a ten-to-fifteen-year reform plan aimed at transforming Colombia’s rural economy, especially initiatives to improve infrastructure, assure market access and provide better public services. Dissatisfied farmers could return to coca cultivation before these changes materialise. The government elected in 2018 may face frustrated former coca growers and respond by choosing to simply starve the substitution program financially and politically. Second, implementing the program has generated high tensions in coca growing areas. Poor coordination between forced eradication and substitution efforts has led to conflicts between state forces, who claim to be eradicating industrial-size crops not eligible for substitution programs, and communities claiming the crops belong to small-scale growers who have expressed an interest in taking part in crop substitution. In one ominous recent incident in rural Tumaco, security forces were reported to have killed between six and fourteen coca growers and wounded dozens more during eradication efforts. There are still no clear criteria to distinguish between the two sorts of coca crops, although a government committee involving various state agencies has been working on the issue. Third, coca eradication in areas under the control of armed groups could strengthen them politically. Forcible removal would corroborate their anti-government discourse, encouraging coca farmers to seek their protection. In Meta and Guaviare, where the dissident First and Seventh Fronts operate, some coca growers whose crops have been destroyed or are under threat of eradication have displayed precisely this reaction. Armed groups also have pressured local leaders to oppose crop substitution, sometimes threatening reprisals. In Catatumbo and Tumaco, for example, armed groups have menaced whole communities. The FARC, meanwhile, is using its role as co-sponsor of the program to carry out patronage politics, promising crop substitution benefits in exchange for joining its favoured local organisations. Finally, financial constraints could limit the program. The government estimates that 170,000 families may sign substitution agreements, entailing an outlay of some $2 billion over two years. Very little of that money is available under current budgets. Nor has the international community provided financial support, either because this is not regarded as a priority or because of legal restrictions on giving money to farmers who still have coca, or concerns that resources could end up in the hands of the FARC. Colombia’s success in seizing a record amount of cocaine in 2016 should at least help persuade the international community, above all the U.S., to show patience in allowing for the coca substitution program to generate lasting effects in rural zones. In particular, donors should look for ways to fund technical support projects that support post-conflict development goals in rural areas; this would allow them to avoid contributing to direct payments for former coca growers. Despite these challenges, crop substitution is progressing. As of August, some 3,500 families had received their first monthly stipend, and the government is looking to lift these numbers rapidly. Additional measures, such as providing land titles for coca farmers, could help change the way farmers view their property and place in society. But to achieve these goals, the government as a whole needs to make a firm and lasting commitment to goals beyond immediate crop reduction – including broader rural reform – and to secure further international support in the process. 2.Illegal mining The fight against illegal mining poses a different set of problems. Led by the rural police force, DICAR, and its illegal mining unit, which includes 450 people, the campaign depends on cooperation by other government bodies, including the army’s Anti-illegal Mining Brigade. Civilian authorities must be present whenever the police destroy illegal mining machinery. There are various proposals to grant authorities wider powers to charge and penalise those taking part in criminal mining, either directly or by, for example, renting land for such purposes. Statistics show that police are making more arrests related to illegal mining and destroying more machinery. But there is a flip side: communities that depend on illegal mines could be further estranged from the state, turning to armed groups for protection. To avoid this, the government should accelerate the current process to register and formalise small-scale miners, which would protect them from state actions against criminal mining and undermine illegal actors’ ability to use informal miners as a conduit for money laundering. Also, local authorities are responsible for taking certain punitive actions against illegal mining. However, in many cases they do not have the resources or the political will to do so, often due to corruption. To force regional and local authorities’ hands, the Constitutional Court recently ordered the government to define its strategy against illegal gold mining in Chocó; it calls on different government institutions to create a “plan to give regional entities sufficient tools, in terms of institutional capacity, financial resources and personnel” to fight illegal mining. If the Chocó plan shows results, it should be studied and adjusted for application elsewhere. D.Responding to Local Social Demands Local dispute resolution is one of the most effective ways for Colombia’s armed groups to gain community support and legitimacy. All the groups studied here resolve disputes in territories under their control, though generally with a highly authoritarian style of justice. To win local legitimacy, the state needs to offer or improve its own mechanisms. Local access to state judicial mechanisms is insufficient and in some areas non-existent. The public prosecutor has offices in only 453 municipalities (out of 1,101) in 2014; most are in urban centres that rural inhabitants find hard to reach. Alternatives to the court system are needed, and models already exist in some places. In roughly 90 municipalities, 108 Justice Houses bring together national and local bodies as well as formal and informal judicial actors to offer services and information. These Justice Houses promote “alternative mechanisms of conflict resolution”, though their efforts are undermined by uncertain local funding and lack of coordination between the national-level institutions involved. A process known as “conciliation” is also used throughout Colombia, allowing parties to resolve small problems without a formal judicial process. Once an agreement is reached, trained conciliators write a legally binding act with commitments from each side. Police inspectors also can mediate, are often respected by locals, and can take punitive measures in certain cases. Some agreements reached through conciliation suffer from enforcement problems in conflict-affected areas because no state body can swiftly coerce the parties into compliance. If a person does not fulfil his or her commitments, the case can be sent to the formal judicial system where enforcement tends to be exceptionally slow. While the police have begun a mediation program in twelve big cities, their ability to convince people to fulfil their commitments might not extend to conflict-affected areas, where the force is often lacking in legitimacy. In Tibú, Norte de Santander, only one of the 92 community leaders trained as conciliators in 2005 is still working, and relies on income from other jobs to make ends meet. This situation is repeated throughout much of Colombia’s rural periphery. Better training and economic incentives, such as scholarships, stipends for transportation or improvements in housing, could help. But for this to happen, government officials will have to start treating conciliators not merely as a cost-saving device that can reduce pressure on the formal justice system, but as a model for satisfying communities’ demands where the state is weak. E.Negotiations with the ELN Negotiations between the government and ELN in Quito have been mired in mutual mistrust, ongoing violence, and disunity within the guerrilla movement. The agenda remains undefined, despite pressure to reach an agreement before the 2018 elections since there is no guarantee the next president will continue the talks. The negotiations nevertheless received a boost when both sides reached agreement on a temporary ceasefire, which began on 1 October and will last until 9 January, and will be verified by the second UN mission. The ELN peace talks face the same challenges as those with the FARC: they need to achieve sufficient progress to make the political cost of changing course in 2018 prohibitively high. This means reducing the conflict’s intensity and ending violations of international humanitarian law. The ceasefire, although temporary, is an important step in this direction; now agreement is needed on point 5.f regarding “humanitarian actions and dynamics”, which looks to reduce conflict intensity and its effect on victims in the longer run. Extending the ceasefire and making progress on humanitarian issues before upcoming Congressional elections in March 2018 could provide political incentives to continue the talks, and help persuade the public to support further negotiations. The ceasefire will be most difficult to guarantee in areas where the ELN is in open conflict with other armed groups, such as Chocó and Nariño. Violent ELN reactions to other armed actors may not violate the ceasefire, but will stir mistrust toward the ELN in Colombia’s urban population. The ELN leadership states it will carry out internal discussions to explain the ceasefire, but its federal structure and high degree of internal autonomy may limit the effect of these talks. Critically, the Western War Front, based in Chocó, should honour its commitment to send a representative to the negotiating table during ceasefire implementation; this should increase the likelihood that it will remain in compliance despite conflict with the Gaitanistas. V.A Role for the International Community Only recently has the international community begun to focus on addressing the security challenges still facing Colombia, though international organisations have already played a key role in the peace process. The UN mission is especially important, serving as the central political actor charged with verifying and monitoring progress on security in post-conflict communities. While the UN mission risks being exposed to internal and external political pressure over its reporting on security conditions, it must continue to provide the Colombian government and public with a candid, evidence-based assessment of realities on the ground. The 2003-2006 paramilitary demobilisation demonstrated that international organisations such as the Mission to Support the Peace Process of the Organisation of American States (MAPP-OEA) and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights also can help promote frank debate on these issues and pressure the government to recognise the true scale of security threats, exactly as they did a decade ago when they publicly reported the presence and growth of armed groups that arose in the wake of the demobilisation. Thanks to their robust presence in Colombia’s outlying regions, these organisations can do the same again, while also supporting the UN mission through information sharing. The international community is strikingly absent in the area of crop substitution. While the issue is politically and legally troublesome for some international actors, all agree that high levels of coca production hinder the consolidation of peace. Additionally, since the early 2000s, many international actors have been pushing for a development-based approach to coca cultivation, which is essentially what the peace agreement and crop substitution program delineate. As discussed, the program suffers from underfunding and would benefit from financial assistance to help coca growers engage in productive projects, receive technical support and implement household food security projects. VI.Conclusion Colombia has made progress on security since the FARC gathered its fighters in camps and began handing over its weapons. Yet these improvements are neither uniform nor stable. In some conflict-affected regions little has changed. Political polarisation over the merits of the peace deal, coupled with pressure on the government to broadcast consistently positive results, has undermined impartial coverage of emerging security threats within Colombian society and inside the government. Yet the evidence now shows that FARC dissident groups, organised crime groups of differing scales and the ELN still control territory or are looking to do so in the face of selective state resistance. Still, the state response is taking shape. The Defence Ministry has crafted sophisticated plans to occupy territory vacated by the FARC and combat organised crime, even though they are progressing more slowly than anticipated or hoped for. Accelerating implementation of these plans, and adapting them to the specific challenges posed by each territory and armed group, will help ensure that other parts of the peace accord, notably coca crop substitution, rural development programs and reincorporation of FARC fighters, can be undertaken in more peaceful conditions. This is vital to ensure that the government to be elected in 2018 continues to honour the agreement. Security, though, is not only a product of state coercion. The Colombian government is in a fight for territorial control, especially over border regions and river deltas. It finds itself continually hampered by the huge monetary incentives of illegal economic activity and the difficulties of curbing corruption. Armed groups flourish wherever they can claim to provide protection and justice for communities, and they tend to find their most willing partners and subjects in areas where locals fear the state and depend on illicit economic activity for their livelihoods. As the government looks to expand its control, it will need to focus not just on the use of coercion, but on providing protection for communities, substituting illicit economies with alternative means of development and resolving local disputes. Failure to meet any of these undertakings will open the door for illegal armed groups. The deployment of military and police units in post-conflict territories provides a window of opportunity that the state should not squande. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Group

Undocumented Migration from the Northern Triangle of Central America Flows of undocumented migrants from Central America, through Mexico and toward the U.S. have given rise to a humanitarian emergency, albeit one that at present is largely treated by Washington as a national security menace and a justification for tougher border control. Originally driven by economic hardship, this northbound migration owes its intensity and longevity to multiple causes that make controlling or reducing it extremely hard. Mass victimisation of vulnerable migrants in transit has become the norm and could well be aggravated by Washington’s growing anti-immigration agenda. In this context, the European Union (EU) should adapt its current strategies in Central America to promote a more comprehensive approach to the protection of migrants. Humanitarian impact The flow of migrants from the countries of the Northern Triangle of Central America (NTCA) – El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras – to the U.S. has become as much a flight from life-endangering violence as a search for economic opportunity. Surveys of migrants and refugees carried out by Doctors Without Borders (MSF) in Mexico showed 39.2 per cent cite attacks or threats to themselves or their families, extortion or forced recruitment into gangs as the main reasons for their flight. Once on their journey north, undocumented migrants must chart a perilous path between the dual threats of law enforcement and criminal groups. Crisis Group’s 2016 report (Easy Prey: Criminal Violence and Central American Migration, 28 July 2016) describes how toughened law enforcement has diverted undocumented migration into more costly, circuitous and dangerous channels, where criminal gangs and corrupt officials benefit from policies that lead desperate people to pay increasing sums to avoid detention. In the process, undocumented migrants are exposed to kidnappings, human trafficking, enforced disappearances, sexual violence, robbery and extortion. The most egregious cases include the 2010 and 2011 San Fernando massacres, in the northern Mexican state of Tamaulipas, in which 265 migrants, most of them Central American, were killed by the Zetas drug trafficking cartel. Stuck in a legal limbo, migrants are doubly victimised: fearful of authorities, they are highly unlikely to report the crimes they suffer or gain access to medical care should they need it. MSF has described undocumented migrants’ plight as “comparable to the conditions in conflict zones”. Two thirds of migrants reported being victims of violence during their transit toward the U.S.; nearly one third of women surveyed said they had been sexually abused during the journey. Among the migrants exposed to these risks are some of the most vulnerable groups in Central American society. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that asylum requests by unaccompanied NTCA minors in Mexico increased 416 per cent from 2013 to 2016. U.S. policies Fear of undocumented migration to the U.S. increasingly dominates political debate in that country. Although former President Obama stepped up border controls and continued a vigorous deportation policy – returning over five million people in total – his administration also welcomed legal migrants, acknowledged the humanitarian crisis posed by unaccompanied children arriving from Central America, and extended support to refugees around the world. President Trump, by contrast, was elected in part on a platform of clamping down on immigration, and some of his most influential supporters have made clear that their continued backing depends on implementation of stringent restrictive measures. Undocumented entry into the U.S. already had become more difficult. 100,000 undocumented migrants made it into the U.S in 2016, compared to over 600,000 in 2006, according to a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) report. Deepening Mexican collaboration with U.S. efforts to staunch the flow of Central Americans accounts for much of this reduction, and is likely to persist as Mexico strives to mitigate bilateral frictions with the Trump administration. In response to the 2014 crisis presented by migrant children arriving at the U.S. border, Mexican authorities boosted checkpoints, detentions and deportations of Northern Triangle nationals on its southern border with Guatemala. Mexico now deports more Central Americans than the U.S. (see graph). Mexican Secretariat of Government http://politicamigratoria.gob.mx/es_mx/SEGOB/Boletines_Estadisticos and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE) https://www.ice.gov/statistics None of this has lessened the Trump administration’s determination to curb recent arrivals from Mexico and the Northern Triangle. The Temporary Protected Status (TPS) – which benefits some 200,000 migrants who came to the U.S. following hurricane Mitch in Honduras in 1998 and an earthquake in El Salvador in 2001 – is at risk of termination in 2018. Likewise, on 5 September, President Trump rescinded the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, created by the Obama administration to defer deportation and provide work permits to 800,000 undocumented migrants who entered the U.S. as minors. President Trump suggested that Congress should use the six-month wind-down period before the DACA work permits expire to create a legislative framework for the program. But, under pressure from some of the administration’s staunchest supporters, the White House has made clear that it will only support such legislation if Congress also enacts tough new immigration measures. How the legislative process will play out is not yet clear. Although overall deportations by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE) are reported to have fallen slightly – they reached 211,068 as of 9 September 2017, three weeks before the end of the fiscal year, as compared to 240,255 in FY 2016 – arrests of undocumented migrants have risen by 43 per cent since Trump took office, as compared to the same period the year before. Most strikingly, the number of migrants without a criminal record being detained has increased threefold since 2016. Mexican and Central American responses An increase in deportations – driven by arrests of undocumented migrants and expiry of the TPS and DACA – would place further strains on troubled social conditions in the Northern Triangle. Although the region has relatively robust legal frameworks to protect refugees, with Mexico at the forefront of international refugee and migrant protection efforts, they frequently are unable to provide what they preach. For instance, asylum in Mexico can be a prolonged process. Out of 8,788 requests, only 5,954 were resolved in 2016, 3,076 of which were granted. Asylum-seekers must file requests within 30 days of crossing the border, and are kept in detention if arrested before applying. Many give up because of the detention centers’ cramped and insalubrious conditions, or because they have no right to work while their requests are being considered. Overall, the NTCA countries are not adequately equipped to receive new deportees. El Salvador’s preparations to receive them are almost entirely restricted to the monitoring of suspected gang activities. The National Assembly’s security commission has agreed on measures to track returnees accused of being street-gang members: over 500 suspected gang members have been sent back so far in 2017 to El Salvador, where high rates of violent crime and reported cases of extrajudicial execution of gang members complicate prospects of a return to peaceful civilian life. Capacities to provide legal counsel, shelter, social reintegration or even transportation for returnees across the Northern Triangle are scant. Proposed legislation in Guatemala to strengthen the state’s readiness to protect migrants has stalled because of that country’s political crisis. In Honduras, the number of departing refugees and arriving deportees is the highest in the NTCA, but its government is concentrating on the president’s re-election campaign and on activating its own protocols against deported gang members. Recommendations to the European Union and its member states The more U.S. concerns about security and the economic effects of mass migration continue to drive a restrictive immigration policy, the more important it will be – from both a humanitarian and regional stability perspective – for the U.S. and its partners to help generate economic opportunities, better governance and broader social protection south of the U.S. border. That was the logic behind the “Alliance for Prosperity”, which the Obama administration established jointly with the NTCA governments and pursuant to which some $1.3 billion have been allocated to Central America in the 2017 and 2018 federal budgets. Today, that logic is at risk. A June 2017 high-level summit in Miami on prosperity and security in the NTCA, heralded a far stronger emphasis on security issues at the expense of recognition of the humanitarian emergency related to undocumented migration. While the European Union (EU)’s role is limited due to the U.S.’s overwhelming influence in the region, it nonetheless could strengthen humanitarian responses and press for a more informed, integral approach to the protection of migrants, especially women and children. Migration forms a significant part of the EU’s cooperation with Latin America. The 2015 EU-CELAC Action Plan as well as the 2014-2020 Multiannual Indicative Regional Programme for Latin America include migration management and the protection of migrant rights as action points. So far, the EU’s initiatives in this field have focused on Latin America as a whole. However, the evolving migration dynamics in the NTCA call for a more targeted response. The EU should adapt its priorities in Central America and promote migration policies that focus on the protection and integration of migrants. The EU should support Mexican and Northern Triangle authorities in their efforts to strengthen oversight of security agencies and state institutions working on migrant issues. Technical assistance and capacity-building support for the under-resourced Central American consulates situated on the migrant route through Mexico would help ensure better protection for those in transit. The initiative MIgration EU eXpertise (MIEUX), a peer-to-peer experts’ facility that supports partner countries to better manage migration through tailor-made assistance, can be a useful platform and starting point for the exchange of expertise and best practices. The EU could also boost technical support to expand refugee processing of NTCA nationals in neighbouring countries (mainly Belize and Costa Rica), particularly minors, and ensure regional governments and NGOs provide adequate shelter to those awaiting decisions. Financial and logistical support to neighbouring countries such as Panama and Costa Rica, as well as to other Latin American countries that agree to take a share of refugees, would help cushion the impact of increasingly forbidding U.S. immigration policies. All in all, the EU should continue to pursue an approach to Central America grounded in supporting community violence prevention, institutional reform and poverty alleviation. Perhaps most urgently, it should assist the three Northern Triangle countries in developing new programs to help them reintegrate deportees, including through initiatives to help them access health care, training, employment and psychosocial support when necessary. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): A Dangerous Stalemate Political uncertainty and instability in the DRC are growing as the one-sided implementation of the 31 December 2016 (Saint Sylvester) agreement has deepened the gulf between a newly invigorated regime and a weakened opposition and civil society. The Electoral Commission (CENI) still has not published a new calendar for polls promised by the end of the year, although, speaking at the UN General Assembly on 23 September, President Joseph Kabila indicated it was imminent. Recent comments by the CENI president indicate that the elections would not be organised before 2019. In this context of political uncertainty, opposition and civil society are renewing efforts to bring people out onto the streets; whether they can do so is unclear, as is whether they could control any protests that do occur. The grave socio-economic crisis, harsh repression by security forces and lack of confidence in political elites make for a potentially explosive cocktail of resentment and frustration. Beyond urban centres, violence is escalating in many provinces, adding to concerns for regional stability. An increasingly confident regime that lacks a clear strategy Few, if any, of the 31 December agreement’s signatories sincerely believed in the agreement’s stipulation that elections would be held by the end of 2017. The government has since controlled implementation of that deal and interpreted its provisions to suit its agenda of delay. Meanwhile, domestic pressure to stick to the timeline has diminished, in particular following the February death of Etienne Tshisekedi, the charismatic opposition leader, and in March, after the Catholic Church withdrew from its direct mediation role. For its part, Kabila’s government has engaged in a two-pronged strategy: violent repression and closure of political space at home on the one hand, intensive regional diplomacy to defuse U.S. and European Union (EU) pressure on the other. The latter track appears to have been particularly successful. African and especially Southern African powers now largely accept the government’s interpretation of the agreement (notably its unilateral choice of prime minister). While they have been more critical behind closed doors and acknowledge that the political manoeuvring and delay tactics increase the risk of violence, their public positioning has given the regime vital breathing space. A weakened opposition focused on Kabila leaving power Faced with the regime’s hijacking of the 31 December agreement, opposition and civil society are trying to regain the initiative. In July, Felix Tshisekedi, president of the main opposition coalition, the Rassemblement, suggested a six-month transition if the vote were not held in December, but without Kabila (whose constitutional mandate expired in 2016) retaining the presidency. In August, representatives of civil society platforms (including the youth protest movements Lucha and Filimbi as well as the “Debout Congolais” recently launched by Congolese businessman Sindika Dokolo) adopted a manifesto with a similar proposal. Moïse Katumbi, a prominent opponent in exile, added his name to this manifesto in September. It calls for non-violent actions to pressure the government, reminding the population of its duty, enshrined in Article 64, to defend the constitution against anyone seeking to exercise power by violating its provisions. It hopes such actions will force President Kabila out, with a national conference held afterwards to designate a transitional mechanism. This approach has scant chance of success. The opposition, weakened by the exile and imprisonment of several of its leaders, is riven by distrust among its factions and lacks internal cohesion. Struggling to organise street demonstrations, or control them when they do take place, its leaders appear for now to be resting their hopes on greater international (particularly Western) engagement. But the opposition faces a paradox: international actors are unlikely to take a more robust position in the absence of a credible domestic dynamic. Worrying security developments Meanwhile, several provinces – including the Kasais, Tanganyika, North and South Kivu – are experiencing violent conflict, fuelled by both local tensions and the national political stalemate. Playing the role of pompier-pyromane, the government thus far has contained the fighting while people close to the regime have simultaneously stoked unrest and used it to justify election delays. But this dangerous strategy has increased tensions with several neighbours, notably Angola, which hosts thousands of refugees from the troubled Kasai region. As one of the world’s gravest humanitarian crises, with 3.8 million internally displaced and more than 600.000 refugees, humanitarian support remains under-funded despite some EU and member states contributions, and the recent additional amounts announced this year. A recent small rebound in copper prices has allowed the government to promise better and more regular salaries as well as to ease currency depreciation pressures. But economic fundamentals remain poor. With families squeezed by rising prices and growing petty corruption, popular discontent is rising along with prospects for urban unrest. International actors need to step up support for the 31 December agreement The EU, UN, the African Union (AU), relevant sub-regional organisations and the Chinese, French, Russian and UK governments, together with the DRC government, met on 19 September on the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York. The chair’s summary of that meeting reaffirmed broad support for the Saint Sylvester agreement, despite the inevitability that its electoral timetable will now slip. This is welcome news insofar as the agreement’s core principle – the need to hold elections without amending the constitution – deserves strong support in the face of the regime’s attempts to kill it with a thousand cuts. But international actors need to turn this support into concrete action that pressures the government and electoral commission to move forward with election preparations. While the EU should offer technical electoral support, as envisaged at the New York meeting, it should denounce attempts by the DRC government to further delay the polls (including through publishing unnecessarily long timetables). It also should condemn, of course, any attempt by Kabila to change the constitution’s presidential two-term limit. International reaction to the soon-to-be-announced electoral calendar will be an initial test – if the timetable stretches too far into the future, as recent communications from the CENI indicate it may, the EU, in concert with other relevant international actors, should make this clear, stressing that elections could be held sooner and offering technical support to reach that goal while actively criticising delay tactics. Alongside this, EU and member states should continue work that supports Congolese civil society and internal voices calling for democracy and constitutionalism. Effective pressure on President Kabila to move toward elections and stick to term limits requires better international cooperation. Western powers – notably the EU and its member states – should reach out to African leaders to hear their concerns and try to iron out differences. At present, African powers tend to acquiesce in Kabila’s interpretation of the agreement and refrain from criticising (at least publicly) his efforts to remain in power, while the West has adopted a more critical stance. Disagreement thus far has revolved around how best to push Kinshasa toward elections. African leaders are hostile to Western sanctions on DRC leaders put in place over the last fifteen months. While those sanctions may have had some impact in 2016 in deterring violence and helping forge the December agreement, they increasingly have diminishing returns as Kabila’s regime uses them to portray pressure on it as a form of Western imperialism. They ought not be reinforced while efforts are made to align international views. Post-ISIS Iraq: A Gathering Storm With the military defeat of the Islamic State (ISIS) drawing near, Iraq faces dramatic new challenges. On 16 October, Iraqi federal forces marched onto Kirkuk, helped by a deal with one of the Kurdish parties, and retook the city and Kirkuk’s oil fields. The action was prompted by a referendum on Kurdish independence staged by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) on 25 September within its territory and in areas disputed with Baghdad. The “yes” vote was overwhelming, and thus held out the threat of eventual secession. In its aftermath, the government of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi saw the need to reassert Iraqi sovereignty over the disputed territories, including Kirkuk, ahead of (still unscheduled) legislative elections next year. This is because of an intra-Shiite competition that has been unfolding in Baghdad, involving military and political factions with longstanding ties to Iran that were empowered by the fight against ISIS. The Kurdish-Arab standoff and the intra-Shiite rivalry intersect and reinforce each other. The involvement of a plethora of armed groups in the fight against ISIS, alongside state agencies that respond to different chains of command, has created a hyper-militarised environment that further undermines Iraq’s already weak legal framework. Political actors jockeying for power in the post-ISIS environment may be tempted to exploit this fragmentation and to expand their leverage by pushing toward further escalation. To prevent a collapse of Iraq’s post-2003 political system, substantial reforms are required. The EU can play a key role in such an effort. While the anti-ISIS campaign operated primarily on the military level and was largely conducted in the framework of the U.S.-led coalition, the next steps involve areas where the EU has strong expertise and capacities, namely reconstruction and security sector reform. A messy governing and security framework Despite its military achievements, the anti-ISIS campaign has had the unintended effect of arming and training security forces that operate outside formal institutions in both Iraq and the Kurdistan region. Western countries’ largely unconditional military support and lack of a common and clear political roadmap for the post-ISIS period have not helped. The control that various militarised groups exercise over parts of the country challenges Baghdad’s authority and sovereignty. Without conditionality, reconstruction aid to ravaged areas may be hijacked by the militias that control them, further entrenching their rule, with adverse effects for the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and governance. Baghdad-Erbil: From standstill to standoff to violence The Kurdish independence referendum raised the Kurds’ expectations of statehood while severely damaging relations between Erbil and Baghdad. It led Baghdad to shift from a lukewarm-cooperative to an openly confrontational approach as a way to show resolve in defending Iraq’s territorial integrity. Abadi felt he could move to regain control of the disputed territories because he realised he had the support of both Iran and Turkey (an ally of the KRG until the referendum), as well as the U.S. All three were angered by Barzani’s rejection of their repeated requests that he agree to delay the referendum. The challenge now will be to return to political talks about the future of the disputed territories; settling the internal-boundary question will be critical to bringing long-term stability to these troubled areas. A blocked political system Political tensions and institutional weakness will remain endemic as long as Iraq fails to reduce corruption and refresh a leadership that has ruled since 2003. To shore up declining popular support, leaders engage in confrontational rhetoric and strategies, exacerbating ethnic and sectarian tension and inviting external interference. This stands as the largest obstacle to addressing outstanding issues, such as the conflict between Erbil and Baghdad, the Sunnis’ crisis of representation, and the broken trust in Iraq’s legal framework, institutions and formal politics. In particular among young Iraqis, this adds to the urge to either join armed groups or leave the country altogether. (See Crisis Group MENA Report N°169, Fight or Flight: The Desperate Plight of Iraq’s “Generation 2000”, 8 August 2016) An EU role in reshaping the post-ISIS period At its June 2017 Foreign Affairs Council the EU reiterated its commitment to support Iraq during the post-ISIS period. Beyond responding to the immediate humanitarian crisis, the EU should seek to tailor this support in ways that help address the underlying causes of the current political malaise, notably the corruption and dysfunction of the Baghdad government, the corruption and succession quarrel within the Kurdistan regional government, the crisis of Sunni representation, and the Baghdad-Erbil standoff. Through its upcoming EU Strategy for engagement with Iraq and subsequent action, the EU should pursue: Humanitarian and reconstruction aid as part of a political strategy: EU assistance should be guided by the overarching political goal to transform a militia-dominated environment into more effective governance by state institutions. To this end, aid and reconstruction should aim to break local communities’ security and financial dependence on the various militia leaderships that emerged from the anti-ISIS campaign. Local governance institutions linked to and funded by the central state or the Kurdistan regional government should be partners of first choice. Strengthening those institutions may also make it possible to integrate local armed factions (of Sunnis as well as minority groups) into the local police and other security forces, thus breaking Shiite militias’ monopoly over security, which has fuelled resentment and could reignite support for jihadists who are currently lying low. In the disputed territories, EU reconstruction assistance could be conditioned upon acceptance by both Erbil and Baghdad of a renewed UN-led process (see below) to resolve the questions of these territories’ status and the sharing of revenues generated from the oil extracted there. The way forward should include a return to a shared security mechanism between Erbil’s peshmerga ministry and Baghdad’s defence ministry in the most sensitive areas. Reorganisation of the security sector: In the post-ISIS phase, the EU should assist Iraq and the Kurdistan region in integrating chains of command and bringing the range of formal and informal armed groups under the purview of the Iraqi security forces and the Kurdish peshmerga ministry. Through its new Advisory Mission for security sector reform (EUAM), the EU can contribute its member states’ extensive experience in this field to enhance efforts by other international actors (NATO, UNDP) to help the federal government and Kurdistan Regional Government reorganise their respective security forces. In particular, the duties and purview of various security bodies (Counter-terrorism Forces, Iraqi Army, National Police, Kurdish peshmerga forces and Kurdish Asayesh security police), as well as the status of new outfits such as the Shiite militias, need to be defined. Leadership regeneration: Post-ISIS stabilisation also hinges on a renewal of the political leadership in Baghdad and Erbil by committing both capitals to free, fair and timely elections. Thanks to its established network in civil society organisations, the EU can encourage the participation of new political actors by engaging in leadership training for members of informal, non-violent protest movements, who have challenged the political elite in the recent past, and identify new youth-led civil society groups and volunteer organisations – even if they have emerged under the umbrella of, or enjoy ties to, the Shiite militias – and facilitate their integration into local governance institutions and established political parties. Iraq’s Territorial Integrity. The EU should use its diplomatic and economic weight to help revive negotiations between Baghdad and Erbil over the Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs) question. Settling the endemic instability in these areas is crucial to both sides regardless of the ultimate disposition of Kurdistan. Talks should be led by the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) based on its important but still unused 2009 study and proposals on that subject. To this end it should work to refocus UNAMI’s mandate (through a Security Council resolution). This is also an issue that Turkey, a support of the earlier UNAMI effort, has found of great interest and would almost certainly wish to engage Erbil on. Rohingya Crisis: A Major Threat to Myanmar Transition and Regional Stability Since Crisis Group’s warning in its February Watch List, Rakhine state’s “alarming trajectory” has deteriorated further. The views of most people in Myanmar and those of much of the international community on the crisis are diametrically opposed. Domestically, the situation is seen to stem from terrorist attacks and a legitimate security response to them; internationally, the focus is on the disproportionate military response to those attacks involving serious abuses characterised as possible crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Myanmar’s political direction in relation to the crisis has now been set and is very unlikely to be altered. Views domestically and internationally are hardening in different directions, with huge implications for domestic politics and Myanmar’s standing in the world. At the open session of the UN Security Council on 28 September, there was consensus among many members on four points: (1) ending the military operation and vigilante attacks on Rohingya; (2) giving unfettered humanitarian access to northern Rakhine state to UN agencies and their INGO partners; (3) ensuring a safe, voluntary and sustainable return of refugees from Bangladesh to their original places of origin in Myanmar; and (4) addressing the underlying problems through implementation as soon as possible of the recommendations of the Kofi Annan-led Advisory Commission, in particular the need to expedite the citizenship verification process and to ensure that those granted citizenship are able to enjoy associated rights. Failure to address the immediate humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state – through concerted efforts to end attacks and protect civilians as well as urgent humanitarian assistance to Rohingya communities still in Myanmar who are already on the move – has aggravated the crisis and triggered the departure of tens of thousands more Rohingya to Bangladesh, who have been arriving in recent days. Only the UN has the capacity to quickly deliver assistance at the required scale, and in a way that will reassure the international community that needs of all communities are being met. The main reason for this second wave of departures must also be clear: it is not a lack of food or humanitarian assistance per se, but rather restrictions and insecurity that deprive people of their normal means of survival, whether farming, fishing, foraging or trading. Likewise, failure to make significant progress on voluntary refugee returns under UN High Commissioner for Refugees (HCR) auspices, and begin to address the root causes of the crisis through implementation of the Annan commission recommendations, will leave a huge population in Bangladesh of some 700,000 people who have fled over the last year. This group of traumatised people with no hope for the future could easily be taken advantage of by militants and transnational jihadist groups for their own ends, which could create deep instability in Myanmar and the wider region. Some may attempt to cross the Andaman Sea by boat to Malaysia once the monsoon recedes in the next month or so, facilitated by people-smuggling networks, risking a repeat of the maritime migration crisis of 2015. Myanmar’s action are already aggravating the terrorist threat. On 3 September, a senior leader of al-Qaeda in Yemen called for attacks on Myanmar and its leaders in response to the treatment of the Rohingya. On 13 September, al-Qaeda appealed to its members to support the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) militancy and warned that Myanmar would face “punishment” for its “crimes”. Although ARSA issued a statement the following day stating that it had no links with “any transnational terrorist group” and “did not welcome the involvement of such groups in the conflict”, the risk of other groups manipulating the situation is significant, as is the possibility of terrorist attacks elsewhere in Myanmar from outside the country, whether directed or inspired by transnational jihadist groups. Tellingly in this regard, an Egyptian militant group named Hasm claimed responsibility for a blast at the Myanmar embassy in Cairo on 30 September. Furthermore, the crisis represents a grave threat to Myanmar’s transition. It has unleashed a wave of strong nationalist sentiment and greatly amplified and reinforced bigoted views. There is extremely strong support in the country for Suu Kyi’s position and the military’s approach. The risk is that once such narrow nationalist sentiments take hold, unopposed by the democratically-elected government, they will constrain future government responses to the crisis and set the country once again on a path to international pariah status. This will make it much more difficult for Myanmar to forge an inclusive national identity, essential for such an ethnically, linguistically and religiously diverse country. And it would hinder progress on the peace process, whose success requires national consensus on granting greater political authority and economic resources to minority communities and areas. Anti-Western sentiment, currently running high, also could be entrenched. Suu Kyi does not have the authority under the constitution to order the military to take a different approach, but through the president has the power to convene military leaders. However, her most powerful tool is her undisputed position as the person in the country enjoying the greatest political and moral authority. This gives her the power to sway public opinion, and considerable ability to influence the security forces; her speech to the nation on 12 October contained some positive signals in this regard. Efforts to shift the domestic narrative may come at a cost to both her political support and relations with the military. However, the risk of the military attempting to take complete power, or launch a coup, is very low; the military spent more than twenty years preparing the current constitutional arrangement and putting it in place, and from their perspective the transition has been much more successful than they might have expected. They would see a return to military rule as a failure of their generational project, to be avoided at all costs. Recommendations for the EU and its member states Immediate priorities remain those articulated by a number of members in the 28 September Security Council briefing: ending state and vigilante violence and village destruction; unfettered humanitarian access for the UN and INGOs; ensuring voluntary return of refugees to places of origin in line with international law; and timely implementation of the Annan commission’s recommendations. To work toward these priorities, and in light of the 16 October EU’s Foreign Affairs Council conclusions, the EU and its member states should: Continue to support strong Security Council scrutiny and action. Continue to support strong, principled multilateral and bilateral engagement with Myanmar’s civilian and military leaders in order to chart a way out of the crisis. Support efforts to ensure accountability for rights violations in northern Rakhine state. Encourage Suu Kyi to speak to the nation and make full use of her position to shift the national narrative in a more constructive direction. A return to previous forms of bilateral and EU sanctions on Myanmar in the form of travel bans and asset freezes may not be helpful in achieving concrete progress, and risks constraining future policy options as well as sending unintended signals to investors that could impact on the economy, to the detriment of ordinary Myanmar people. Turkey’s Growing Refugee Challenge – Rising Social Tensions Recent events have brought tensions between the European Union (EU) and Turkey to a head. Ankara is embittered over the stalled accession process and what it perceives as the EU’s inadequate support for Turkey’s fight against terrorism. The EU and its member states voice heightened criticism of Turkey’s human rights track record, increasingly unaccountable institutions and lack of respect for the rule of law; President Erdoğan’s pre-referendum rhetoric caused particular harm to relations with Germany and the Netherlands. In the absence of substantive accession talks, the March 2016 refugee deal now represents the main venue for dialogue and the most significant strategic thread holding the two sides together. Although Ankara complains that EU’s €3 billion pledge to support Turkey’s response to the refugee influx has been conditional and that only €883 million so far has been disbursed, and while EU representatives find the Turkish bureaucracy ill-prepared for developing projects, both sides value continued cooperation in this area. At first glance, Turkey has handled the refugee influx remarkably smoothly. The backlash caused by Turkey’s absorption of some 3.2 million Syrians, who arrived incrementally since 2011, has been far less serious than anticipated and refugee flows to the EU have substantially diminished. But the Syrian refugee issue in Turkey is far from being settled. In particular, social resentment and hostility toward Syrians has risen, notably in suburban districts of Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, which have high refugee concentrations. Violence affecting refugees and asylum seekers – which, according to the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees grew markedly in 2017 – is most prevalent in neighbourhoods offering cheap housing and low-skilled jobs: these have drawn large numbers of Syrian refugees, in turn raising housing costs and depriving host communities of job opportunities. Risks of violent outbursts are further exacerbated where ethnic differences overlap with economic tensions. This is the case in particular of Kurdish host communities, some of whose members already feel politically marginalised, resent that public institutions such as hospitals and municipalities offer Arabic translation services and are angry that the central authorities are seeking to accommodate Syrian parents’ desire for Arabic language courses in schools even as their own longstanding demands regarding the Kurdish language remain unaddressed. They also find their low-skilled informal sector jobs threatened by the influx of Syrian refugees. (The informal economy, where competition between host and refugee communities tends to take place, constitutes on average 34 per cent of the economy according to Turkish and World Bank statistics). More broadly, interaction between refugees and host communities remains extremely limited, especially among women. Syrians and Turkish citizens living in large urban areas are particularly prone to misunderstanding and conflict, lacking the affinity that tends to exist in border provinces. Turkey’s generosity toward Syrians – for example providing them with free health care and easier access to university entrance – at times gives rise to beliefs that are strongly held but inaccurate, such as that Syrians can enter university without taking an examination, or that monthly aid channelled to Syrians in need is covered by citizen taxes; these in turn inevitably fuel resentment and anger. Ankara also faces enormous problems in seeking to integrate roughly 1 million school-aged Syrian children into its already strained education system. The challenge is not only to ensure Syrian children can enrol but also to cope with host communities’ anger at the overburdening of the local school system. (According to a recent report by Education Reform Initiative, around 77,000 additional classrooms, and 70,000 new teachers are required to meet the needs of local and Syrian refugee communities). This situation is all the more serious following the government’s decision to both phase out the temporary education centres (TECs) which essentially provided a parallel Arabic-language school system for Syrians and to shut down NGO-run schools for Syrians. Integrating Syrian children into Turkish public schools is the correct policy approach in the long run, but for now it generates tensions given insufficient infrastructure and teacher capacity. The World Bank and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in particular have been working closely with Turkish authorities to build new schools and train teachers to support the transition away from the temporary education centres, but implementation has been lagging. Some schools place Syrian children into separate classrooms, thereby defeating the purpose of integrating Syrians into Turkish public schools. As 2019 local and presidential elections loom, and with the Syrian presence increasingly unpopular, opposition parties might well resort to an exclusionary discourse, calling on the state to send refugees back home. Such a political dynamic inevitably would further exacerbate tensions and fuel instability. Because the government often faults the EU for the presence of Syrians in such large number and for not doing enough to ease Turkey’s burden, rising tensions between Syrians and host communities also potentially could harm broader Turkey-EU relations. This in turn would call into question the value of the refugee deal. Both Turkish authorities and the EU should take steps to minimise this risk. For Turkey, a key is to adopt an inclusive approach, paying special attention to those segments of society most affected by the presence of Syrian refugees. The EU and its member states also have an important role to play in facilitating the integration of Syrian refugees. In planning further disbursements and considering possible additional allocations through the EU’s Facility for Refugees in Turkey, the EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian Crisis or Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, they should: Develop a roadmap for gradually shifting from humanitarian aid to local-level development, especially geared at strengthening already-existing public service capacities. The focus should be on encouraging Syrians to achieve sustainable livelihoods, although any effort along these lines should not come at the expense of humanitarian assistance, particularly to vulnerable groups. Continue to support expanding vocational training opportunities to enable both Syrian refugees and host communities to acquire skills that match labour market needs and to foster greater social cohesion, particularly in big city neighbourhoods that have been rife with tension. Expand opportunities for Syrians to learn Turkish as a foreign language. Some 70 per cent of Syrians in the country are believed not to speak Turkish; the resulting lack of interaction with host communities provides fertile ground for negative sentiments to grow. As part of the ongoing effort to integrate Syrian school-aged children into Turkish public schools, support the employment of Syrians currently teaching at TECs as “intercultural mediators” in public schools to help refugee children who have trouble keeping up and fitting in. Continue to channel resources toward bolstering school infrastructure and teaching capacities. This is key to facilitate the transition away from TECs while addressing related host community grievances. Work with Turkish authorities to more effectively dispel myths about how EU funding is channelled and convey that resources and aid are not exclusively channelled to Syrians. Consider offering support for service provision in languages other than Turkish in municipalities and public institutions that service large groups of residents with a different mother tongue. For example, this policy could be applied to localities where the number of such residents exceeds a certain percentage. This is a highly sensitive issue in Turkey, but could be addressed practically, for instance by employing a sufficient number of translators. Ensure that field-based, EU-funded NGOs and their community centres focus on ways to encourage positive interaction between Syrian and host community groups of diverse backgrounds. Tensions, already high, could rise further still, especially if Syrian refugees’ return prospects do not rise. With Turkish citizens’ youth unemployment having reached 20 per cent, and with relatively low economic growth rates predicted for next year, social pressures are likely to increase and, with them, the risk of inter-communal confrontation. Moreover, as Syrians learn Turkish, develop more settled communities and grow more acutely aware of their relative lack of opportunity, they could become increasingly frustrated and alienated; more may also fall prey to criminal networks. That approximately 40 per cent of school-aged Syrians currently are not enrolled in school and that up to 30 per cent of Syrian adults in Turkey are illiterate raises the spectre of the emergence of a parallel society facing long-term marginalisation. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Group

Register : https://indefenseofchristians.org/idc-2017-summit/#register _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 In Defense of Christians

Religious freedom is directly related to a country’s economic growth, lasting stability and sustainable security. According to U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) Vice Chair Kristina Arriaga, for far too long, our government asserted that religion belonged in the private sphere. But recent evidence shows that religious persecution increases instability, human rights abuses, and provides a breeding ground for violent extremism. In testimony on Friday to the National Security Subcommittee of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Ms. Arriaga said: “World events repeatedly have demonstrated that religion remains central to people, and our nation and its diplomats cannot have productive dialogues and satisfactory relations or outcomes if we ignore, downplay, or dismiss religion’s pivotal role.” Ms. Arriaga encouraged Congress to do all it can through legislation to promote religious freedom abroad, in part by tying U.S. funding and aid to a country’s progress in protecting religious liberties. Sadly, also last week, the Trump Administration lifted economic sanctions against Sudan, a move the 21st Century Wilberforce Initiative and other religious freedom advocates fought against through a letter-writing campaign and other advocacy avenues. It is a blow that many do not take lightly, but can’t take personally. To persist in our work, we must never give up hope. In her testimony, Ms. Arriaga quoted Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.: “Human progress is neither automatic nor inevitable ... Every step toward the goal of justice requires sacrifice, suffering, and struggle; the tireless exertions and passionate concern of dedicated individuals.” As individuals, we must use our voices, our time and our resources to make a difference. No one can do everything, but everyone can do something. In November, there are a few opportunities we want to highlight for you so your mosque, synagogue, church, temple or community group can begin planning your part. We hope you will join us in one of these ways: PRAY November 5, International Day of Prayer Pray for those who suffer persecution for their faith. Of the world’s three major monotheistic religions alone, Christians suffer persecution in 128 countries; Muslims suffer persecution in 125 countries; and Jews suffer persecution in 78 countries. Go to www.SpeakFreedomTexas.org and click on “Church Toolkit” to access resources dedicated to the International Day of Prayer. Open Doors also has prayer resources at: http://prayerevent.opendoorsusa.org ACT November 22, #REDWEDNESDAY 21CWI is collaborating with UK-based Aid to the Church in Need, which has organized a week of events with the focus on #RedWednesday, a day when you can show your solidarity with the persecuted through hosting various events, lighting your buildings in red, and wearing red. We are asking the Trump Administration and Congress to participate. For more information, go to: https://acnuk.org/campaign/redwednesday/ GIVE November 28, Giving Tuesday The Tuesday after the U.S. Thanksgiving holiday is recognized as Giving Tuesday, when non-profits raise money for needed funds to do their work. Many supporters offer matching donations for money donated on that day. 21CWI will be raising funds on our Facebook page: 21wilberforce. As religious persecution worsens globally, and the data continue to show how vital this freedom is to economic and physical security, we must all do our parts. Christine Virgin Online Editor Take Action: Based on Ms. Arriaga’s testimony, contact your senators and representative and encourage them to vote in favor of all legislation related to religious freedom. For details, read the update on what 21CWI is tracking with our International Religious Freedom Scorecard. _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________' (c) 2017 Wilberforce Initiative

Executive Summary African and European leaders are scheduled to meet in November for the fifth triennial African Union-European Union summit at a time when relations between the two institutions have reached a turning point. Both are in transition, undergoing internal reforms that will have serious implications for their future peace and security partnership. After significant disagreements in 2016 over European Union (EU) payments to troops in the African Union (AU) mission in Somalia, there is now considerable political will on both sides to strengthen cooperation. While collaboration has improved in some areas in recent months, deep-seated frustrations over financing and each other’s perceived deficiencies remain strong. Relations are too emotional, bound up in colonial history – a breeding ground for mistrust and resentment. If the relationship is to be deepened, both sides must deal openly with disagreements. Deliberations should be less transactional, moving away from a narrow list of African demands and negotiations over what the EU will pay for. Instead, they must be more strategic, based upon clearly articulated interests. The AU has embarked on a potentially transformative process of institutional reform that, if implemented, will make it leaner and more efficient and should increase its financial self-sufficiency. However, there are significant challenges to the AU’s authority resulting from the changing nature of conflict in Africa, especially the spread of jihadist and other non-state armed groups, and the concomitant rise of ad hoc military coalitions to combat them, such as the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad basin and the G5 Sahel. These changes also bring into question the suitability and sustainability of the continent’s peace and security architecture. Designed in the 2000s, it is now under strain and in need of wholesale review. The AU needs to clearly set out its strategic priorities and define its role in peace and security, deciding whether to focus on developing and harmonising policy and maintaining political oversight or becoming an implementer of projects. It also should reassess its relations with the regional economic communities, a central element of the continent’s security architecture, clarifying which organisations should take the lead in conflict situations. With the prospect of the UK’s exit, the EU is preparing for life without one of its most influential and wealthy member states. This inevitably will impact its relations with the AU, as will renegotiation of the Cotonou Agreement, a partnership between the EU and 79 sub-Saharan Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries which expires in 2020. The African Peace Facility, the main source of EU support for the AU’s peace and security activities, is funded through the agreement’s financial instrument, the European Development Fund. The EU is one of the AU’s most significant peace and security partner; since 2004 it has provided more than €2 billion ($2.39 billion) in assistance. The question of financing is one of the areas of greatest tension between the two institutions. Their relationship is essentially that of donor and recipient but both are reluctant to characterise it as such, even though they actively, if inadvertently, perpetuate the dependency. The EU increasingly resents being treated like a “cash machine”, especially as it believes it does not receive due recognition. It wants the AU to pay its “fair share”. The AU claims to want this too. It wishes to reduce its reliance on external support and, as a result, member states have agreed to proposals for a 0.2 per cent levy on imports to the continent that could generate more than $1.2 billion per year. This is essential. If the suggested levy is not workable for some or all member states, alternative solutions must quickly be found. The vexed donor-recipient dynamic is further complicated by tensions over the legacy of European colonisation, which intensified greatly during Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s tenure as AU Commission chairperson. This has a detrimental effect on trust and confidence, prevents free and frank discussions and bars progress toward an interest-based partnership. The AU-EU summit is unlikely to be as transformational as the two institutions would wish – preparations have not progressed far enough for this. But it could still be a useful springboard for more strategic discussions and movement toward an interests-based relationship, if the following steps are implemented: Pursue a pragmatic partnership based on mutual interests:assertions about an “equal partnership” in a seriously imbalanced relationship cause unnecessary tensions, irritating some AU member states and raising unachievable expectations. The notion, while remaining an aspiration, should be de-emphasised and replaced with a more pragmatic understanding of AU and EU mutual interests and the interdependent nature of their relations. Focus on strategic and political interests: discussions of the minutiae of what the EU will or will not pay for tend to dominate AU-EU meetings at all levels. It will be hard to avoid financial matters, but the summit should focus on matters that are vital to the long-term interests of the two unions and address the issue of funding as part of a strategic examination of peace and security after Cotonou. Ideally, any future support should be predictable to enable the AU to do more medium-term planning, and flexible to permit adopting new initiatives and adapting the continental security architecture. It also should include an instrument for rapid reaction like the existing Early Response Mechanism. Support should focus on four key areas: early warning; preventive diplomacy and mediation; peace support operations; and capacity-building and non-lethal equipment for AU member states’ military and security forces. To encourage AU member states to increase their financial support, any future mechanism should be based on a matched funding system in which the EU’s contribution is proportionately linked to those made by African governments. Put migration on the agenda: another step toward a more interests-based partnership would be the inclusion of migration and mobility on the summit agenda, a highly contentious issue that AU member states are reluctant to discuss openly. The EU’s kneejerk reaction to increasing flows of irregular migration from Africa has alienated the AU, which wants Europe to increase legal migration routes and tackle root causes rather than the seal its borders. However uncomfortable, the issue should be on the table – it will permeate the meeting regardless. I.Introduction Much binds Africa and Europe together. Collectively, the EU’s 28 members are Africa’s principal trading partner, main foreign investor, chief source of remittances and largest provider of development and humanitarian assistance. The two continents are geographically close (just eight miles separate them at their nearest points) and they have a shared, if chequered, history. Security issues in one rebound on the other: for example, instability in Libya and the Sahel (in part, at least, of Europe’s own making) has contributed to rising numbers of migrants crossing the Mediterranean. Since its inception in 1957, the EU (then the European Economic Community) has had a close association with Africa, initiated by France and later supported by the UK when it joined in 1973. Over time this has developed from a narrow focus on trade and development to encompass security, governance and the rule of law. The first formalisation of relations between the AU (then the Organisation of African Unity) and the EU was the establishment of a framework for political dialogue at a summit in Cairo in April 2000. It was cemented in 2007 with the development of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) which sets out the shared values, interests and strategic objectives of the two institutions. In November, leaders representing the AU’s 55 members are scheduled to join those from the EU in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire for the fifth triennial AU-EU summit. The EU has declared 2017, which also marks the tenth anniversary of the JAES, “a defining year” for its partnership with the AU and has expressed the hope that the Abidjan meeting will “reshape and deepen” relations. The AU has yet to pronounce its expectations for the summit, but there is a sense in Addis Ababa, home to the organisation’s headquarters, that relations are ripe for reinvigoration. Relations reached a low point in 2016 with a bruising dispute over the EU’s payment of stipends to troops in AMISOM, the AU’s peacekeeping mission in Somalia, but coordination and cooperation are said to have improved in recent months. A re-evaluation of the AU-EU relationship is timely. Both unions find themselves at an institutional crossroad that will greatly impact their continued association. The AU is embarking on a potentially transformational process of reform almost as radical as the evolution from the Organisation of African Unity to the African Union in 2002. It also cautiously welcomed Morocco back into the fold at the January 2017 summit, after 33 years of self-imposed exile, and now for the very first time is a truly continental body. The EU, having weathered the worst of its existential crisis over migration, is now faced with the prospect of the UK’s exit and is preparing for life without one of its most influential and wealthy member states. These transitions come at a time of rapidly changing international politics. The geopolitical context for multilateral diplomacy is deteriorating under the influence of U.S. President Donald Trump who prefers a bilateral, transactional approach to foreign relations and is seeking to considerably reduce U.S. financial support to the UN, in particular to peacekeeping.There is uncertainty surrounding the Trump administration’s wider Africa policies, though it will maintain and likely increase the focus on counter-terrorism, particularly in the Horn of Africa and the Lake Chad basin, bringing only short-term gains in countries like Somalia and Nigeria, while causing further civilian casualties. China’s weight on the continent continues to grow. Beijing’s Africa policy has been shaped by economic interests, but its need to protect business investments has pushed it to engage in peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Mali and more particularly in South Sudan. The commercial, diplomatic and military presence of the Gulf states and Turkey in Africa, especially the Horn, is increasing but it is not yet clear whether it will undermine or bolster stability. How the two institutions adjust to these external and internal challenges will have serious ramifications for their peace and security partnership. To deepen relations, they will need to tackle deep-seated frustrations that breed mistrust and resentment. This report is based on extensive interviews with AU and EU officials and member states’ representatives in Addis Ababa, Brussels, Berlin, The Hague, Juba, London, Nairobi and Pretoria, between January and October this year. It provides a detailed analysis of the relationship between the two institutions, identifying and assessing key points of divergence, elucidating concerns and complaints, and suggesting ways to strengthen future relations by bridging the divides that currently separate them. II.Africa and Europe at a Crossroad A.The AU: Toward Greater Self-sufficiency and Efficiency To lessen AU dependence on external donors, member states have committed, in principle, to significantly increase their funding, including for peace and security activities. To ensure they get value for money, they have embarked on a potentially radical reform process that, if successful, will make the AU leaner and more efficient. 1.Financial reform In July 2015, African leaders pledged to fund 25 per cent of the AU’s budget for peace and security operations by 2020 – an acknowledgement that its over-reliance on external aid is unsustainable, compromises the AU’s ownership of its agenda and constrains its freedom of action. The strong desire by some member states for increased financial self-sufficiency can be traced back to the 2011 crisis in Libya, during which France, UK, the U.S. and their allies side-lined the AU and its road- map for a negotiated exit for Muammar Qadhafi. This sense of powerlessness was compounded as Africa, unable to act due to internal political disagreements as well as a lack of military capacity, watched French troops stem insurgencies in Mali and Central African Republic (2012 and 2013). Members agreed in July 2016 to a 0.2 per cent levy on “all eligible” goods imported to the continent, based on proposals from Donald Kaberuka, former African Development Bank president and now AU high representative for the Peace Fund. The tax has the potential to generate more than $1.2 billion per annum. This commitment has opened the door to more predictable and sustainable funding for AU-led peace support operations through UN-assessed contributions, but it must be transformed into ready money before these funds will be unlocked. So far, only Ghana and Rwanda have enacted the levy into national law. Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya and the Republic of Congo are the only other states known to have taken steps to implement it. The 0.2 per cent levy is “very controversial” among some member states. Their objections are threefold. First, the levy contravenes World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules and could harm bilateral trade relationships. The WTO and U.S. government have questioned the levy’s legality and some African states are using this as the basis for delaying implementation. The WTO objections are not insurmountable: the AU could establish a continental free trade area or push for a waiver. However, such measures would take considerable time to implement, making the originally proposed January 2018 start date unachievable and the new 2020 deadline a longshot. Second, the plan was adopted hastily during a retreat of heads of state at which no technical experts, who could have flagged potential legal hurdles, were present. This objection reflects wider concerns about the decision-making process at the AU and a worrying new trend of resorting to secluded retreats (two so far) rather than AU summit plenary sessions. Third, some member states are very uneasy about increasing spending on the AU and doubt the commission’s ability to administer additional funds. Their misgivings will be hard to overcome, but have resulted in an institutional reform process that is intended to make the organisation more efficient and cost-effective. 2.Institutional reform January’s AU summit saw the adoption of Rwandan President Paul Kagame’s radical reform agenda, developed following a request by heads of state six months earlier. Kagame’s proposals, if implemented, would reduce the AU’s focus to just four areas with continental scope: peace and security; political affairs; the establishment of a continental free trade area; and Africa’s voice and representation in global affairs. The reforms also aim to establish a clear division of labour among the AU, member states and the regional economic communities and mechanisms (RECs/RMs) – which are the building blocks of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) – in line with the AU’s principle of subsidiarity that maintains that conflict resolution is best driven by actors closest to the crisis. Part and parcel of the reform is a comprehensive overhaul of hiring procedures for AU Commission staff, a more robust, merit-based process for selecting the chairperson and competitive recruitment for the deputy chairperson and commissioners. Reform proposals have been drawn up and dropped before – the findings of a 2007 high-level panel were shelved, and a plan to transform the AU into the African Union Authority was quietly put aside following the demise of its chief proponent, Libya’s Muammar Qadhafi. However, this time could be different because three sitting heads of state – Presidents Kagame, Idriss Déby of Chad and Alpha Condé of Guinea – have been charged with driving the process. Even so, securing member states’ political support is unlikely to be straightforward. The Pan-African fervour that drove the AU’s establishment in 2002 has waned. Some heavy hitters, Nigeria, Ethiopia, South Africa and Libya (coincidentally the AU’s architects) are focused on troubles at home or in their regions. Some of the smaller countries, such as Tanzania and Zambia, historically champions of Pan-Africanism, are similarly distracted, while Kenya is disillusioned with the AU following the defeat of its candidate for commission chairperson. There is also unease about Kagame’s style. His authoritarian leadership is not winning friends, although, following member states’ complaints, he has dropped proposals that only heads of state or their deputies be allowed to participate in meetings of the Assembly, the AU’s supreme decision-making body. To succeed, Kagame needs to build a coalition of continentally minded leaders. He also needs to bring along all the AU’s constituencies, particularly the commission and the regional economic communities – which have yet to be properly consulted – and the member states, especially the current big five budget contributors (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa). Central to Kagame’s plans are Kaberuka’s financial reforms. “These measures are the nerve centre of everything else we are doing”, Kagame told AU leaders at the summit in July. “The independence and self-reliance of the African Union is an existential question for our continent”.Without significant additional member states’ financing, the AU will find it increasingly difficult to fulfil its security mandate and AU-led peace support operations will remain blocked from accessing UN-assessed contributions. Increasingly, other partners – including the EU – will be looking for more significant AU funding before committing their own resources. B.The EU: A Breakup and a Breakdown The UK’s unexpected decision to withdraw from the EU and the continuing fallout from the 2015 migration crisis have placed enormous strain on the union, for a time calling into question its very existence. Its kneejerk response to migration has imperilled its relationship with the AU and threatens to overshadow the AU-EU summit. 1.Brexit The UK’s decision to leave the EU will have serious implications for EU-AU relations. The UK provides almost 15 per cent (€4.478 billion or $5.36 billion in 2014-16) of the budget for the European Development Fund (EDF), through which the African Peace Facility, the financial mechanism for AU peace and security activities, is funded. The UK will continue to fund its own aid programs in Africa, and may even keep channelling support through EU mechanisms like the EDF. Either way, it seems unlikely that current levels of spending on the AU will be maintained. In recent years, the EU’s Africa policy has been finely counterpoised between French and UK interests. Both countries have used the EU’s financial instruments to further their own national interests in the continent.Brexit will likely result in a rebalancing away from the Horn of Africa (in particular Somalia, which has received by far the most African Peace Facility funding) to the Sahel and West Africa. This change will be driven not only by France but also by AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat – his native Chad is central to efforts to combat Boko Haram in the Lake Chad basin and jihadist groups in Mali. It already is noticeable: France was behind an EU decision in June to award €50 million ($59.8 million) to the G5 Sahel force charged with combatting terrorism and organised crime in the region. By chance, Brexit coincides with increased German interest in Africa. Partly because of the European migration crisis, Germany has recognised that instability in Africa affects its national interests and is making its engagement increasingly visible. In January 2017, the government unveiled its “Marshall Plan with Africa”, which aims to promote fair trade, increased private investment, bottom-up economic development, entrepreneurship, jobs and employment opportunities. The continent was the focus of Germany’s 2016/2017 G20 presidency, resulting in the launch of the Compact with Africa – country-specific agreements aimed at promoting private investment and increasing infrastructure provision.Germany also raised its troop ceiling for MINUSMA, the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, from 650 to 1,000, making it Berlin’s largest deployment, exceeding Afghanistan and Iraq. It remains to be seen whether Germany’s greater military and economic presence will translate into more political power in Africa – it still does not have the confidence that France and the UK exude in this arena. There seems to be little appetite to assume the UK’s mantle: “Germany is very hesitant in taking a leading role”, explained one government official. “The UK and German approaches are very different: the UK takes a military approach and Germany a civilian approach”. Germany’s more assertive foreign policy could reflect its increased economic strength within the union following the economic crisis. The recently launched Alliance for the Sahel, a joint German, French and EU initiative intended to improve coordination of development assistance to the region, could be a sign of this and an illustration of how a Franco-German partnership could be used effectively in the future. 2.Migration and terrorism Two issues – migration and terrorism, interlinked in Europe’s imagination but not in Africa’s – have brought home to the EU just how close the two continents are. They simultaneously represent one of the largest sources of tension and the greatest opportunity for cooperation between the two institutions. Terrorism is an area where the AU and the EU in theory should find common ground. “[It] has become a unifying factor for the AU and EU. It weakens African countries and has an effect on European countries in terms of refugee flows”, one AU official told Crisis Group. So far, much of the EU and its member states’ engagement has been with AU member states, not the commission, including support for the G5 Sahel force and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad basin, which are coalitions of directly affected states combatting cross-border jihadist and criminal threats in the two regions. This is largely because the AU lacks a coherent plan to combat terrorism, but also because member states are reluctant to cede sovereignty on what they see as an issue of domestic security, and because EU member states prefer to deal directly with militaries they know well (for example, France and Chad). However, the AU could play an important role, especially in terms of enforcing continental agreements and authorising and coordinating ad-hoc forces like the G5 and MNJTF. One area on which the AU and the EU do not see eye-to-eye is the intersection between terrorism and migration. There is some disquiet at persistent attempts in Europe, especially in the media, to link African migrants to increased terrorist attacks. This and other aspects of the EU’s response to migration have strained relations with the AU. In 2015, more than one million refugees and migrants fleeing war, persecution and poverty in the Middle East and Africa crossed into Europe. EU member states struggled to find an equitable means of accommodating this sudden influx of people. Deep divisions emerged, raising questions about the EU’s commitment to open borders and threatening the viability of the union itself. Its chaotic response drew unfavourable comparisons with developing countries, like Lebanon, Ethiopia and Uganda, that have long been host to millions of displaced persons. The crisis provoked a backlash against migrants and was marked by an increase in support for right-wing, anti-immigrant, anti-Islam political parties and movements across the continent, contributing to the UK’s 2016 decision to leave the EU and seriously impacting elections in France, Germany and the Netherlands. Europe has taken a two-pronged approach to African migration and what it sees as the concomitant danger of terrorism. First, through the Partnership Framework and the EU External Investment Plan, the EU is trying to address the root causes of instability, forced displacement and irregular migration. External observers have criticised deals made under the framework for offering incentives for curbing migrant flows to repressive governments, such as Sudan and Eritrea, whose own domestic policies fuel the exodus to Europe. Some EU member states also have questioned the ethics of this program. Second, in an attempt to seal its southern border, the EU and its member states have increased their military presence and counter-terrorism operations in the Sahel and Lake Chad basin, key transit points and sources of irregular African migrants. This has included providing support to the G5. This “fortress approach” coupled with ham-fisted diplomacy, epitomised by the botched Valletta Summit, has alienated Africa. Following the drowning of 800 migrants crossing from Libya in April 2015, the EU drew together leaders from both continents in Valletta, Malta, in November that year. The seeds of failure were sown before the meeting had even begun: critics said the EU had failed to consult the AU or its member states sufficiently and had cherry picked those leaders with whom it wanted to work. Despite the EU’s pledge to spend $1.9 billion on the root causes of migration through the Emergency Trust Fund, the Africans left feeling frustrated and insulted by what they saw as the EU’s “discriminatory approach” (accepting Syrians fleeing conflict but turning away Africans escaping poverty) and its attempts to bully them into automatically receiving deported migrants. The assistance offered was not nearly enough to override concerns about potential lost remittances valued at more than $32 billion per year. There is also some disappointment with the Emergency Trust Fund, especially among the regional economic communities (RECs): “It’s failed”, said one REC official. They feel the money has been spent on securing borders rather than migration’s root causes, as promised, and some regional bodies believe they have been short-changed as resources previously earmarked for their programs have been transferred to the trust fund. There is also a sense that the projects are not well-run, with contracts being awarded to EU member states’ aid agencies, some of which lack the requisite expertise or local knowledge. Some are concerned that the competition for resources is “dividing the continent” with many countries of origin believing their needs are not being met. Additionally, there is resentment regarding the amount of money made available to Africa, especially when compared to what is seen as the comparatively lucrative deal received by Turkey. African and European views on the issue are fundamentally at odds: the EU is doggedly focused on trying to prevent irregular migration whereas the AU is looking for ways to increase legal flows. These two positions need to be reconciled. The EU should concede ground on finding routes for skilled workers, which are essential given Europe’s aging population. In turn, AU member states should cooperate more on returnees; for example, there is much frustration among EU member states that Ethiopia is balking at the readmission of just 32 migrants from Europe while planning to facilitate the return of hundreds of thousands of its citizens being expelled from Saudi Arabia. The AU and the EU also should look for common ground outside the question of flows to and from Europe, for example by focusing more on the root causes of migration, something in which both institutions profess an interest. Scarred by Valletta, Africa is opposed to any serious discussion of migration at the upcoming AU-EU summit. The EU would like to have an open deliberation at the AU-EU summit, but is hesitant to put migration on the agenda. Instead, it hopes to use the central theme of “youth” to introduce the issue through the backdoor. C.Reshaping AU-EU Relations The Cotonou Agreement, a partnership between the EU and 79 countries from sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP), expires in 2020 and will be renegotiated over the next two years. Development assistance under the Cotonou Agreement is channelled through the European Development Fund. The fund also finances the African Peace Facility, the main source of EU support for the AU’s peace and security activities and its regional economic communities. It is not yet clear what shape the post-Cotonou settlement will take – neither the EU nor ACP states has defined its position – but significant change is possible and will reshape relations between the two unions. One major uncertainty is whether the ACP model will continue. Largely comprising the former colonies of France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the UK, it is considered by some to be a colonial construct. Beyond a shared history of colonialism, there is little that binds the group except climate change and some aspects of development. Certainly, the peace and security challenges faced by Caribbean and Pacific countries are very different from those confronting Africa. Some EU member states, the Netherlands and Germany in particular, would like to see an overhaul of the ACP system. One possibility would be for the EU to broaden Cotonou to include all developing countries, making Africa as a whole, not just sub-Saharan Africa, a separate pillar. However, some North African countries are against this and are sceptical of the EU’s motives, preferring to maintain their current treaty arrangements with the EU under the European Neighbourhood Policy. The re-entry of Morocco to the AU in January 2017 after an absence of 33 years also changes the EU’s relationship with the AU. Previously, the partnership was between Africa and the EU with a more ambiguous role for the AU. Now that the AU encompasses all 54 African states, plus Western Sahara, the process has begun to put the AU more firmly at the centre of the partnership, starting with the renaming of the summit from Africa-EU to AU-EU. Another question surrounding the post-Cotonou settlement is the future of the European Development Fund and, within it, the African Peace Facility, specifically whether it will be subsumed into the EU budget and its scope will remain the same. This feeds into a wider debate around the mid-term review of the EU’s financial instruments and budget. It also is connected to an ongoing discussion on whether the EU should finance security (including military) capacity building in African and other partner countries, either through existing mechanisms or the establishment of new ones post-2020. While the security-development nexus is well established in EU policy documents, its practical implications, especially on funding, remain a divisive issue within and between EU member states. The core of the debate is the extent to which development assistance should be used to finance peace and security activities, particularly the military component. III.What Role for the AU in Peace and Security? A.The Changing Nature of Conflict in Africa The African conflict landscape has changed dramatically since the start of the decade. Old forms remain: contested government transitions, civil wars, state repression and low-intensity insurgencies among them. But they now interact with challenges that add complex new dynamics, including the expanding influence of non-state actors (especially religious or other extremists and transnational criminal networks) and the effects of climate change and population growth. Some new militant groups have ties to global jihadists, are deeply intolerant, reject political and religious pluralism and espouse goals that make their inclusion in political settlements hard to envisage. They operate alongside other pro- and anti-government militias; often their membership is fluid and overlaps with other forces. Their use of suicide attacks and improvised explosive devices pose new challenges to national security forces and peacekeepers. Non-state actors of all stripes, but particularly jihadists and traffickers, exploit huge spaces beyond government control, particularly in the Sahel and Savannah Belt. Armed groups are increasingly fragmented, with at best loose command structures, and commanders at all levels continue to enjoy easy access to funds through criminal activities. All this makes it harder to end the continent’s crises. Regional powers and economic communities, the AU itself and outside powers have all struggled to manage crises, both new – such as those that have exploded over the past five years in Libya, Mali, Nigeria, the Central African Republic and South Sudan – and old – such as those in Sudan, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Africa’s peace and security architecture, designed and developed during the 2000s, needs to evolve to respond to today’s challenges. The AU and its member states are trying to adapt through new initiatives such as the Nouakchott process which aims to boost security cooperation among eleven West African and Sahelian states, AFRIPOL, the AU mechanism for police cooperation, and the authorisation of ad hoc forces such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad basin and the G5 in the Sahel. However, wholesale re-evaluation of the architecture and the AU’s role in peace and security, rather than a piecemeal approach, is required. The Kagame reform process presents an opportunity to do this, but it will require the AU to think strategically. Supporters see the G5 and the MNJTF as flexible and innovative responses to new security threats. Others are concerned about the longer-term implications for the sustainability of the AU and its peace and security architecture. These ad hoc forces lie outside the current architecture, being led neither by the AU nor a regional economic community. Their mandates, however, have been endorsed by the AU Peace and Security Council, making them eligible for EU funding, which is supposed to be channelled through the AU. The AU has been cut out of the EU’s funding process for the G5 to avoid a repeat of the shortfalls that have left the MNJTF troops without essential equipment for over a year. Instead the EU appointed an external procurement provider. The AU did not challenge this decision even though it could significantly undermine its authority. As outlined in its founding documents, the AU has primary responsibility for peace and security on the continent. By giving in to pressure from the EU and some AU member states, and allowing itself to simply rubber-stamp the G5 without maintaining political or financial oversight of the mission, the AU has ceded part of its power and set a precedent that may be difficult to erase. From an institutional perspective it would have been more prudent if the AU had insisted the G5 Secretariat report back to it on a regular basis so that it could monitor progress and adherence to the agreed mandate. Instead it gave up a major source of leverage over regional bodies and member states – access to EU funding. B.The AU’s Strategic Priorities To adapt both to the changing nature of conflict and to the emergence of ad hoc forces like the G5, the AU must set out a coherent peace and security strategy and clearly articulate its role within it. The AU has an excess of ambitious goals, but is unsure of its strategic priorities. This is reflected in the plethora of declarations and roadmaps developed in recent years. Everyone interviewed for this report gave different, sometimes wildly divergent, perspectives on the AU’s future direction. Strategically, the AU is caught between long-term aspirations for “a peaceful and secure continent” by 2063 – a time scale that makes planning difficult – and the impossibly short near-term aim of “Silencing the Guns” by 2020. It is unclear how much buy-in member states have to these frameworks and master plans, meaning that the vision laid out in these documents may be divorced from political realities on the continent. Perhaps the most accurate guide to the AU’s current thinking is the Peace Fund, the only framework member states have committed to financing themselves. It has three funding windows: mediation and preventative diplomacy; institutional capacity; and peace support operations. But not all African officials agree on these priorities. A diplomat from one African country said the AU should not engage at all in expensive peace support operations that have limited success. Another questioned whether the AU genuinely was committed to conflict prevention, suggesting the AU was simply following the UN and EU’s lead. One key area that will not be financed through the Peace Fund is post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD), despite overwhelming support from the commission, the regional economic communities and member states for the AU to take a more active role in stabilising and rebuilding countries emerging from war. One reason for its omission from the Peace Fund is the high cost of PCRD activities. There is also disagreement over whether the AU should simply set policy and strategic direction or engage in post-conflict reconstruction and development implementation, with regional bodies typically favouring the former course. The AU’s partners, in particular the EU, have little appetite for financing post-conflict reconstruction efforts, however. C.The African Union and the Regional Economic Communities How the AU realigns relations with the regional economic communities (RECs) and mechanisms (essential elements of Africa’s security architecture) is also crucial to its future role in peace and security. This relationship has been marked by “tension and competition” over which organisation should take the lead – disagreement between the AU and the East African Community on Burundi is a clear example of this. Rivalry arises, in large part, from competition over the substantial financial resources available in crisis situations – funding for mediators, observers, equipment, training and lucrative peace support operations. “Peace and security is a money spinner for the regional organisations”, said one senior UN Department of Political Affairs official. The memorandum of understanding that governs their relationship is not clear on who takes precedence. Article IV, which lays out the relationship’s guiding principles, acknowledges that primary responsibility for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security lies with the AU but goes on to say there must be “adherence to principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage”. The absence of a clear definition of these principles results in friction. This is compounded by member states’ lack of faith in their own continental body – European diplomats more readily extol the AU’s merits than their African counterparts. Leaders often prefer to address crises at the regional level where they have greater political influence and can better defend their national and regional interests which, unsurprisingly, they tend to place above the need for speedy conflict resolution in other African countries. The EU would like to see regional economic communities play a larger role, in part because they have better knowledge of local conditions and dynamics, but also because they believe the AU is not delivering, though the capacity and readiness of these regional bodies varies considerably.Unfortunately, the EU’s pivot to the regions fosters competition. It is also resented by the AU, which feels the EU devolves to the RECs when it cannot reach agreement at the continental level, ignoring the AU’s important coordinating role. “Things will collapse in the short term if the EU keeps its preference for the regions”, said one REC official concerned about the capacity of his organisation. IV.Points of Divergence The AU-EU relationship is dysfunctional. Both institutions complain vociferously about the other’s deficiencies and limitations and yet they ascribe great value to the partnership. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Federica Mogherini made a point of being the first to meet the new AU Commission chairperson, Moussa Faki, after he took office in March, while Faki, in his inaugural speech to the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, identified the EU as the AU’s major strategic partner.Both institutions ostensibly would like to improve ties but must address their deep-seated frustrations if they want to move forward. A.Resentment and Mistrust: The “Equal Partnership” and the Colonial Trap Europe’s colonisation of Africa is the proverbial “elephant in the room” of AU-EU relations. Subconsciously – and at times consciously – its legacy negatively affects mutual trust and confidence. The AU’s anti-colonial rhetoric intensified greatly during Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s chairmanship (October 2012 to March 2017), and tensions around the issue ratcheted up significantly. The EU affirms it has an “equal partnership” with the AU to distance itself from the colonial past and disguise the inherent imbalance of power between the two institutions. Some in the EU feel that progress is being made toward equality, others that the economic gulf between the two continents makes this impossible, at least in the short term. For many in both unions, equality is an aspiration, but most agree that calling the current partnership equal is a fallacy. Beyond this, the myth of equality translates into an assumption that the two institutions are the same. They are not. The EU’s 28 member states have a population of 508 million and a collective GDP of $17.6 trillion, while the AU’s 55 members are home to 1.1 billion people and their economies are worth $2.39 trillion. The EU has a staff of 32,546 and an annual budget of $189 billion. In contrast, the AU employs around 1,600 people and its projected expenditure for 2018 is $769.4 million. African member states have ceded no sovereignty to the AU, in fact they typically use the continental body as a means of entrenching national sovereignty. EU member states, on the other hand, have turned over some or all control in a range of areas, including foreign, security and defence policy, trade, justice and development cooperation. The decision-making procedures and the validity of pronouncements made by the EU and AU are not comparable; when the two commissions speak to each other, they do not do so with the same authority. The presumption that the AU and the EU are equivalent creates false expectations of the AU’s capabilities and unhelpfully obscures the two institutions’ many differences. The EU and its member states are often accused of paternalism by both the AU and some of the EU’s own staff – a hangover from colonial times, according to some. This is said to manifest itself in a variety of ways: the language EU officials use, the statements it issues, its choice of representatives, the behaviour of heads of delegations and the development of programs intended to benefit the continent but which, like the recently announced German Marshall Plan with Africa, are often designed without consulting African interlocutors. Particularly annoying for the AU is the asymmetry of their discussions. The two bodies only talk about African countries and continental issues, never European problems such as Brexit or the treatment of African migrants in EU member states. The AU is not invited to meetings of the Africa Working Party (COAFR) or the Political and Security Committee in Brussels, but the EU is invited, on occasion, to the AU PSC in Addis Ababa. The EU and its member states push hard to attend AU summits but do not reciprocate when EU leaders meet. The assertion of “equality” serves only to aggravate the tensions here. The AU is also frustrated that the EU does not always follow its lead. “When we are dealing with a crisis they should first listen to us”, said one AU official, by which he means adopt AU positions. This tension is most obvious in the Great Lakes, specifically around the application of sanctions in DRC, the suspension of aid to Burundi and the direct payment of Burundian troops in AMISOM. It’s unrealistic for the AU to expect the EU to blindly support its approach; like the AU, the EU and its member states have their own (sometimes conflicting) interests and constituencies. Also, European officials may simply disagree with their African counterparts on the main drivers of crises, particularly regarding the role of incumbents, and how the EU should respond. However, the two institutions could work more cooperatively, whether regarding substantive issues or the timing of public statements and events. African officials also sense that the EU imposes its own programs and priorities on the AU and does not respect its decisions. This is perhaps most stark with regards to the migration crisis: in its scramble to stem the flow of people crossing the Mediterranean, the EU has given the impression of relentlessly pushing forward its own agenda. For their part, EU officials often feel that the AU moves too slowly or leaves things too late and worry that if they do not take the initiative – for example on the agenda for the AU-EU summit – things won’t progress. This area of dispute is symptomatic of the wildly different timescales on which the two institutions operate. The EU is beginning to align its priorities with those of the AU in some areas. A recent Brussels communication on the Africa-EU partnership deliberately referenced Agenda 2063 (the AU’s long-term framework for social and economic development), incorporating elements from it and other AU instruments into action points. But changing attitudes among EU member states may be more difficult. At a meeting of the EU Foreign Affairs Council one minister reportedly said: “The joint communication is good, now we have to get the Africans to agree to it so that they can take ownership”. More difficult to address are African complaints that the EU leverages its bilateral relations with smaller African countries to push positions unpopular at the continental level. For example, the EU is seen as relentlessly promoting the African maritime security framework, encouraging smaller states to support it despite significant opposition from several key countries. These divide-and-rule tactics, while not unusual in diplomatic practice, assume a more negative aspect when viewed through the prism of colonial history and the supposedly equal partnership. The EU, while it understands the African position, is losing patience with the AU’s anti-colonial rhetoric. The EU should not lightly dismiss this sentiment, however, which is often heartfelt, especially in Southern Africa where liberation was hard-fought. But the AU and its member states also must not overplay their hand. Most African authoritarian regimes, and some more democratic ones, respond to European criticism by invoking the colonial past. In October 2015, Burundi invoked colonialism when the EU and Belgium imposed targeted sanctions on individuals linked to the government who were accused of undermining democracy and serious violations of human rights. South Africa’s ruling ANC did the same when it recently made claims of “regime change” to deflect attention away from alleged corruption scandals involving President Jacob Zuma. Arguably this is part of the game, but it is important to note that African leaders rarely censure their peers for doing so. B.Funding: The Donor-recipient Dilemma The AU-EU relationship, especially in the area of peace and security, is first and foremost a financial one – since 2004, the EU has provided more than €2 billion ($2.39 billion) in support through the African Peace Facility. Given the limited amounts AU member states contribute to peace and security operations, it is essentially one of recipient to donor. The AU tries to disguise its overreliance on the EU by asserting its independence, stressing the need for African ownership and calling for the EU to follow its lead, all the while bristling at the idea it should be accountable for the funding it receives. This dynamic is a source of great tension, but both sides actively, if inadvertently, perpetuate it. The near-constant lament of EU officials and member states’ representatives is that the AU sees the EU as a “patronising cash machine” that delivers a ten-minute sermon before dispensing money. But the EU is often too eager to dispense funds in response to AU requests without sufficiently thinking about results. Some EU officials worry that pressure to deliver quickly to allow member state governments – constantly under public scrutiny and concerned about re-election – to demonstrate impact, has led to a situation in which disbursement alone is used as the chief indicator of EU success. Officials also complain that their AU counterparts, even very senior ones, only want to discuss funding, further entrenching their status as grantees. Relations were tested in 2016 over EU funding for AMISOM, the AU mission in Somalia. Since it began to support the mission in 2007, the EU had always given the impression that its payment of troop stipends was open-ended. The AU, unsurprisingly, was shocked and lambasted the EU for decreasing stipends when the Europeans finally followed through on their long-threatened decision to reduce support by 20 per cent.Tensions grew when the EU requested the AU find a direct way of paying Burundi’s AMISOM contingent in order to prevent the government from appropriating the stipends following the EU’s suspension of all budget support as a result of the country’s political crisis. This was compounded by the temporary suspension of all payments to AMISOM troops after the AU failed the EU’s Pillar Assessment, a routine evaluation of its management of EU funding. EU officials complained they were “held hostage” by their AU counterparts, who applied enormous pressure to get the decision reversed. Outside observers marvelled at the EU’s tolerance of its treatment: “The Europeans are showing incredible patience”, remarked one Western diplomat. Even some AU member states were dismayed by the AU commission’s behaviour, with one diplomat denouncing the commission for criticising the EU while rushing to take its money. There is disappointment (and increasingly resentment) within the EU that it does not receive enough public recognition for the contribution it makes to African peace and security, especially compared to other partners, like China, whose support is dwarfed by comparison. The EU is particularly sensitive about (perhaps even jealous of) the AU’s relationship with Beijing, believing it receives preferential treatment. “The Chinese give $1 million and get an AU press release”, complained a senior EU official. “We give over €20 million per month and we get criticised when we reduce our commitment”. The AU readily admits that it tends to view the relationship through a financial lens. By doing so it is missing out on opportunities to influence the EU’s policy and strategic priorities. In Brussels and Addis Ababa there are concerns that the upcoming AU-EU summit will focus on programming and funding rather than tackling big picture political issues, such as migration. A more clear-eyed assessment of the two institutions’ mutual interests would put the relationship on a much stronger footing. Relations have improved since their 2016 nadir, following an agreement on the payment of Burundian troops and the appointment of Faki as AU Commission chairperson.Moreover, both parties agree that the current situation is not sustainable: the EU’s resources are diminishing (this will only worsen when the UK leaves) and its member states are suffering from donor fatigue. There are concerns in Brussels that the upcoming African Peace Facility replenishment will be more difficult than the last – it took six months to approve the previous €500 million ($597 million) tranche of support. The EU wants to be more than just a donor. It wants a greater say in when, where and how its money is spent, at least partly because it has less to spend and wants its contributions to be utilised more effectively. Europe also wants Africa to pay its “fair share”. AU member states have committed to this, on paper at least, through the 0.2 per cent levy on imports, but so far there has been little follow through. C.Institutional Irritants: Bureaucratic Burden and Capacity Deficit “The EU complains that the AU cannot deliver. The AU complains that the EU overcomplicates things”, is how one EU official describes the dynamics between the two institutions. Both viewpoints have some validity. The AU acknowledges it has a capacity deficit, due in part to a lack of resources but also to poor recruitment procedures. Member states have committed to improvements on both these fronts. In July 2015, African leaders undertook to finance 100 per cent of the operations budget, 75 per cent of programs and 25 per cent of peace support operations. Kagame’s proposed reforms envisage a more rigorous, merit-based recruitment process. The Kagame plans to streamline activities should help sharpen the AU’s focus. It tries to do too much with limited resources. A case in point is the fourteen liaison offices established in post-conflict countries to support ongoing peace processes, peacebuilding and reconstruction activities. Not only are the offices understaffed and under-financed, but the Peace and Security Department is not able to deal effectively with the reports and assessments they generate. The AU also sets itself up to fail by imposing impossible targets, such as ending conflict in the continent by 2020. All of which is compounded by a lack of political will at the very highest levels and second-guessing of leaders’ wishes by the commission. On occasion, the EU feeds into the cycle of underachievement by providing funding for projects it knows the AU is unable to complete; pressure to deliver from EU member states means bureaucratic incentives sometimes favour disbursement over impact. For example, the EU approved a €50 million support package for the multinational force combatting Boko Haram in the Lake Chad basin (MNJTF) on 1 August 2016 through the AU, but to date none of the equipment promised has been delivered to the field. The EU blames the AU’s lack of procurement capacity for the delay, while the AU squarely points the finger at Brussels’ bureaucracy. As a result, the EU is searching for more reliable partners either in the regional economic communities or through coalitions of member states. The EU’s support for the G5 force combatting jihadist groups and organised crime in the Sahel is one outcome of its dissatisfaction with the AU. It has – with Chairperson Faki’s consent – cut the AU out from the G5 procurement process. The experience with the MNJTF has also undermined AU member states’ confidence in the abilities of their own institution. The EU and its member states, as well as other partners, have long focused on building the AU’s capacity. However, their support typically pays for staff salaries or workshops and travel, rather than developing much needed technical expertise, such as logistics, management skills, and support in the preparation of concept notes, workplans and strategic plans. Some partners, such as the German development agency, GIZ, provide such practical assistance. But even when the EU offers meaningful training, the AU does not always make the best use of it. Training, and the concomitant travel and per diems, are seen more as a reward than an opportunity for personal development. Problems exist on the EU side as well. EU officials are the first to admit the organisation’s bureaucratic processes are complex, cumbersome and time consuming. “We would do anything to run away from our own procedures”, a senior EU official told Crisis Group. The AU’s limited administrative capacity means that it struggles to comply fully with EU rules and regulations and has consistently failed monitoring and evaluation assessments. The bureaucratic burden also reduces opportunities for meaningful political and strategic discussions because AU and EU officials are forced to spend much of their time discussing administration. The African Peace Facility’s Early Response Mechanism, which allows for quick reaction to emerging situations, is generally seen as one of the most effective parts of EU support. The AU particularly appreciates its speed and flexibility. It works well because the administrative burden is reduced – funds can be available in just ten days with only written EU commission approval. D.“Whatever Works!” In its haste to respond to public concerns, the EU is taking a “whatever works” approach to stemming the flow of migrants from Africa and curbing the terrorist threat. The most recent example is its support to the G5 force, a coalition of states – Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger – directly affected by the activities of violent non-state actors in Mali and in their own territories. Pushed hard by France, which under Operation Barkhane has 4,000 troops stationed across the G5 states, the EU agreed to a €50 million support package for the G5 in June. The decision seems to have been hurriedly concluded, taking some member states with reservations about the force by surprise. The EU favours ad-hoc initiatives like the G5 because AU member states commit their own resources – national armies bear much of the costs – and consequently local ownership is stronger. They also allow the EU to donate discrete packages of assistance rather than getting embroiled in long-term commitments that are difficult to end like the AU mission in Somalia. However, these ad-hoc forces raise serious questions that are being brushed aside in the EU’s rush to appease domestic public opinion and the AU and African government’s desperate scramble for funding. Among these: will the G5 secretariat, established only in 2014, be more efficient or have better financial management than the AU? How will unity of purpose be maintained among a group of states with very different interests and no clear consensus on the forces’ objectives or enemies?Will the proliferation of such groups increase competition for resources among member states, RECs and the AU? Furthermore, circumventing the AU’s traditional oversight of EU funding to African peace support operations has the potential to reduce the AU’s legitimacy, which could have long-term consequences. It also effectively marks open season on the African Peace Facility; instead of having one interlocutor (the AU) to deal with on peace and security the EU will now have a multiplicity, in effect as many countries as want to join forces to combat a perceived common threat. Europe’s panic over migration and terrorism represents a danger, but also offers the AU and its member states an opportunity. The EU and its member states have money to spend provided they can be assured of quick wins that will assuage the concerns of beleaguered citizens. If the AU and African governments really want to address the root causes of migration, as they profess, they should leverage continued support for border control and fighting jihadists or terrorists against increased EU investment in education, job creation, better governance and more even economic growth across Africa, in countries of origin – not just transit. They should also collectively press for increased legal routes of migration for their citizens. However, this requires coordination. Unfortunately, competing national and regional interests have overridden a more unified strategic approach that could bring continent-wide dividends. V.The Search for Common Ground The relationship between the AU and the EU has reached a potential turning point: “It’s now or never”, a senior EU official told Crisis Group. Reforms at the AU coupled with renegotiation of the Cotonou Agreement mean that existing arrangements inevitably will change. There is political will in both commissions to work together, and cooperation and coordination has improved in recent months following a low point in relations during 2016. The Africa-EU summit represents an opportunity to bridge some differences. If seized, a stronger and more mature partnership, based on mutual interests could emerge. A.A Rational, Interests-based Partnership The levels of disappointment and distrust that have built up around the idea of an “equal partnership” suggest the time has come for this notion to be de-emphasised. The relationship should be more pragmatic, with mutual interests rather than assertions of equality privileged. Both parties insist they want to work toward this but it will require the two institutions and their member states to be more explicit about what they want and need from each other. This is much easier said than done, particularly given the tensions and suspicions arising from the colonial past. The relationship as it stands is far too emotional; interviewees sounded more like disgruntled family members than dispassionate officials. This is hardly surprising given the two continents’ shared history, but it prevents frank and honest discussion. Increased transparency will be important for building trust. The AU should recognise that the EU is a union of 28 (soon to be 27) countries, few of which ever had colonies. For its part, the EU should be more conscious of how its actions are perceived and aim to be less paternalistic in dealings with Africa. To ensure that the partnership is more firmly grounded in interests, the AU and EU need to focus their discussions less on financial and administrative concerns and more on political and strategic matters, especially at senior levels. Where possible, technical discussions should be delegated to department or section heads. Exchanges on politics – not money – must have primacy when the AU Peace and Security Council and the EU Political and Security Committee meet at the annual college-to-college meetings and at summits. A start could be made by including migration and mobility on the agenda of the AU-EU summit, a subject which both institutions have been reluctant to discuss openly. B.Splitting the Bill More Equitably The EU and its member states have made it clear that the current system of funding is not sustainable. It is unlikely to commit again to open-ended financing, as it did with troop stipends for the AU mission in Somalia.The future of the African Peace Facility is also uncertain, as is the EU’s post-2020 budget and the financial instruments it supports. Africa’s peace and security architecture, developed with significant assistance from the EU, is unique and requires specially tailored support to respond to emerging challenges. Ideally, any new funding stream would be predictable – to enable the AU to do more medium-term planning – but flexible – to allow for new initiatives and to adapt the security architecture to emerging threats. It also should have a rapid reaction capacity like that of the Early Response Mechanism. Support should focus on four key areas: early warning; preventative diplomacy and mediation; peace support operations; and capacity-building and non-lethal equipment for military and security forces. The AU’s early-warning system is well established but needs strengthening. Many of the continent’s crises are predictable, especially those linked to poor governance and disputed political transitions. Funding should be directed toward identifying dangerous political dynamics, which is central to conflict prevention. Additional support for the AU’s Department of Political Affairs is therefore essential, including for more effective integration of the African Governance Architecture with the peace and security architecture. Translating early-warning data and analysis into early action has been hampered, in part, by poor information flows within the AU Commission and between it and the regional economic communities. EU financing should be used creatively to break down barriers between the Departments of Peace and Security and Political Affairs, and the commission and regional organisations. Mediation and preventative diplomacy are key priorities for the AU, and the EU should significantly increase its funding in this area. While continuing support for high-profile envoys – leader-to-leader contacts are often the best entry-point for dealing with a crisis – more should be given for middle- and lower-level officials working on the details of peace processes. The AU’s mediation mechanisms are fragmented, with little oversight and political direction from the top. The recently created mediation support unit is a good first step, but it will need considerable financial support to attract skilled, experienced specialists. EU funding traditionally has been heavily skewed toward peace support operations. This needs to be rebalanced, especially given the AU and UN commitment to fund 100 per cent of UN-approved missions between themselves. Any EU support to peace operations must be considered on a case-by-case basis, especially for AU member state-led ad-hoc initiatives, like the MNJTF and G5 force. Such support should have a definitive timeframe or clearly articulated and verifiable end goals – once begun, even limited operations develop their own logic and can breed resistance in local communities. Financing therefore needs to be accompanied by a clear political plan, ideally enjoying consensus among troop contributors, the AU and Europeans; peacekeeping is a tool, not a strategy. As for the final pillar, the military can play a significant role in preventing conflict as well as in maintaining and sustaining peace. In Somalia, for example, a sustainable national force that can take over responsibility for security is vital for the AU mission’s drawdown. The EU therefore should provide training, advice, non-lethal equipment and other resources to select African militaries but it must be aware of the political dynamics of national security forces in each context. It should first evaluate security forces’ ability to threaten governments, especially weak and discredited administrations; whether divisions among security forces could lead to infighting or security vacuums; and, where states face external threats or internal disorder, if security forces have the potential to provide an adequate defence and the discipline to maintain public trust. Control mechanisms and risk assessments are needed to ensure that training and equipment are not used by unaccountable or abusive security and military actors. Both institutions have expressed a desire for the AU to become more financially self-sufficient. AU member states must stick to their commitment to fund 25 per cent of the AU’s peace and security activities by 2020. If the suggested 0.2 per cent levy on imports is not workable for some or all member states, alternative solutions quickly should be found. Some of the proposals recommended in 2012 by a high-level panel headed by former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo should be reconsidered – for example a $5 levy on flights to Africa originating from outside the continent and a $2 tax on hotel stays. To encourage AU member states to increase their financial support to the AU, any future EU mechanism should be based on a matched funding system in which the EU’s contribution is proportionately linked to those made by African governments. Something similar to the cost-sharing ratio of 1 to 3 (AU to UN) used for UN-authorised, AU-led peace support operations could be adopted. EU funding also could be used to promote better coordination and cooperation between the AU and the regional economic communities, rather than fomenting competition over resources. The EU could use some of its support specifically for joint AU-regional body projects. The AU also should consider allocating a percentage of the Peace Fund’s assets to regional blocs that are delivering on the continental peace and security agenda. C.Greater Cooperation and Working-level Linkages Increasing cooperation at all levels would be a good way to build trust between the AU and EU. More regular dialogue would increase mutual knowledge of the two institutions and their internal dynamics. It also would help foster a shared understanding of conflicts on the continent, or at the very least a greater appreciation of the other’s point of view, which also could reduce tensions and misunderstandings. Recent collaboration and coordination between AU and EU election monitors during Kenya’s August elections, provides a good example of the benefits of close cooperation in a potentially volatile situation. More frequent interaction between the AU Peace and Security Council and the EU Political and Security Committee – they currently meet just once a year – would be beneficial and could be supplemented by video conferences between their chairpersons. Where appropriate, as has happened in the past, they could undertake joint field visits. Additional consultations between EU and AU commissioners, outside the annual college-to-college meetings, would be valuable. Closer linkages between equivalent commission departments should be encouraged, as envisaged in the memorandum of understanding on staff exchanges, and resources made available to facilitate this. Sharing lessons learned and best practices would be valuable, as would regular exchanges of information, whenever possible. The AU’s liaison offices could also benefit greatly from closer working relations and information sharing with in-country EU delegations. Aside from increased engagement between the two commissions, some AU member states have expressed an interest in having more contact with their EU counterparts. Regular formal and informal meetings between AU and EU diplomats could be easily scheduled in both Brussels and Addis. In addition, foreign ministers could convene in between the triennial Africa-EU summits. The EU should review the possibility of opening up some sessions of its PSC and the Africa Working Group under the same terms that the EU is allowed to attend AU PSC deliberations. If the EU wishes to maintain its privileged access to AU summits it should be open to reciprocating. D.A Realistic Assessment of Constraints The EU and AU have invested heavily in their relationship and have high expectations of what it can achieve. They also need to understand their own – and each other’s – constraints and capacities and to adjust their ambitions and demands accordingly. Both sides should look for ways to mitigate their limitations. 1.Reorient capacity building and reduce the bureaucratic burden The recent Brussels communication on the Africa-EU partnership stressed the need for increased capacity building and training to improve the AU’s operational capabilities. This is essential, but must shift away from paying for travel costs and organising workshops. More technical assistance is required. The two institutions should undertake a joint assessment of the AU’s training needs and work out an improvement program. As mentioned above, they should implement existing agreements on staff exchanges. This would have the added benefit of strengthening understanding between the two organisations. The EU must look for ways to ease the bureaucratic burden. This should include expanding the scope and duration of support given under the African Peace Facility’s Early Response Mechanism, which allows for the disbursement of funds in as little as ten days. Increased technical support could be tailored to improve the AU’s ability to administer projects and meet EU compliance standards. Increased coordination between the EU and its member states in Addis would help reduce the burden on key AU staff who have to fend off partners’ almost constant demand for bilateral meetings. The EU and other partners could also better coordinate their support to the AU. This would avoid duplication and overloading the AU Commission which has a finite ability to absorb training and other support. The proposal of a partners’ platform, contained in the communication on the Africa-EU partnership, should be implemented. 2.Limitations and consequences Neither the AU nor the EU is monolithic. Both include many actors – the commissions, the member states and, for the EU, the parliament and the External Action Service with its in-country delegations – each with distinct priorities and interests. This hinders coherent action and makes it more difficult to anticipate the institution’s response in any given situation. At the EU, foreign policy is an intergovernmental rather than a multilateral issue, meaning that national interests are likely to be at their strongest when it comes to questions of peace and security. For the AU, these questions usually touch on member states’ own national and regional interests, and continental priorities sometimes get left by the wayside. Member states’ lack of confidence in the AU seriously constrains its ability to act effectively and in a timely manner. The AU Commission does not successfully communicate its achievements to member states. It must do better. The EU could provide support for this and use its in-country delegations to advocate for the AU on the continent. The changing nature of conflict means that the AU needs to seriously consider whether the African Peace and Security Architecture is still fit for purpose. An audit should be undertaken as part of Kagame’s reform process. The current assessment of African Standby Force doctrine could be rolled into the wider audit. Among other things, it should examine whether and how to fully incorporate ad-hoc military initiatives like the G5 and the MNJTF into a revamped architecture. The AU needs to reflect on its role in peace and security. Its resource limitations mean it has to decide whether to focus, on the one hand, on developing and harmonising policy and maintaining political oversight or, on the other, increasing its operational role in peace support operations and becoming an implementer of projects on the ground. Its current strengths lie in the former – it does not have the requisite staff, financial resources or expertise and is too far removed from member states for the latter. However, regional economic communities (RECs) can and ought to step up their implementing role. Crisis Group believes the AU should play to its strengths and concentrate on building its leadership on issues of peace and security to reinforce its role as the authoriser and supervisor of peace operations in Africa. The EU too, must be clear on what role it envisages for the AU – political lead and authorising body or something more operational. It also should decide whether it will continue to give the bulk of its support to the AU or concentrate its resources on the RECs and the new ad-hoc groups. It should be conscious that not all the regional bodies and member states are equally capable, and it needs to be aware of the impact its decisions could have on the legitimacy of the AU and continental conflict dynamics. VI.Conclusion Ten years after signing the Joint Africa-EU Strategy that established the parameters of their partnership, the AU and EU have reached a turning point. Relations have recovered in recent months after falling to a nadir in 2016 over disagreements about EU payments to AMISOM troops, and cooperation has increased. Now the two institutions should harness current high levels of political will – on both sides – to reinvigorate and strengthen their alliance. To capitalise on this fully, they must confront key areas of disagreement and frustration – however difficult that process may be – and pursue a partnership based on mutual interests and strategic priorities. In this context, the AU-EU summit comes at a particularly opportune moment. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Group

Complete destruction of Rohingya villages in close proximity to intact Rakhine village, Maungdaw township, recorded on 21 September 2017.© 2017 Human Rights Watch Newly released satellite images reveal that at least 288 villages were partially or totally destroyed by fire in northern Rakhine State in Burma since August 25, 2017, Human Rights Watch said today. The destruction encompassed tens of thousands of structures, primarily homes inhabited by ethnic Rohingya Muslims. Ethnic Rohingya village completely destroyed adjacent to intact ethnic Rakhine village in Maungdaw Township, Burma. © 2017 Human Rights Watch Analysis of the satellite imagery indicates both that the burnings focused on Rohingya villages and took place after Burmese officials claimed security force “clearance operations” had ceased, Human Rights Watch said. The imagery pinpoints multiple areas where destroyed Rohingya villages sat adjacent to intact ethnic Rakhine villages. It also shows that at least 66 villages were burned after September 5, when security force operations supposedly ended, according to a September 18 speech by State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi. The Burmese military responded to attacks on August 25 by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) with a campaign of ethnic cleansing, prompting more than 530,000 Rohingya to flee across the border to Bangladesh, according to the United Nations refugee agency. “These latest satellite images show why over half a million Rohingya fled to Bangladesh in just four weeks,” said Phil Robertson, deputy Asia director. “The Burmese military destroyed hundreds of Rohingya villages while committing killings, rapes, and other crimes against humanity that forced Rohingya to flee for their lives.” Map of villages destroyed in Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Rathedaung Townships.© 2017 Human Rights Watch A total of 866 villages in Maungdaw, Rathedaung, and Buthidaung townships in Rakhine State were monitored and analyzed by Human Rights Watch. The most damage occurred in Maungdaw Township, accounting for approximately 90 percent of the areas where destruction happened between August 25 and September 25. Approximately 62 percent of all villages in the township were either partially or completely destroyed, and southern areas of the township were particularly hard hit, with approximately 90 percent of the villages devastated. In many places, satellite imagery showed multiple areas on fire, burning simultaneously over wide areas for extended periods. Human Rights Watch found that the damage patterns are consistent with fire. Comparing recent imagery with those taken prior to the date of the attacks, analysis showed that most of the damaged villages were 90 to 100 percent destroyed. Many villages which had both Rohingya and Rakhine residing in segregated communities, such as Inn Din and Ywet Hnyo Taung, suffered heavy arson damage from arson attacks, with known Rohingya areas burned to the ground while known Rakhine areas were left intact. Multiple villages on fire along the coast of Maungdaw Township, Burma on the morning of September 15, 2017.© 2017 Human Rights Watch The Burmese government has repeatedly said that ARSA insurgents and local Rohingya communities were responsible for setting the fires that wiped out their villages, but has offered no evidence to support such claims. Human Rights Watch interviews in Bangladesh with more than 100 refugees who had fled the three townships gave no indication that any Rohingya villagers or militants were responsible for burning down their own villages. The Burmese government and military has not impartially investigated and prosecuted alleged serious abuses committed against the Rohingya population. UN member countries and international bodies should press the Burmese government to grant access to the UN-mandated fact-finding mission to investigate these abuses. The UN Security Council should also urgently impose a global arms embargo on Burma, and place travel bans and asset freezes on those Burmese commanders responsible for grave abuses. Governments should impose a comprehensive arms embargo against Burma, including prohibiting military cooperation and financial transactions with military-owned enterprises. “The shocking images of destruction in Burma and burgeoning refugee camps in Bangladesh are two sides of the same coin of human misery being inflicted on the Rohingya,” Robertson said. “Concerned governments need to urgently press for an end to abuses against the Rohingya and ensure that humanitarian aid reaches everyone in need.” _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Human Rights Watch

IDC Summit 2017: American Leadership and Securing the Future of Christians in the Middle East Day 2, October 25 Policy Briefing Day and Solidarity Dinner JW Marriott 1331 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20004-1796 Panels 8:00 am to 5:00 pm Breakfast and Opening Remarks Lebanon and Syria: Security and Stability Post Conflict How to Advance U.S. Interests by Protecting Religious Minorities in the Middle East Who Are America’s Allies and Enemies in the Middle East? A Hard Look at Turkey, Iran and the Gulf States Interactive Workshops: Setting Up In-District Meetings with Members of Congress Panel Speakers IDC Special Guests: Patriarch Rai, Patriarch John X Yazigi, His Holiness Catholicos Aram I, and Most Rev. Nicholas James Samra. Aram Hamparian, Robert Nicholson, Andrew Doran, Tonia Khouri, Neemat Frem, Charles Hage, Alberto Fernandez, Loay Mikhael, Nermien Riad, Stephen Hollingshead, Andrew Walther Brian Katulis, Pamela Prior, Art Estopinan, Armen Sahakyan, Nahren Anwiya, Father Paul O' Callaghan, Bill Fathauer, Milad Zohrob, Antoinette Balta, Hagar Chemali, Philippe Nassif, Peter Burns and Steven Howard. Solidarity Dinner 6:30 pm Cocktail Hour Dinner 7:30 pm Cedars of God Award Recipient Congressman Chris Smith Remarks by Congressman Darin Lahood Special Performance by Internationally Acclaimed Lebanese Singer Abeer Nehme Register for our upcoming Summit NOW! Register:https://indefenseofchristians.org/idc-2017-summit/#register _______________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 In Defense of Christains

Activity Overview | Pregled aktivnosti SEP - OCT 2017 Intercultural Achievement Award Nagrada za interkulturalna dostiguća On September 28, PCRC received the Intercultural Achievement Award from the Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs during a ceremony hosted by the Austrian Embassy in Sarajevo. We received this award for Balkan Diskurs - our independent multimedia platform that provides young citizen journalists, activists and academics in the Western Balkans with a space - free from censorship - to publish their opinions, analyses and impressions of relevant issues in the region. Centar za postkonfliktna istraživanja (CPI) je 28. septembra primio Nagradu za interkulturalna dostignuća koju dodjeljuje Austrijsko Federalno ministarstvo za Evropu, integracije i spoljne poslove, tokom ceremonije koja je organizovana u Austrijskoj Ambasadi u Sarajevu. Nagradu smo dobili za naš rad na Balkan Diskursu- nezavisnoj, multimedijalnoj platformi koja pruža priliku mladim novinarima, aktivistima i akademicima sa Zapadnog Balkana da objavljuju svoja mišljenja, analize i utiske o relevantim događajima u regionu bez straha od cenzure. What's new on Balkan Diskurs? Šta je novo na Balkan Diskursu? Be sure to check out the new, re-designed balkandiskurs.com and read viewpoints on society, culture, and politics that cannot be found in other media. As the winner of the Intercultural Achievement Recognition Award by the Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe,Integration and Foreign Affairs, we had the chance to re-design the Balkan Diskurs website and present this award-winning journalistic platform in an updated, more streamlined way. Naša multimedijalna platforma Balkan Diskurs je sada dostupna u novom, redizajniranom ruhu na balkandiskurs.com! Kao dobitnici Nagrade za interkulturalna dostignuća od strane Austrijskog federalnog ministarstva za Evropu, intergracije i spoljne poslove, Balkan Diskurs je dobio priliku da redizajnira svoju web stranicu i predstavi svoj nagrađivani rad u novom svjetlu. Resonant Voices Hackathon Resonant Voices hakaton One team, two days, and third place at the Resonant Voices Hackathon in the Western Balkans! PCRC walked away from the Resonant Voices Initiative with new mentorship and funding to launch the next phase of our Ordinary Heroes program. The hackathon, organized through partnership between CIJA US, Birn Balkans, and Talks 2.0, was designed to help critical voices in the region further develop the skills, know-how, and resources to counter radicalization and extremism online. Click here to learn more about our award-winning Ordinary Heroes program. Jedan tim, dva dana i osvojeno treće mjesto na Resonant Voices hakatonu! Resonant Voices inicijativa nam je donjela novo mentorstvo i finansije za pokretanje naredne faze našegprograma Obični heroji. Hakaton, organizovan kroz partnerstvo između CIJA US, Birn Balkan i Talks 2.0, dizajniran je da pomogne kritičnim glasovima u regionu da razvijaju vještine i resurse za borbu protiv radikalizacije i ekstremizma na internetu. Kliknite ovdje da saznate više o našem nagrađivanom programu Obični heroji. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 WARM

Sharing hope: Fr Douglas Bazi (right) enjoying the hospitality of Brisbane’s Iraqi community including Amanouil Younan (left) and Kareem and Bushra Patros. Photos: Mark Bowling AN Iraqi priest, shot and imprisoned by ISIS has praised and thanked Australians and the Catholic Church for helping in the face of the Christian genocide in his country. In Brisbane to address a Christian conference and to meet Iraqi refugees, Fr Douglas Bazi, of the Chaldean Catholic Church, also said there was a risk that Christians in northern Iraq were in danger of “disappearing forever” unless immediate international action was taken. “Thank God there is the Catholic Church,” Fr Bazi said as he visited the home of Iraqis Kareem and Bushra Patros, members of the St Joseph and St Anthony parish, Bracken Ridge, in Brisbane’s north. The Patros family has helped co-ordinate the arrival and settlement of scores of Iraqi families into the local community. “It is easy to rebuild cities, but I think it an impossible mission to rebuild the trust between people. Can we again live with the Muslims?” Fr Bazi said. “The Catholic Church understands the meaning of help. It means support, praying, dollars, sending doctors and social workers – everything. “So thanks to Australia. Thanks to the Catholic Church – they provide home to my people.” Fr Bazi is visiting Australia to raise awareness about the ongoing plight of minorities, including Christians and Yezidis, in northern Iraq. He is the “face” of the ongoing struggle. Extremists bombed Fr Bazi’s church and twice he survived gunfire attacks on his parish community. He made international headlines after he was kidnapped by armed men one Sunday after Mass, taken and tortured for nine days, while being repeatedly questioned about being a spy. However, while visiting Australia he would rather talk about the urgent, ongoing aid needed in northern Iraq. “With more pressure we can help the people still suffering,” he said. “Just to open your gates to our people that is a good thing.” Fr Bazi estimated the number of Christians in Iraq – mainly in Mosul and the Plain of Nineveh, once a valley full of Christian villages – had dwindled to about 180,000. Before hostilities began in 2003, Christians numbered about 1.6 million. “In northern Iraq, it is the last stand of my people,” Fr Bazi said. “We are in danger. Our people are going to disappear if we are not going to take action. “I am proud to be Iraqi, but my people are praying they find a country to call their home … because we don’t have any home anymore.” Fr Bazi said the Catholic Church had shown generosity towards refugees fleeing Iraq’s war-zone and arriving in the Kurdish-controlled city of Erbil. There is a newly-opened Catholic university, eight schools, two clinics and a hospital. However, he said the United Nations had failed to recognise the plight of Iraq’s fleeing Christians, because they were considered internally displaced persons, until they crossed an international border. “Already my people have no rights there,” Fr Bazi said. “If you want to help us stay there – help us to get out. This is the reality. “I’m not pushing people to stay, but I am saying that whether people decided to stay or leave, we have to support them.” Fr Bazi asked for donor support for Project 52, launched by the Chaldean Catholic community. The aim is to provide safe haven for disabled children born in war-torn Iraq, and now in Erbil. Some children have been adopted and brought to New Zealand. Fr Bazi also heads a centre for war survivors suffering ongoing trauma. He was a keynote speaker at Spirit in the City 2017 – a conference on faith, culture and public affairs held at the Queensland University of Technology on October 7. He also visited St Laurence’s College and spoke to about 200 senior students about events in Iraq. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Catholic Leader

The failed UN/African Union “hybrid” Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)—which has shamelessly and with gross inaccuracy celebrated its success for the almost ten years in which it has been charged with protecting civilians and humanitarians—is (per its most recent reauthorization by the UN Security Council | June 2017) drawing down its forces on a scale ensuring that what exceedingly limited protection the Mission has offered will be greatly reduced. 44 percent of military personnel are being deployed out of Darfur and 30 percent of the policing personnel. The knock-on effects of withdrawing this hopelessly misconceived, demoralized, ill-equipped, and badly led Mission are many. Some of the greatest consequences will be a reduction in humanitarian access; for example, since the UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) flies only to areas militarily protected, locations abandoned by UNAMID troops will no longer be accessible. This is especially perverse since a condition for the permanent lifting of U.S. economic sanctions by the Trump administration was the improvement of humanitarian access in Darfur. The UN’s current estimate of the number of people in Darfur in need of humanitarian assistance is 3 million. Notably, UNAMID—in completely inappropriate and unqualified public commentary—celebrated the permanent lifting of sanctions, a celebration undoubtedly motivated by a desire to assist in lifting the opprobrium that hangs heavily over a genocidal regime regime that continues to flout, abuse, and block UNAMID’s movements in Darfur. By celebrating the lifting of sanctions, the ignominious retreat in which UNAMID is engaged—more deployments out of Darfur will certainly be part of any UNAMID reauthorization in June 2018—is supposed to appear less ignominious. But the truth is conspicuous: UNAMID is the single greatest failure in the history of UN peacekeeping. UNAMID failed disgracefully in its “investigation” of the mass rapes at Tabit, North Darfur, October/November 2014; regular Sudan Armed Forces, at the command of the local garrison chief, raped more than 200 girls and women over two days. UNAMID took days to reach Tabit to “investigate” and announced it found no evidence of mass rape. Human Rights Watch authoritatively, based on hundreds of interviews, confirmed what had been reported within days by Radio Dabanga: that mass rapes had occurred and had been committed by regular SAF troops | https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/02/11/mass-rape-north-darfur/sudanese-army-attacks-against-civilians-tabit Tragically, the greatest consequence of UNAMID’s deployment out of Darfur are the continuation, and in some places acceleration, of daily ethnically-targeted attacks on civilians throughout Darfur, primarily by Arab militias controlled or sanctioned by Khartoum. Non-Arab (African) civilians continue to be—as they have been for more than fourteen years—subject to murder, rape, displacement, and loss of property and goods. There is good reason to believe that we will see in the reports from Darfur (conveyed primarily by Radio Dabanga) continuation, and most likely acceleration, of these attacks. Only the fact of previous vast destruction of African villages and the violent expropriation of farmlands, and the massive concentration of displaced persons (some 2.7 million in Darfur itself, another 320,000 in eastern Chad refugee camps) limits the scale of attacks. Moreover, we should remember that some 600,000 people have been killed as a direct or indirect result of violence over the past fourteen years: this approaches ten percent of the pre-war population in Darfur (see | http://sudanreeves.org/2017/01/05/quantifying-genocide-darfur-mortality-update-august-6-2010/). IDP camps in Darfur offer little protection from the predations of Khartoum-backed militias; here a victim of the recent brutal, murderous attack on Kalma IDP camp in South Darfur Here a victim of the infamous “Nierteti Massacre” of January 1, 2017; UNAMID offered no protection As a crude barometer of the scale of violence, I will be assembling weekly a brief compendium of foreshortened dispatches (all with sources on the ground). For surveys covering more extensive periods the violent expropriation of African farmlands (November 2014 – November 2016) and the rape of girls and young women (for the years 2014 and 2015), see | http://sudanreeves.org/2016/02/17/changing-the-demography-violent-expropriation-and-destruction-of-farmlands-in-darfur-november-2014-november-2015/ http://sudanreeves.org/2017/03/07/continuing-mass-rape-of-girls-in-darfur-the-most-heinous-crime-generates-no-international-outrage-january-2016/ Herewith the first weekly compendium of violence reported from Darfur during the withdrawal of UNAMID: • Shooting in North Darfur market wounds six | Radio Dabanga | October 13, 2017 | KUTUM / KATOR Six people were wounded in an attack by militiamen on the market in Kutum, North Darfur, on Thursday. Bandits robbed the passengers of a vehicle en route to El Fasher. Ten armed men, driving a Land Cruiser, opened fire in the market of Kutum town and wounded six people who had to be taken to the hospital. Three of them were transferred to the hospital in El Fasher in a serious condition. Robbery On Thursday afternoon, bandits stopped a commercial vehicle on its way from Deribat in eastern Jebel Marra to El Fasher, and robbed the passengers of their mobiles phones, money and goods. One of the victims told Radio Dabanga that three men, wearing military uniforms, opened fire on the vehicle in the area of Kator, hitting the tires… • Four girls raped in North Darfur | Radio Dabanga | October 6, 2017 | TAWILA Four girls were raped by gunmen, outside of a camp for displaced people in Tawila locality on Wednesday. Gunmen attacked the girls of 15 to 18 years old when they were collecting straw in Susuwa near Rwanda camp. They raped them at gunpoint, sheikh of Rwanda camp Omda Mukhtar Bosh reported to Radio Dabanga. He said that the girls have been transferred “in a bad condition” to the Doctors Without Borders hospital in Tawila. “They are still bedridden,” he said on Thursday. The incident has been reported to the peacekeeping mission UNAMID and the police detective in Tawila, Lt. Ibrahim Sayak Ibrahim. Non-Arab/African girls and women remain extraordinarily vulnerable to rape; UNAMID and past UN Secretaries General have done completely inadequate jobs of reporting on sexual violence in Darfur, this out of cowardice and deference to Khartoum’s “sensitivities” on the issue • Three people killed in South Darfur | Radio Dabanga | October 10, 2017 | NYALA / ED DAEIN Three people were killed in separate robberies and clashes in South Darfur this week. Also in East Darfur the forced collection of weapons from civilians is at hands. Gunmen shot and killed a trader in Nyala in South Darfur on Monday evening, witnesses reported to Radio Dabanga. Ishag Shorom, one of the businessmen in the capital of South Darfur, was driving his vehicle when the gunmen intercepted him. “They shot him dead and fled the scene. It happened in Sabrin market, from where Ishag’s body was taken to Nyala hospital,” a witness said. Also in Nyala, a woman in the Sakali district was harassed by a member of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on Sunday night. She resisted when the armed man tried to rape her. He shot and wounded her. The woman has been transferred to the academic hospital in the city in a serious condition. • Farmer killed, South Darfur robberies continue | Radio Dabanga | October 6, 2017 | FANGA / GIREIDA A farmer was shot dead and his wife was seriously injured in the eastern part of Jebel Marra. In Gireida town, militiamen continued committing atrocities against locals and displaced people, injuring two women on Friday morning. In Dulo, north of Fanga in the area popularly known as eastern Jebel Marra, armed shepherds opened fire on farmers Hawa Ibrahim Hussein and Shadia Harun Suleiman. They tried to keep the herders from entering cattle onto their farms. Hussein was hit and died on the spot while Suleiman sustained serious injuries from the attack. She has been taken to the hospital to receive treatment, one of her family members told Radio Dabanga. Gireida raids Two displaced women were seriously wounded west of Gireida on Friday morning by militiamen. Witnesses told Radio Dabanga that three of them opened fire on the sisters Halima Musa and Khadija Musa, who were working on a farm in Um Asal. The farmers sustained wounds in the thighs, hands and legs, and have been transferred to a health centre for treatment. Also in Gireida, bandits robbed the passengers of a commercial vehicle on the Santa-Joghana road on Thursday evening. A source informed this station that about 15 gunmen, wearing camouflage uniforms, opened fire on three vehicles en route from Santa to Joghana. Aboard were people who returned from the markets. • Ambulance driver, displaced man killed in North Darfur | Radio Dabanga | October 6, 2017 | MELLIT / KUTUM / KABKABIYA / GIREIDA Three people were killed in separate incidents in Kutum, Kabkabiya and Mellit in North Darfur, including an ambulance driver. Armed men shot and killed Bashir Ibrahim Tahir, a displaced man from Fata Borno camp in North Darfur’s Kutum locality, on Thursday morning. Tahir was working on a farm east of the camp when the gunmen attacked him and stole his money, property and his donkey. Militia attacks People in Gireida in South Darfur have complained of continuous militia raids on farms and roads, which seem to target women in particular. A witness told Radio Dabanga that the area has witnessed a series of attacks in the past two days, the latest of which was carried out on Wednesday. Three displaced women from Gireida camp who were out on the fields came under attack by gunmen. The sisters Safia and Fawziya Ahmed Hussein respectively sustained a deep injury in her head and a broken leg, and a broken hand, during the attack. Khadija Omar suffered various injuries. This week, five militia raids were reported to Radio Dabanga, including the raid on Monday in which three people were shot dead in Fogali area in East Jebel Marra. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 SUDAN Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

On September 21, 2017, the UN Security Council unanimously passed the resolution 2379 aimed at establishing a mechanism for bringing Daesh to justice. It establishes an Investigative Team tasked with collecting evidence of Daesh atrocities in Iraq. The resolution has received widespread praise. However, the resolution, as a whole, may be too weak to ensure justice for the victims. The UN Security Council votes on the resolution 2379. (Photo credit: DON EMMERT/AFP/Getty Images) The Resolution The resolution requires the UN Secretary-General to establish an Investigative Team in Iraq consisting of Iraqi judges who will work together with Iraqi and international experts. The Investigative Team has been given a mandate of two years and will be led by a Special Adviser appointed by the UN Secretary-General. The Investigative Team will support the Iraqi domestic courts by ‘collecting, preserving, and storing evidence in Iraq of acts that may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide committed by [Daesh] in Iraq.’ The evidence obtained is to be used ‘before national courts, and complementing investigations being carried out by the Iraqi authorities, or investigations carried out by authorities in third countries at their request.’ The resolution also raises the possibility for the newly established team to collect evidence of Daesh atrocities in countries other than Iraq. Any such request would first need to be approved by the UN Security Council. The resolution can be praised for expanding the scope of the atrocities in focus to ‘murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking, suicide bombings, enslavement, sale into or otherwise forced marriage, trafficking in persons, rape, sexual slavery and other forms of sexual violence, recruitment and use of children, attacks on critical infrastructure, as well as its destruction of cultural heritage, including archaeological sites, and trafficking of cultural property.’ The destruction of cultural heritage and trafficking of cultural property remain an element of the Daesh atrocities that have not gained widespread attention. Considering the patterns of such atrocities perpetrated by Daesh aimed at the destruction of the signs of religious minorities in various regions - the atrocities cannot be neglected or degraded in their importance. In fact, they contribute to the establishment of the specific intent to destroy the protected groups - specific intent is of course required for the atrocities to be classified as genocide. However, the main genocidal crime perpetrated against Christians, namely forced displacement, was excluded from the resolution. This despite the fact that in August 2014, over 120,000 Iraqi Christians from Nineveh Plains were forcibly displaced to Kurdistan and other regions. Similarly, thousands of Yazidis were forcibly displaced from Sinjar. The failure to include forced displacement in the resolution causes concerns. Is it aimed at excluding the cases of forcibly displaced Christians or Yazidis from the investigation? Is it 'merely' gross negligence of the drafters who managed to forget about this mass atrocity? Lastly, as cultural heritage received more attention than the forcible displacement of thousands of people - is it the ultimate failure of the drafters to, yet again, put more value to the destruction of cultural properties than to the suffering of thousands of people fleeing for their lives. The issue whether forced displacement will be within the scope of the inquiry will have to be clarified. It may be the case that the Investigative Team will consider the atrocities even if they are not expressly included in the resolution (and especially as the list of atrocities is included in the preambular and not operative paragraphs of the resolution). One can hope so. However, as any action starts with the recognition of the problem - it is doubtful. The resolution is very clear in its purpose. Once instigated, it is envisaged that Daesh fighters will be prosecuted by ‘competent national-level courts’ and not international or hybrid tribunals. Any other use of the evidence obtained by the Investigative Team is to be ‘determined in agreement with the Government of Iraq on a case by case basis.’ The fact that Daesh fighters are to be prosecuted by Iraqi national courts also causes concerns that cannot be neutralised by the operative paragraph encouraging ‘Member States, and regional and intergovernmental organisations, to provide appropriate legal assistance and capacity building to the Government of Iraq in order to strengthen its courts and judicial system.’ ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Forbes

U.S. President Donald J. Trump’s 13 October decision not to certify Iran’s compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JC POA) based on his assessment that the agreement's costs outweigh its benefits will not, in and of itself, abrogate the deal. But it seriously, unnecessarily and recklessly undermines it. At best, it injects a level of uncertainty and unpredictability in a region that already has a surfeit of both. At worst, it is the opening salvo in a potential tit-for-tat that ultimately could unravel the deal, resuscitate the spectre of military confrontation and significantly compromise any prospect of a diplomatic settlement of the far more acute and perilous North Korean nuclear crisis. The accord’s fate now primarily rests on the actions of others: Iran, which could wisely display patience and avoid provocative counter-measures; Europe, which is beholden to the deal and would need to stand up to U.S. pressure; and the U.S. Congress, which ought to avoid the trap laid out in plain sight by the president and refuse to restore sanctions on Iran in violation of the deal or unilaterally alter the terms of the multilateral accord in the illusory hope that they can compel Tehran to renegotiate it. That Iran has been in compliance with its JCPOA obligations is beyond dispute. This repeatedly has been verified by the impartial UN nuclear agency entrusted with monitoring Iran's actions with the most rigorous inspection regime ever negotiated; by all the JCPOA’s signatories; indeed, by the U.S. itself. Unable to argue non-compliance when its own state department and defence and intelligence community have found otherwise, the president has opted for another path made possible by congressional legislation: refusing to certify the JCPOA on the grounds that the sanctions suspension is not proportionate to Iran's nuclear steps. For the White House, this has all the makings of a win-win-win scenario: it signals opposition to the deal while removing the burden of periodically certifying it; creates doubt as to its survival without taking immediate responsibility for torpedoing it; and shifts that burden to Congress, which has until 14 December to decide whether to restore, through an expedited process by a simple majority, the sanctions waived under the JCPOA. Such dramatic Congressional action seems unlikely. The administration and key lawmakers are disinclined to take this step, which would be tantamount to a unilateral U.S. exit from the deal – and thus a recipe for U.S. isolation and condemnation by its allies. Instead, their preference has gravitated toward a more subtle but potentially equally destructive route: to codify a threat to automatically snap back sanctions Congress previously suspended if, among other things, Iran no longer abides by restraints on its nuclear program after they elapse. In other words, legislation that would reimpose sanctions even if Iran continues to scrupulously abide by the deal. Needless to say, such a unilateral alteration of the JCPOA would constitute a violation of the accord. Worse, President Trump warned that he would walk away from the deal if Congress were not to pass such legislation, or if other JCPOA signatories did not agree to "fix" the deal's alleged flaws (notably that some of its provisions expire within 10, 15, 20, or 25 years, that Iran can conduct limited research and development, that the International Atomic Energy Agency does not have unhindered access to Iran’s military facilities, and that Iran furthers its missile program). In other words, Trump's message to U.S. partners is: violate the deal with me, or I'll violate it alone. The idea of a renegotiation is a chimera, and dangerous to boot. Iran's leaders have made it plain they will not renegotiate a just-concluded deal under pressure from a co-signatory that is threatening to walk away and whose compliance with the agreement's provisions they already doubt. Besides, any renegotiation inevitably would include reciprocal demands from Tehran that, at this point, it seems utterly implausible the U.S. would entertain. The White House might have other ideas in mind. It may be aiming not so much to achieve an unrealistic renegotiation, but rather either to ensure Iran complies with the agreement’s nuclear provisions without enjoying its economic benefits, or to push Iran to exit the deal. Whatever the case, the administration’s logic is both flawed and pernicious: it simultaneously claims that preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon is their most important priority; acknowledges that Iran is complying with a deal that achieves precisely that goal; and announces steps that potentially jeopardise it. Risks go beyond the JCPOA’s survival. As Iran's anger at U.S. actions and doubts regarding its intentions grow, and as growing uncertainty over possible U.S. sanctions risk scaring away potential foreign investors, it might eschew a direct response on the nuclear front. But its restraint could be tested on non-nuclear matters: some of its senior military officials already have threatened to directly or indirectly target U.S forces and assets in the Middle East in retaliation for sanctions aimed at Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, which the White House has announced would be a primary target of its policy. With tensions rising and no high-level political channel between Tehran and Washington, an incident at sea, escalation by proxy in Yemen or a clash between the two sides or their respective allies in the race for territory once occupied by ISIS rapidly could take a turn for the worse. More generally, in such circumstances, Tehran is likely to double down on policies it views as intrinsic to its national security: its ballistic missile program and alliance with non-state actors and proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. The result would be that, by destabilising the JCPOA, the Trump administration could provoke precisely the outcome it purportedly seeks to avoid. All of which explains why the deal’s survival now rests in other hands. First, Iran: its leaders have indicated that as long as other members of the P5+1 (and in particular its European members) remain committed to the accord, they will uphold it. The wiser course is indeed to adhere strictly to the deal, avoiding even technical infringements, refraining from responding to U.S. legislation inconsistent with the deal with reciprocal laws of their own, and eschewing provocative actions that not only would threaten regional security but ­– by prompting more sanctions by the U.S. Congress – plausibly spell the JCPOA’s death knell. Better yet, Iran's leaders should recognise that the deal will remain vulnerable as long as tensions between the U.S. and its allies on the one hand, and Iran on the other, remain high. Improving ties with neighbours and taking genuine steps to de-escalate regional conflicts would go a long way toward bolstering the nuclear deal. As senior Iranian officials put it to Crisis Group, Tehran's ultimate decision regarding the JCPOA will be guided both by political interests, such as the desire to maintain robust relations with Europe and drive a wedge between it and the U.S., and commercial considerations, which include the benefits they expected to flow from the deal. How likely it is that Europe will stand up to U.S. pressure is uncertain. Washington banks on the fact that, notwithstanding European vows to respect the deal, the imposition of U.S. secondary sanctions would place its businesses before the not-so-difficult choice of either scaling back their (relatively modest) Iranian trade and investment or risk jeopardising access to the far larger and more lucrative U.S. market. Which brings us to the posture of other P5+1 members in general, and Europe in particular. So far, they essentially have spoken in one voice, including up until the eve of Trump's decision, asserting that they will stick to the JCPOA notwithstanding Washington's views. Some of the deal’s critics have seized on French President Emmanuel Macron’s statedwillingness to supplement the agreement by addressing ballistic missiles and extending the duration of some constraints on Iran's nuclear program as a sign that Paris is open to a renegotiation. That is a mistaken and self-serving interpretation. Macron, like leaders of all other P5+1 states, repeatedly emphasised the primary importance of preserving the JCPOA. True, France and others wish to address other aspects of Iran's approach and see pressure and diplomacy as twin tools to that end. But they do not propose to do so – congressional arms twisting and presidential blackmail notwithstanding – by holding the nuclear deal hostage or threatening to violate it in the event such a supplemental agreement cannot be reached. Now that President Trump has announced his decision, European governments should reiterate their position and communicate publicly and to the U.S. that they will neither renegotiate the deal nor comply with unwarranted unilateral U.S. sanctions on Iran and will continue to abide by their own JCPOA obligations. The EU could go the extra step and revive its “Blocking Regulations”, prohibiting compliance with U.S. extraterritorial sanctions, thereby making clear that they will not give effect to U.S. judgments and administrative determinations pursuant to such sanctions and that companies will be reimbursed for damages incurred for alleged sanctions violations. Given the extent of trade growth between the EU and Iran since the deal came into effect – a 94 per cent increase in the first half of 2017 as compared to the same period in 2016, along with several major investment contracts – Europe's role in protecting the deal will be pivotal. For some European banks and companies, the choice between a $19 trillion U.S. market and a $400 billion Iranian one will be a no-brainer, but others arguably may be more willing to take the risk of dealing with Tehran if they feel shielded by their governments. In that spirit, the EU could signal its intent to facilitate financial transactions with Iran by expediting the process of turning Iran into one of the European Investment Bank's partners to support private sector and infrastructure development in the country. Overall, Europe's goal should be to send a political signal to both Tehran and European companies, providing both with reassurance and cover. Finally, and crucially, the U.S. Congress. The rashest of actions for now also appears the least likely: entirely snapping back the suspended nuclear sanctions. But as seen, there is danger in the so-called “third way”: congressional action that does not immediately re-impose all sanctions but penalises Iran and threatens to restore some in response either to Iranian actions not covered by the JCPOA or its refusal to modify the accord. Non-certification by Trump creates no obligation on the Congress other than to consider whether to re-impose sanctions. In the absence of an Iranian breach of the nuclear deal, U.S. legislators could simply, and prudently, decide to do nothing, making plain that the administration already possesses all the tools required to sanction Iranian ballistic missile activity, support for militant groups or human rights violations. Alternatively, if they feel the political need, they could pass legislation that clearly connects the prospect of sanctions re-imposition to Iranian violations of the nuclear deal that the JCPOA adjudication mechanism fails to remedy. What they should not do is become unwitting accomplices in the White House's all-too transparent effort to undo by stealth a deal that is working, and whose collapse would provoke a wholly unnecessary and dangerous set of crises not limited to the Middle East. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Group