Official Documents (in Burmese) of the ban against Ma Ba Tha (the first 2 pix), Ma Ba Tha's call to national meeting (the third one with the Ma Ba Tha logo) and today's (28 May) official announcement (the 4th and last one) of its rebranding itself as a philanthropic foundation. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________(c) 2017 MaBaTha, #Myanmar's military-backed civil society fascists rebranding themselves Buddha Dharma Philanthropy. The ban & rebranding documents.

UNITED NATIONS — A string of blatantly illegal attacks on clinics and ambulances in war zones around the world prompted the Security Council last year to demand protection for health workers and accountability for their attackers. It made no difference whatsoever. In conflict zones, attacks on doctors, nurses and ambulance drivers continue unabated, flouting one of the oldest principles of international law: to respect the neutrality of medical workers in war. In Afghanistan in March, gunmen disguised as doctors stormed a military hospital in Kabul, killing dozens in an attack claimed by the Islamic State. In Yemen, the Saudi-led military coalition, which is backed by the United States, bombed a hospital supported by the medical charity Doctors Without Borders in August, killing at least 15. The resolution, passed last May, served to remind countries of the laws of war that have long been on the books. Targeting a medical center is a war crime if it is intentional — and that is a difficult legal hurdle to overcome. Susannah Sirkin, director of international policy for Physicians for Human Rights, an advocacy group, said the Council had done little to actually carry out the measure. “It’s just a bunch of words on paper,” she said. “There’s been no effort at implementing it.” Syria alone accounts for nearly two-thirds of all attacks on medical centers documented in 2016 by the World Health Organization. For instance, in the blitz on Aleppo in November, the Syrian government bombed two hospitals providing trauma care in the rebel-held territory and hit the only children’s hospital operating there. The W.H.O. data, released on Friday, shows that attacks on health facilities have gone on unabated since the Security Council adopted the resolution that explicitly condemned such strikes and called for accountability. The W.H.O. tallied 302 such attacks last year, compared with 256 in 2015 and 338 in 2014. Data from the first quarter of this year shows that the world is on track for another deadly year. Ms. Sirkin’s organization is part of a coalition of health and human rights groups, Safeguarding Health in Conflict, that this month released its own report of attacks on medical facilities. The report documented attacks on health centers in 23 countries. It, too, found that Syria accounted for most of those attacks. The Security Council met on Thursday to discuss developments since the resolution. “These attacks are evidence of a broader trend: Parties to conflict are treating hospitals and health clinics as targets, rather than respecting them as sanctuaries,” António Guterres, the secretary general, told the council. “This goes against the spirit of the Geneva Conventions, the fundamental tenets of international humanitarian law, and our basic humanity.” Few Council members can claim innocence. Russia and its ally the Syrian government are accused of indiscriminate attacks on hospitals and clinics in rebel-held areas. Red Crescent ambulances have been attacked repeatedly as they rushed to help people hurt in the conflict. Syrian forces have routinely prevented medicines from reaching rebel-held territory. Rebels have been culpable, too, shelling a hospital on the government-held side of Aleppo last May, just hours before the Council resolution was adopted. The United States, for its part, is implicated in attacks by the Saudi-led coalition that it supports in Yemen. And in 2015, American forces repeatedly bombed a Doctors Without Borders hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan. The White House issued a rare apology, but the United States has refused to submit itself to an independent international inquiry. Governments condemn attacks on health facilities, but selectively, when their rivals are blamed for it. The Saudis rail against the Syrian government for attacks on clinics in areas held by the opposition. Russia uses the Saudi-led strikes in Yemen to skewer the United States and Britain. “The frequency of attacks and the impunity afforded to their perpetrators demands strong, sustained and fearless action at the national as well as global level,” the coalition said in its recent reporting through on their promises. The resolution condemns the “prevailing impunity” for attacks on health centers and calls on governments to carry out independent investigations. The coalition pushed governments to adopt military rules of engagement that protect health facilities, to train military forces to obey those rules and to ensure that perpetrators were held accountable. It also urged the secretary general to publish a kind of name-and-shame report, highlighting every year what measures countries have or have not taken to follow through on the Council resolution. In Syria, by far the worst violator of these laws, the attacks have become so endemic that health providers have had to take radical measures. Underground bunker hospitals have dotted the battlefield. The International Committee of the Red Cross has recently advised front-line medical providers to take a variety of precautions. They include erecting high boundary walls, developing contingency plans ensuring that health facilities can be self-sufficient for about 10 days in the event of fighting nearby and using their own judgment on whether to share their location coordinates with warring parties. A version of this article appears in print on May 26, 2017, on Page A4 of the New York edition with the headline: Despite a U.N. Resolution, Attacks Continue on Medical Personnel in War Zones. (C) 2017 The New York Times

Among the topics discussed by Catholic leader Pope Francis and US President Donald Trump was the persecution and protection of dwindling minority communities in the Middle East like that of the Christians. A Vatican statement highlighted that Trump and Pope Francis made "particular reference to the situation in the Middle East and the protection of Christian communities." Minority communities like Shabaks, Yezidis, Christians, Kakais were largely displaced in places like Baghdad, the northern Iraqi province of Nineveh, and northern Syria as ISIS swept across the Middle East in 2014. "The discussions then enabled an exchange of views on various themes relating to international affairs and the promotion of peace in the world through political negotiation and interreligious dialogue," read Vatican statement. Prior to the rise of ISIS in 2014, there were about 400,000 Christians in Iraq of various Chaldean, Assyrian, Syriacs and Armenian sects. Now there are about 200,000 who are sheltered in the Kurdistan Region with about that many having sought refuge abroad. “Radical ideologies, extremist lectures, wars and massacres especially against our Yezidi and Christian brothers and sisters have not affected this culture,” Kurdish Nechirvan Barzani Prime Minister said in December 2016. “But it has caused hesitation, fear, a deep wound and pain and posed a serious threat to the culture of coexistence in Kurdistan and Iraq. Interfaith leaders in the Kurdistan Region have participated in various coexistance forums; however, minority leaders have said that often the platitudes don't leave the room. “We have a serious task ahead of us. In this time of threats and terrorism this spirit of tolerance and coexistence has to be strengthened,” Barzani previously added. More than 100 churches and monasteries in Mosul alone have been demolished by ISIS militants since 2014. Elsewhere in the country, there was the 2010 October attack on the Assyrian Church in Baghdad that killed over 50 people, including many worshipers. The White House readout of the meeting stated the two leaders “discussed how religious communities can combat human suffering in crisis regions, such as Syria, Libya, and ISIS-controlled territory” The situation is complicated by the presence of rival forces protecting Christian towns and villages. Some areas, including Alqosh, Bashiqa, Tal Squf, and Batnaya, are under the protection of Nineveh Plains Protection Forces supported by the Peshmerga. But in Tel Kef, Hamdaniya and other places, Babylon Units, associated with the Hashd al-Shaabi forces, are in control. “It is my desire that you become an olive tree to construct peace,” the Pope, not referencing any one conflict, told Trump, according to The Associated Press. "We can use peace," Trump replied According to 1987 Iraqi census, 1.4 million Christians lived in Iraq primarily in the Nineveh Plains, Baghdad, and some Kurdish cities. But many have since migrated to the West or places like Lebanon after years of persecution and economic hardship. _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Rudaw

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) is extremely concerned about Mathias Depardon, a French photographer held for the past two weeks in Turkey and now on a hunger strike, and reiterates its call for his immediate release. Based in Turkey for the past five years, Depardon was arrested on May 8 while reporting in the southeast of the country for National Geographic magazine. Although an order for his deportation was issued on May 11, he is still being held at a detention centre in Gaziantep, a city near the Syrian border. RSF has learned from his lawyer, Emine Şeker, that he began a hunger strike on May 21. “The ordeal to which Mathias Depardon is being subjected is unacceptable and has lasted for too long,” said Johann Bihr, the head of RSF’s Eastern Europe and Central Asia desk. “The Turkish authorities, who are responsible for his safety, must end this grotesque situation. We again urge the French government to intervene firmly to protect this photographer and obtain his release.” RSF, two other media freedom organizations and 19 media outlets sent a joint letter to Turkish interior minister Süleyman Soylu on May 19 calling for Depardon’s immediate release. Turkey is ranked 155th out of 180 countries in RSF’s 2017 World Press Freedom Index. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Reporters Without Boarders

Executive Summary Defence sector corruption is a major threat to Nigeria's internal security and political stability. Largely unaddressed, it has weakened Nigerian counterterrorism capacity whilst strengthening Boko Haram. Nigeria's corrupt elites have profited from conflict; with oil prices at a record low, defence has provided new and lucrative opportunities for the country's corrupt kleptocrats. Former military chiefs have stolen as much as US $15 billion – a sum equivalent to half of Nigeria's foreign currency reserves – through fraudulent arms procurement deals. Defence sector corruption in Nigeria has enabled the political elite to accumulate and distribute political patronage. Longstanding military exceptionalism meanwhile, has justified weak and compromised oversight of securityrelated spending and excessive secrecy. By far the most significant corruption opportunities are those exploited through inflating procurement contract values and creating "phantom" defence contracts. Such contracts are used as a vehicle for money laundering: facilitated via weak or corrupted Nigerian banks, illicit financial flows are often hidden in property in the UK, United States, South Africa and Dubai. President Buhari's government has taken significant steps to identify and prosecute individuals involved in security sector corruption. And the campaign to focus international attention on returning stolen assets has been powerful. But however effective these efforts are, they will not be enough to win the long fight against corruption. The reality is that Nigeria's attempt to secure the repatriation of large quantities of illicitly laundered assets from places like the UK makes a better media headline than it does anti-corruption strategy. With the President's first term ending in 2019, the window of opportunity for far reaching change is closing rapidly. Only a holistic reform agenda can deliver the deep, systemic changes and improvements in transparency and accountability needed to prevent the next US $15 billion quietly leaving Nigeria through the back door. Ex-Air Force Chief of Staff Adesola Amosu was arrested by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission in 2016, and his trial is still ongoing. Photo credit: Premium Times Introduction Violent extremism thrives as a result of exploitative governing structures and state predation. Terrorist groups motivated by radical political and religious ideologies have destabilized Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, Somalia, Nigeria, and other weak or misgoverned states. These groups have been able to co-opt disaffected populations by leveraging popular antipathy toward corrupt governments, often by presenting their own radical agenda as having greater moral value and popular legitimacy than the secular governments they seek to destroy. Predation by these regimes – whether it takes the form of elite corruption, security force abuses, or ethno-religious chauvinism – serves to validate extremist narratives about the immorality of secular governance. The Boko Haram insurgency is now entering its fifteenth year, fed by the notorious levels of public sector corruption that have eroded the Nigerian state's legitimacy. Politicians compete for private control of national coffers, rather than delivering public goods based on the growing needs of Nigeria's booming population - on track to be the third largest in the world by 2050. Yet for the vast majority, corruption remains endemic and systemic, warping the social contract between the government and citizens. Patronage - not performance - is the ticket to advancement. Securing a prosperous future for nearly 180 million people will be tough. The continent's largest economy has, since 1970, suffered from the largest per annum illicit financial outflow on the continent as corrupt actors seek to exploit banking loopholes to launder and hide their unlawful assets. An estimated US $217.7bn was illegally transferred out of Nigeria between 1970 and 2008. The same study estimated that illegal transfers from the African continent have tripled since 2001. Across the board, public sector corruption is undermining the state's ability to address Nigeria's many challenges: socioeconomic underdevelopment, unemployment and insecurity. Nowhere is the failure of governance more evident than in the northeast, a region that was already impoverished even before it was devastated by Boko Haram. The conflict has displaced over 2.6 million people and killed as many as 50,000 since May 2011. Corruption has been particularly destructive in the defence and security sector. Overlooked in peacetime, defence sector corruption has devastating real world consequences when conflict flares. With lower oil prices, corrupt elites have increasingly exploited alternative illicit revenue streams. The secret nature of defence and security budgets has made them the easiest and most lucrative opportunity to exploit. While Boko Haram has constructed a conflict economy geared around pillage, racketeering, and kidnapping; senior players in the Nigerian security sector have also profited from the insurgency. Extra-budgetary spending on counterterrorism has dramatically increased throughout 2014 and into 2015, and with it the scale and scope of corrupt opportunities in the defence sector. Corruption has hollowed out the Nigerian Army, the largest in West Africa, and compromised the integrity of the country's Navy, which has been implicated in the theft of millions of barrels of crude oil in recent years. The result has been a corrupt war economy that incentivises high- ranking officials and security personnel to perpetuate conflict for personal gain. War has been a boon to Nigeria's corrupt. Since coming to power in May 2015, President Buhari has taken some bold action in tackling defence sector corruption. Central to his approach have been two ad hoc, temporary audit committees: one investigating spending by the Office of the National Security Adviser and one investigating defence arms and equipment procurement. Taking on the defence establishment was a significant move: the evidence uncovered by these probes revealed that several of the country's former military chiefs, using dozens of companies, together stole as much as US $15 billion. President Buhari's anti-corruption drive is a rare example of senior Nigerian defence and security officials being exposed to criminal investigation. By signalling that military impunity is not without limit, it is undoubtedly a positive step forward. The approach has been coupled with a determined attempt to see the return of Nigeria's stolen wealth. During the London Anti-corruption Summit in May 2016, President Buhari demanded the return of illicitly laundered assets from the UK. The point was powerfully made, but sadly, the chances of success are slim. Asset recovery is a lengthy and resource heavy procedure. The UK performs relatively well compared to international peers, but even at the highest estimate, asset freezing and repatriation are tiny in relation to the vast scale of theft. Over the past 12 years, UK enforcement agencies have prosecuted just a handful of cases – three state governors – and repatriated only a few million pounds to Nigeria. This is a fraction of what has surely been stolen. The extent of misappropriation of public funds by former General Sani Abacha is notorious. Listed as one of the top four most corrupt world leaders, during five years in office Abacha is estimated to have embezzled between US $2 and 5 billion. Despite unprecedented cooperation between UK, USA, Swiss and Nigerian authorities to return these stolen assets, the case is on-going 19 years after Abacha's death. Abacha and these three governors all plundered defence and security budgets. Nigeria suffers from the continent's highest illicit financial flows because it offers the most opportunities for corruption. To stop today's assets being misappropriated, defence sector reform must be an equal priority to enforcement and repatriation, or Nigeria's leaders will always be chasing the past. Since independence, every civilian and military administration has come to power promising to root out corruption. Without progressing its approach to anti-corruption reform, Nigeria's current and future governments will at best be destined to the same media headlines as its predecessors. Political patronage With evidence uncovered by the two ad hoc audit committees established by President Buhari, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Nigeria's main anticorruption agency, has indicted over 300 individuals and companies for defence sector procurement theft and misappropriation. Fifty-five people, including former government ministers, military chiefs, state governors, and bankers were reported by the committees to have stolen 1.34 trillion naira ($6.8 billion) over a seven-year period in the shape of arms equipment deals. A further $2 billion was allegedly stolen from the National Security Budget under the watch of National Security Advisor, Colonel Sambo Dasuki. What these investigations illustrate is a system of kickbacks, where billions of dollars were diverted from procurement spending, through the use of 'briefcase' companies, in order to fund the ruling party's supporters and ensure electoral success for the People's Democratic Party (PDP) in the 2015 general elections. The amounts stolen are shockingly bold. Yet the misappropriation of budgets to buy political support is not new. Successive Nigerian leaders, both civilian and military, have built governmental power structures around the country's main income stream: oil. And until recently oil revenues have typically accounted for up to 70 per cent of government revenues - feeding powerful patronage networks. Obasanjo did not even appoint an oil minister, preferring to supervise the ministry directly himself. Successive administrations have maintained the same structure: former PDP president Goodluck Jonathan, a civilian, appointed his close ally Diezani AlisonMadueke as Oil Minister. Madueke – who has recently been charged with money laundering – was described by one Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) official as, "the oil institution." The drop in Nigeria's state oil revenues has hit oil sector rents hard, and this has led Nigeria's corrupt elites to raid defence and security sector budgets to maintain their power bases. With defence budgets forming close to 20 per cent of total government spending in 2017, the sector offers lucrative rewards to Nigeria's corrupt elite. Much of this has been hidden through large value contracts. According to the former Head of the Bureau for Public Procurement (BPP) – the agency established to monitor, oversee and set standards for government procurement spending – 90 per cent of bribes in Nigeria occur through procurement. Both the size and opacity of the defence sector has made it an attractive veil for fake corporate activity. While some of this money is stolen for individual profit, a great deal is dispersed through complex patronage networks. As former Central Bank Governor Lamido Sanusi phrased it, "corruption in Nigeria is not mindless...it is calculated and systematic." Sustaining political patronage is a system, a system that was previously predominantly funded by the oil sector but is now increasingly relying on plundering of the defence and security budget. Former President Goodluck Jonathan expended unprecedented amounts of patronage, even beyond historical norms, to improve his electoral chances. One former adviser observed that President Jonathan and his allies acted "with a siege mentality" within an unstable PDP. The oil and defence sectors were exploited to record levels in order to sure up an extensive patronage network and safeguard President Jonathan's political future. These kleptocractic networks have yet to be disabled. Kleptocratic capture of the defence sector What is overwhelmingly clear from the results of the ad hoc audit committee investigations is the extent of unmonitored, systemic control over the defence sector by senior government elites. The lack of clear separation between the executive and the military is a long running problem. Despite the formal end of military rule in 1999, the military has played a significant role in political life. With control of the armed forces and a monopoly on access to arms, military generals have the power to protect access to resource rents and ensure their place within the ruling elite. Kleptocratic capture of the defence sector rests on three pillars: capture of defence budgets and income, capture of defence spending and procurement, and capture of senior military posts. Facilitating this capture are powerful senior figures – godfathers – who select and appoint personnel to defence sector positions, in order to operationalise systemic control over security finances. The system facilitates control from the highest levels of the political party to the lowest levels of the military. Appointments can also be used as political bargaining chips: former President Jonathan cemented a pre-election political alliance with former head of state Ibrahim Babangida by appointing Aliyu Mohammed – a long-time Babangida loyalist, ex-Army chief, and NSA to two presidents – as minister. As one Nigerian Army officer put it, the "selection of officials [both civilian and military] is done politically and based on who is who. Even when personnel are picked to oversee certain aspects that involve anything in procurement, it is done based on the gain expected or to be reaped by the 'godfather' who does the selection." Among the rank-and-file, chronic pay shortfalls, inadequate training, and dilapidated facilities create powerful incentives for corruption by undercutting the overall professionalism and morale of the military. As the military's esprit de corps has eroded, so too has its sense of purpose and focus on its core missions. Over time individual officers and soldiers have come to prioritise their own personal wellbeing - or even their mere subsistence - over the needs of the service. Perceiving themselves to be victims of corrupt behaviour, such as the skimming of allowances or embezzlement of essential operational funds, many have lost faith in the legitimacy of the system and the patrimonial guarantees made to them when they joined it. Excessive secrecy In any country, a proportion of spending must remain confidential for security reasons; typically 15 per cent, including among states in conflict. Yet Nigeria classifies nearly all defence contracts and budgets, and considers any broadlydefined security-related matter 'secret' by definition. Even according to the Nigerian government, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) ranks among the agencies least compliant with the 2011 Freedom of Information (FOI) Act. Civil society, meanwhile, ranks the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) among those security agencies most resistant to disclosing information in response to FOI requests. These opaque habits are cultural remnants of the decades Nigeria spent under military rule that have been preserved by contemporary military and civilian leaders keen to forestall outside scrutiny of their activities. As a result, Nigeria ranks among those countries at the highest risk of corruption due to the overclassification of budget data and weak oversight of secret budgets. This culture of secrecy is often openly hostile or vengeful towards journalists and civil society. In December 2015, soldiers reportedly perpetrated gross human rights violations during two separate military crackdowns in Zaria and Onitsha. In response to these allegations the Nigerian Army has labelled its critics as "unscrupulous and unpatriotic". Meanwhile President Buhari's government has failed to take any action to hold the military to account for incidents such as the deaths of several thousand detainees – due to starvation, torture, and disease – at the Giwa Barracks military prison between 2011 and 2014. Similarly, in June 2016 Nigeria's Minister of Defence condemned media reports about the Chief of Army Staff's links to high-end property in Dubai describing them as "disgruntled and unpatriotic elements" and warning the media that they should show more "professionalism [when reporting on] security and defence related matters". In September 2016, military soldiers and officers of the State Security Services allegedly stripped and beat ten journalists and media workers with barbed wire before arresting them. The Nigerian military's hostile response to scrutiny reinforces the perception that it is distinct from other state institutions and can play by a different set of rules. Moreover, there has been a long standing culture among senior officers that rank has its privileges and that promotion to top echelons comes with the prerogative to use one's position for personal gain. This heavily undermines public trust. Military exceptionalism Despite Nigeria's 1999 return to democratic rule, the oversight exercised by civilian officials and other watchdogs over the military and security agencies remains very weak. Weak accountability has enabled powerholders along the entire defence spending chain to misappropriate state funds, from the Presidency down to unit commanders at ground level. Although the Senate and the House of Representatives have several security committees (National Security and Intelligence, Defence, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police Affairs), members of these panels rarely undertake in-depth oversight activities. With defence sector spending shrouded in secrecy, entities such as civil society groups, media organisations, the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP), the Auditor General of the Federation, and National Assembly committees are similarly unable to marshal sufficient information to play watchdog, even if they have the formal legal authority to do so. By establishing two ad hoc investigatory committees to audit the ONSA and past defence procurement, President Buhari has attempted to sidestep existing undeveloped or ineffective oversight institutions. Official announcements from the Presidency declared the probe would investigate contracts entered into from 2007 to 2015, but critics claim that current ruling party members implicated in fraud have been allowed to pay to evade charges, while opposition supporters have been held without bail and charged. Whether or not accusations over political manipulations are true, the reality is that these ad hoc bodies lack the legitimacy and credibility to be a successful long-term solution. The acquiescence of international partners International military partners have a part to play and have done precious little to disincentivise Nigerian security-sector corruption. By failing to integrate effective anti-corruption measures into their security engagement policies, partners are inadvertently diminishing the impact of their military assistance. US military and police aid to Nigeria, totalled US $45.4 million from 2010 to 2014, but was just a small fraction of the more than US $2 billion in security funds that was allegedly stolen by Nigeria's previous National Security Advisor – who for three decades enjoyed a close relationship with Washington. Key international suppliers of Nigerian military hardware are facilitating fraud by agreeing to uncompetitive or unorthodox contracts. In 2013, Nigeria officials reportedly skimmed US $20 million from an internet surveillance contract directly awarded to an Israeli company in defiance of public procurement competition rules. Likewise, a former air-force chief admitted embezzling millions via seven arms contracts directly awarded to a Ukrainian company. International partners are missing opportunities to encourage reform. The United States' efforts to sell 12 A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft to the Nigerian Air Force – whose last three chiefs, along with other senior officers, are currently on trial for embezzlement and procurement fraud – looks like business as usual. Contracts such as this are opportunities to prompt change, yet it is not at all clear that the Nigerian Air Force has become more transparent about its finances and procurement; and the senior air force officer invited to Washington in July 2015 to discuss the Super Tucano sale, has since been charged with corruption. The widespread use of both international and Nigerian agents to facilitate such deals also increases opportunities for inflating contracts and paying bribes, as illustrated by the recent investigation into Rolls-Royce. Although this case is a good example of how strong, coordinated international enforcement efforts can make businesses accountable for unethical conduct. Disrupting financial crime The most effective action against asset flight is to prevent it occurring in the first place; and here the Nigerian and international financial sectors could play a much greater role. Recent evidence from the Presidentially-appointed ad hoc Audit Committees has shown that stolen funds often pass through multiple accounts before being moved offshore beyond the reach of domestic authorities. As facilitators of corrupt funds, both Nigerian and international banks need to raise their standards of governance and control. Those that repeatedly fail should be sanctioned or shut down. But this is not currently happening: Skye Bank has been consistently implicated in the EFCC's corruption and fraud prosecutions, such as the current N22.8 billion trial of three former air force chiefs and an Air Force Director of Finance for money laundering. Skye Bank has been indicted alongside the defendants, yet the Central Bank of Nigeria has not used its sanctioning powers to hold board members to account. Instead, the Central Bank allowed board members to announce they had "voluntarily resigned" - despite evidence of gross insider malpractice, including by the Chairman Tunde Ayeni. Ayeni is a close associate of President Jonathan and convicted PDP governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha. Whilst chair of Skye Bank, Ayeni was also chair of Joint Aviation Services Limited - a briefcase company involved in bidding for inflated defence procurement contracts - highlighting the high level of elite control of defence spending and money laundering. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Africa Focus

The interview with Dr. Sai Oo, Country Representative of Pyidaungsu Institute for peace and dialogue in Yangon, Myanmar was led by Mirco Kreibich, Director, Heinrich Böll Stiftung Myanmar After the first peace conference in August last year Myanmar has seen a surge in heavy fighting, in particular in Kachin and Northern Shan States. What is behind the latest clashes between the Burmese army, the Tatmadaw, and the ethnic armed organizations (EAO)? Sai Oo: A simple answer is they are trying to get an upper hand in the conflict. There is not enough political will on both sides. To some degree, Tatmadaw still believes it can win militarily. [They think a better] military position can give them an upper hand in the negotiations. Among the EAOs, many groups still do not have enough confidence in the negotiations. Some still believe that the Tatmadaw is not sincere. They don’t have enough trust in the peace process. Which EAOs have been involved in the recent fighting and what are their interests? Sai Oo: Heavy fighting took place in Kachin State between the Tatmadaw and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO). You can see this as a battle for strategic positions. The Tatmadaw wants to ensure that the KIO is cut off from their main incomes. In Shan state, [the context] looks similar but is very different. In Northern Shan state, the Tatmadaw is mainly engaged with the TNLA- the Ta’ang National Liberation Army – and also the Kokang Army (Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army -MNDAA). From time to time, the Arakan Army (AA) is also involved [in the fights]. So we see that Tatmadaw is fighting with three organizations in Northern Shan state. None of these organizations has a bilateral ceasefire agreement with the government, so the Tatmadaw can justify its actions by arguing that it is trying to bring peace [to the region]. TNLA, AA, and Kokang have not been invited to sign the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in 2015. Basically, from the Tatmadaw perspective, they are not part of the game and they need to have a bilateral agreement before they can come to the negotiating table. The EAOs claim to be fighting for the liberation or freedom of their own people and do not understand why they are being excluded from the process. These groups feel that they need to make noise so that they can be heard (laughs). You already mentioned that the interest of the Tatmadaw is to gain a strategic position and maybe strategic depth. But are they reacting in the attacks - as they claim - or are they instigating the conflicts? Is it maybe in the Tatmadaw’s interest if the country is locked in a low or medium intensity war where you have regular clashes with EAO? Sai Oo: The Tatmadaw on the one hand says, “we need to sit down and negotiate, we got to deal with our differences politically”. But at the same time, on the ground, in Kachin State, the fighting was very heavy on both sides and a number of displacements took place but they are not being well-published in media. The Tatmadaw tries to brand these groups as terrorists. This is another political strategy put in place so they can officially launch attacks on these groups. But would you say it is in the interest of the Tatmadaw to have these fights going on? Could it be that for the Tatmadaw fighting is also a means to justify their continuous engagement in politics, saying that as long as the country is in the middle of clashes and regular fights, the Tatmadaw has to play not only military but also a political role? Sai Oo: There is enough evidence that the Tatmadaw does not have enough political will. The Tatmadaw claims to be making peace but has a very rigid position on the NCA. Often the Tatmadaw would go back to its six principles . It knows that the six principles are for the EAO very difficult to accept. On one hand, they try to promote peace by inviting these ethnic groups to come and negotiate, while on the other hand, it launches attacks on certain groups. So you can see that the Tatmadaw has very different strategies when it comes to peace building. It [The Tatmadaw] still believes in the fighting, and that it can keep it in a better position. And yes, armed conflict will serve the Tatmadaw’s interest. If it keeps engaging in armed conflict, the Tatmadaw’s role continues to be important as an army as well as in politics. Is there a real possibility that the Tatmadaw wins this war, in a military sense, especially with regard to the KIO? Is there a threat of defeat of the KIO? Sai Oo: The fighting has significantly weakened the KIO position. But it is nearly seventy years of armed conflict, the Tatmadaw knows very well that it cannot finish this conflict by military means. The Tatmadaw is fighting not to win militarily but to gain a strategic position, both in military as well as political terms. Aung San Suu Kyi has made the peace process one of her priorities. But she has been criticized for being silent to a large extent on the latest fighting. What is behind this silence? And what do you think are the degrees of freedom she has to speak out and her leverage over the Tatmadaw? Sai Oo: It is very clear that the government and the Tatmadaw are not in agreement when it comes to how to go ahead with the peace process. The government has difficulties influencing the Tatmadaw. It has been unable to win the Tatmadaw over in the political process. From the previous to the current government, we have seen more fighting and the current government is not able to stop that or even slow it down. We can clearly say that the government is unable to influence the Tatmadaw when it comes to negotiations. The Tatmadaw does not totally agree with the government’s political strategy. But at the same time, the Tatmadaw wants the NCA to go ahead. So what might be happening is that the Tatmadaw and the government are fighting for the leadership in the peace process. So you are saying that for the Tatmadaw the ultimate aim is to have peace but only under the conditions defined by the Tatmadaw. Is that a good description? Sai Oo: It is exactly that way. The Tatmadaw wants peace but it has to be on its own terms. That is why the current negotiations are having difficulties. That is why the groups that have not signed the NCA continue to negotiate. And for these negotiations, you can see that the Tatmadaw has not moved its position. It is difficult to have peace if you do not move your positions. The second peace conference was supposed to take place in late February but has been postponed. EAOs are reluctant to participate in a new peace conference as long as the fighting is going on. What do you think are the prospects for having a meaningful peace conference now and what are the prospects of different armed organizations coming back to the table? Sai Oo: The NCA has the political road map laid out. As soon as the document was signed, there was some step by step work to be done. By then, all sides had agreed, to organize a Union Peace Conference every six months. The last peace conference in August 2016 can be called an inclusive one because the invitation was extended to the groups that had not signed the NCA, for example, the KIO. The expectation was that this Union Peace Conference was about making peace, about finding a solution, about establishing a Federal Union of Myanmar. There were high expectations for this 21st century Panlong conference in August. But along the way, the negotiations between the UNFC [United Nationalities Federal Council – an association of ethnic minorities] and the government did not produce a good result. Instead they were having a media war, holding on to their positions, and accusing each other for not succeeding in the negotiations. So that golden opportunity was lost again. By the end of 2016, it became really clear that UNFC were not ready to sign the NCA. That is one of the reasons why the second conference, that was supposed to take place in February, has been postponed again and again until now. Some EAO who already signed the NCA are in favor of having more EAOs participating. The Tatmadaw has made it difficult to negotiate because it sticks to its position. From the EAOs side, there is lack of clarity in terms of their strategy and their political goal. For example they will argue for all inclusiveness but then they cannot define what inclusiveness means to them. Sometimes they have contradicting views and even on terms. Both sides are sticking to their maximum positions and there is not enough political will and interest on both sides. So this lack of political will, you also see this from the ethnic side? Are there spoilers who may not have a genuine interest in peace? I am thinking of the Wa State Army for example. What is there interest in having a long lasting peace? Sai Oo: The difficulty is the numerous numbers of ethnic groups with some being more pragmatic than others. Some leader would say the NCA is an opportunity to engage politically to find a solution. You also have some leaders who do not trust the process yet. They would say that the Tatmadaw is not genuine. What I mean is: do you think there is also some actors in the whole process who simply lack a genuine interest in peace because some of them live well on a situation of a war economy? If you have these kind of actors, how do you deal with them? Sai Oo: Everyone is claiming they are working for peace, whether they have signed the NCA or not, the Tatmadaw, the government... Peace is a term that everybody uses. There is no armed group that is saying it is not interested in peace. That is including the groups that have not signed the NCA, the UNFC, and that includes the Northern Alliance who say that they don’t have confidence in the NCA. They want peace but not this process. But you can say that all groups want more or less to maintain their position. They want a good solution but they do not want to sacrifice anything. And yes, more or less each group has certain interests in their current position. What is your outlook for the future? How do you see the process in the next month, and year maybe? Sai Oo: It looks more and more complex now than a couple of years ago when there was a better opportunity to move forward the peace process. Now it has become three, or four, five different groups and with different interests. That will make it hard. One thing for sure is that the current strategy is not working. They need to look for better options. I believe that all groups are starting to talk with neighboring countries, especially China, which is keen to be part of the peace process. There is a general assumption about China, being behind a number of different armed groups, has good relationships that can help move the process forward. The Northern Alliance proposes a new process but they have not explained or clarified what they mean. The Tatmadaw and the government think that the NCA is so far is the best document; the groups who have signed the NCA would also say that. So we have all these different positions. I think it will continue to be a chaotic process for now unless the Tatmadaw and the government realize that the current strategy they are applying is not effective. The government needs to unite the people in the peace process. For the Tatmadaw, unless they have another hidden agenda, the current strategy they are using is not going to produce much good for either side. Thank you very much! __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Green Politcal Foundation

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) is alarmed to see that the Turkish authorities are stepping up their persecution of those who took part in a campaign of solidarity with the pro-Kurdish daily Özgür Gündem and that, for the first time, they have imposed an actual prison sentence on a participant, Murat Çelikkan. All previous jail sentences were suspended. The trial of RSF Turkey representative Erol Önderoğlu for participating in the same campaign is meanwhile due to resume on 8 June. Çelikkan “has not shown enough remorse,” an Istanbul court said on 16 May when it announced that it was sentencing this journalist and human rights activist to 18 months in prison on a charge of “propaganda for a terrorist organization.” A total of 56 journalists, human rights defenders and intellectuals took part in the solidarity campaign, taking turns at being Özgür Gündem’s “editor for a day” from May to August 2016 because it had been hounded by the justice system. Forty-one of them were charged. Most of those whose trials are already over have been convicted on the same charge as Çelikkan. They include university academic Beyza Üstün, who was given a suspended 15-month jail sentence on 16 May. “This is the first time that one of this solidarity campaign’s participants has been sentenced to actual imprisonment and it is extremely disturbing,” said Johann Bihr, the head of RSF’s Eastern Europe and Central Asia desk. “We call for the convictions of Murat Çelikkan and Beyza Üstü to be overturned on appeal and for the withdrawal of all charges against the other participants, who just defended pluralism.” The articles cited in evidence against Çelikkan, published when he was “editor for a day” on 25 May 2016, were mostly reports on operations by the Turkish security forces in the troubled southeast of the country. One was about a Turkish conscript who deserted and joined the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) after an attack on pro-Kurdish activists. Thirteen of the campaign’s participants have so far been convicted of “propaganda for a terrorist organization” (the PKK) or “publishing its statements.” They have been given suspended sentences that, combined, so far total 11 years and 10 months in prison. They have also been fined a total of 50,000 Turkish lira (13,200 euros). The suspended sentence of 15 months in prison and fine of 6,000 lira that well-known composer and free speech advocate Şanar Yurdatapan had received was upheld on appeal on 14 April. When RSF representative Önderoğlu’s trial before the same court as Çelikkan resumes on 8 June, the prosecutor is expected to present his summing-up. If that happens, Önderoğlu’s lawyers will request an adjournment in order to prepare their speech for the defence. Önderoğlu is being tried along with Şebnem Korur Fincancı, the head of the Turkey’s Human Rights Foundation (TIHV), and the writer Ahmet Nesin. These three are the only ones to have been placed in pre-trial detention for their role in the solidarity campaign. That was last June, when they were held for ten days before being freed conditionally. They are facing up to 14 and a half years in prison on charges of PKK propaganda, condoning crime and inciting crime. Turkey is ranked 155th out of 180 countries in RSF’s 2017 World Press Freedom Index, between Democratic Republic of Congo and the Sultanate of Brunei. The media freedom situation in Turkey was already worrying but it has become critical since the July 2016 coup attempt. Around 150 media outlets have been closed and more than 100 journalists are currently in prison. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Reporters Without Boarders

In a wide-ranging interview with Radio Dabanga published a week ago, the Obama administration’s third and final Special Envoy for the Sudans, Donald Booth, offered a reprise of much that has been reported about the decision by President Obama to lift longstanding U.S. economic sanctions on the genocidal Khartoum regime. The sanctions were originally imposed by President Bill Clinton in 1997 and modestly strengthened by President George W. Bush. I append the interview in its entirety below, edited only very slightly for formatting; however, I’ve also interpolated by own comments at various junctures, always in [brackets], blue italics, and followed by my initials, ER]. I would begin by noting the preposterous nature of the claim in the title to the Radio Dabanga dispatch: far from being “a start to address Sudan's human rights issues,” sanctions relief has produced nothing in the way of an improvement in the rights of Sudanese, or a diminishment in what is in fact intensifying repression. In the more than four months since President Obama signed the Executive Order lifting sanctions (pending a review of Khartoum’s adherence to various stipulations in July 2017), there continue to be massive human rights abuses, daily restrictions of freedom of the Sudanese press, and incarceration of human rights and civil society leaders, often in conditions that amount to torture under International Humanitarian Law. The most prominent human rights and human development leader currently incarcerated (at the notorious Kober Prison) is Mudawi Ibrahim, arrested in December 2016. Indeed, rather than releasing Mudawi, officials of the Khartoum regime brought capital charges against him one week ago, the day before Booth’s interview. Human rights defender and human development advocate Mudawi Ibrahim was charged with capital crimes by Khartoum regime officials the day before Booth's interview with Radio Dabanga---does he care? I have twice offered “report cards” on Khartoum’s behavior, judged on the basis of terms stipulated by the Obama administration for a permanent lifting of economic sanctions; on both occasions, the summary grade was a well-deserved “F” – failing. A Permanent Lifting of U.S. Sanctions on Khartoum? Report Card Number One | April 8, 2017 | http://wp.me/p45rOG-22o A Permanent Lifting of U.S. Sanctions on Khartoum? Report Card Number Two | May 11, 2017 | http://wp.me/p45rOG-238 The current assessment, represented in my interpolated comments, continues to be “F,” despite the disingenuousness and distortions in Donald Booth’s responses to Radio Dabanga’s questions. Former Obama administration Special Envoy for the Sudans, Donald Booth ************************************************************ Donald Booth: “Sanctions relief is a start to address Sudan's human rights issues” | Radio Dabanga | May 15, 2017 https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/donald-booth-sanctions-relief-is-a-start-to-address-sudan-s-human-rights-issues Over the next three months, the United States will decide whether Sudan has made sustainable progress on certain areas and it will remove 20-year-old economic sanctions imposed on Sudan. “Given the level of trust that the US and Sudan were starting from, we needed to have areas where it would be as clear as possible if indeed the agreed objectives were being met.” The prerequisites for the revoking in July, such as Sudan's ceasing of offensive military activity, were drawn up while Donald Booth was in charge as US Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan. More access for humanitarian organisations in Sudan, halting support to the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, collaboration in the fight against terrorism, and efforts to achieve peace in South Sudan, are the other four tracks. In the event that Sudan performs to the satisfaction of the US and sanctions are partially removed, Sudanese politicians said that this will improve Sudan's economy by easing cash transfers, investments, importing industrial equipment and ultimately raise the value of the Sudanese Pound. In an exclusive interview with Radio Dabanga broadcast today, former envoy Booth expresses his view on the plan he worked on. “The five tracks are the beginning of a process, for the mutual confidence that was needed in order to address these very difficult issues of human rights and good governance.” RD: Dear Ambassador Booth, what were your overall expectations when you started as special envoy to Sudan and South Sudan and what are your impressions now, concerning these both countries? DB: “I left the job in mid-January 2017. When I started, President Obama gave me a clear objective to work towards. That was two countries, Sudan and South Sudan, at peace internally, with each other, and with the region. [Both countries remain riven by conflict, violence against civilians, and with clear, indeed unambiguous past evidence of Khartoum’s support for the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/In Opposition in South Sudan—ER] What I've seen in the past three years, we did manage to bring Sudan closer to peace. [Given the levels of violence that continue, particularly in Darfur, the catastrophic “success” of Khartoum’s genocidal counter-insurgency in the region, and the threat of continued fighting in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, this seems an absurdly premature assessment—ER] South Sudan unfortunately is not any closer to peace, further away actually than when I started. [The Obama administration, particularly under his first two Special Envoys for Sudan—Air Force Major-General (ret.) Scott Gration and Princeton Lyman—bears heavy responsibility (as does the Bush administration) for failing to respond to the obvious and growing crises that emerged following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of January 2005. The failure to secure a self-determination referendum for Abyei ensured the violence that began in May 2011 and has resulted in the de facto annexation of the region by Khartoum. Leadership, governance, oil revenue transparency, and capacity building were terribly and consequentially ignored for too long by both previous U.S. administrations—ER] That's a very unfortunate development. We certainly worked very hard with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) region and all South Sudan neighbours to try to put an end to the fighting. We had a peace agreement, which unfortunately the parties refused to implement. And now they're back fighting. The situation in South Sudan is indeed deplorable. The fighting is spreading to different parts of the country that had not been affected in the preceding years. The US and the region need to continue pay attention to this.” RD: “People in Sudan expressed surprise to Radio Dabanga at the plan of the United States to lift economic sanctions on Sudan, seen as a reward for the situation.” DB: “First of all, I would not characterise it as rewards. [It matters not how Booth would “characterize” the radical policy shift: it is clearly a great reward, a potential financial and economic boon to a genocidal regime that is presently presiding over an imploding economy—the result of 28 years of gross mismanagement, kleptocracy, widespread cronyism, and multiple failures to invest in key sectors (e.g., agriculture) and infrastructure (e.g., provision of clean water to Sudanese citizens living outside the capital region—a failure that can presently be measured by the spread and persistence of deadly cholera—ER] What we managed to do in 2016 was to initiate a process to achieve change that would benefit the people of Sudan. [This is simply grotesque: judged by any metric, the people of Sudan not only suffer grievously because of the policies of the current regime but will continue to do so: the military/security budget far outstrips what is spent on education, medical services, job training, infrastructure (including provision if essential electrical services), and humanitarian assistance to Sudan’s own people. The people of Sudan are, overwhelmingly, convinced that only regime change will bring real benefits to them. See Appendix A for specific examples of what the people of Sudan suffer compared with the rest of the world—ER] What will "benefit the people of Sudan" is an end to slaughter by the army and militias controlled by the Khartoum regime; here a victim of the January 1, 2017 "Nierteti massacre"... The level of trust between US and Sudan was at a very low point. [Sanctions were originally imposed on Khartoum because of its support for international terrorism, a business in which it was active with long-time partner Iran for many years after Osama bin Laden ended his four-year stay in Sudan in 1996. To this day, Sudan is one of only two countries remaining on the U.S. Statement Department list of “State Sponsors of Terrorism." Leaked (and fully authenticated) minutes from an August 31, 2014 meeting of the regime’s most senior military and security officials revealed clear involvement in terrorist activities and support for radical Islamic militants (e.g., “Libya Dawn” in Libya)—ER] So we developed the five tracks plan, to try do begin to develop trust which could lead to positive changes. And the areas that we focused on that are areas that the US has long been focused on: a country at peace with itself. One of these tracks was to end offensive military operations, in part including aerial bombardment, which has been so horrific and harming innocent Sudanese. In achieving greater access of humanitarian assistance so that those Sudanese who need those humanitarian aid could be reached.” “It was also, frankly, a way to address and improve what had been tense relations between Sudan and Uganda.” RD: Recently Uganda and the US have ended a six-year search for warlord Joseph Kony and his LRA, because Kony apparently no longer leads his men and the threat to the region has diminished. Is helping to reduce support to the LRA included in the five conditions for Sudan because in fact, Kony is no threat to the region anymore? DB: “No, not at all. The LRA and Kony killed and enslaved thousands of people throughout the region, and certainly terrorized people in the region. Removing him as a threat to the region was a priority for the [former US president] Obama administration. It was also, frankly, a way to address and improve what had been tense relations between Sudan and Uganda. So, in getting Sudan to cooperate fully in the efforts to remove Joseph Kony and the LRA as a threat to the region, we believed would be an important contribution to regional peace and stability.” [As Booth well knows, Khartoum’s ending of its longstanding and well-documented support for a badly weakened LRA is not difficult: continuing support for Kony’s maniacal campaign of brutality and human destruction is simply no longer necessary for the regime, tactically or strategically—ER] RD: Do you feel there is progress in the relations between Sudan and Uganda? DB: “I know that during the period that I was envoy, there were, for the first time in a long time, there were high-level meetings between the leaderships of the two countries. And so that discussion, getting underway in itself, I think was positive. How that has continued now, I'm not in the position to know any details of.” RD: One of the things human rights organisations, activists and observers felt was missing in the five track plan was a condition or discussion on human rights, religious freedom issues and basic good governance in Sudan. DB: “Frankly, ending aerial bombardment, barrel bombs being dropped on civilian targets, and offensive military operations that displaced and killed and wounded civilians, we believe are a major human rights offence. [Here we have a perfect example of a disingenuous refusal to answer the question posed to him: of course Khartoum’s military actions have consistently been gross violations of “human rights,” and indeed violations of international law that have seen various members of the Khartoum regime—including President Omar al-Bashir—charged with genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes by the International Criminal Court. But Radio Dabanga is obviously asking about the right to public protest, freedom of the press, religious freedoms (e.g., the crackdown on Christians and Christian churches has continued apace since the Obama Executive Order of January 2017), freedom from discrimination, harassment, and violence suffered on the basis of African ethnicity. Not to answer this question forthrightly is the signature maneuver by Booth and his predecessors—ER] Civil uprising throughout Sudan in September 2013 resulted in the Khartoum regime's issuing "shoot to kill" orders, a fact established by Amnesty International and the African Center for Justice and Peace Studies; hundreds were killed. Regime President Omar al-Bashir threatened to issue the same "shoot to kill" orders this past September, as civil society actions were again in the offing. “So if you want to talk about protecting human rights, the basic right is that of life. We felt that that focus of the five-track plan had very much a human rights component to it. Secondly, the five tracks are the beginning of a process, for the mutual confidence that was needed in order to address these very difficult issues of human rights and good governance. [By declaring that the “five-track plan” is the “beginning” of the process of rapprochement, Booth gives himself all the leeway he needs in dodging questions central to the current concerns of virtually all Sudanese—ER] “And third, we had to pick areas in which we could both measure and achieve progress. [This appears to be nothing short of a confession that the U.S. is powerless to make progress in the area of “human rights” as the term is commonly used—ER] “Given the level of trust that we were starting from, we needed to have areas where it would be as clear as possible if indeed the agreed benchmarks were met. So that we would be able to have a very clear and mutual understanding. And we would not have--what happened in the past—where expectations had not been met as both sides had different interpretations of what would be done. [This is more deeply disingenuous twaddle from Booth: the simple truth is the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime has never abided by any agreement with any Sudanese party—not one, not ever. Not to speak honestly and directly about this long and uniform history of bad faith is itself a kind of bad faith—ER] “So I think we succeeded in this with the five track plan, in building that confidence that Sudan does take certain hard measures, like ending military actions against its own people—offensive military actions. That there will indeed be a response from the US, and that the US will keep its word in that regard.” [The past four months have hardly been free of organized violence, especially by the Rapid Support Forces in Darfur; not to acknowledge this is to encourage Khartoum to believe that it will receive a “passing grade” from the U.S. on this count, despite the violence reported by Radio Dabanga, Sudan Tribune, and sources on the ground. Notably, nowhere in his interview does Booth mention the use of chemical weapons by the regime during its 2016 military offensive in Jebel Marra, conclusively established in a report on this brutal military campaign by Amnesty International in September 2016—ER] The Amnesty International report cover page; below, two of the victims of Khartoum's use of chemical weapons in its 2016 Jebel Marra offensive, which figures nowhere in Booth's comments: RD: How did the US government determine in 2016 that the situation in Sudan was suitable for a review of the five criteria for the possible lifting of economic sanctions, and how did you find whether Khartoum failed its commitment concerning the five tracks? “There were very clear benchmarks. The US, during the period of the five-track plan's implementation at the end of my time as envoy, was very carefully monitored. We had regular consultations with the UN, international NGOs. We took all reports that related to potential violations of conditions of the five-track plan very serious. We investigated them to the fullest extent possible. We held bi-monthly meetings between the US government and the Sudanese government, to make sure that if there were problems, that they were corrected. In a monthly basis we met at ministerial level with the Sudanese government, to work out where there were any issues in the implementation. [And this “careful monitoring” issued in a statement by then-Obama administration UN Ambassador Samantha Power, declaring in her final interview that there has been a “sea change” of improvement in humanitarian access in Sudan. Such an egregious falsehood—which Booth never corrected, even as the State Department has admitted there was no basis for such a claim—undermines completely Booth’s credibility here—ER] Former Obama administration ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power: There has been a "sea change" of improvement in humanitarian access in Sudan (UN press conference, January 20, 2017) “So, for example, the ability to monitor whether there was support to armed opposition in South Sudan, was very clear if it were happening or were not happening. [Two points of note:[1] Khartoum’s support for the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/In Opposition became far too publicly known; [2] the destruction in South Sudan was so great from conflict between the SPLA/IO and the SPLA of the government in Juba, that the tactic of assistance was no longer necessary—ER] This is true in all of the areas, with the possible exception of humanitarian access. [There is still no explicit retraction of Samantha Power’s false statement about humanitarian access, a revealing omission—ER] Here we recognized all along that there would be no on/off switch. We would not go from a system where there were a lot of restrictions to one which had complete openness. But what we saw over the course of the six months, of the five track plan, was a continued improvement, reported by those on the ground as we engaged the government in that part of the five track plan.” [This stands in stark contrast to what I have heard from international humanitarian non-governmental organizations (INGOs) working in Darfur and (surreptitiously) in South Kordofan; here is an excerpt from an email to me by Dr. Tom Catena, the only surgeon working in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan: “there's been absolutely no change in humanitarian access [in the Nuba Mountains—suffering under Khartoum’s humanitarian embargo for over five and a half years]. Not a single grain of sorghum nor one tablet of medicine has entered Nuba from any of the usual humanitarian agencies.” (email received January 17, 2017) The most recent estimate by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is that 3 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance (this leaves aside the 300,000 Darfuri refugees who remain trapped in eastern Chad because of ongoing insecurity in Darfur). The most credible report I have received from the INGO community operating in Darfur is that Khartoum continues to obstruct, in one way or another, humanitarian assistance to 30 percent of this population—almost 1 million human beings. Booth’s assessment is in this light simply preposterous—ER] RD: Radio Dabanga has reported on military activities and aerial bombardments by Sudan that violate the conditions for the lifting of sanctions. US Congressmen, NGOs, and groups in Sudan voiced their concerns or held protests against your plan. What do you think the US will do in case of failure by Sudan? DB: “The monitoring by the US Government is ongoing, and in July this year, the US Secretary of State will report on compliance on the five-track plan. The unlimited replication of the sanctions' executive orders—and those sanctions that had the broadest impact on the people of Sudan—will depend on that report. I certainly hope that the Government of Sudan will honour its commitment to the five-track plan so that those reports can be positive. And the sanctions executive orders can be lifted.” [Booth declares this “hope” despite the abundant evidence that Khartoum is reneging on what are clearly the two key terms of the “five-track plan”: humanitarian access and an end to organized violence against civilians, even if by proxy militias—ER] RD: The ruling National Congress Party and President Omar Al Bashir say that they have started change in Sudan with their National Dialogue. Do you feel that too? DB: “There has been a dialogue but today it's certainly been too narrow. [The truth is the there has never been any sort of “national dialogue,” which the regime has spoken of privately in the most cynical and expedient terms. It is not that the “national dialogue” has been “too narrow”: it is a foolish hope, based on the same misguided premises that were reflected in a statement by Booth’s predecessor, Princeton Lyman, over five years ago: “We [the Obama administration] do not want to see the ouster of the [Khartoum] regime, nor regime change. We want to see the regime carrying out reform via constitutional democratic measures.” (Interview with Asharq al-Awsat, December 3, 2011 | http://english.aawsat.com/2011/12/article55244147/asharq-al-awsat-talks-to-us-special-envoy-to-sudan-princeton-lyman) Former U.S. Special Envoy for the Sudans Princeton Lyman; in December 2011 he wanted us believe to that the NIF/NCP regime was capable of "carrying out reform via constitutional democratic measures.” The intervening five and a half years offer not a shred of evidence justifying this preposterous assumption. Despite the absurd cynicism, finally the mendacity, of this statement, Booth continues to be guided by its premise: that the current Khartoum regime will “carry out reform via constitutional democratic measures.” To believe this is to ensure that U.S. Sudan policy will be a continuing accommodation of genocidal ambitions, expressed most clearly several years after the Lyman statement by regime Vice President Hassabo Mohamed Abdul-Rahman, cited here in a Human Rights Watch report of September 2015 about the “new Janjaweed,” the Rapid Support Forces (“Men With No Mercy”): Ahmed, a [defecting] 35-year-old officer in the Border Guards, spent two weeks at military base in Guba in December 2014 before being sent to fight rebels around Fanga. Two senior RSF officials, the commanding officer, Alnour Guba, and Col. Badre ab-Creash were present on the Guba base. Ahmed said that a few days prior to leaving for East Jebel Marra, Sudanese Vice President Hassabo Mohammed Abdel Rahman directly addressed several hundred army and RSF soldiers: “Hassabo told us to clear the area east of Jebel Marra. To kill any male. He said we want to clear the area of insects… He said East Jebel Marra is the kingdom of the rebels. We don’t want anyone there to be alive.” [Presumably Booth has read the Human Rights Watch report, but one would hardly gather as much from his faith in the NIF/NCP regime, which has engaged in multiple genocidal counter-insurgency wars, not only in Darfur, but in the oil regions of South Sudan, in the Nuba Mountains in the 1990s, and currently in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, where the regime maintains a total embargo on humanitarian assistance to civilians in the large areas controlled by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/North—ER] Vice President Hassabo regards the non-Arab/African people of Darfur as "insects"; the goal of the 2014 offensive in East Jebel Marra was guided by his primary directive: "We don't want anyone there to be alive." One of the things that I did as envoy was to continue to urge the GoS to keep the process open and to make it inclusive, as they promised to do in the March 2016 Roadmap Agreement that it signed. This is the agreement [African Union Chief Mediator Thabo] Mbeki had negotiated, and the roadmap which initially the armed opposition and others refused to adhere to. [There could hardly be a more incompetent and corrupt mediator for Sudan’s conflicts than Thabo Mbeki. His original “Roadmap” for peace in Darfur (2009) failed utterly, paving the way for the conspicuous failure that was the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (2011), which even Booth’s office now acknowledges is a non-starter for Darfuri civil society and what remains of the rebel movement. Mbeki is despised and held in contempt by Sudanese in opposition; to invoke him here as somehow having enjoyed diplomatic success is grossly disingenuous, and expedient insofar as if frees the U.S. from taking on greater diplomatic responsibility in making Khartoum a more tractable and good-faith partner in negotiations—ER] Lead African Union mediator in various of Sudan's crises Thabo Mbeki: corrupt and incompetent--here with his pal Robert Mugabe, strongman leader of Zimbabwe The US and the Troika and European partners worked for months to convince the opposition that it, too, needed to engage, and sign the Roadmap, and begin the process of addressing the substantive issues rather than just procedural issues. The National Dialogue will hopefully remain open and can be made inclusive.” [There simply is no “National Dialogue”—and the pretense that there is makes it clear again that the U.S. is willing to accept symbolism in place of substance when it comes to the Khartoum regime—ER] RD: There are various sanctions imposed on Sudan, regarding the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act (2006), which President Bush signed to block the property and transactions with designated individuals and entities associated with Sudan’s government, the executive order, and the branding of a state sponsor of terrorism. Which one is prioritised if Sudan fulfills its obligations and commitments by July? DB: “What President Obama did with his executive order in January this year, was to suspend two executive orders: 13067 and 13412. And these—if the report, to be done in July, shows that the Government of Sudan has continued to adhere to its commitments—would be indefinitely lifted. [...] But there are other sanctions and restrictions in place. One certainly has to do with individual sanctions, those persons' sanctions by the UN, which have been implemented under another executive order. As well as the restrictions and sanctions that stand from the 'state sponsor of terrorism' designation, and various other designations and US laws, including the Darfur Peace Accountability Act.” [As I suggest above and in my two previous “report cards,” the issue of lifting sanctions has been prejudged, a prejudgment most conspicuous in the preposterous claim by Ambassador Power that there has been a “sea change” of improvement in humanitarian access. Given the opposition to the decision to lift sanctions—by the majority of Sudanese, by human rights groups and advocacy organizations—we may see a six-month delay emerge from the July “assessment.” But as long as the thinking of Booth and his predecessors guides U.S. policy—which it may well do, given the rudderless Trump administration, which is still without an Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs—then the decision to lift sanctions permanently is only a matter of time—ER] RD: Did US trade missions to Sudan, consisting of ICT and consumer goods companies, take place during your time as special envoy? DB: “I did not lead any trade missions to Sudan during my time as special envoy. Clearly I think the lifting of the sanctions […] would open the door for much greater participation by US companies in Sudan, and by Sudanese companies dealing with the US as well. I hope that that will happen – I think we need to get to a mutually beneficial trade commitment.” [Economic benefits accruing from improved trade relationships with the U.S. and EU countries will benefit only those within the regime and its extensive network of cronies that provide the small but key political support the regime enjoys—ER] Displaced Darfuris who have little chance to realize the purported benefits of a lifting of U.S. economic sanctions on the genocidal Khartoum regime RD: If you have a special message for the Sudanese people, please share it with us. DB: “I think what the people of Sudan want… To have security, to be left alone, to work their land, to live their lives, and educate their children. And so, when I heard that the Government of Sudan took those measures to restore peace and stability, to protect all Sudanese, and to enable them to get on with rebuilding their lives… [Here Booth is simply ventriloquizing Princeton Lyman, ignoring countless realities in Sudan and crediting a genocidal regime with a change of heart that simply has not occurred. This utterance is a disgrace to the U.S.—and the grossest and most consequential insult to the people of Sudan—ER] …enabling refugees and displaced people to return home – this requires first and foremost the end of fighting and the establishment of internal security. […] I urge the armed opposition to also cooperate in that, simply refusing to talk is not a way that will help the people of Darfur and people of Sudan. [The implicit characterization of the rebel movements in Darfur—blameworthy in many ways, to be sure—will only work to convince Khartoum to remain obdurate in peace negotiations. This fact is to conspicuously obvious that it is impossible not to conclude that the U.S. is simply pursuing national interest by ignoring it. The lust by the U.S. intelligence community for what Khartoum can provide in the way of counter-terrorism intelligence governs at every point, and in Donald Booth, the intel community has found someone willing to do their dirty diplomatic work in the same way that previous Obama administration special envoys for Sudan have—ER] “I wish the people of Sudan all the best. I hope peace and stability will come, and they indeed will be able to building their lives, educating their children and moving forward to their country.” APPENDIX A: Facts ignored by Donald Booth: under 28 years of tyrannical rule by the NIF/NCP regime, Sudan currently— • Ranks 107th out of 176 on the CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2016; • Ranks 174th out of 180 countries in the 2017 WORLD PRESS FREEDOM INDEX (Reporters Without Borders) • Roughly half the population lives below the international poverty line http://www.indexmundi.com/sudan/population_below_poverty_line.html ; • Inflation is raging in excess of 50 percent, although the official rate (as reported by the regime-controlled Bureau of Central Statistics) is 35 percent; food is increasingly too expensive for great numbers of Sudanese; • Not having planned for the loss of oil revenues from what is now South Sudan, the regime has allowed the supply of Foreign Exchange Currency (Forex) to fall to extremely low levels, creating severe difficulties in importing adequate quantities of wheat for bread and refined petroleum products; the lack of the latter has meant that water pumps are not operating in many areas, even as cholera continues to spread for lack of clean water; • Shortages of clean water, electricity, and basic medical services affect more than half the population of Sudan; • There has been enormous emigration of medical personnel, especially doctors and highly trained nurses, because of shortages, poor salaries, and harassment by the regime; • The regime continues to maintain its monopoly on national wealth and power, and functions as a brutal kleptocracy, something that has not changed in the slightest, despite claims by Booth and his predecessors (see | "Kleptocracy in Khartoum: Self-Enrichment by the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party, 2011 – 2015" | Enough Project Forum Report | http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/enough-forum-release-kleptocracy-khartoum/); • Rape continues to be used as a weapon of war in Darfur, targeting non-Arab/African girls and women (e.g., https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/north-darfur-schoolgirl-13-survives-brutal-rape ); more broadly, see: “Continuing Mass Rape of Girls in Darfur: The most heinous crime generates no international outrage” | January 2016 | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1QG [Arabic translation of this report | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1Rr ] [Arabic names for key locations on maps | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1Si • Senior regime officials as well as regional officials in Darfur continue to speak of dismantling camps for displaced persons—some 2.7 million human beings, most without resources, land, or homes outside the camp after 14 years of violent expropriation of farmlands by Arab militia groups: see | “Changing the Demography”: Violent Expropriation and Destruction of Farmlands in Darfur, November 2014 – November 2015" | December 1, 2015 | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1P4 • In the aftermath of years of conflict throughout Sudan, the regime has created what is effectively a “militia state,” a phrase that figures centrally in two important recent reports that have evidently escaped the attention of Donald Booth: “Border Control from Hell: How the EU's migration partnership legitimizes Sudan's "militia state" | The Enough Project | April 5, 2017 [by Suliman Baldo] http://www.enoughproject.org/files/BorderControl_April2017_Enough_Finals.pdf “Remote Control Breakdown : Sudanese Paramilitary Forces and Pro-Government Militia,” by Jérôme Tubiana | HSBA Issue Brief 27/Small Arms Survey, April 2017 | http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-27-Sudanese-paramilitary-forces.pdf _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 SUDAN Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

Sunday Detroit Free Press published the Letter I sent to the Chief Editor for Detroit Free Press News Paper Sunday. May 21, 2017 U.S. must demand that Iraq protect minorities While the world is focused on the genocide caused by ISIS, a leading Iraq Shi’te imam, Ala al-Musawi, the head of Shi’ite Endowment of Iraq, this month described Christians as infidels who should be killed if they refuse to abide by rules for non-Muslims in a Muslim country. The U.S. government must demand that Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi denounce Ala al-Musawi’s statements. At their meeting in March, President Trump and al-Abadi “agreed that the United States and Iraq will pursue a long-term partnership to decisively root out terrorism from Iraq,” a White House readout from the talks said. If this agreement is to have any meaning, al-Abadi must speak out in support of the Christians and other minorities. The Iraqi constitution, which establishes Islam as the country’s official religion and the basis for its legislation, should be amended to encompass all religious in Iraq. Despite guarantees of religious freedom for minorities in the constitution, sectarian leaders treat minorities as second-class citizens, and in much of the country, Muslims who convert to a different religion face the threat of death. The U.S. government must take a principled stand and demand that the government of Iraq protect all its citizens and jail all those who foment violence. By, Joseph T. Kassab Founder and president, Iraqi Christians Advocacy and Empowerment Institute West Bloomfield, Michigan ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Sunday Detroit Free Press

Those who believe that all Buddhists respect their religion's core principles of peace and tolerance should take a look at The Venerable W (Le Venerable W), director Barbet Schroeder’s eye-opening chronicle of one Burmese monk’s long campaign of racism and violence against his country’s minority Muslim population. The third part in a “trilogy of evil” that began in 1974 with General Idi Amin Dada and continued in 2007 with a look at the controversial French lawyer Jacques Verges in Terror’s Advocate, this scathing portrait gets up close and personal with Ashin Wirathu, the self-appointed spiritual leader of Myanmar’s anti-Muslim crusade. Speaking openly to the camera, Wirathu propagates xenophobia and bigotry against a group that represents only a fraction of the local population, yet have been subject to decades of persecution by both the monk's followers and the military-controlled Burmese government. The result has been hundreds of deaths, thousands of homes burned to the ground and tens of thousands of Muslims displaced — all of it in the name of a religion that asks, according to one translation of the Metta Sutta, to “cultivate boundless love to all that live in the whole universe.” The Venerable W, which consists of interviews with Wirathu and some of his most outspoken critics, as well as footage of riots, beatings, burnings and killings that have taken place since the 1970s, reveals that the 75-year-old Schroeder is still a fearless explorer of the darkest facets of our society. At a time when Islamophobia is on the rise in Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere, his film is a reminder that even the most peaceful of religious doctrines can, if twisted in the wrong way, be used as a veritable source of evil. A premiere in Cannes should give this vital documentary the attention it deserves. Wirathu operates out of the city of Mandalay, a third of whose inhabitants consist of monks or monks-in-training. In the late 90s he formed the “969” movement and began delivering racist sermons to his disciples, referring to Muslims as “kalars” (the equivalent of the n-word) and claiming they are a subspecies who don’t deserve Myanmar citizenship, that their businesses should be boycotted and that they should be banned from intermarriage with Buddhists. Although prejudice against the Rohingya Muslim community, which is based in the western part of Myanmar bordering Bangladesh, dates back to before Wirathu’s time, he has helped accelerate a campaign resulting in many, many deaths and the mass destruction of property. In order to fuel the fire, he often highlights incidents where Muslims have attacked Buddhists (in one case, the rape and murder of a woman), distributing propaganda videos on DVD and backing riots where Rohingyas are driven from their homes while the armed forces stand idly by. What’s especially disturbing about Schroeder’s inquiry is how, on one hand, Wirathu can be seen expounding the peaceful tenets of Buddhism to his followers, while on the other he preaches a holy war meant to ostracize — and indirectly, destroy — an entire segment of the population. The man himself sees no contradiction in the two, simply believing that Muslims are a lesser race unworthy of the basic human rights accorded to Buddhists. While the situation in Myanmar is particularly extreme, Schroeder reveals at one point how, even in a Western nation like France, the perception of Islam’s grip on society versus the reality of that grip is highly exaggerated. Terrorist attacks like those that occurred in Paris in 2015 only help to augment fears and nationalistic tendencies, which is why a candidate like Marine Le Pen was able to capture more than a third of the vote in France’s recent presidential runoff. The Burmese authorities have made some attempts to quell the tide of Islamophobic sentiment, banning the “969” group and jailing Wirathu for several years. But after his release, the popular monk managed to form a new movement, promoting a series of “protection of race and religion bills” that seem to be the first step toward a modern version of the Nuremberg Laws of Nazi Germany. One of those laws has already been enacted, while the government continues to persecute the Rohingyas throughout the land. Like in his portraits of Verges and Idi Amin, Schroeder has an unflinching way of capturing the propos and rationale of Wirathu without any filter whatsoever. Ace editor Nelly Quettier (Holy Motors) juxtaposes the lengthy one-on-one interview with found footage of devastated villages and grisly beatings, revealing how Wirathu’s teachings resonate through the widespread violence that has afflicted Myanmar for several decades now, and that will likely continue in the near future. In a place where Buddhists currently represent more than 90 percent of the populace, it’s unthinkable how a religion that preaches so much love can, in this case, yield so much hate. Production companies: Les Films du Losange, Bande a Part Films Director: Barbet Schroeder Producer: Margaret Menegoz Director of photography: Victoria Clay Mendoza Editor: Nelly Quettier Composer: Jorge Arriagada Venue: Cannes Film Festival (Special Screenings) Sales: Les Films du Losange In French, Burmese, Rohingya, Spanish 107 minutes __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Hollywood Reporter

An unprecedented Christian exodus is sweeping across the Middle East as the Islamic State continues to target the religious minority in deadly attacks, a trend that could see their population dwindle to a record low. (REUTERS / Stoyan Nenov)Migrants line-up at a registration point after crossing the Macedonian-Greek border near Gevgelija, Macedonia, September 7, 2015. Sponsored Watch Your Favorite Christian Films, 24/7. If the record-breaking Christian exodus continues, the proportion of Christians could drop to only 3 percent of the Middle East's population by 2025, while they used to make up 13.6 percent of the population in the region. Their exodus raises fears that radical groups will flourish in the region, Newsmax reports. "The disappearance of such minorities sets the stage for more radical groups to dominate in society," according to Todd Johnson, the director of Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary's Center for the Study of Global Christianity. "Religious minorities, at the very least, have a moderating effect." As of now, Islam is still the main religion in the Middle East, and clashes between rival sects under the same faith have led many to fear that violence will continue to reign in the region. Another factor leading to the Christian exodus is the existence of laws that discriminate against the religious minority, such as the ones forbidding them from rebuilding their churches. On May 12, the Syriac Catholic Church, the Syriac Orthodox Church, and the Chaldean Catholic Church issued a joint statement calling for the establishment of a safe zone for persecuted Christians. The leaders of the three main Iraqi churches want that safe zone to be protected by the international community, Rudaw reports. The joint statement was released after Shiite cleric Ali Mousavi made a public announcement declaring Iraqi Christians as "infidels." He said the Christians in the country who still have not converted to Islam must pay the jizya tax or depart from the Muslim areas. In addition, Mousavi called for the implementation of jihad to pressure the Christians into embracing Islam or paying the jizya tax. This statement drew widespread condemnation among Christian communities. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 ishtartv

Last week in Washington, DC, 600 persecution victims and advocates from 130 countries gathered for the first ever World Summit in Defense of Persecuted Christians to create partnerships that can help bring about change. The Billy Graham Evangelistic Association hosted the event, where religious freedom leaders and influencers sought solutions and encouraged and prayed for those who are beaten, tortured, imprisoned and raped because of their Christian faith. During the summit, I had the opportunity to speak with Archbishop Vicken Aykazian of the Eastern Diocese of the Armenian Church in America. The Archbishop is a Turkish-born priest who represents the Diocese of the Armenian Church of America (Eastern) in Washington, DC. The genocide taking place in the Middle East today weighs heavily on him. One hundred years ago, the Ottoman Turks had a vision of a new Turkish state that included Armenia, so they vowed to annihilate Armenians who had occupied the land for more than 3,000 years. In 1915 the Turks began deporting, starving and murdering; when they were done, more than one-and-a-half million Armenians had suffered from the genocide. In a sermon delivered to the General Convention of The Episcopal Church in 2015, Archbishop Aykazian stated, “Sadly, such brutality set the tone for the 20th century: a tone which would be heard again in the Nazi death camps, in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Rwanda and Darfur. And it echoes in our own days, in the Middle East, in Syria, in Iraq, in Africa, and other desperate places.” In what he called the most difficult trip of his life, in early 2017 Archbishop Aykazian visited Baghdad and the northern Kurdistan region as part of a delegation. “When I visited a refugee camp in Iraq, I thought it was 1915, visiting the same people only 100 years ahead.” Archbishop Aykazian met with 70 young adults at the refugee camp and asked how he could help them rebuild. A somber young woman stood up and said, “I am married and have three children. You look at me and I look like a human being, but I am not. They have destroyed everything in me. You see my body, but it is empty. They have taken my identity. Bring that back for me.” “My colleagues and I were so depressed that we could not continue our conversation with these young people,” Archbishop Aykazian said. “I want to believe what Vice President Pence told us yesterday at this summit, that the U.S. very much cares about Christians, but it is easy to say. This week President Erdogan of Turkey is coming to meet with President Trump. It is time to ask him: ‘Why don’t you open the Christian seminaries in Istanbul? Why are you putting pastors in prison? Why don’t you allow the Armenians to elect a Patriarch?’” In Iraq, there were 1.7 million Christians before 2003; today, there are fewer than 200,000. In 10 years, maybe there will be no Christians. “What this means is that the nativity is going to be a museum. All those churches that have been there for centuries will be a museum for the Western world. “And here in America, the shining city on top of the hill, the light is only in words, not in actions. You have to act.” Lou Ann Sabatier Director of Strategy and Communications Take Action: 1. In light of the Armenian Genocide and the continuing genocide, Click here and see if your representative is supporting it. 2. Learn more about the history of the Armenian church. 3. Write to President Trump and ask him to raise religious freedom issues with the President of Turkey. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Wilberforce