What does child marriage mean for girls’ lives? And why does child marriage persist? Child marriage and a lack of access to quality education are major barriers to progress for girls across the globe, Human Rights Watch said today, on the United Nations International Day of the Girl Child. Millions of girls worldwide are married or at risk of being married, and global progress by governments to end child marriage and ensure access to quality primary and secondary education is slow. Child marriage occurs in every region of the world: one out of every four girls marries before age 18. “Child marriage blights the lives of millions of girls, including by depriving them of their education,” said Liesl Gerntholtz, women’s rights director at Human Rights Watch. “Unless governments act decisively, the number of married girls and women married as children will only grow, holding both the girls and their countries back from reaching their full potential.” Girls in India during a hygiene training as part of the Great WASH Yatra. Himanshu Khagta, WASH United, 2012 Loss of access to education is both a cause and a consequence of child marriage. Around the world, 32 million primary school and 29 million lower-secondary school-age girls are out of school, and almost two-thirds of the world’s illiterate adults are women. Girls who are out of school are at heightened risk of being married as children. South Asia has the highest prevalence of child marriage, with one in two girls married before the age of 18. In sub-Saharan Africa, 40 percent of girls marry before age 18, and African countries account for 15 of the 20 countries with the highest rates of child marriage. Child marriage also occurs in high-income countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom. Human Rights Watch has documented the adverse consequences of child marriage in Nepal, Bangladesh, Malawi, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, South Sudan, and Yemen. Child marriage prevents girls from participating in all spheres of life but has a particularly pernicious impact on their access to education. Girls who marry often leave school prematurely due to social pressure, domestic responsibilities, and pregnancy and parenting. In many countries cultural or religious beliefs stigmatize unmarried, pregnant girls, with the result that pregnant girls are forced into early marriages. Discriminatory government policies often bar married or pregnant girls from attending school. In Tanzania, for example, Human Rights Watch found that school officials conduct forced pregnancy tests and expel pregnant students. The government has also stalled on its commitment to increase the legal age of marriage to 18 for boys and girls. Girls in Malawi, South Sudan, Nepal, and Bangladesh told Human Rights that once married or having given birth they faced family pressure to drop out, lack of child care, inability to pay education-related costs, and the need to do household chores. The government’s failure to provide genuinely free and accessible education for all contributes to the pressure on those most at risk. Syrian refugee Omayma al Hushan, 14, who launched an initiative against child marriage among Syrian refugees, walks on her way back from school in Al Zaatari refugee camp in the Jordanian city of Mafraq, near the border with Syria, April 21, 2016. © 2016 REUTERS All UN member countries have made a commitment to the UN Sustainable Development Goals to guarantee gender equality, end child marriage, and provide universal access to free primary and secondary education for all children by 2030. Governments should adopt—and fully enforce—laws that set 18 as the minimum marriage age for boys and girls, Human Rights Watch said. They should also enact laws to ensure the free and full consent to marriage of both spouses and to provide penalties for violence and intimidation to pressure people to marry. Governments should educate parents, guardians and community leaders about the harmful effects of child marriage and put programs in place to protect girls at risk. Governments should also guarantee that girls have equal access to free quality primary and secondary education, Human Rights Watch said. They should ensure that girls get the support they need to stay in school, and reverse harmful policies and practices that discriminate against girls, including forced pregnancy testing and regulations that allow for the expulsion of pregnant or married girls. Governments should also provide information to parents, guardians and community leaders about the benefits of educating girls and step-up efforts to keep girls in school in rural and remote areas where child marriage is more prevalent. “Girls in school should not have to fear marriage depriving them of their education,” said Zama Neff, children’s rights director at Human Rights Watch. “Governments should put in place laws and policies that ban child marriage and ensure that all girls have access to free primary and secondary education.” __________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Human Rights Watch

It was April 30, 2006, and a recently elected Illinois senator named Barack Obama walked up to a microphone on the National Mall in Washington. He was speaking at a rally against genocide in Darfur, a region of western Sudan roughly the size of Texas. Joining him was actor George Clooney, Nancy Pelosi, and 50,000 people waving signs saying “Never Again” and “Stop Genocide.” The idea of the rally was simple: raise awareness and prevent further atrocities in Darfur by putting pressure on U.S. politicians to take action. Obama listed the atrocities committed by Sudanese government forces against its own civilians in Darfur: Women gang-raped while gathering firewood, 300,000 people killed, children slaughtered. Three years earlier, ethnic minorities in Darfur rebelled against the Sudanese government, provoking a wave of atrocities in retaliation. Sudanese military pilots flew hulking Russian-made airplanes and dropped bombs from above. Government forces and an allied militia known as the Janjaweed burned villages to the ground. The Washington rally was the pinnacle of a historic mobilization of American citizens known as the Save Darfur movement. With a multimillion-dollar advertising budget, celebrity star power, and prolific media attention, Save Darfur marked one of the first times in U.S. history that a campaign to prevent genocide in a distant country entered the political mainstream. The Save Darfur movement grew beyond anyone’s expectations, with clubs forming in high schools across the country, letter-writing campaigns by Americans, and grand celebrity support. Yet Darfur was not saved. A decade later, the campaign’s accomplishments are hard to see. There has been no political agreement to end the civil war between Darfuri rebel groups and Sudan’s government. Last year, the human rights watchdog Amnesty International documented how Sudanese government forces continued to commit atrocities in Darfur. It described a military campaign that included bombing civilians and raping women. Amnesty also uncovered evidence that “strongly suggests” government forces repeatedly used chemical weapons during the campaign. Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir has been accused of crimes against humanity in Darfur, but he has brazenly ignored an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court. There appears to be little path to accountability. Meanwhile, the Trump administration announced last week that it is permanently lifting sanctions on Sudan after two decades of estranged relations. The decision was widely expected and was a process that began under former President Obama. Experts argue engagement could actually give the U.S. more leverage over Sudan through rewarding limited progress. The sanctions can come back, U.S. officials warn. Even amid the ongoing tensions, Sudan has also been a longtime U.S. counterterrorism partner and is believed to have one of the largest CIA bases in the region. But for the human rights groups that rallied around Darfur, the removal of sanctions on Sudan’s government is a crushing defeat just a decade after its unprecedented entrance into the conscience of American politics. “Millions of people called, wrote, marched for Darfur, and it wasn’t enough. It wasn’t enough,” said Eric Cohen, a co-founder of the Act for Sudan’s activist group and a regional leader of the Save Darfur movement. Cohen described strategic and tactical missteps from the campaign. Infighting over strategy was rampant. The Save Darfur Coalition actually shut down last year. One of the leading voices in the Save Darfur campaign said that it was never meant to be a panacea. “To expect a schoolteacher in Iowa who shows up at a rally to have had answers that a seasoned U.S. or African envoy did not have is a fundamental misreading of the division of labor between civil society and governance,” John Prendergast, a board member of the Save Darfur Coalition and human rights activist, told me. “Perhaps the narrative asserting a failed Save Darfur campaign with its celebrity backers has a better chance of getting published than an informed critique of international policy.” But the lessons of the Save Darfur campaign are not that celebrity activists and support from schoolteachers in Iowa should be shunned. The advocacy movement faltered when it came to translating its noisemaking into effective policy, said Rebecca Hamilton, a professor at American University. “This is the story of mass movement advocacy. It is second-to-none when it comes to sheer awareness-raising, but agility and nuance are rarely its strengths,” Hamilton said. At that same rally in 2006 where Obama spoke at the rally to save Darfur, Prendergast promised the crowd a simple solution. He told the tens of thousands on the Mall that there was “good news” about Darfur: “This genocide can be ended immediately.” The U.S. needed to do only three things to save people in Darfur, Prendergast said: Push for United Nations peacekeepers in Darfur, punish perpetrators of genocide, and create a special envoy to solve the crisis. A decade later, it is hard to see how those bite-sized solutions have helped people in Darfur. The U.N. peacekeepers were eventually sent to the region but were repeatedly criticized for standing by as atrocities continued unabated. Al-Bashir has ignored a global arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court. And President George W. Bush created a special envoy for Sudan, but it had little effect. “The campaign for international troops distracted attention from the need for a political settlement, and some [Save Darfur] campaigners were actively opposed to a peace deal because they believed that anything short of regime change was a sellout,” said Alex De Waal, the executive director of the World Peace Foundation. The Save Darfur movement spent its early years reading from an outdated policy playbook, said Hamilton, who is also the author of the book Fighting for Darfur. Memories of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, during which the Clinton administration was criticized for blocking more aggressive action by U.N. peacekeepers to stop the killing, were still fresh in activists’ minds. “In trying to right the wrongs of Rwanda, it took a U.S.-centric view that overlooked the rise of China and its ability to shield Sudan from international condemnation,” she said, referring to Chinese arms shipments to Sudan and support at the U.N. Security Council. At the same time, it would be inaccurate to say the Save Darfur movement was a complete bust. The overwhelming political support from the movement ensured that U.S. assistance to the people of Darfur was substantial. For each of the past five years, the U.S. has given roughly $100 million in humanitarian assistance to the region. De Waal and Prendergast both said that the Save Darfur movement created more attention on Sudan’s leaders, which caused them to think twice before committing more atrocities. Of course, that attention did not always work. Fighting in Darfur continued, and the government attacked civilians in other areas of the country, including South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Last Thursday, the same day the Associated Press reported that the Trump administration would permanently lift sanctions on Darfur, former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Samantha Power spoke to a room of wealthy donors to support refugees in New York City. Before joining the Obama administration, Power was best known as the Pulitzer Prize–winning author of the book A Problem From Hell, which describes America’s unwillingness to prevent mass atrocities in the 20th century. Power is also one of the principal architects of the theory that pressure on U.S. politicians can force America to prevent mass atrocities. This was the underlying idea behind the Save Darfur movement, and after nearly a decade of government service, Power still believes that it can work. “More people, and particularly more young people, are getting involved in politics, recognizing that everything they care about seems to be coming back to this political question—that the humanitarian is no longer simply humanitarian,” Power told the audience. “Political, political, political.” Two days later, Swiss aid worker Margaret Schenkel was kidnapped in northern Darfur by unknown gunmen. Darfur is hardly peaceful. She is still missing. http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2017/10/why_couldn_t_the_save_darfur_movement_stop_the_killing_in_sudan.html (c) 2017 Slate

I.Overview A public rift between Ali Abdullah Saleh’s General People’s Congress party (GPC) and the Huthis (aka Ansar Allah) may change the course of Yemen’s two-and-a-half-year war. Despite significant ideological and political differences, the two have been allied against the Saudi Arabia-led military intervention in support of the Yemeni government of Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi. Yet tensions between them rose to an all-time high following a GPC rally in Sanaa on 24 August to celebrate the party’s 35th anniversary and to demonstrate its political strength. This rift could expand and prolong Yemen’s regionalised civil war, further shattering the country and threatening regional security – or it could be seized upon as an opportunity to advance peace. This will require Saudi Arabia and its international backers, including the U.S. and the UK, to act quickly to capitalise on a division they have encouraged by supporting an immediate ceasefire and an inclusive political settlement. After a period of rapid advances, the Huthi/Saleh alliance lost territory in the south in July and August 2015. They since fought the opposing side to a stalemate, maintaining control over the northern Zaydi (version of Shia Islam) highlands, which includes the country’s capital, Sanaa, and the majority of Yemen’s population. This has produced a tense status quo, from which several parties in the conflict benefit, but which has produced immense suffering among the Yemeni people as well as additional instability in a region that has no shortage. For Saudi Arabia in particular, the fighting has created a growing security threat, with Huthi/Saleh forces firing rockets deep into Saudi territory and threatening to target Riyadh’s closest regional ally, Abu Dhabi. It is a financially costly war and a diplomatic headache, as Riyadh has borne considerable criticism for the devastating humanitarian consequences, including near famine conditions and widespread cholera. To take advantage of heightened Huthi/Saleh tensions, Riyadh should champion a political process, agree to suspend military operations, and forgo the temptation to simply wait for its adversaries to turn their guns on each other. Indeed, direct Huthi/Saleh confrontation is unlikely and, even if it were to occur, the result would be even less likely to redound to Riyadh’s benefit: the Huthis could defeat the GPC or the civil war could spread to the highlands, further facilitating both Iranian intervention and al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) expansion. If by contrast the Saudis – in partnership with regional states like Oman and with support from the UN Security Council and the UN special envoy – sponsor a realistic peace initiative, the onus would shift to the Huthis and GPC to accept it, lest they provoke even greater suffering and possibly destabilise areas under their control. Saleh’s GPC almost certainly would entertain the offer, placing Huthi hardliners in an awkward position if they were to reject it, changing the political dynamic and possibly paving the way for a settlement. The stakes have never been higher. With Huthi forces threatening to target Riyadh and Abu Dhabi and the Trump Administration eager to push back against Iran in the region, there is a serious risk of wider escalation. This could include direct U.S. confrontation with Iran, which Washington and its allies blame for providing the Huthis with the requisite missile technology. Too many opportunities have come and gone to end the Yemen war. Neither Yemenis nor their neighbours can afford to lose this one. II.GPC-Huthi Relations A.Historical Context and Contemporary Challenges Tension between the Huthis and Saleh’s GPC is nothing new. Between 2004 and 2010, then-President Saleh fought six wars with the Huthis, killing their leader, Hussein Badr al-Din al-Huthi, in 2004 and laying waste to much of their home governorate, Saada. Common enemies brought the two sides together in 2014 as they sought to shift the balance of power in Yemen’s north against the Sunni Islamist party, Islah, and Hadi, who had alienated both groups during the country’s transition period (in which Saleh transferred power to Hadi through a political agreement known as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative). Their cooperation, initially tacit, may well have faded if not for the Saudi military intervention, which began in March 2015, to reinstate Hadi and reverse Huthi/Saleh military advances. The campaign bound them together against what in Yemen’s northern highlands is commonly perceived as a national, existential struggle against Saudi Arabia – rather than as a Yemeni civil war, which is how the national conflict is viewed elsewhere in the country. Beneath the surface, however, differences festered. The GPC views itself as a party of the political centre, an umbrella organisation encompassing a range of political perspectives and confessional groups, with appeal throughout the country. It sees the Huthis in much the same way it views Islah, an intolerant religion-based political organisation with ties to foreign actors – in the Huthis’ case, Iran, in Islah’s case, Qatar and chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood elsewhere in the region. Like many Yemenis, they suspect the Huthis of plotting to bring back the rule of Zaydi Imams, who ruled northern Yemen for a millennium before the 1962 republican revolution ousted them. In this view, the Huthis are a throwback to Yemen’s oppressive, discriminatory past, an anathema to a modern state and institutions, let alone an inclusive democracy. Similarly, the Huthis have fundamental problems with Saleh and the GPC. They view him and his close supporters as dangerous and unreliable allies. From their perspective, Saleh’s GPC is responsible for a corrupt past in which the government failed to develop the country, marginalised them politically, facilitated the spread of Salafi/Wahhabi doctrine (their ideological adversary) and destroyed their territory. Huthis are hostile to the U.S., viewing its Middle East policy as part of an improbable Israel/Saudi/Wahhabi plot to sow discord among Muslims, and as such are deeply suspicious of Saleh’s past support for and cooperation with the U.S. and its counter-terrorism activities. Some Huthis want eventually to hold Saleh and other GPC leaders accountable for past crimes, including killing Hussein al-Huthi. As the GPC doubts Huthi commitment to democracy, the Huthis doubt the GPC’s commitment to real power sharing. These mutual suspicions have left both groups ill at ease. Ever since October 2016, when they formed a “national salvation government” with the Huthis, GPC leaders have complained that the Huthis have not honoured their commitment to disband the “revolutionary committee”, which the Huthis had established in February 2015 after they toppled the Hadi government. Still active, the committee oversees government functioning and forms a kind of shadow government with final say in decision-making, in effect undermining weak state institutions. Their frustration with Huthi interference has been exacerbated by the Huthis’ relative inexperience in the governance realm – not only do they as a movement lack know-how, but in many cases have appointed young loyalists who interfere in the decision-making of long-serving bureaucrats. In an ironic reversal of their traditional roles, GPC members today accuse the Huthis of corruption, disregard for the country’s laws, for example regarding detentions, and failure to treat them as an equal partner in government. In particular, the GPC resents Huthi control of the limited resources flowing into the north in the form of customs, taxes and telecommunications fees. After dividing ministerial portfolios, the two sides fought over the appointment of ministerial deputies. Arguably most importantly, they disagree on the leadership and future of the Republican Guards, the most qualified military unit in the army before the 2011 Arab Spring, which was led by Saleh’s son Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh and was largely loyal to him. Today it is a shadow of its former self, disbanded under Hadi in 2012 and later partially reconstituted during the current war. The GPC would like to strengthen and lead it; the Huthis are blocking them. The Huthis accuse the GPC of stoking public resentment against them instead of focusing on the fight against the Saudi-led coalition. Bearing the brunt of casualties, they view GPC politicking as an affront to their sacrifices. Regarding the civil service, they say, Saleh’s party continues to dominate decisions on retirement and recruitment, encumbering their ability to implement the law, which requires, for example, pensioning off individuals above a certain age. The Huthis also are quick to point out that integrating their members into all parts of the state is one of the agreements reached by the 2014 National Dialogue Conference, the centrepiece of the country’s UN-sponsored transition. Arguably most importantly, the Huthis suspect the GPC of trying to strike deals with their mutual enemies, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, to end the war to its advantage. Some Huthi supporters, for example, were convinced that the massive GPC rally in Sanaa on 24 August was a plot by Saleh to oust the Huthis from power and push them from Sanaa, with the help of the UAE. Until August 2017, the leadership of both groups successfully contained their many differences. Under attack by the Saudi-led military campaign, both political leaderships continue to argue that what unites them – especially defence of the parts of Yemen they each control – is more significant than what drives them apart. But the groups’ respective rank-and-file, and certainly their hardliners, do not uniformly agree. Many GPC cadres, in Yemen and elsewhere, do not see value in the relationship.They are blunt in their hostility to its continuance and even support going on the offensive against the Huthis, should an opportunity arise to shift the balance of power. A GPC supporter expressed a perspective common among the rank-and-file in Sanaa: Now the Huthis control the army and the resources of the north. Everything is going to them because of the war. The GPC would be ready to fight the Huthis, but they cannot open a second front. The Huthis are doing many things that harm the Yemeni people. They are completely destroying the army. But if the GPC turned on the Huthis now, the U.S., Saudi Arabia and Islah would fight the GPC from the other direction. The Huthi movement at all levels evinces internal differences about the necessity and desirability of cooperation with the GPC. The political side of the movement, represented by figures such as Saleh Somad, head of the supreme political council (a ten-person organisation formed by the GPC and Huthis in August 2016 and split equally between them that serves as a presidential council) appears to value the partnership and works pragmatically to maintain it by mediating conflict between the two sides.Hardliners in the revolutionary council and the military-security apparatus, including Mohammed al-Huthi, head of the revolutionary council, are seemingly less keen on cooperation and aggressively attack the GPC in public. One Huthi supporter summed up scepticism of the partnership: Partnership with the GPC is not important for the war because Ansar Allah is controlling all of the fronts and Saleh is not really contributing to the fight. The alliance is only really in the area of government and there, the GPC needs the alliance more than Ansar Allah. Without it, the GPC would lose all power and influence. Many in Ansar Allah think that the partnership with the GPC has damaged its reputation in the north as the GPC has conducted a smear campaign, accusing it of corruption even as the GPC obstructs proper running of the government. A break-up of the alliance could be better for Ansar Allah. Though the security situation and resulting territorial fragmentation make it hard to judge, the prevailing wisdom among a range of interlocutors in Sanaa, including GPC members, independents and analysts, is that a group of Huthi sceptics and hardliners have the upper hand, a situation that bodes poorly for the future of cooperation. B.24 August and its Aftermath The GPC-Huthi coalition has been deeply strained, possibly irreparably damaged, by events surrounding the GPC’s 24 August political rally. In the lead-up to the gathering, the groups engaged in a vicious war of words. Saleh gave a bombastic speech calling the Huthi popular committees a “militia” and warning them not to interfere in the GPC’s celebration or to cause chaos in Sanaa. The Huthis accused Saleh of “backstabbing”, lacking commitment to the war and trying to secure a deal with the Saudi-led coalition to remove them from power. While the rally went forward without incident, the following day a prominent GPC politician, Khaled al-Radi, and three Huthi-aligned security personnel were killed in a gun battle at a Huthi-controlled checkpoint. The next day saw further clashes near one of Saleh’s son’s homes in south Sanaa; a large contingent of Huthi security forces deployed in the area. Since then the two sides have agreed to de-escalation measures, but tensions remain high. The Huthis have increased their security presence, which risks minor disagreements escalating into clashes. With the rally, Saleh sought to send a message to the Huthis and the international community that he and his party are politically strong, key to any settlement, and ought not be treated as junior partners in negotiations, which has been the case in both UN-led and informal negotiations. His supporters suggest that the rally’s timing was based on his calculation that his political support and popular frustration with the Huthis are at relative highs. The events of 24 August were a culmination of what could be considered a GPC revival. After surviving attempts by Saudi Arabia to divide it and pull its leadership to Hadi’s side, Saleh’s camp has emerged stronger, at least for now. GPC members inside Yemen describe a new conviction that the GPC is the only party capable of protecting the country from the ravages of sectarianism and preserving its republican system from religious groups like the Huthis or Islah. But this awakening is as much an indicator of weakness as strength. It is driven in part by the fear that if the war continues, religious actors and militias will gain greater strength, while the GPC and political parties will lose influence and relevance. Rally participation was not limited to the GPC. Many other people attended or supported it on social media, including those aligned with the Hadi government and even Islah. For them, the gathering was a chance to demonstrate their opposition to the Huthis (not their support for Saleh) and, for some, to encourage the brewing fight between the two to knock both down to size. Though the rally’s size – a least tens of thousands, with local reports saying around 300,000 – and eclectic backing might indicate that the GPC’s political fortunes have eclipsed the Huthis’, the military balance is still clearly in the latter’s favour. The Huthis allowed the GPC rally, but the same day organised their own smaller demonstrations at the city’s entrances and imposed a heavy security presence in Sanaa. After the rally, loyal forces further increased their presence around the city, especially in neighbourhoods dominated by Saleh sympathisers. They too had a message: their dedicated supporters and fighters were ready to confront any challenge to their authority. The Huthis then held their own massive public rally, to celebrate what they call the 21 September Revolution, the anniversary of their entering in Sanaa (in 2014), demonstrating that they too can rally significant support, albeit not as politically diverse. Those who hoped that Saleh would pursue a more confrontational course in the wake of the rally have been disappointed. Instead of backing out of the coalition government or fighting to regain control of the capital, Saleh ultimately adopted a more conciliatory tone. At the GPC rally, he gave a short speech praising the GPC and called more fighters to the war fronts, but since then he has called for calm and reaffirmed his commitment to the alliance. According to a prominent Yemeni politician who has remained neutral during the war, “GPC supporters and anti-Huthi groups alike experienced a moment of collective depression when Saleh failed to act. Most attribute his inaction to weakness in the face of the Huthis’ superior military strength”. Indeed GPC, Huthi and Hadi government supporters interpret his actions as a sign of weakness and evidence that the GPC cannot challenge the Huthis in the context of war. It is unclear whether Saleh changed his course of action in light of Huthi pressure or whether he knew all along that he could not risk opening a second front with them. In any case, he is walking a fine line, straining but not breaking the relationship, and in doing so raising yet more questions about the future of the coalition with Ansar Allah and the course of the war writ large. III.A Way Forward Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the Yemeni government and their backers, including the U.S. and UK, have long encouraged a break in the Huthi/Saleh alliance either to enable a popular uprising in the north or improve the Yemeni government’s (and by extension Saudi Arabia’s) bargaining position. Post-August 2017, U.S. and UK officials say they increasingly recognise the dangers of such a split, while their allies in the region appear determined to pursue it. Putting aside how likely they are to succeed, they should be careful what they wish for. If the two allies turn on each other, the more likely result is the prolongation of the civil war and the complication of peace efforts. A.Danger Ahead? It is hard to predict the course of a putative Huthi-Saleh fight. In a worst-case scenario for Saudi Arabia, the Huthis would win a military confrontation and consolidate political and military control of the north. Already the Huthis dominate the military-security apparatus in Sanaa and over the course of the war they have gained the upper hand over Saleh, though the extent of their advantage is widely debated among Yemenis. That said, the Huthis have miscalculated in the past. In Aden, for example, they were confident that the population would support them against what they viewed as the al-Qaeda threat there. But ultimately they were perceived as invaders and pushed out by local forces, with the help of the UAE, in July 2015. In Sanaa too, they may overestimate their strength. Certainly Saleh and his party are politically popular; over 33 years of Saleh’s rule they built strong networks inside the military-security apparatus. Today it is not clear how many of these GPC loyalists are keeping their distance but would answer the call if violence erupted with the Huthis. There is also the issue of the tribes. In Yemen, they are a critical component of hard power. Here again, the relative power balance is not clear. Saleh enjoys influence and support, both personally and because the Huthis have insulted and bullied many sheikhs, some of whom are eager to take revenge when the time is ready. But the Huthis also have cultivated their own tribal networks, which often are a product of frustration with Saleh and his former allies like the al-Ahmar of the Hashid confederation. The uncertainty about the two sides’ relative strength suggests that the consequences of a fight between them would be disastrous for Yemen and likely for Saudi Arabia as well. The Huthis and Saleh would lose ground as they pull their fighters from the war fronts, but their losses would not necessarily translate into sustainable gains for the Hadi government. Two years since the UAE and aligned southern fighters pushed the Huthis and Saleh’s forces out of southern territories, the Hadi government has been unable to successfully control, let alone govern, these areas. Instead, infighting between Hadi’s forces and southern separatists in the government’s temporary capital of Aden has divided the coalition, with Saudi Arabia backing Hadi and the UAE closely aligned with his competitors. Southern territories also are plagued by al-Qaeda’s expansion.Despite hardships in Huthi/Saleh controlled areas, residents express relief that they are not living in the south’s “liberated areas”, a term they use to suggest chaos. In the north, the prospect of the government profiting from an internecine Huthi-Saleh fight is even weaker. Given widespread resentment toward Hadi and Saudi Arabia in the Zaydi highlands in particular, it is virtually impossible to see his government as an alternative to the Huthis or Saleh’s GPC. The likely result of a clash would be the north’s fragmentation, leading to the same civil strife and sectarianism that has racked areas like Taiz. Islah, which has popular support in the north, could join forces on some fronts with the GPC against the Huthis. The GPC itself could fracture, with some continuing to ally with the Huthis while others join their enemies, including Islah and tribal forces aligned with the government in Marib. Almost certainly the conflict would be a magnet for Yemen’s al-Qaeda branch, which has forged alliances against the Huthis with local fighters in other parts of the country; given the collapse of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, Yemen could provide an attractive destination for these fighters to relocate. These dynamics could shred the north’s social fabric, which hitherto has been strained but not as severely as the south’s, and accelerate the country’s humanitarian disaster, already one of the worst globally.The weaker Yemen’s north, the more likely chaos is to spread to Saudi Arabia. Iran would find ample opportunity to keep the Saudis bogged down. Perhaps most dangerously for Riyadh, it will become increasingly difficult to engineer a way out: as intra-group fragmentation grows, there will be no clear address for negotiation. That said, the most likely scenario is a continuation of the troubled Huthi/Saleh partnership. The danger of a split is obvious to both political leaderships. Any military escalation by the Saudi-led coalition likely would reinforce this sense, and push them to paper over their differences. Yet the continuation of the Huthi/Saleh alliance does not bode any better for Saudi Arabia and Hadi. If the two stay together and the war continues, the Huthis likely will tighten their control of the north. Already, they have announced a new round of changes in the government, which they say are meant to weed out corruption but which are being made at the GPC’s expense; they also have tightened restrictions on the press and some in the movement are calling for a state of emergency, which the GPC fears will facilitate an even greater crackdown. If the Huthis consolidate power, the north’s precarious political balance will be lost and their relatively hard-line position will complicate negotiations. Their propensity to form shadow state institutions and supervisory bodies through the revolutionary committee also would further hollow out already weak state institutions. B.A Way Out Saudi Arabia and its partners have long sought to pry the GPC away from the Huthis. However, now that divisions have become more apparent, Riyadh should forgo the temptation to push for military advantage or wait for its adversaries to fight each other, scenarios that, as explained above, almost certainly will not give them a decisive advantage. Instead, along with regional partners including Oman, and with the encouragement of the Security Council and UN special envoy, it should champion a political solution. The timing is ripe but the opportunity easily could slip away. There is widespread frustration with the Huthis in the north and a desire, including within the GPC and some parts of the Huthi movement, to find an exit to the war. If Riyadh, through a regional initiative, supported a realistic compromise to end the fighting – outside the narrow requirements of UN Security Resolution 2216, which are perceived as tantamount to surrender by GPC and Huthi constituencies alike – both would be hard-pressed to reject it in the face of public pressure. A new Saudi-backed regional initiative also would allow the GPC, by reacting positively, to seize the political momentum. That in turn would give leverage to those Huthi political leaders who say that they would support a political deal, as they did in October 2016 when former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry proposed one, before the Hadi government rejected it. Would-be Huthi dealmakers need ammunition against hardliners, especially those in the military-security apparatus who are deeply sceptical of compromise and derive benefits from continuing the war. Saudi Arabia is the best positioned to take advantage of the political moment. Everyone, including the GPC and the Huthis, their hesitations about Saudi intentions notwithstanding, know that it is the real powerbroker, in no small part because of its role in supporting the opposing side of the war and its superior capacity to fund reconstruction. Yet at present, Riyadh refuses to acknowledge its role in the conflict, instead insisting that it is an intra-Yemeni one that must be resolved between Yemenis. In part, the contention is correct. No agreement between Saudi Arabia and the Huthi/Saleh side will resolve intra-Yemeni disputes, particularly regarding the issue of decentralisation and the federal structure, which triggered the violence and civil war in the first place. That said, the Saudi-led military intervention has further highlighted a regional dimension to the fight. For the GPC and the Huthis, the war is now first and foremost against Saudi Arabia and only secondarily against domestic enemies. Both of Riyadh’s adversaries are largely dismissive of the Hadi government, which they rightly insist has limited influence on the ground. Instead, they seek negotiations to end the war with Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, the UAE, who – in addition to launching airstrikes – are the war’s main financiers in general and of anti-Huthi/Saleh fighters in particular, who comprise a mixture of Islah, tribes, Salafi groups and southern separatists. If a compromise to end the regionalised part of the war were able to gain traction, Saudi Arabia should have the leverage to bring its Yemeni allies along. Given that UN negotiations to end the conflict have been stalled since the collapse of talks in Kuwait in August 2016, new thinking is needed. If Saudi Arabia is not willing to take a seat at the table, at a minimum it should advance a political initiative and, in cooperation with regional states and with UN support, provide the table around which Yemenis can hammer out the details. In that scenario, Riyadh optimally would co-sponsor a political initiative and dialogue with other GCC or Arab states – including Oman, which has ties to the Huthis, and possibly Kuwait, which previously has hosted UN talks. A chief benefit of a regionally-sponsored initiative is its potential to break the diplomatic stalemate following three unsuccessful rounds of UN negotiations and an ensuing deficit of trust by all combatants, but especially the Huthi/Saleh bloc, in the UN process and the special envoy. It would also send a clear message to all Yemeni belligerents that Saudi Arabia, the pivotal regional powerbroker, is fully supportive of a settlement, something that Yemeni stakeholders from across the political spectrum say is currently lacking. To be successful, a regional initiative and subsequent talks should break out of the constraints imposed by UN Security Council Resolution 2216, which has impeded UN negotiations because of its one-sided and unrealistic nature. The resolution demands, in effect, the surrender of the Huthi/Saleh side and establishes a negotiating framework – the Huthis and Saleh on one side, the Hadi government on the other – that does not reflect the range of Yemeni belligerents on the ground. More inclusive, regionally-sponsored talks could comprise all relevant combatants, including Saleh’s GPC, the Huthis, the Hadi government, tribal representatives, Islah, Salafi groups and representatives of the Hiraak, south Yemen’s separatist movement. With wider terms of reference, more issues could be addressed, including for instance Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s security concerns about Iranian influence in Yemen, as well as border and maritime security. Such talks also could have the flexibility to address the role of controversial Yemeni leaders like Saleh, Hadi, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (Saleh’s former partner who defected in 2011 to join the Arab Spring and is now Hadi’s vice president) and others who are central to the current conflict and whose removal from politics may be needed for the country to move forward. For any of this to work, back-channel bilateral discussion between Saudi Arabia and Saleh on one hand, and Saudi Arabia and the Huthis on the other, will be needed to lay the conceptual foundations for an agreement to end hostilities. Most likely, a successful regional initiative would contain the following elements, which would need further specification in the context of talks: Comprehensive ceasefire, lifting of all blockades and opening of international airports, with security guarantees and monitoring to ensure that Yemeni belligerents, including the Huthi/Saleh side, do not use a ceasefire to rearm; Return of Huthi/Saleh fighters to Yemeni territory and withdrawal of all of these fighters from the Saudi-Yemeni border; Commitment of all Yemeni groups to cut military ties with Iran and to combat al-Qaeda; Commitment by Saudi Arabia and other regional states to help in post-war reconstruction; Agreement on a new executive leadership, including an interim president, vice president and prime minister, and an inclusive coalition government for a limited period of time until elections, as well as agreement on the government’s responsibilities, which must include a clear plan for implementing and overseeing the withdrawal of all militias from cities and the handover of heavy weapons to the state, most likely through an inclusive military-security council; Commitment of all Yemeni parties to the consensus outcomes of the country’s National Dialogue Conference (NDC), including the principle of decentralisation, and completing the remaining tasks of the transition period, including a constitutional referendum and elections; Agreement to implement decentralisation measures during the transition period, giving governorates significant financial and security authorities, with a special status for the south; Develop a mechanism to revisit the main outstanding issues of the NDC: the number of federal regions, the status of south Yemen and the issue of national reconciliation. The UN has an important role to play. Regionally sponsored talks over the details of the elements listed above should be supported by UN Security Council members and by the UN envoy to encourage participation and ensure that agreements have international backing. Yemenis also will need technical and political assistance from the UN to implement an agreement for ending the war and to resolve political issues, like state structure, that will likely require further negotiation. Finally, the UN could serve a vital role in ensuring that women, youth, civil society activists and a full range of political parties have a seat at the decision-making table and the influence to affect what happens during the transition phase, something they enjoyed during the NDC but which was quickly eroded by war. Under the long shadow of Resolution 2216 and after three rounds of failed UN talks, there is little chance that the UN envoy, working under the established framework, would be able to produce an agreement. In these circumstances and with the war poised to metastasise in Yemen’s north or even spill outside its borders, the best chance for an exit resides with regional actors and Yemenis themselves, with the international community actively encouraging and supporting their efforts from behind. _____________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Group

I’ll be writing regularly about what follows in the wake of the Trump administration’s permanent lifting of U.S. economic sanctions on the Khartoum regime. Given the abundance of commentary on the benefits of such action, it seems useful to begin with the observations of a Sudanese economist who actually knows something about the Sudanese economy, as opposed to the staggering ignorance in this sphere revealed in commentary by the International Crisis Group, other American and European “think tanks,” and actors such as UNAMID, whose contemptible performance in reporting on what has occurred in Darfur since the Mission deployed in January 2008 makes its celebration of the Trump administration action particularly and perversely ironic. Professor Hamid Eltigani of American University in Cairo has regularly and astutely commented on the economic situation in Sudan, and understands full well the dynamics of the collapsing economy. His previous work—frequently cited by actual experts on Sudan such as Suliman Baldo and Omer Ismail—has proved consistently accurate and Radio Dabanga’s interview of him today provides a useful overview: “US sanctions relief will not improve living conditions in Sudan”: Economist Radio Dabanga | October 9, 2017 | CAIRO / KHARTOUM https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/us-sanctions-relief-will-not-improve-living-conditions-in-sudan-economist Economic expert Prof Hamid Eltigani has contradicted predictions by Sudanese government officials that the US lifting of the trade embargo on Sudan will solve the economic crisis in the country to a large extent. Sudan’s FA Minister announced that the second phase of the dialogue with Washington will take place early next year. According to Prof Eltigani, economist and head of the Department of Public Policy and Administration at the American University in Cairo, the permanent lifting of the trade embargo on Sudan as declared by Washington on Friday, “has mostly a psychological effect. The lifting of the sanctions opens the door for Sudan to free trade and investment, but the problem is that Khartoum is bankrupt and has nothing to sell,” he commented in an interview with Radio Dabanga broadcast today. “Almost all industries have become inoperable in Sudan, as their structures have collapsed,” he explained. “Most of the productive forces migrated to urban areas and are trying to survive by doing marginal jobs in the informal sector. Others are living in the various camps for the displaced. In addition, the country’s infrastructure and the education sector that is supposed to provide qualified production cadres have collapsed completely.” Investments Eltigani does not believe that investors will enter into long-term projects. “Major US and European companies will refrain from investing in Sudan under these circumstances, especially as Sudan is still on the list of countries that support terrorism. These countries will most probably not invest in Sudan as long as Al Bashir remains in power,” he stated. “Service companies such as McDonald’s, Pizza Hut etcetera may enter the Sudanese market but they will not contribute to an increased production.” The economist predicted that large national transport institutions such as Sudanair, the railways and sea lines, and the El Gezira Agricultural Scheme “will not return to normal again. “The collapse of these institutions does not result from the sanctions and the ensuing scarcity of spare parts, as government officials claim, but of forgoing corruption, mismanagement, and a lack of commitment to the services they provide.” He ruled out that the lifting of the sanctions on Friday will stabilise the rate of the Sudanese Pound, but predicted a further rise of the price of the Dollar against the Sudanese Pound at the black market. “The dependence on the import of various basic commodities such as grain or medicine requires hard currency. “The government is supposed to raise the exchange rate, but instead it is misleading the people with slogans saying the lifting of the sanctions will solve the economic crisis – which of course will not happen.” He further refuted rumours that the lifting of the sanctions represents an opportunity for government officials to smuggle the hard currency they acquired through corruption abroad. “These allegations are unfounded because the leading members of the current regime and its beneficiaries have secured their money long ago. At least 11 billion Dollars have been put away in Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates and other countries in the Arab Gulf,” he said. Not all sanctions lifted On Friday, the administration of President Donald Trump lifted two-decades-old economic sanctions on Khartoum “in recognition of the Government of Sudan’s sustained positive actions to maintain a cessation of hostilities in conflict areas in Sudan, improve humanitarian access throughout Sudan, and maintain cooperation with the US on addressing regional conflicts and the threat of terrorism”. The US State Department noted that any further normalisation in the bilateral relations with Khartoum requires “continued progress” by the Sudanese government. The US decision did not include the removal of Sudan from the list of states sponsoring terrorism—to which it was added in 1993—which means that restrictions on debt relief, receiving foreign aid, or the sale of arms are still in place. Debts relief In a press conference in Khartoum on Saturday, Sudan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Ibrahim Ghandour, announced visits by American high-level officials within the coming weeks “to further develop the partnership between the two countries” He said that Khartoum agreed with Washington to start “the following dialogue stage early next year. “There are files still pending, including keeping Sudan on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, the external debts problem, and Sudan’s accession to the World Trade Organisation.” [I have not included the final paragraphs further representing the completely self-interested and characteristically mendacious statements of Khartoum officials—they may be found by clicking on the Radio Dabanga link above—ER] A victim of the recent savage attack on Kalma IDP camp in Darfur my Khartoum’s armed forces _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 SUDAN Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

As a young boy, Oscar survived a mass killing in a Guatemalan village. Decades later, investigators try to locate him in an effort to uncover the truth about what happened and bring the perpetrators to justice. Join us for this film screening and discussion on November 8 at American University. Wednesday, November 8 5:30 p.m. Claudio Grossman Hall Washington College of Law American University 4300 Nebraska Avenue, NW Washington, DC In a mass killing during Guatemala’s civil war, soldiers murdered more than 200 people in the village of Dos Erres. Amidst the violence, they decided to spare the lives of two young boys, Oscar and Ramiro, and proceeded to raise them as their own. Decades later, investigators began trying to find Oscar to provide evidence of the army’s crimes. This documentary film by Ryan Suffern tells the story of this 1982 massacre and the relentless search for justice. Discussion to follow. This event is free and open to the public, but registration is required atushmm.org/events/oscar. RSVP: http://go.ushmm.org/gT0X25e0300bYO0HK000AoA Co-presented with: War Crimes Research Office of American University Washington College of Law and the Human Rights Violators and War Crimes Unit of the US Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement National Security Investigations Division Photo: Aura Elena Farfán is the executive director of Famdegua, an organization of victims’ families. Photo by Michael Parry. Photo courtesy of FilmRise _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 The United States Holocasut Meorial Museum

On November 12-13, we are hosting our annual STAND Fall Lobby Weekend for Atrocity Prevention in Washington, DC! This is your time to gather with other student activists from across the country, hear from activists working in the field, and to lobby Congress to pass significant atrocity prevention legislation! On Sunday, November 12, you will receive all of the training you will need to effectively lobby, organize your campuses to rally behind genocide prevention, and more! Our speakers are excited to share their wealth of knowledge with you, to prepare you - the next generation of #genprev activists - to mobilize your communities and become stronger advocates. The big day is Monday, November 13, when you will finally get the chance to STAND up for our issues and lobby Congress! This is a great opportunity to meet with your representatives and show them that their constituents care about genocide and atrocity prevention. Registration is $20, but we have limited fee waivers available for those who cannot otherwise attend. Need help figuring out budgeting or travel? Just reply to this email and we’ll be happy to lend a hand! We hope you’ll join us for this incredible opportunity, whether it is your first, second, or third lobby weekend - we’d love to meet you in person! In solidarity, Savannah Wooten Student Director University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill '18 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Stand

States have agreed upon a treaty with humanitarian foundations that prohibits nuclear weapons. It contains much, beyond its prohibitions, that is unprecedented in a nuclear weapons treaty. Crucially, it provides a framework for responding to the rights of victims and remediating contaminated environments. In a remarkable achievement this summer, States concluded negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Having opened for signature in September, the TPNW will be a key topic for States at the UN General Assembly’s First Committee in the coming weeks. The awarding of the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) for their work for the TPNW will further draw attention to the treaty. The treaty text prohibits these weapons—because of their catastrophic and unacceptable humanitarian consequences—and provides a framework for their elimination. It also bans assistance with prohibited acts. But, this is not all that it does. A key area in which practical impacts from the TPNW could soon be felt is through its provisions for victim assistance and environmental remediation (i.e., the rehabilitation of the environment and protective measures that minimise human exposure to radiation). These obligations follow the approach of previous treaties on anti-personnel land mines and cluster munitions. Humanitarian foundations The conclusion of the TPNW means that international prohibition treaties for all the weapons of mass destruction—biological, chemical and nuclear—have now been successfully negotiated. This treaty thus resolves a legal anomaly that has persisted for decades. Moreover, it represents a morally appropriate and legally coherent response to the overwhelming weight of evidence and testimony about the horrific impacts of nuclear weapons—many aspects of which were presented in the International Review of the Red Cross’s edition on The Human Cost of Nuclear Weapons last year. The international community reached this point through a State-led humanitarian initiative. During this process, different entities—including States, the ICRC and humanitarian organisations—examined the evidence about the impact of nuclear weapons on people, places and the environment, bringing in new research and perspectives. The initiative sought to change the terms of the international debate between States on nuclear weapons, from considerations of State security towards the humanitarian costs of the weapons themselves. Through this focus, the humanitarian initiative thus raised fundamental questions about the acceptability of nuclear weapons. Victims, including survivors of the atomic bombings of Japan and of nuclear tests, gave testimonies both to conferences of the humanitarian initiative and to States during the treaty negotiations. Inclusion of victims’ perspectives—where it does not exploit experience but gives agency and empowerment—has a logical centrality to the development of a humanitarian discourse, and to full understanding of the effects of particular weapons. During the humanitarian initiative, States involved also acknowledged that the rights and needs of many of the victims of nuclear weapons use and testing had not yet been adequately addressed. When negotiations began, there was therefore an expectation that a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, arising from the humanitarian initiative, might include positive obligations on States to address these rights—as well as to address the continuing humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons on communities from environmental contamination. Sections of civil society, including ICAN, campaigned strongly for the inclusion of such obligations in the run up to and during the negotiation of the TPNW. The humanitarian framework Part of this argumentation involved making the case that the treaty should not take a step back from recent international law on the prohibition of certain weapons. The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and in particular the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) have strong frameworks for the non-discriminatory assistance of victims, and the clearance of dangerous remnants from the use of these weapons. Including analogous provisions on victim assistance and environmental remediation in a treaty banning nuclear weapons therefore represents a continuation of these important developments in international law, which have had a real impact in countries and for people affected by these weapons. Beyond the fact of its prohibitions, the final negotiated text of the TPNW contains much that is unprecedented. Among these, the ‘unacceptable suffering of and harm caused to victims’ of nuclear weapons use and testing are recognised in the treaty’s preamble. This highlighting of the current and actual human costs (rather than the hypothetical devastation of a future nuclear war) is a novel step forward in treaties addressing nuclear disarmament. Recognition of the discriminatory effects of nuclear weapons in the form of disproportionate impacts on women and girls is similarly significant. The preamble’s acceptance of the disproportionate impact of nuclear weapon activities on indigenous peoples is also a first for any weapons-focused treaty. The issues of victim assistance, environmental remediation and international cooperation and assistance are addressed in Articles 6 and 7 in the treaty. Together, they oblige States parties to collectively respond through an international framework, for the first time, to affected individuals’ rights and needs, and to take steps towards remediating environments contaminated by the testing and use of nuclear weapons. On victim assistance, Article 6 requires States, ‘with respect to individuals under its jurisdiction who are affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons,’ to ‘adequately provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance, without discrimination, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for their social and economic inclusion.’ This reflects the rights based, non-discriminatory approach of the CCM—though the TPNW does not articulate provisions that are as detailed. On environmental remediation, the treaty requires that States ‘shall take necessary and appropriate measures towards the environmental remediation of areas’ under their jurisdiction or control that are contaminated as a result of ‘activities related to’ nuclear weapons use or testing. By including this provision, the TPNW expands the scope of international weapons prohibitions treaties to cover obligations on the clearance of toxic, as well as explosive, remnants of war. Article 7 outlines the right of States to seek and receive assistance, obliges States to cooperate to facilitate the implementation of the treaty, and requires those in a position to do so to provide a range of assistance. It also articulates a particular responsibility to provide assistance on the part of any State party that has used or tested nuclear weapons. Moving towards action Based on past experience on anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions, the existence of these obligations could—and should—improve the global state of assistance to the victims of nuclear weapons and steps towards the remediation of contaminated environments. The existence of treaty obligations should serve to: raise awareness and levels of expectation on these issues; increase the resources available to address them; and bring together a global community of practice. Previously, the impact of treaty frameworks has extended beyond States parties, on these issues. For example, the United States is now the biggest donor to mine clearance efforts globally, despite not being a party to the APMBC, suggesting that the treaty helped to shift global norms. Similar normative impacts could be possible for the people and places affected by nuclear weapons. The TPNW will enter into force, making these obligations legally binding on States parties, following 50 ratifications. Looking at the ratification rates of past similar agreements, this may take 1-2 years. In order for the positive obligations in the TPNW to have the greatest impact, there are a number of steps that States, in partnership with civil society and international organisations, could take in the meantime, in preparation for their implementation. Needs assessments at the local, national, regional and global levels should be undertaken before the first Meeting of States Parties of the TPNW to better understand the scope of action needed, and potential donors and development assistance mobilised. Action plans and measures to monitor progress could then be established through treaty meetings. Action could also be taken now towards building a global community of practice on these issues, through convening those already implementing relevant programmes or who have experiences from other processes—including from States, international organisations and civil society—to discuss lessons learned and standards. Throughout, the meaningful participation of victims—including survivors and affected communities—should be ensured and developed. Despite the mobilisation of victims during the humanitarian initiative and treaty negotiations, individuals and groups have had little input so far on the form of these obligations and their implementation. As the States that join the TPNW move forward in coming years on its implementation and towards ensuring its impact, the treaty’s positive obligations could be a key area of activity. This would be true to the humanitarian foundations of the treaty, and to its origins the evidence of the ongoing catastrophic effects on people and places of nuclear weapons. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Humanitarian Law and Policy

Kyrgyzstan’s forthcoming presidential elections on 15 October are a milestone for Central Asia: for the first time, a president from the region will voluntarily stand down at the end of his constitutionally mandated term. Kyrgyzstan has come far in the seven years since the tumultuous events of 2010, when President Kurmanbek Bakiyev was ousted in Bishkek and ethnic violence engulfed the southern city of Osh, killing over 400 people, mostly Uzbeks. The presidential race is tight and unpredictable. Sooronbai Jeenbekov, from the southern province of Jalalabad and representing the ruling Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (SDPK) party, faces Omurbek Babanov, a wealthy independent candidate from the northern province of Talas, still closely aligned with the party he formed in 2010, Respublika. But whoever wins the ballot will face renewed north-south regional tensions as well as rivalries within Osh, where the memory of violence is still fresh and small arms abound. The central government in Bishkek has long struggled to exert its authority over Osh, a city of 276,000 people situated over the mountains in the Ferghana Valley and lying along a route used by traffickers of Afghan opium. More than 43 per cent of the local population are ethnic Uzbeks. In a speech in the city on 28 September, Babanov inadvertently showed how high tensions are. After urging Uzbeks to protect their rights, he swiftly was denounced by leading government figures for inciting ethnic hatred and supporting Uzbek separatism. Osh appears calm, but complaints of local government corruption, mismanagement and lawlessness suggest root causes of the 2010 bloodshed remain unaddressed. Once controlled by the now-exiled former Mayor Melis Myrzakmatov, a virulent Kyrgyz nationalist allied with former President Bakiyev, Osh has been transformed from the fiefdom of one powerful man into the playground of a handful. Today’s power brokers in the city, all ethnic Kyrgyz, owe little to Bishkek. After the new Kyrgyz government sacked Myrzakmatov in 2013, elections to replace him narrowly were won by Osh’s current mayor, Aitmamat Kadyrbayev. Since then, Bishkek has missed opportunities to rebuild its influence in the city or forge better relationships with the local government. Kadyrbayev himself was accused of participating in confrontations against the central government that preceded the ethnic clashes in Osh. He was convicted for his alleged role in seizing the Osh regional administration building in 2010, but the judgment was overturned two years later and he was acquitted. Kadyrbayev maintained that the charges were politically motivated. He is now loosely aligned with two other powerful southern actors: Rayimbek Matrayimov, the country’s deputy customs chief, widely regarded as one of the richest people in Kyrgyzstan; and Suyun Omurzakov, the former head of the Osh city and regional police forces, who is now deputy minister of the interior. Although both men now hold national positions, they still exert significant influence in the city. Reports in the polarised Kyrgyz-language press tend to portray Omurzakov as either a champion of law and order, or associate him with allegations that Osh authorities have allowed a local sports club to train thuggish youth, serving as another tool for power brokers. The club’s manager, Omurzakov’s brother Uluk, denies the accusations made against the club and its members. Mayor Kadyrbayev meanwhile, has aroused irritation in Osh with high-handed behaviour reminiscent of his predecessor, Myrzakmatov. Notwithstanding Myrzakmatov’s own abuses, under his rule the Osh city administration was a unified force that was relatively accessible to residents and responded to their requests in a reasonably timely manner. This is no longer the case. Broadly speaking, the new Osh elite appears less interested in providing services and garnering popular support than in squeezing the city for its material enrichment. Any attempt by the victor in the 15 October election to reassert central power over Osh will be risky, as the city's local power brokers could react by mobilising their respective constituencies, banking on popular dissatisfaction that could spill over into violent confrontation. Outgoing President Almazbek Atambayev was a relatively skillful manager of the competing interests of regional strongmen, even if he did not seek to rebuild Bishkek’s authority in Osh. Should Jeenbekov, believed to be hostile to Matrayimov and Kadyrbayev, be elected president, he could seek to remove these power brokers and replace them with his own southern allies. Babanov, lacking roots in the region, might attempt the same. A struggle over control of elite networks in a city still full of arms and latent ethnic tensions could spell disaster. Yet doing nothing about growing tensions in Osh is not a good option either. However difficult the task, the next president will need to promote genuine reconciliation between the Uzbek and Kyrgyz communities in the south. Rooting out corruption and reinstating the rule of law should top his agenda. Foreign donors, including Russia and China, should engage the Kyrgyz government on these issues even as they recognise that things will be slow to change and difficult to discuss. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Group

The Ackerman Center for Holocaust Studies is proud to announce that The University of Texas at Dallas is the new home of The Annual Scholars' Conference on the Holocaust and the Churches (ASC). The Ackerman Center invites you to join fellow scholars March 3-5, 2018 as we continue the important legacy established by Franklin H. Littell and Hubert G. Locke nearly fifty years ago. This conference offers the opportunity to address the historical significance of the Holocaust through scholarship that is interfaith, international, and interdisciplinary. The ASC provides an invaluable forum for scholars to discuss and advance Holocaust research, ensuring the valuable lessons of the Holocaust remain relevant for today’s world. The central theme of the 2018 ASC is “Critical Moments in the History and Memory of the Holocaust.” Next year marks significant anniversaries of several pivotal moments in the history of the Holocaust, including Hitler’s coming to power in 1933, Kristallnacht in 1938, and the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in 1943. These anniversaries are critical moments in the unfolding of the Nazis’ endeavor to exterminate the Jewish people and provide timely lenses through which to revisit the Holocaust. The ASC invites proposals that explore these events and others that may lie outside these anniversary events of 1933, 1938, and 1943, as well as papers that more generally address the memory of the Holocaust. Please email presentation proposals to annualscholarsconference@utdallas.edu with “ASC Proposal” as the subject. The proposal should include the title of the paper with a short abstract of 250-500 words and the presenter’s bio or CV. Proposals may be for a panel, roundtable, or individual paper. Proposal submission deadline: November 15, 2017. Notification of Acceptance letters will be emailed no later than November 30, 2017. If you can serve as a commentator or panel chair, please email a brief CV, description of your area of expertise, and topics of special interest with “Able to Serve” as the subject. Contact Info: Interested participants are encouraged to visit www.utdallas.edu/ackerman/asc for more information or email Cindy Seton-Rogers at annualscholarsconference@utdallas.edu with any questions. Contact Email: annualscholarsconference@utdallas.edu URL: http://www.utdallas.edu/ackerman/asc ____________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 The Ackerman Center for Holocaust Studies

‘ It is not the movement of persons that is the problem, it is the movement of persons without the protection of fundamental rights and norms.’Thus concludes the recently published report on “Forced to flee: A multi-disciplinary conference on internal displacement, migration and refugee crises”, supported among others by the ICRC and held last November at SOAS, University of London.Throughout history people have migrated in search of a better life—for a wide variety of reasons. Today, however, the extent of migration is challenging the international order and is accompanied by largely negative perceptions about migrants. In a sense, this is nothing new. History shows us that people on the move have often been treated as an inconvenience rather than as being entitled to humanitarian assistance and protection. Yet, all people who leave their homes—for whatever reason—deserve our respect and our support. In this context, labels matter. The labels chosen by observers determine the future of these vulnerable people in a very real and heart-rending way—whether they are called ‘economic migrants’, ‘forced migrants’, ‘internally displaced persons’ (IDPs) or ‘refugees’. In order to find truly sustainable solutions to the current crises of people on the move we must look beyond these labels. This blog considers the scope of the global crisis, the negative labels placed on migrants, the historical use of these categories, and how we could respond in a better way. The global reach of the crisis The conference took place against the background of Europe’s continuing inability to deal humanely and effectively with the twin crises of refugees fleeing the armed conflict in Syria and economic migrants escaping poverty and deprivation in Africa, but also—as the report points out—of a less visible but much bigger crisis in the developing world: ‘Today, 86% of refugees are in developing countries; the top six host countries in Africa have three times the number of refugees as the top six in Europe.’ Quoting UNHCR data, the report states that: ‘In 2015, there were reportedly some 20 million refugees and 40 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) worldwide.’ However, it also points out that ‘In addition, there are many so-called “economic” migrants, who are also vulnerable to violence—including kidnapping, human trafficking, extortion and sexual violence—along the route to their destination, and many are detained or interned.’ Thus, Europe’s refugee crisis is in reality a relatively small part of a much greater global phenomenon of vulnerable people on the move—often at great personal risk. Speakers at the public event accompanying the conference emphasised that these people have not decided to leave their homes lightly; as the accompanying film produced by the British Red Cross put it, they have embarked on ‘journeys filled with resilience, determination, and uncertainty about the future’—and they are entitled to our respect and support rather than our indifference or hostility. Labels and negative connotations This brings us to the leitmotif of the conference: forced to flee. In a sense it is quite an unhelpful concept: who is to determine what constitutes being ‘forced’ when it comes to abandoning situations of conflict and violence, extreme poverty, or marginalisation? Contemporary discourse, at least in Europe and North America, distinguishes between ‘refugees’ and ‘migrants’. The implication is that while the former are forced to flee their homes, the latter do so of their own volition—and are therefore somehow less deserving of our sympathy. Although international law does reserve particular rights for refugees, and in that sense the distinction is valid, the terms ‘migrant’—and even more—‘immigrant’—have acquired decidedly negative connotations in contemporary western society. Thus, a phenomenon as old as the human race itself has been reconceptualised as a problem. But what seems to have happened also is that negative feelings about migration have been projected onto refugees, so that even those fleeing persecution no longer command our sympathy in a way they might once have done—and the force of international law is also diminished. Perhaps the most obvious example of this is in the Mediterranean region, where economic migrants from Africa and refugees from Syria come together in a crazy and anarchic maelstrom of human misery. Both groups have undertaken hazardous journeys, often at the mercy of unscrupulous people traffickers—and yet neither is welcome in Europe. They are just contributors to ‘our’, i.e. Europe’s, problem, and Europe’s preferred solution is the questionable notion of ‘humanitarian border management’. This concept is, as contributors to the conference pointed out, fundamentally self-referential and contradictory—and is in fact an abuse of the word ‘humanitarian’: one can ‘manage’ people more or less ‘humanely’, but it certainly is not ‘humanitarian’ to take action that primarily serves the interests of the person taking it. Learning from history The conference’s starting point was that a deeper historical understanding of migration might enable contemporary society to deal with migration in a better way. Certainly, history reveals that the problems we face today are not new. But, sadly, it also reminds us of the enduring ability of States and other authorities to treat vulnerable people on the move as a threat to the established order and as a risk to be managed rather than as people at risk and in need of our protection. Refugees, IDPs, and other migrants have always been vulnerable to a realpolitik that puts their human rights second to the interests of the powerful. For example, as the conference report explains: ‘Decolonisation exposed the limitations of the Refugee Convention, since its way of separating refugees, IDPs and economic migrants bore little resemblance to what was happening on the ground.’ In reality, people in colonial and postcolonial societies were displaced from their communities for a wide variety of reasons that defied such neat categorisations. Yet, the way they were categorized and treated depended more on what was convenient for the authorities than on the human rights of those displaced. A similar conflation is evident in the treatment, in the 1980s, of hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese who took to small boats to escape the chaos in their country. The British government and the colonial authorities in Hong Kong quickly decided that those arriving there were economic migrants rather than refugees. These ‘economic’ migrants were kept behind barbed wire in detention centres—where some of them stayed for many years. During the Cold War, those fleeing communism and coming to the West were welcomed as refugees because their flight supported the narrative of ‘The Evil Empire’ with which the West was in conflict. After the collapse of the Soviet Union ‘forced migrants’ became ‘economic migrants’—a burden on the West. Even when the countries of East and Central Europe became part of the European Union—with guaranteed free movement of people—their citizens’ desire to pursue economic opportunities in Western Europe became a political hot potato in the latter. It seems that while we embrace the free movement of capital we do not feel the same way about the free movement of labour, i.e. economic migration. Today, would-be immigrants into the United States who have fled into Mexico from violence in Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador are still mostly treated as economic migrants regardless of the reasons that caused them to flee in the first place. One of the most heartbreaking stories at the conference was from a young woman from El Salvador whose husband had been murdered as a result of local political violence. Fearing for her own life she risked the journey to Mexico in an attempt to find safety in the United States. Her account of the dangers faced by a young woman travelling alone with her children as an illegal immigrant with no protection from various forms of exploitation encountered along the way was truly humbling—and shaming. (This and other cases are documented in a powerful report published by MSF in May 2017.) Responding to today’s migration crisis Thus, whether someone is deemed to be a ‘forced migrant’ or an ‘economic migrant’ is likely to depend on the point of view of the observer. Certainly, the labels will mean nothing to those on the move and yet the labels that are chosen will frame the nature of the debate about their future: the fate of ‘refugees’ is discussed in one way and that of ‘migrants’ in another. Only by turning this through 180° and seeing things from the perspective of vulnerable people themselves can we claim any moral high ground in the way we respond to their situations. It is not that international law is somehow absent from or unhelpful to this discussion. Admittedly, the Refugee Convention of 1951 contains a narrow definition of what it means to be a ‘refugee’. And this continues to cause problems for international agencies grappling with the issue of IDPs. The 1951 Convention provides protection for people who have crossed national borders but not for those who have been displaced in their own country. But, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977, not to mention the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, provide a clear framework for protection of vulnerable people whether they are on the move or not, and, depending on the convention, whether they are in situations of armed conflict or not. Greater respect for existing law would therefore be a good place to start. And let us not forget that the emerging norm of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) originated precisely from the need to articulate the responsibilities of sovereign governments towards IDPs in their own country: the notion of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’. The framework is there if we choose to use it. The bottom line is that people on the move have the same rights as everyone else, whatever it was that caused them to embark on their journey in the first place. Our inability to make this the starting point for how we engage with the challenge of protecting them is—or should be—a source of shame in a supposedly civilised international society. Sir Michael Aaronson was chief executive of Save the Children UK from 1995–2005, having previously been the charity’s international director. His earlier career was in the UK Diplomatic Service, although he first worked in the relief action in Nigeria during the Biafran conflict. Mike is a founder member and was Chair of the Board of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva. An Honorary Fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford, he is also an Honorary Visiting Professor and Director of cii—the Centre for International Intervention—at the University of Surrey. He chairs the Research Councils UK (RCUK) Strategic Advisory Group for the Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF). ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Humanitarian Law and Policy

Rohingya crowd the side of the road waiting for food distribution outside Cox's Bazar in Bangladesh on September 10, 2017. Photo by: Poppy McPherson In mid-September, several days after arriving in Bangladesh from conflict-torn Western Myanmar, 18-year-old Rashida Begum sat with her baby by the side of the road, under the shade of a tree. She had lost her brother and sister somewhere in the crowd as they fled. Now in Cox’s Bazar, she was alone in a sea of thousands. “I have no house, I live in the street like this,” she said, as her four-month-old crawled in her lap. They were waiting not for aid distribution from international agencies — like many Rohingya interviewed by Devex, they said they had received nothing — but for scores of trucks manned by Bangladeshis who tossed snacks and shoes to Rohingya refugees waiting with outstretched arms. The roads were lined with families nestled under tarps. Trampled clothing lay on the ground: the new arrivals needed food, water, and shelter, not T-shirts. Now, nearly six weeks on from the start of the crisis, conditions in the camps are still being described as chaotic as thousands of exhausted, traumatized Rohingya, a persecuted Muslim minority, continue to pour in daily, and aid agencies struggle to handle the influx. While United Nations officials and international NGOs cite the urgent need to “scale up,” staff on the ground say the humanitarian response has been hampered by funding shortfalls and bureaucratic obstacles that have left agencies without approval to work and vital supplies stuck in transit. At a press conference in Cox’s Bazar on Tuesday, Mark Lowcock, the U.N. Emergency Relief Coordinator, said aid agencies had delivered 9 million food rations over six weeks and inoculated more than 100,000 children, but conditions continued to be “terrible.” Now, aid workers fear an outbreak of cholera — endemic in Bangladesh — may be imminent. “We need to do a lot more to scale up beyond what we have done so far,” said Lowcock. An ‘unprecedented’ crisis This is a humanitarian crisis that has happened faster, on a greater scale, than most aid workers can remember. After August 25, when Rohingya militants attacked police posts across Myanmar’s northern Rakhine state and the army responded with a brutal crackdown, hundreds of thousands of Rohingya crossed the border within days. Since then, Rohingya have continued to flee what Amnesty International is calling a “scorched earth campaign” by Myanmar’s military, who are accused of mass arson, indiscriminate killings, and rape. The army insists Rohingya militants are urging the exodus as a way to generate sympathy for the population. More than 500,000 Rohingya are now in Bangladesh, adding to an existing population estimated at more than 300,000. “This crisis has been one of the fastest displacements that I can remember,” said Paolo Lubrano, Oxfam’s regional humanitarian manager for Asia. “It’s an immediate wave, an injection of hundreds of thousands of people in very few days and in an area that is relatively deprived.” “Back in June I was working on South Sudan, where a million people crossed in two to three years,” said Kyle Degraw, Save the Children’s global emergency and humanitarian communications manager. “It does feel like a unique crisis just because there are so many people in such a short period of time.” A large proportion of the new arrivals — about 60 percent — are children, many of whom were already severely malnourished before fleeing. “The humanitarian response has been inadequate, but this crisis is in many ways unprecedented, particularly in the scale of refugee movement in such a short period of time,” said Matt Wells, Amnesty International’s senior crisis adviser. “The Rohingya are also an extremely vulnerable population, due to the systemic discrimination in Myanmar that has long affected their access to food and medical care, and the fact that many refugees have gone days without eating while hiding and fleeing from the army’s attacks,” he said. Challenging logistics The conditions in Cox’s Bazar district, a hilly region prone to landslides and about to enter cyclone season, have presented a unique set of challenges for aid distribution. Last month, a truck carrying relief supplies crashed into paddy field, killing nine Red Cross staff. There is no single entry point into Bangladesh for Rohingya refugees, who have been arriving overland and by boat. Groups are spread across a huge area of land. “One of the elements is that most of the displaced people are living in hard-to-reach places and we’re just coming out of the rainy season, so logistics is quite challenging,” said Lubrano of Oxfam. The Bangladesh army plans to move more than 800,000 Rohingya into a 3,000-acre “super-camp” currently under construction. The government has signed an agreement with Myanmar to repatriate those who have fled, but expectations are low. “What for me is important is really raising awareness in the international community of the magnitude of this crisis,” said Lubrano. “We have no idea for how long the Rohingya refugees will be in Bangladesh. We have no idea how this response could be sustainable in the long run.” NGO access delayed For years, Bangladesh has tightly controlled humanitarian access to the Rohingya, who have arrived in waves since the 1970s. They are not officially recognized as refugees, and so the agency tasked with leading the humanitarian response is the International Organization for Migration. Since the latest crisis began, scores of agencies have applied to the government for permission to help in the camps, but authorization has been slow to come, meaning some international NGOs have been unable to start work. Medicine and shelter supplies have been stuck in offices and staff grounded. Dominic Bowen, response and team leader at Medical Teams International, said they had been forced to operate on verbal agreements with government, which could cause problems if staff were stopped at a checkpoint and asked to produce a permit. “The biggest thing slowing us down is everyone is talking about, ‘Are you registered? Can you distribute?’” he said. “And that just prevents NGOs from going larger. It discourages our fundraising departments from going all-in and raising money.” One of MTI’s partners had money and shelter for some 4,000 families but are unable to distribute it because official permission has not come through, he said. “They’re literally just sitting on their hands,” he said. The delays have mostly affected smaller agencies, but even large NGOs were waiting for approval as recently as this week, Lubrano from Oxfam said. Oxfam was given access in early September, he added, raising funding shortages and capacity as other obstacles. “Visas to work in Bangladesh are one month and there’s a bit of turnover that doesn’t help the consistency of the response,” he said. On Wednesday there was a meeting between the Inter Sector Coordination Group (which represents UN agencies leading the response) and Bangladesh’s NGO Affairs Bureau where the issue of authorization was raised. “The NGO Affairs Bureau has committed to speed up the approval for a number of agencies,” said Lubrano. The bureau did not respond to a request for comment and phone calls to their office went unanswered. “Historically, the number of registered humanitarian actors in Bangladesh has been limited,” said Wells of Amnesty. “This needs to be scaled up, given the enormity of what Bangladesh and the humanitarian community are responding to. Donor countries should also increase their support and engagement. “Otherwise, the warning signs are there that this humanitarian crisis will continue to worsen, with a devastating impact on people who have already gone through so much; doctors were already telling me several days ago that they’re seeing a spike in serious illness.” The specter of a cholera outbreak now looms large over the camps, where clean water supplies are scarce and many families are drinking out of muddied holes. The U.N. has shipped 900,000 cholera vaccines set to arrive next week, said Jean-Jacques Simon, UNICEF’s regional communications chief. But additional doses are needed. “The biggest need now is definitely water and sanitation and also health care because you’ve seen over the last few days that there were many thousands of cases of diarrhea, and we are just hoping it will not transform into cholera,” he said. “That’s the biggest fear in the camps today.” _________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Devex

I.Overview Tajikistan’s 25 years as an independent state have been marred by poverty, endemic state corruption and the steady narrowing of political power to a single family. Its patriarch is President Emomali Rahmon, 64, who has ruled the country since 1992 through a carefully calibrated system of patronage and brutality. With Rahmon’s current seven-year term set to end in 2020, many observers believe he is now planning to hand over power to a close family member, probably his eldest son, Rustam, 29. This transition plan is fraught with risk, however, and will play out in a country riven by internal frailties and external vulnerabilities. The outside world has few levers in this Central Asian state of 8.7 million people. But its pivotal position in Central Asia, where it borders on both Afghanistan and China, should prompt external actors, especially Russia, to engage as far as possible to avoid a new source of regional disorder. Over the past two years, President Rahmon has cleared the political space, removing any group or individual, ally or adversary he considered a potential threat. This provides him with a powerful argument against any international or domestic political actor tempted to call for change. Other than the president and his family, there are no organised, functional political forces left. It is his regime or nothing, with even parts of his own traditional powerbase increasingly marginalised. The resentment this produces could lead to a destabilising and potentially violent internal backlash. The fallout likely would be felt throughout Central Asia. The international community has few options. Central Asian neighbours, including Russia and China, should focus on securing the vulnerable Tajik-Afghan border and China in particular should take steps to help revive Dushanbe’s failing economy. The European Union (EU), an important donor to Tajikistan, should push for an orderly transition even if devoid of democratic credibility. In taking these steps, all parties need to bear in mind the one overriding factor that constrains their influence: for now, Rahmon’s own personal interests dominate the country’s agenda. II.Internal Uncertainties A.Family Feuds A key question for Tajikistan today is whether President Rahmon will forego power in 2020 and, if he does, whom he will choose as a successor. Rahmon, still relatively young at 64, is putting a transition plan in motion, if not for 2020 then later. Constitutional amendments passed in 2016, particularly one that lowers the president’s minimum age, suggest Rahmon’s son Rustam is the favourite.Rahmon has been pushing Rustam into high-profile, powerful posts, such as that of mayor in the capital city of Dushanbe. If Rustam joins the senate as its chairman after he turns 30 in December 2017, as analysts and media have speculated, he could become president should his father die or became incapacitated. This scenario is far from certain, however. Rustam faces internal competition and is hampered by his own lack of skill as a government administrator and manager of patronage networks. But he has consolidated informal power over the security services, which ultimately will be the decision-makers in the event of a contested succession. Moreover, although Western observers and members of the urban intelligentsia often describe Rustam as reckless, aggressive and lacking leadership qualities, the pool of potential successors is small. That pool consists of family members. Media speculation focuses on internal rivalries, mentioning Rustam’s sister Ozoda, 39, who runs the presidential administration and is reputed to be competent. She and her banker-businessman husband Jamollidin Nuraliyev at times are mentioned as a possible power couple, though Tajikistan’s patriarchal society works against her. Conflicts involving members of the extended family and could also trigger instability in the context of a succession. Rustam has struggled with his uncle (the president’s brother-in-law) Hasan Asadullozoda for control of revenues from the Tajik Aluminium Company (Talco), which provides up to 70 per cent of the Tajikistan’s foreign currency earnings. Other family members feature in local conflicts over state resources. Without careful management, these internal family feuds could be destabilising, especially at a time of uncertainty over the presidency’s future. B.Local Rivalries The president’s regional power base is showing signs of disaffection. President Rahmon’s winning faction during the civil war (1992-1997) was based in Kulob, part of the cotton-growing area of Khatlon, on the country’s southern border with Afghanistan. Kulobis consequently dominate the most lucrative businesses and hold the most important positions in security structures, at the expense of those from other regions who feel they occupy subservient positions. That circle of power has narrowed, however, as money and resources have dwindled. The effect has been to sharpen fault lines among Kulobis, undermining the political unity that had allowed them to prevail. For example, Kulobis from other parts of Khatlon are losing out to Kulobis from Rahmon’s hometown, Danghara. This is feeding anger among many previously loyal supporters, who may not need much persuasion to take a stronger stance against the Rahmon clan. The trouble brewing in Rahmon’s loyalist heartland is a bellwether for tensions in Tajikistan’s politically peripheral regions. Any perception that President Rahmon’s power is about to weaken could tempt areas suspicious of Dushanbe’s central power – such as the eastern area of Rasht and the mountainous Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) – to take further steps toward autonomy. Rasht has long been known for its distrust of Dushanbe’s authority. Former United Tajik Opposition (UTO) members there have used force to retaliate against efforts by Dushanbe to enforce its writ, leading to killings of Tajik security and military forces.In GBAO, too, infringements on local autonomy resulted in bloody flare-ups in 2012 and 2014. Clashes in both Rasht and GBAO have embarrassed Rahmon, demonstrating the limits of his power. His response to the unrest in both regions was to cut deals and co-opt leaders by granting access to resources and other forms of patronage. Given Tajikistan’s weak finances, this is far from sustainable. Moreover, Rahmon’s successor may not have the skills required to navigate a fraught political environment. C.Economic Troubles Tajikistan’s systemic economic problems are part of the reason government resources are shrinking. Many sectors are suffering: confidence is low in Tajikistan’s currency; remittances from Russia decreased in 2016; the real-estate market is crashing; and half of all bank loans are non-performing. The Tajik government this year issued high-yield bonds to raise revenue, which has allowed them to avoid working with international financial institution or donors who ask for reforms. The government points to the Russian economic crisis as the primary cause of its woes, but fiscal mismanagement and predatory economic policies have also played a significant role over the past decade. Diplomats say the lack of accountability remains a major hurdle for international financial support. In 2016, the Tajik government declined an offer of up to $200 million in the form of grants and loans from the World Bank, because of the pre-conditions attached, which involved reform of the banking sector, currently largely controlled by Rahmon family members and associates.Nor did the EU or International Monetary Fund (IMF) provide financial support to the Tajik budget in 2016. Tajikistan’s successful foray into the bond market arguably has weakened the leverage of donors seeking to impose political conditionality on aid and loans. The public bears the brunt of these persistent economic difficulties. A third of Tajikistan’s population is undernourished and malnutrition is the underlying cause of about one third of child deaths, a higher proportion than in any of the other former Soviet republics. But the economic crisis also affects the corruption and patronage networks behind Rahmon’s rule. Citizens and private businesses increasingly are unable to pay bribes to law enforcement officers and government officials. These officials, in turn, have become increasingly aggressive as they struggle to pay debts incurred to finance the bribes they had to pay to obtain their jobs. In short, economic realities are placing an increasingly fragile power structure under strain, raising questions about its long-term viability. D.Migration Migration is the main outlet for Tajiks suffering from social, political and economic tensions. More than a million Tajiks live and work in Russia, which helps defuse a potential source of instability by absorbing working age men who might otherwise be under- or unemployed at home. But there is a flip-side as Moscow could force the migrants to return, which gives it important leverage over the Tajik president and serves as a considerable constraint on his dealings with Russia. Moscow’s priority is to have a compliant partner and an ongoing military presence in Tajikistan. A senior member of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), an opposition party banned in October 2015, said, “Russia tolerates, not supports, Rahmon, because there are no other options really … whether Russia will support his eldest son, Rustam, [in his succession bid] will depend on how Rustam behaves”. Although it seems unlikely at this stage, Moscow could threaten to expel Tajik migrants should bilateral relations deteriorate, presenting the current or incoming president with an enormous crisis. Emigration from Tajikistan also concerns the EU as the number of Tajik asylum seekers is rising. In 2016, 3,230 Tajiks applied for asylum in EU countries, up from 1,160 in 2015 and 605 in 2014.An IRPT member living in Europe said, “if something happens in Tajikistan, Tajik refugees will come to Europe. It is cheaper and easier for Tajiks to get to Europe than for Syrians”. European officials express fears that Russia could use an influx of Central Asian migrants to heighten tensions over migration in Europe. III.A Jihadist Threat? A.Afghanistan For years Tajikistan has confronted the risk of jihadist spillover from across its 1,400km border with Afghanistan. The emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan Province or the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), an affiliate of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), has led both Russian and U.S. officials to express concern that the movement may reset its priorities northward and attempt to make inroads into Central Asia. The presence of Central Asian militants within IS-K ranks, albeit as a minority, aggravates such fears. So too does increasing instability in Afghanistan’s north east, close to the Tajik border. The immediacy of the threat remains open to debate, however. Although the situation in northern Afghanistan is deteriorating, most incidents along the Tajik-Afghan border appear to be related to smuggling rather than incursions into Tajik territory or attempts to attack the Tajik state. Though its emergence is worrisome, the IS-K is still dwarfed by the Taliban, which remains by far the largest armed opposition group and whose leaders express no territorial interest beyond Afghanistan’s borders. The Taliban arguably has been the main check on ISIS’s growth in Afghanistan, often moving quickly to crush IS-K factions. Moreover, the core of the IS-K remains in eastern provinces closer to Pakistan than Central Asia. Whether the small militias in the north that claim to be part of IS-K have direct operational ties to forces in the east is unclear. Nor is it clear, for now, that the Central Asian militants fighting alongside the Taliban, including in the north east, have Tajikistan in their sights. Tajikistan’s inherent weakness and porous borders make it vulnerable, however. Traffickers have been moving large volumes of drugs across the Afghan border for over two decades, providing revenue to security officers who, in turn, support Rahmon and his inner circle. The governing elite’s role in cross-border narcotics smuggling may help it manage the border informally for now, but in the longer-run such activities undermine efforts to secure it. So long as corrupt officials have an interest in keeping the border porous, there is a danger that militants – not just drugs – will spill over from Afghanistan into Tajikistan. B.Radicalisation Under the guise of combating jihadists, authorities in Dushanbe have quashed internal dissent and repressed Islamic practices. The government restricts its citizens’ ability to display piety and publicly adhere to Islamic norms. Police have forcibly shaved men’s beards, and registered or even arrested women who wear hijabs. The government also forbids anyone under the age of eighteen from attending a mosque and prohibits anyone under 35 from making the pilgrimage to Mecca. Tajiks resent these policies, which apply only to certain citizens. The economic or political elite faces few such restrictions. Young members of criminal gangs and the sons of government officials are seen wearing beards and the wives of government officials wear hijabs, sometimes because their husbands order them to. While the security services claim the bulk of militants travelling to Syria and Iraq to join the ranks of ISIS come from the opposition IRPT – thereby linking Islamism in Tajikistan to jihadism abroad – a prominent Tajik expert on radicalisation disputes that: We have this stereotype that people who leave for Syria are usually from areas that were pro-opposition during the civil war, but it is not true. It is actually the opposite. People from the areas known for being pro-communist [pro-Rahmon] during the war leave more. A lot of Uzbeks leave, a lot of Ku-lobis leave. Even Gulmurod Khalimov who left, is Kulobi, always fought on the government’s side and was never in the opposition. The government’s refusal to distinguish violent jihadists from non-violent individuals who are visibly devout or hold anti-government views risks making all of them enemies. This contributes to popular frustration, which with the right trigger could bubble over into street protests, other types of resistance – or even violence. IV.Conclusion Tajikistan’s current trajectory is cause for concern. In less than three years, the country’s president is – in theory – obliged to transfer power. Whether President Rahmon will do so is uncertain, but either continuation or succession could result in turmoil. Feuds inside the ruling family and rivalries among Tajikistan’s various regions, including those that have previously supported the president, form a turbulent political backdrop. The regime’s margin for manoeuvre is narrowing in the context of a troubled economy, institutional dysfunction and growing instability in Afghanistan. The next president will inherit a fragmented state with low levels of trust in government if not deep hostility toward the state. Many constituencies possess a capacity for violence. Foreign powers have little leverage over Rahmon’s government, which is hostile to any external criticism. Western powers appear reluctant to expend limited political capital pushing for reforms that might over time strengthen Tajikistan’s institutions but whose prospects for now appear remote. Russia and China hold more cards, but have decided so far not to play them. As the main outside power engaged in Tajikistan, Russia has a major interest in securing the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border and ensuring Tajikistan does not become a victim of jihadist violence. Yet despite occasional signs of impatience, Moscow tolerates Rahmon if only for lack of a viable alternative. China, which holds over half of the country’s debt and wants to protect its growing economic assets, is also concerned about Afghanistan and has therefore stepped up security cooperation with Tajikistan. Most of all, China seeks to counter Islamic extremism, separatism or terrorism in its restive Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, which borders Tajikistan and is home to a small minority of ethnic Tajiks. Yet despite these interests, Russia and China are even less likely than Western powers to press for meaningful political or institutional reform. Foreign powers have few good options, but they share an interest in a smooth transition whenever it occurs. Central Asian countries, Russia and China, with help from the EU and U.S., should focus in the interim on bolstering vulnerable borders to prevent violence from spilling throughout the region. With the limited leverage they have, EU and U.S. political engagement should stress the risks of political exclusion urging Dushanbe to refrain from repressive measures that could undermine the transition, triggering instead instability and violent conflict. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Group