Nine-month-old Ali Hassan is among a generation of Somalian babies facing a looming famine. Credit: AP An unprecedented four nations could be declared as fighting famine in food-rich 2017, with an estimated 20 million people and 1.4 million children rated at imminent risk of death. While food security crises, predominantly in Africa, are sadly common, the declaration of famine is a rare and sparing classification. So what is required to declare a famine, what has caused the current desperation and what action has been called for to save millions from starvation? The UN waited to measure death, malnutrition and hunger before declaring famine in South Sudan. Credit: AP The term famine is officially used sparingly and, bluntly, only once people have already started dying of hunger. The UN will only declare a famine the following three measures of death, malnutrition and hunger must be met: At least 20% of households in an area face extreme food shortages (less than 2,100 calories a day) and a limited ability to cope. More than 30% of the population is acutely malnourished. At least two people for every 10,000 die each day South Sudanese women wait for food after a famine is declared in the east African nation. Credit: AP Northern Nigeria, Somalia and the Middle Eastern nation of Yemen are rated at risk but famine has already been declared in parts of South Sudan. At least 100,000 people in Unity state are battling famine, along with one million more on the brink of it, the UN confirmed last month. Prior to South Sudan, famine was last declared in July 2011 in Somalia. The UN estimates around 4.9 million people are currently in need of urgent food, agriculture and nutrition assistance in South Sudan, along with millions more in the other at risk nations. 4.9m - The estimated number of people in South Sudan facing severe food insecurity. 2.9m - The estimated number of people in Somalia facing severe food insecurity. 1.8m - The estimated number of people in Nigeria's conflict-hit north facing severe food insecurity. 14.1m - The estimated number of people in Yemen facing severe food insecurity. What has raised the threat of famine? Millions of invaluable livestock have perished as Somaliland battles a devastating drought. Credit: ITV News Conflicts, drought and economic crises are the most common causes while efforts to bring aid are, according to the UN, woefully underfunded. South Sudan has been embattled in a three-year civil war before its entrenched financial woes were compounded by months of drought that has hit their fellow east Africans in Somalia. Fighting has totally undermined efforts to fight natural problems in north-east Nigeria, Somalia and Yemen. The conflicts force people to flee, disrupt agriculture, make regular trading near-impossible and thwart aid responders. The situation is too dangerous in Nigeria for aid workers to confirm suspected famines in two towns in the northern region where the military is battling Boko Haram insurgents. Yemen's famine threat has also risen because of water shortages. What action is being done in response? Bags of food have been dropped by the World Food Program in South Sudan. Credit: AP In the short term, the battle to fight the spread of famine is one of funding and access. Secretary General António Guterres of the United Nations said the UN needs around £3.6 billion by the end of March to prevent the catastrophe of hunger and famine in South Sudan, Nigeria, Somalia and Yemen. Immediate humanitarian assistance is needed to bring aid, but that has been woefully hindered by conflict. In the longer term, the ending of fighting will vastly boost efforts to support those facing starvation. How widespread is Africa's food problems? The map shows the grading of food insecurity across crisis-hit Africa. Credit: Africa Center For Strategic Studies The persistent lack of rainfall across the Horn of Africa at the end of last year has left an estimated 12 million people in dire need of food assistance. The UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) said the plight of families in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia was exacerbated by rising debt, poor harvests, low milk and meat production that, combined, meant limited access to food and income. But that is only a small section of the continent's food woes. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies, which is based in the US, said 19 African countries are facing crisis, emergency, or catastrophic levels of food insecurity. Ten of those countries are experiencing civil conflict. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 ITV News

Executive Summary The first 100 days of Uzbekistan’s new president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, hint at the possibility of much-overdue change in one of Central Asia’s most repressive states. But as its long-time prime minister, Mirziyoyev was a key player in the 25-year rule of his predecessor, Islam Karimov, and he inherits a system designed to protect those in power at the expense of the population. It would be premature to conclude that release of a few political prisoners, an early focus on urgent economic issues and a thaw in relations with neighbouring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, welcome departures from past practice though they are, promise an intention for systemic reform policies of the sort needed to cope with rising pressures over social and economic issues. Uzbekistan’s Western partners share an interest with Russia and China in the country’s sustainable stability, however, so should cautiously work with the new administration to encourage change while being prepared to call out any backsliding. A cabinet re-shuffle in January appears to have done much to consolidate the president’s position. Numerous visits to Uzbekistan’s regions are allowing the population a degree of interaction with the head of state that was unthinkable under Karimov. Steps like that and acknowledgement of the economic hardship in rural areas have created some genuine popular support for him and a degree of optimism in the national mood. He has a complicated relationship with Rustam Azimov, an ex-finance minister, and Rustam Inoyatov, the head of the National Security Service (SNB), though the former has been somewhat sidelined. Mirziyoyev needs to cultivate their continued support and that of others, including rich Uzbeks living in Russia and elsewhere, who may have a limited interest in significant changes to the system they know so well. Uzbekistan has pressing domestic issues, unpredictable neighbours and a jihadist extremism threat. Though its border with Afghanistan is one of the region’s most secure, it looks to the south with nervousness. Citizens need economic and social policies that improve their living standard. Pensioners and public sector workers exist on meagre benefits and salaries, often not paid on time. According to Russian authorities, as many as 3.35 million Uzbeks have felt obliged to find work in that country. Though Mirziyoyev has made a point about creating dialogue between citizens and the state, discontent finds no expression through civil society or in the narrow political space. Uzbekistan’s partners need to find a balance between building a relationship with the new administration and providing a critique of Karimov’s institutional legacy. I.Introduction On 4 December 2016, for the first time in the history of independent Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov was not elected as the country’s president. Shavkat Mirziyoyev, prime minister since 2003 and acting president following Karimov’s death on 2 September, received 88.61 per cent of the vote after a campaign “devoid of genuine competition”. As acting president, he said he would stay true to Karimov’s course, yet he made several statements and gestures that suggested he would deviate from some of his predecessor’s policies. These included promises to improve difficult relations with neighbours, liberate the state-controlled economy with its foreign-currency black market and listen to the people, who had been deprived of their civil voice under Karimov’s heavy-handed rule. This report, Crisis Group’s third paper on Uzbekistan since Karimov’s death, aims to provide perspective on executive decisions and other political processes in President Mirziyoyev’s first 100 days and assess the scope for engagement with the new government. Research was done in Tashkent, Fergana, Bishkek and Brussels. Though Crisis Group was able to conduct field work there, access in Uzbekistan remains somewhat restricted due to security concerns for staff and interlocutors. II.Loose Ends and Fresh Starts Following his election, Mirziyoyev declared 2017 the “Year of Dialogue with the People and Human Interests” and held a modest inauguration on 14 December. Listening to his constituency had been the central theme of the campaign, during which Mirziyoyev established a personal virtual address at which every citizen could submit concerns. It is still uncertain, however, what kind of follow-up there will be to that initiative, and Uzbeks remain wary. The practice has now been adopted by the foreign ministry and even the National Security Service (SNB), but their responsiveness is also unclear. The SNB remains a shadowy entity about which little public information is available. 100 days have been insufficient to answer the key questions asked during the three months between Karimov’s death and the election: were Mirziyoyev’s pledges merely a campaign tactic, or did they indicate a genuine interest in addressing the country’s political, social and economic realities; and in turn, what would the answer mean for Uzbekistan’s international partners? Mirziyoyev’s earliest moves as acting president were to consolidate his position with a series of reappointments and cabinet adjustments. Abdulla Aripov, deputy prime minister between 2002 and 2012, was returned to that post on 14 September. After the inauguration, Mirziyoyev obtained Aripov’s installation as prime minister by the rubber-stamp parliament’s two chambers. Oxford-educated Rustam Azimov, once seen as a potential rival, kept his post as deputy prime minister for macroeconomic development and foreign investments but lost the finance ministry to Batyr Hodjayev, a former (2006-2009) economy minister. This was a clear message from Mirziyoyev about who is in charge. The president also singled him out for criticism at the 16 January cabinet meeting, questioning his commitment to solving the problems of entrepreneurs and the management of his portfolio, pointedly urging him to be self-critical and rebuking the finance ministry that he had run for eleven years. If Azimov is further, or even permanently, sidelined, it implies the powerful SNB at least tacitly approves. Mirziyoyev’s engagement with the security service is a sign of his confidence. Its long-serving head, Rustam Inoyatov, 72, is believed to be in poor health. The deputy, Shukhrat Guliamov, was transferred to a lesser position in Surkhandarya in December, and his family reportedly went to the U.S. where brother Bakhtiyar is Uzbekistan’s ambassador. Replacing key SNB officials and eventually Inoyatov himself with his own appointees would allow Mirziyoyev to make his power virtually absolute. Inoyatov is reportedly still capable of making trouble for Mirziyoyev, however. There is speculation that he may be blocking much needed economic reforms, specifically a liberalisation of the currency market that could deprive senior figures of black market exchange profits. Beyond the regional governors and SNB generals, another sector the new president needs to win over or neutralise includes organised crime groups involved with prostitution, drugs, money laundering and, allegedly, selling government positions. They are said to have close links with similar groups in Russia or Ukraine. Salim Abduvaliev, who has longstanding connections with Uzbekistan’s political elite and is alleged to be “boss of the Uzbek mafia”, was appointed deputy chairman of the National Olympic Committee. Approval from and cooperation with a variety of actors lends stability to the regime, and establishing ties with individuals such as Abduvaliev was arguably mandatory for Mirziyoyev. Mirziyoyev knows everyone and everything from thirteen years as prime minister. As president, he told his government: “My tragedy is in the fact that I know everything about all of you”. He is at least co-author of his “tragedy”, but the statement bookmarks his new authority while distancing him from old colleagues. As part of promoting dialogue with citizens by example, Mirziyoyev began visiting the regions, making an early stop in the Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan, where he walked through crowds allowing people to take “selfies” with him, something unprecedented in Uzbekistan. The visit suggested a strategic approach and desire to burnish credentials as champion of the country’s territorial integrity. The autonomous region has the constitutional right to secede, and though a fledging dissident movement has gained little traction, there is resentment against the Tashkent government. Mirziyoyev seeks to secure the same support and loyalty of its formal and informal leaders as Karimov had. Speaking in Nukus, Karakalpakstan’s capital, Mirziyoyev stressed the importance of developing entrepreneurship in Uzbekistan. Outlining a scheme for all rural households to possess 100 chickens and enjoy the financial benefits of egg-selling, he tasked Azimov with implementing it, and it kicked off in Jizzakh mid-February with 257 low-income families each receiving twenty chicks. A focus on rural development should be welcomed, but there are doubts about the feasibility of a proposal that may indicate the government and its president retain a Soviet, top-down command economy mentality. An Uzbek observer suggested responsibility was given to Azimov to create a pretext for eventually firing him. However, the scheme, along with other initiatives outlined in a draft document published in February such as investments in small-scale fruit farming, do appear to indicate that much-needed rural development is at least on the government’s radar. This might give the European Union (EU) and member states an opportunity to test the new government’s reform instincts by offering technical help. The “chicken project” would require phyto-sanitary and logistical support for collecting, processing, packaging and, crucially, developing a market for the eggs. His statements and efforts to hear out people’s needs, combined with public criticism of officials, are earning Mirziyoyev a measure of popularity. “Mirziyoyev is a person who knows Uzbekistan’s real picture, he can make things better”, a 55-year-old teacher said. “He definitely has his eye on the public mood”, a Western journalist recently returned from Uzbekistan said. “He’s more [Kazakh President Nursultan] Nazarbayev than Karimov in that sense”. Speaking out and spotlighting corruption can still be dangerous for a citizen, however, as shown by the arrest of a businessman, Olim Sulaymonov, who appealed to the then acting president about corruption via YouTube. His video resembled a collective cry from a business community under great pressure from supervising bodies that it must bribe in order to function. Sulaymonov’s arrest on 15 February on fraud and slander charges raises doubts about the government’s willingness to engage in genuine dialogue when faced with criticism. Widespread corruption and mismanagement of resources continue to lead to gas and electricity shortages even in the major cities. Karimov’s native Samarkand had extensive blackouts in January. Like elsewhere in Central Asia, infrastructure is worn out and in need of repair and modernisation. The president is involved in nearly every sector of Uzbekistan’s life, from financial reform to health care and education, from designing new buildings to fighting corruption and crime. Mirziyoyev is highly critical of the civil service and has proposed both monetary reward for positive work and monetary for failure. Civil servants at all levels are feeling the pressure, with Western officials noting that ministries and agencies they deal with seem more flustered than usual. Mirziyoyev has released four political prisoners, several with long sentences. Muhammad Bekjan, younger brother of Muhammad Solih, the leader of the opposition party Erk in exile since 1993, was freed on 22 February after nearly eighteen years. Bekjan edited the party’s newspaper until kidnapped by SNB in Kyiv in 1999, brought home and convicted of involvement in bomb attacks in Tashkent that year. Abused and tortured, he is among thousands of victims of Karimov’s regime. Upon release, Bekjan praised Mirziyoyev for efforts to liberalise the system and urged the government to also release his colleagues, Yusuf Ruzimurodov, Agzam Turgunov and Solijon Abdurakhmanov, as well as Erk activist Muhammad Rajab. Jamshid Karimov, the late president’s nephew, who had been held in psychiatric facilities for his reporting off and on since 2006, was released on 1 March. Though welcome, these releases are not a clear sign the government will engage seriously on human rights. A systematic approach to past abuses and preventing recurrences is needed. Uzbekistan’s Western partners should continue to press on this, as hundreds of political prisoners remain in custody. Having released some of Karimov’s critics, Mirziyoyev should not re-stock the jails with his own opponents or persons falsely accused of crimes or persecuted for religious beliefs. Cotton is another sensitive issue. Human rights defender Elena Urlaeva, who reports on child and forced labour in the cotton fields, said she was again under pressure not to meet with World Bank and International Labour Organisation officials. Her 1 March detention underlines the limits of Mirziyoyev’s human rights agenda to date. If his government wishes to repair the regime’s reputation, it must end such tactics, eradicate forced labour and refrain from repressing activists and rights defenders. This should be a priority issue for Uzbekistan’s trade partners. The situation of Gulnara Karimova, the late president’s daughter, is unclear. A Swiss lawyer confirmed that she is alive and under house arrest. The U.S. has frozen $300 million in assets in connection with an investigation of Karimova, whom it accuses of receiving and laundering kickbacks; Tashkent seeks return of those assets. If she testifies, her version of events could be damaging for the government. Her cousin, Akbarali Abdullayev, sentenced to fifteen years in Uzbekistan in 2014 for embezzling state assets, illegal acquisition of currency and bribery, was arrested in Kyiv in January 2017 for the crimes committed on Uzbek territory. Karimov’s younger daughter, Lola, is Uzbekistan’s Permanent Delegate to UNESCO and recently established the Islam Karimov Foundation with the objective of promoting the country’s historical, cultural, and literary heritage. Mirziyoyev appears poised to take a different approach to migration and movement than Karimov. 3.35 million Uzbeks work in Russia, the Russian internal affairs ministry says, almost double what the now defunct Federal Migration Service released in February 2016. In 2013, Karimov called these Uzbeks lazy; in January, Mirziyoyev promised to create conditions to motivate labour migrants to return. Uzbekistan’s unemployment is officially 5.2 per cent. In reality, unemployment and under employment, particularly in rural areas, compel many to seek work abroad. Social and economic development must be a priority for the government. The exit visa regime, which requires citizens to apply for permission to leave the country, is also under review. Only a handful of countries still use an exit visa, including North Korea – not an attractive comparison for the new president – and change is likely, perhaps replacing it with a new international passport. Mirziyoyev’s promise to replace entry visas with 30-day tourist visit permission for citizens of fifteen countries and for citizens over 55 of another twelve countries was quickly postponed due to a stated need to establish proper tourist facilities, but the SNB may have felt overwhelmed by the prospect of more foreign visitors. Given Uzbekistan’s long emphasis on total control, it is likely to struggle with liberalisation of border crossing. Easing foreign national entry is put off for at least four years, but abolishment of exit visas for Uzbeks may happen sooner. International partners may have opportunity to provide expertise and equipment for managing border security that do not deprive Uzbeks of basic free movement rights. Under Mirziyoyev, who praised achievements of the country’s ethnic Kyrgyz community, the state has given citizenship for the first time in decades to foreign nationals and stateless persons. That step will improve hundreds of lives. Gaining Uzbek citizenship was nearly impossible under Karimov. Numbers of labour migrants, minorities and stateless persons in Uzbekistan are rough estimates. The last census was in 1989, and the country would benefit from a new one that would allow coherent understanding of its demographics and ethnic composition and provide other valuable information. III.Friends and Neighbours Border management and security, energy and water are significant issues for Uzbekistan and its neighbours that require domestic, regional and wider international efforts. Mirziyoyev is charting a more open course than Karimov. He has already struck a more constructive tone with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, frequent subjects of Karimov’s ire. Talks on resolving border issues with Kyrgyzstan are underway, though Bishkek remains wary. The first Dushanbe-Tashkent flight in 25 years took place on 10 February, but the route is unlikely to be profitable, and regular service was postponed to April. A visa system is in place with Tajikistan, while Kyrgyz and Uzbek citizens enjoy a 60-day visa-free period in each other’s country. Despite its previously uncompromising position against upstream hydropower projects, Tashkent has been silent about the construction of the Rogun dam on the Vakhsh River in Tajikistan, a possible sign of an agreement and even a shared, integrated energy system. Mirziyoyev’s family ties with Uzbek-Russian oligarch and Putin ally Alisher Usmanov make him a comfortable partner for the Kremlin, despite Uzbekistan’s non-alliance position in economic and military matters that complicates Russia’s ambitions in the post-Soviet space. Uzbek relations with Kazakhstan should move on from the competition Islam Karimov felt he had to deny existed and focus on partnerships in trade, security and other sectors. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are working toward better trade relations, with the focus on energy. Tashkent has expressed interest in resuming negotiations on border issues and finalising the demarcation process with all its neighbours. While regular talks and meetings of border demarcation committees are a significant improvement over years of confrontation and incidents, actual delimitation is challenging, as in some cases the borderline runs through households. The Kyrgyz presidential campaign has produced fine promises and statements on relations with neighbours and demarcation of borders. But the issue is both political and technically complex, so swift progress should not be expected. Though border integration is a distant prospect for Central Asia, not least because of the complex Afghanistan situation, EU expertise with external border security could help ease some of the existing barriers to movement of people, goods and services within the region. Western partners could assist, for example, with programs to install effective equipment for safe, secure, and swift border-crossing. Vladimir Putin’s February 2017 Central Asian tour is a reminder that Russia is everywhere present in the region. The Russian president visited Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) member states, with security high on the agenda. Neither Turkmenistan nor Uzbekistan are CSTO members, but the former’s president received a phone call from Putin on 28 February, while Naryshkin, the director of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, met with Mirziyoyev in Tashkent the same day. With Uzbekistan’s neighbours drawing closer to Moscow, Mirziyoyev is left with few other foreign policy options. While welcoming Chinese investments, he is unlikely to want Beijing to become too influential. Russia and China are powerful actors, but they have no interest in liberalisation. Relations with China have been courteous but not very substantive, centring on infrastructure projects, though work has been paused on a gas pipeline, Line D, connecting Turkmenistan and China through Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan is contracted to export ten billion cubic metres of gas each year. Falling demand in China for gas could hurt the Uzbek economy, as well as those of its neighbours. Mirziyoyev chose Turkmenistan over Russia and Kazakhstan for his first foreign visit as president (6-7 March), signing a protocol on strategic partnership that may mean a collective attempt to counter-balance Russia’s influence in the region by two countries that prefer neutrality and non-alliance. Putin visited neither during his regional tour, but Russia considers Turkmenistan the weak link in Central Asian security and Uzbekistan the top exporter of violent extremists to Syria and Iraq. Both will thus continue to be subjects of Russian pressure. With uncertainty surrounding the U.S. approach to Central Asia under the Trump administration as to so many areas, the EU is one of the few Western actors with capacity and likely interest to pursue a comprehensive agenda of economic reform, good governance and human rights. On resuming textiles trade with Uzbekistan in December 2016, the EU acknowledged positive steps toward eradicating child labour and urged an end all forms of forced labour. Uzbeks are still forced to pick cotton, but pressure from European partners might improve the situation. Its need to develop and modernise its agriculture could give the EU and member states a chance to build links with Tashkent and local government and businesses. Western democracies and international organisations should use such opportunities to test the new president’s intentions, while encouraging reforms, including good governance, a transparent judiciary, quality health care and education. IV.Conclusion Mirziyoyev did not merely inherit a system of governance built on tight, often brutal control and suspicion of change. He had an important part in creating and implementing it. Nevertheless, his first 100 days showed something of a shift from his predecessor’s approach to domestic, regional and wider international issues. If he expands on this to address the difficult issues and receives conditional support from abroad, there may be potential for sustained, broad and genuine cooperation. For now though, much more is needed. It is progress that the new administration acknowledges all is not perfect, and a beginning is needed to resolve the issues impacting society. But content is as yet lacking and delivery is uneven. Mirziyoyev’s efforts to restore relations with neighbours should be welcomed, as Central Asian states are intertwined culturally and historically, and their border, trade, resource and security issues are interdependent. Border demarcation should be accompanied by mutual efforts to establish favourable conditions for legal movement of people as well as goods and services across the borders. The political prisoner issue should remain high on the agenda. Hundreds of Uzbeks are still in custody; speech and expression remain suppressed. Concrete steps to free political prisoners and end torture must be undertaken to establish the new government’s credibility. Uzbekistan lacks genuine political competition, and Mirziyoyev’s power can grow – or he can choose to open political space and liberalise the economy to allow the country to transition beyond Karimov’s legacy. Which way he wants to take Uzbekistan is still uncertain. _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Watch

Greetings! On March 6, 2017 Jubilee Campaign held a press conference in Geneva, Switzerland at the 34th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council titled Terrorism in Nigeria: Boko Haram succeeded by rising Fulani militancy. Panelists of the press conference included Mr. Mark Lipdo, founder of Stefanos Foundation; Ms. Fatima Njoku, lawyer for Stefanos Foundation; Mr. Mark Jacob, former Attorney General of Kaduna State, Nigeria; Mr. Solomon Musa, National President of the Southern Kaduna People's Union; and Ms. Mirjam Bos, the Program Officer for Jubilee Campaign Netherlands. This panel of experts discussed the alarming increase in militarization in North and Central Nigeria, that has resulted in the death of thousands of minority ethnic persons. The rising militia is made up of members of the Fulani ethnic tribe. Therefore, they are referred to as the Fulani militants. These militants have launched systematic attacks on farming communities that are predominately Christian. During their attacks, they kill villagers, raze homes, and destroy farmland. Many times, they then move in to occupy the attacked village. Over 4,000 people have been killed in the past three years. The panelists expressed their distress that the Nigerian government has taken little action to address the violence and has provided no support for its tens of thousands of victims. Mr. Lipdo described, "Most of the communities that have been burnt and people killed within them, there has never been any compensation done by the government, so the people are suffering. They have nowhere to sleep; they have no food because their farmlands have been burnt." Because the Nigerian government has proven unwilling to protect its citizens, the panelists appealed for outside support. "We keep complaining, government appears to be uninterested in what we are saying, and that is why one of the reasons we are here is to ask for intervention," Mr. Jacob stated. Those pleading for help have been rejected by the Nigerian government and have remained unheard by much of the international community. Jubilee Campaign is working to inform the international community and advocate for intervention. Terrorism in Nigeria: Boko Haram succeeded by rising Fulani militancy Due to a rising Fulani militancy, there are minority ethnic villages in North Central Nigeria that suffer deliberate, coordinated, systematic, and continuous attacks. Though this militia has killed thousands of people in recent years, they continue to operate with little to no government intervention. The nature of this violence demonstrates that the Fulani militants have the potential to displace Boko Haram as the greatest threat to Nigeria Terrorism in Nigeria: Written Report In Nigeria, many factors point to a cause for discrimination against non-Muslims. In section 38, the Nigerian Constitution guarantees freedom of religion, including the freedom to change one's religion or belief and freedom to manifest and propagate one's religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance. Yet, in North Central Nigeria, the spirit of this provision in the constitution is not observed. Minority ethnic persons are deprived access to infrastructure in their communities, often marginalized from the judicial system, and sometimes unconstitutionally subjected to sharia law and the authority of sharia police. In HIS Grace and Peace, Ann Buwalda ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Jubilee Campaign

Ubuntu is a southern African ethical concept that suggests that humanity is interdependent. Rooted in a sense of community, ‘ubuntu’ means that we are people through other people. South Africa pushes a strong rhetoric of ubuntu, for example the way Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu used it to substantiate rainbowism. While South Africans claim the concept of ubuntu, we also display disturbingly xenophobic undercurrents, which emerged in 2008. And they keep resurfacing. Over the last couple of weeks we have seen a resurgence in xenophobia in areas like Pretoria West, Atteridgeville and Rosettenville. There was even a whole entire march against immigrants that took place in Pretoria on 24 February. The Daily Vox spoke to Dr Edwin Etieyibo, who lectures African philosophy at Wits University, about the disconnect between ubuntu and xenophobia in South Africa. A simple, straightforward answer would be to say if people practise xenophobia – given that ubuntu is supposed to be more inclusive, it’s about not just my group of people but humanity – then you expect that one who has ubuntu should be welcoming to others. Desmond Tutu expressed it quite clearly when he said someone who has ubuntu is kind, considerate and welcoming to others. Xenophobia is the opposite of welcoming to others. One that is not welcoming to others doesn’t have ubuntu, right? That would be the simple, straightforward answer. People who practise xenophobia don’t have ubuntu, they don’t practise ubuntu. A more complex answer would be that other considerations override the sense of ubuntu. A key concept in Aristotelian ethics is ‘akrasia’, which is weak will. The idea is that if you develop your character sufficiently to have these virtues then you always do the right thing. Why would someone who knows that this [behaviour] is destructive to them, still engage in those actions? According to akrasia, they have weak will so they know what is right but their will is weak. If you use this to speak about ubuntu and xenophobia, you could say maybe they recognise that their actions are wrong but there are other actions that override this. The other thing could be political rhetoric. Maybe they hear political leaders talking about foreigners in certain terms. If you see these politicians as [people] who you look up to, you want to put into action what [they are saying.] For example the attack that happened two years ago; it happened not too long after the King of Zulus talked about foreigners as others. The first attack happened around Durban. People associate this one that happened – I think it was around Tshwane – the mayor of Tshwane talked about foreigners as others. Even if it was by coincidence, there were attacks in Pretoria. It’s not as straightforward as saying [xenophobic attackers] don’t have ubuntu. To be able to say that, you need to interview them and say: “Do you know ubuntu? Do you believe in it?” You may be surprised that they say, “Yes I know ubuntu. I believe in ubuntu.” There are complexities. It could be that they don’t have ubuntu, it could be that some of them pander to the politicians’ rhetorics, it could also be that some people are pushed by their socio-economic conditions. Added to that is the idea of scapegoatism. You look for vulnerable people to blame who cannot fight back. If you blame government, government is going to fight back. In terms of level playing fields, there’s no level playing fields because one can use its power or control over the media to squash you so your narrative gets lost. Generally we could say: if you want to attack people, attack the white people because your condition, for example, is because of the long history of apartheid. It’s because the wealth is concentrated in the hands of 1% of people – most of them, white people. But you can’t [blame white people] because white people will crush you. They have money, they have power. So who is vulnerable? It’s the foreigners – some of them are living on a slippery slope. They don’t have papers – they are illegitimate – so they can’t fight you. The idea of scapegoatism plays a role of catharsis because it’s like frustration that is acted out – when you burn some businesses or punch some people in the face it kind of gives you some satisfaction that my condition is terrible but I’ve meted out justice to those people who are responsible, even if they are the wrong target. But this doesn’t excuse these people. [These are] explanations but not ones that we say we [can] accept. Morality is about prescribing conduct and [saying] this is the right moral conduct. When you fail that conduct, you’ve acted immorally. I feel that in South Africa, as long as you have a large number of the population who are poor, uneducated, continue to struggle economically – there will always be the ubuntu [disconnect]. It’s not like we can say tomorrow will be better. It’s not like we can say God will bring manna from heaven. Even when they die, their children will be chained in that cycle of poverty. Even if politicians did not have this rhetoric of xenophobia, you’re going to have these pockets of it. Even if you chase away all the illegals, it’s not going to solve your problem. Unless you provide a job for them. But I also think, given South Africa’s history with apartheid and racism: you should know better. Xenophobia is racism of a different kind, it’s the same with sexism – discrimination against people who don’t belong to a certain group of people. So you have to wonder: how did you get here? From ubuntu, something’s wrong here. From your history, something’s wrong here. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 The Daily Vox

Nearly 1,000 moviegoers turned out here in the shadow of the temples of Angkor for the world premiere of First They Killed My Father, the adaptation of Loung Ung’s Khmer Rouge-era memoir directed by Angelina Jolie and set to screen on Netflix in September. The movie is the first of its scale to be filmed in Cambodia with local actors and released in the Khmer language. Those seated in the back rows squealed and stood to catch a glimpse of the actor, director, and activist as Jolie introduced her film. For a fleeting moment, a speck of Hollywood stardust had come to Cambodia. The outdoor screening was a rare cinematic spectacle for a country with a population of nearly 16 million and just six modern movie theaters. But the film’s production — which took place in the northern towns of Siem Reap and Battambang over the course of five months — had mobilized a cast and crew of at least 2,000, according to local reports. The towns were transformed: residents were hired as extras, and many of the technicians, production assistants, and designers were young Cambodians. In sleepy Battambang, the six days of filming closed many of the city’s streets in the midst of the Lunar New Year, causing barbers and convenience store owners to complain about lost business. Some in the audience hoped that a large-scale production with such global exposure could put the local film industry on the map. “We didn’t make the film for Cambodian people. We made the film with Cambodian people,” said Rithy Panh, the movie’s co-producer. Panh, considered to be the country’s pre-eminent director, saw his own Khmer Rouge film, The Missing Picture, nominated for an Academy Award in 2014 — a first for Cambodia. He said First They Killed My Father sets a precedent, perhaps for future foreign investment. “The cinema likes stability. Cinema will go to the place that has stability,” Panh said. “That’s why when you shoot a film like this one, with Angelina Jolie… [others] can invest in Cambodia.” Cambodian cinema has an illustrious history. Between 1960 and 1975, the local film industry thrived. More than 350 movies were produced, often featuring traditional Khmer legends that sometimes drew crowds abroad. Phnom Penh was dotted with at least 33 movie theaters. (One that still stands, the Cinema Luxe, appears in an early scene in Jolie’s film, when the Khmer Rouge roll into the capital’s streets on April 17, 1975.) The Khmer Rouge regime decimated the cinema. Actors, directors, and producers disappeared. But in the intervening decades, enterprising filmmakers have ushered in its resurgence, often on small budgets. Short films have received top prizes at regional award ceremonies. This week, the seventh Cambodia International Film Festival — which claims Jolie as its patron — will feature two Cannes selections, Panh’s Exile and young French-Cambodian director Davy Chou’s Diamond Island. Speaking in Phnom Penh late last year, Lord David Puttnam — who produced the last foreign feature about the Khmer Rouge regime, The Killing Fields, in Thailand in 1984 — pointed out that there is still plenty of room for foreign intervention in film in Cambodia. “You can build the industry off the back of an enormous [amount] of expat help,” he said. The country was in fact well-equipped to host a Hollywood crew, Panh pointed out. Many of the Cambodians on set had picked up their skills through his Bophana Center, which holds much of the country’s audiovisual archives, and the Cambodia Film Commission (CFC). “We were prepared for it for years,” he said. “Through the CFC, we had trained 300 technicians already.” But none had ever worked on a Hollywood-scale production. “When you spend five or six months on a big set like that, you learn a lot,” Panh said. Kim Sothea Thangdy, 29, is a drama producer at local television network PNN and had previously trained with Bophana. She dropped everything when she was offered a temporary position as an assistant to a line producer on First They Killed My Father. “I didn’t want to quit my job, but I decided to leave because I just wanted to do the Angelina Jolie project,” she said with a bubbly laugh. “I wanted to work with Hollywood people.” Thangdy said her peers on set were inspired by the experience, including the artistic and technical demands of Jolie. “I am a filmmaker, and [Jolie] is my role model. I am sure other filmmakers feel the same way,” she said. “I want to make films like her, like that.” Both she and Yean Reaksmey, a 20-something artist who worked as an assistant in the costume department, recalled the long hours on set — an image conjured when they saw the film onscreen for the first time, Reaksmey said. “All the memories come back: when you get up at 4 or 5 in the morning to catch the van to go to the set,” he said. Reaksmey had never before worked on a film with so many departments, and said the sheer scale of the production provided lessons for building an industry here in Cambodia. “Here to be on set with a big crew was something different,” he said. “It was a kind of workshop for everyone to understand: from the camera crew to the costume department to production assistants.” At a press conference a few hours before the premiere, Jolie said she had been taken with the young people on set. “I didn’t know which actors we would find, and I didn’t know what to expect,” she said. “I have been surprised every step of the way… This is a country of great artists. And I’m sitting next to many of them right now.” When a Cambodian reporter asked how young filmmakers might capitalize on their experience on set, Jolie was quick to respond. “I think I would start by letting them answer the questions,” she quipped, to applause. Over 30 years after The Killing Fields, Jolie and Loung — who co-wrote the script — sought to bring the story back to Cambodia, to let Cambodians tell it. To Youk Chhang, a child survivor of the Khmer Rouge sitting in the audience, their mission was a resounding success. “The Cambodian identity is there immediately. That was my first impression,” said Chhang, who directs the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam), the country’s foremost genocide research center. “Even the colors, the afternoon golden light. [Jolie] captured the beauty of the country.” And in that fading light in Siem Reap, hundreds like him thronged toward the screen — passed the red carpet — as the air buzzed with excitement. If a measure of a fledgling industry’s success is its potential to bring in an audience, the local turnout for First They Killed My Father sets a high bar. “These are people who don’t go to the cinema,” said the young artist Reaksmey. “And they were there.” ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 The Diplomat

Media Advisory 6th March 2017 People’s Tribunal on Myanmar State Crimes to be announced. 6th-7 th March 2017Host: School of Law, Queen Mary University of London, Mile End Road, E1 4NS LONDON: On the 6th and 7th March, representatives of Rohingya and Kachin victim groups will present first-hand, live and recorded, testimonies about crimes committed by the Myanmar state against their groups to the Rome-based Permanent People’s Tribunal.They will bring forth the charges that the Myanmar government is committing crimes, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Additionally, expert witnesses from around the world, including Professor PennyGreen (Queen Mary University of London), Dr Mandy Sadan (School of Orientaland African Studies, University of London), Azril Mohamed Amin (Centre forHuman Rights Research and Advocacy, Malaysia), will testify on specific crimesand/or the historical context of grave violations under international law. Video-recorded testimonies of Rohingya rape victims, who recently fled toBangladesh, will also be presented to the Panel of Jury. The Dalai Lama has issued a formal statement, which will be released during the Press Conference of the Opening Sessions, on Tuesday 7th March. The Tibetan Buddhist leader disclosed that he has ‘privately communicated to Nobel Laureatead Burmese leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’ about his concerns regarding the persecution of the Rohingya. Among the initial Panel of Jury, are Prof Daniel Feierstein, renowned genocide scholar and former President of the International Association of GenocideScholars (IAGS), Dr Helen Jarvis, former Public Affairs Officer at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, and Denis Halliday, UN Assistant Secretary-General (1994-98) andwinner of Gandhi International Peace Award 2003. The inaugural session in London will be hosted at, and webcast live from, theInternational State Crime Initiative of Queen Mary University of London, on 6th March (1000 GMT to 1800 GMT) and 7th March (0900 GMT–1200 GMT). Theopening session will end with a press conference at 1200 GMT. An announcement about the full and final session to be held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, will be madeat the end of Tuesday’s proceedings. Notes to Editors: The tribunal sessions which are open to public, can be viewed live at http://tribunalonmyanmar.org/ and followed on twitter @MyanmarTribunal, #MyanmarTribunal The People’s Tribunal on Myanmar has been endorsed by over 20 Rohingya,Kachin and Burmese organizations worldwide, International State Crime Initiative of Queen Mary University of London, S. Africa’s Protect the RohingyaCampaign, Genocide Watch, Burma Task Force USA, Malaysian human rights networks such as the International Movement for a Just World and Centre forHuman Rights Research and Advocacy (Centhra), and individual genocide prevention campaigners including Youk Chhang of Cambodia The Tribunal is a people’s initiative, made possible by the generous support of the International State Crime Initiative, Queen Mary University of London, individual activists: Mark Sampson, Ko Aung, the Rohingya community in London, andBurma Task Force (USA), and Women collective for people's rights, Lecco, Italy. NB All sessions to be held in Room 313 Laws Building, MileEnd Campus E1 4NS All 1.5 day sessions to be webcast LIVE by Oxford Digital Media: https://www.oxforddigitalmedia.com/media-gallery/ Webcast can be viewed on the official Tribunal website at: http://tribunalonmyanmar.org/ Tribunal proceedings may be followed on twitter @MyanmarTribunal #MyanmarTribunal : Contact email: info@TribunalOnMyanmar.org Contacts: Dr Gianni Tognoni, Permanent People’s Tribunal, Rome, Italy at +39 (0) 3471824914 Dr Thomas McManus, International State Crimes Initiative, Queen Mary U. of London +44 (0) 795 806 99 27 Ms Kai Htang Lashi, (Kachin National Organization) at +44 (0)79 20 82 66 94 Tun Khin, Burmese Rohingya Organization UK at +44 (0) 78 88 71 48 66 Dr Malik Mujahid, Burma Task Force (Justice For All), Chicago, USA at 312-750-1178 Azril Mohd Amin, Centre for Human Rights Research and Advocacy (Centhra), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia at +60123037110 Dr Maung Zarni (UK) at +44 (0)77 10 47 33 22 PROGRAMME Monday, 6th March – Location 313 Laws Building QMUL, Queen Mary University of London 10.00 START 10.00 - 10.10 Announcement of day’s programme by members of Steering Committee and Organising Committee (represented by Dr Maung Zarni) 10.10 - 10.45 Presentation by the PPT Secretariat stating procedures and methodology (Dr Gianni Tognoni) 10.45 - 11.10 Rohingya and Kachin present their respective accusations against the Myanmar state Speakers: • Ronnie, Arakan Rohingya National Organization • Mr Ringdu Lachung, President, Kachin National Organization (UK) 11.10 – 12.15 Kachin Victim Statement & Expert Statements Speakers: • Dr Mandy Sadan, Associate Dean of Research (Art and Humanities), School of Oriental and African Studies & author Being and Becoming Kachin: Histories beyond the State in the Borderworlds of Burma (OUP, 2013) • Mr Ringdu Lachung, President, Kachin National Organization (UK) • Kachin video clips presentation (Kachin Baptist leader) 12.15 – 12:30 - Coffee break 12.30 – 13.30 Rohingya victim statements on 1978 King Dragon Operation against Rohingya (to be followed by Q & A) Speakers: • Tun Khin to present recorded testimonies of Rohingya rape victims, and victims of recent attacks (plus video testimonies) • U Ba Sein (Rohingya Blogger, originally from Maung Daw, N. Rakhine State), • Daw Khin Hla (Rohingya blogger, originally from Maung Daw, N. Rakhine State) 13.30 - 14.30 - LUNCH 14.30 – 16.30 Expert Testimonies I on the Rohingya Speakers: • Azril Amin and 5 Malaysian Lawyers representing Rohingya victims in Malaysia • Professor Michael Charney (SOAS) on the ethnic identities and claim to indigeneity in Rakhine or Arakan (11 minutes) • Dr Maung Zarni to discuss the military-controlled state and its role in the persecution of Rohingya, Kachin and other groups (10 minutes) 16.30 - 18.00 Expert Testimonies II on the Rohingya • Key findings from OCHR’s flash Report, based on mission to Bangladesh (official video clip from UN press conference, 3rd February 2017, Geneva) • Ro Nay San Lwin, Rohingya researcher and blogger (via video link), to discuss incidents and patterns of attacks on Rohingya civilians since 9th October 2016 18.00 END Tuesday, 7th March - Room 313, School of Law, QMUL 09.00 START 09.00 – 09.45 Prosecution Team summary and formal indictment Speakers: • Penny Green and Thomas MacManus (International State Crime Initiative), Rosal Azmin Bin Ahmad (Centre for Human Rights Research and Advocacy, Malaysia) 10:00 – 10:30 Closing remarks/comments/proposals from members of Jury & PPT 10.30 – 11.30 Press Conference • Announcing Full and Final Session and jury deliberations KL, Malaysia 2017 • PPT Preliminary indictment and summary of first tribunal session • Recorded/Written Statements • Written Statement from the Dalai Lama (3 minutes) • Amartya Sen’s recorded elaboration on the slow genocide of Rohingya (5 minutes) Line-up for press conference speakers: • Lord Nazir Ahmed, PPT Jury Member (TBC) • PPT Representative • BROUK/Arakan Rohingya National Organization Representative • KNO Representative Ms Kai Htang Lashi Formal Closing Remarks by Representative from the ISCI Host 12.30 - Lunch Directions: ISCI is based in the School of Law at Queen Mary University of London: School of Law Queen Mary University of London Mile End Road London E1 4NS The nearest tube stop is Mile End. When you come out of Mile End cross over the road straight away, then turn left. Carry on walking for 5 minutes or so, crossing over another road. QMUL will be on your right, through the blue gates. For Room 313 (Law School): After turning right through the blue gates, take the first left, walk down the narrow path to the Law School which will be on your left. Room 313, where we will hold several of the meetings, is on the 3rd floor. Please contact Louise Wise if you have any difficulties: l.wise@qmul.ac.uk; 07900073348 or 0207 882 6411 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 The Peoples Tribunal On Myanmar

The International Coalition to Stop Crimes against Humanity in North Korea (ICNK) today announced its support for two new United Nations reports calling for the international community to hold the North Korean government accountable for crimes against humanity. The group of independent experts on accountability, appointed by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights at the request of the Human Rights Council last year with a specific mandate to explore approaches to accountability, asserted that “investigation and prosecution of serious crimes is critical.” The group called for “measures to ensure the right of victims to reparations, the right of victims and society to know the truth about violations, and guarantees of non-recurrence of violations.” “The North Korean government and its leaders should face justice for their crimes against humanity, which continue to this day,” said Phil Robertson, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “We urge the UN Human Rights Council to respond positively to the special rapporteur’s call that the recommendations of the group of independent experts be implemented without delay.” The independent experts stressed the need to consider creating an ad hoc international tribunal, even with a referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC provides an important way to hold accountable those most responsible for gross rights abuses, but given the pervasive impunity in North Korea, the experts argued the prosecution of some high-level perpetrators at the ICC should be complemented by other criminal accountability processes. “A dedicated international tribunal for the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] would allow the temporal, territorial, personal and subject-matter jurisdiction to be calibrated to meet the needs and aspirations of the victims,” the experts argued. The independent experts – Sonja Biserko, a Serbian human rights activist who served on the UN Commission of Inquiry on human rights in North Korea, and Sara Hossain, a lawyer in the Supreme Court of Bangladesh – contended that “given the severity and complexity of the human rights situation in the DPRK, a comprehensive and multi-pronged approach is required to addressing violations.” They also made concrete recommendations to the Human Rights Council to strengthen the UN Human Rights Office in Seoul with additional resources to “receive, preserve and consolidate information and evidence pertaining to the human rights situation in the DPRK, through a central and independent repository, for use in any future accountability mechanism.” “The two independent experts deserve backing for their hard work and strong recommendations for achieving accountability for human rights violations in North Korea,” said Eunkyoung Kwon, secretary-general of the ICNK. “Member states of the Human Rights Council should now step up to provide support and resources to OHCHR Seoul to support initiatives on extending research and ensuring effective analysis for holding perpetrators accountable.” In a separate report, the new UN special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK, Tomás Ojea Quintana, emphasized that “addressing human rights violations, particularly allegations of crimes against humanity, requires that perpetrators be held accountable.” He called for a “two-track strategy” of engagement with North Korea on human rights where possible, and the pursuit of accountability. “These two tracks are mutually reinforcing, and a dual approach is necessary to produce tangible and sustainable improvement in the situation of human rights.” The special rapporteur endorsed the group of independent experts’ recommendations and urged “all relevant stakeholders” to act and “to ensure that serious human rights violations, especially those amounting to crimes against humanity, do not go unpunished.” He called on the Human Rights Council to implement the recommendations of the group of independent experts “without delay, ensuring that perpetrators of gross violations are held responsible and supporting all victims in their quest for truth and justice.” He further urged the UN “as a whole” to address “the grave human rights situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in a coordinated and unified manner.” “Six years ago we joined together with over 40 other human rights organizations to establish the ICNK with the specific purpose of seeking accountability and justice for crimes against humanity in North Korea,” said Benedict Rogers, East Asia Team Leader at Christian Solidarity Worldwide. “The UN Commission of Inquiry and its report were a landmark step on the path to accountability. The time to end the culture of impunity surrounding North Korea’s crimes against humanity is long overdue.” __________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Human Rights Watch

An elderly activist observes three minutes of silence to mark the moment tear gas was used by police on the same day in 2014, in front of the government headquarters in Hong Kong on September 28, 2016, on the second anniversary of the pro-democracy 'Umbrella Revolution'. ANTHONY WALLACE/AFP/Getty Images The U.S. has long encouraged Hong Kong, an economically free and prosperous state, to let its residents exercise political and individual rights to the highest degree possible. To reaffirm that stance—and to address the erosion of freedom and rights in Hong Kong over the last couple of years—Sens. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) and Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) recently reintroduced the Hong Kong Democracy and Human Rights Act. Under the “one country, two systems” policy, Hong Kong is an autonomous region of China. This framework permits Hong Kong to pursue capitalist economic policies until at least 2047—the 50thanniversary of its return, by Britain, to Chinese sovereignty. It also lets Hong Kong retain some political autonomy. Citizens of Hong Kong have a limited form of democracy that allows for a quasi-independent government. In recent years, however, China has begun to meddle in the private affairs of Hong Kong citizens, further restricting its autonomy. In late 2015, five booksellers and publishers were abducted from China, Hong Kong and Thailand; they subsequently turned up in Chinese custody. One Hong Kong bookseller, Lam Wing-kee, reported that, while in custody he was kept under constant surveillance and subjected to psychological torture. The abductions clearly curtailed the basic freedoms of Hong Kong citizens, thereby violating the “one country, two systems” policy. The booksellers’ abductions came on the heels of the 2014 Umbrella Movement – spontaneous demonstrations calling for democracy, and in some instances, full independence, in Hong Kong. Led by elites and students, the Umbrella Movement was a response to China’s increased intervention in Hong Kong’s internal affairs. The Umbrella Movement resulted in occasionally violent clashes between citizens and law enforcement and contributed to deepening tensions over China’s involvement in Hong Kong’s political affairs. Anson Chan, former chief secretary of Hong Kong, fears that if the world does not act to defend the autonomy of Hong Kong, the “one country, two systems” policy will exist in name only. While Hong Kong was formerly a British colony, the UK government has reneged on promises to defend and protect the rights of Hong Kong citizens. Consequently, the burden to defend Hong Kong has fallen on the U.S. which has responded with legislative initiatives such as the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act. If passed, current proposal would reinstitute an annual report on the state of democracy and human rights in Hong Kong, require certification that Hong Kong is sufficiently autonomous from the People’s Republic of China to merit separate treatment under future U.S. law and agreements, and impose sanctions against those who abducted—or helped in the abduction of—the booksellers. “We are at a watershed moment in Hong Kong,” said Sen. Rubio, “Will Hong Kong be able to maintain its cherished autonomy as promised 20 years ago when the British handover occurred, or will Beijing continue chipping away at the democratic institutions and basic rights which have long distinguished Hong Kong from mainland China?" The Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act would help ensure the vitality of freedom in Hong Kong. And help is definitely needed. Hong Kong has always ranked #1 in The Heritage Foundation’s annual Index of Economic Freedom. But its economic freedom score has fallen in each of the last two years, , largely due to corruption in the government and deterioration in the rule of law. It is essential that freedom be defended now before it deteriorates too significantly. As Minky Worden, director of global initiatives at Human Rights Watch noted, “The best hope for a rights-respecting China is in Hong Kong, where rights already exist and only need to be protected and preserved, rather than created anew.” If the international community does not defend the rights and freedoms of Hong Kong’s citizens, there is little hope that freedom and respect for human rights can take root elsewhere in China. Better to preserve rights in Hong Kong now than to let them erode further and then struggle to revive them later. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Forbes

A series of recent dispatches from Sudan Tribune and Radio Dabanga make painfully clear the consequences of gross mismanagement of the Sudanese economy by the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime, which retains its monopolistic hold on national wealth and power despite the absurdly factitious “new government” announced by President (and indicted génocidaire) Omar al-Bashir. The grotesque misdirection and illegal appropriation of national wealth increasingly takes a large toll on the people of Sudan, with widespread suffering in the form of acute shortages, medical crises, and the continuing deterioration of meaningful existence for the people of Darfur, especially those facing the prospect of displaced persons camp closings. The regime consistently refuses to accept the economic reality of losing large oil revenues with the secession of South Sudan, and has failed to invest in critical sectors of the economy or to commit to equally critical elements of the decaying national infrastructure. Health and medical care are deteriorating in conspicuous ways throughout Sudan. This was true even during the years 1999 – 2011 when the regime was flush with petro-dollars. The aggregate effects of this economic mismanagement, while clear to the people of Sudan who bear their terrible burden, are ignored by those who have thrown their support to this genocidal junta: the Europeans, the Gulf Arab States, the African Union, and the United States, as well as traditional supporters Russia and China. The general pretense is that the economy has struggled because of causes that cannot be traced back to the regime’s mismanagement. This is convenient but is finally an immensely destructive lie. Just how destructive are the economic policies of the regime? I have written frequently on this topic before and Appendix A comprises a list of publications, recent and more distant in time, that focus sharply on this question. Here I wish to point to recent, specific implications of the destructive policies and priorities of the Khartoum regime as it oversees Sudan’s national wealth. This is the first of a series of analyses. SUDAN GENERALLY The devastating consequences of economic mismanagement and gross self-enrichment affect the health, livelihoods, and lives of many millions of people across Sudan. Here the destruction of Zimbabwe under the thuggish and long-ruling Robert Mugabe offers a number of suggestive comparative points, however different the two countries may be and the nature of the two authoritarian leaderships (on Zimbabwe, see “How to Kill a Country,” Samantha Power, The Atlantic, December 2003 | https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2003/12/how-to-kill-a-country/302845/ ). On virtually ever point of economic health and development, Sudan deserves a failing mark, despite lies of the sort increasingly promulgated by European countries eager to partner with the Khartoum regime and corrupt international actors such as the International Monetary Fund. In an October 2013 “IMF News Release,” Edward Gemayel, the IMF's Mission Chief for Sudan, declared that: "Sudan has a long track record of implementing sustainable economic policies” (http://www.4-traders.com/news/IMF-International-Monetary-Fund-Press-Release-Sudan-Meeting-of-the-Technical-Working-Group-on-E--17345158/). This claim by Gemayel is so preposterous, so completely at odds with the economic policies of the current regime both prior to and subsequent to Gemayel’s remarks of 2013, that one must assume a perverse, finally immoral agenda guiding them. We might well wish to ask Gemayel what he makes of the Khartoum regime’s spending priorities for the country and how they contribute to “sustainable economic policies”: Sudan allocates $1,8 billion for defense in 2017 Sudan tribune | December 23, 2016 (KHARTOUM) - Sudan has appropriated more than 29 billion pounds (SDG) (about $1,8 billion) to defense and security which represents the largest single spending item in the 2017 budget. According to Sudan’s 2017 budgetary estimates seen by Sudan Tribune, 5bn pounds have been allocated to the sovereign sector while 2,3bn was appropriated for agriculture and forests spending.,,, Sudan’s security apparatus has expanded vastly and military expenditure continued to rise as the government relies increasingly on militias such as the Popular Defense Forces (PDF) and the Rapid Support Forces (SRF) in military operations. Last year, Sudan’s President Omer al-Bashir said “If 100% of the state’s budget was allocated to the army to secure the country, then that is still not enough.” Does Gemayel think that this grotesque overspending on the military and security services has nothing to do with the immensely destructive rate of inflation that is crushing so many Sudanese seeking to purchase the most essential commodities, including food, medicine, and cooking fuel? The regime’s Central Bureau of Statistics recently put the official inflation rate at 32.9 percent; but the CBS is little more than an extension of Khartoum’s propaganda apparatus and those who follow the Sudanese economy consistently put the inflation rate at over 50 percent—a rate that threatens to become hyper-inflation of the sort that completely destroyed Zimbabwe’s currency. There is virtually no foreign exchange currency (Forex) in the Central Bank of Sudan, which makes many imports impossible, certainly in adequate quantities. Many critical medicines are available only to the very rich. Flour and bread shortages are reported with increasing frequency, driving up prices ferociously. There are also shortages of refined petroleum products, since the “sustainable economic policies” Gemayel speaks of did not include building an adequate domestic petroleum refining capacity: diesel fuel and cooking oil must be imported as a consequence. Transportation costs are skyrocketing, which has particularly serious effects for the peripheral regions of Sudan, including Darfur, where inflation is being felt particularly acutely. Food prices in much of South Kordofan are increasingly beyond the means of many Sudanese. And the value of the Sudanese pound against hard currencies continues is precipitous decline, making imports even more expensive for the average Sudanese civilian. The examples—and effects—of the shortages could be multiplied endlessly, even in Khartoum and Omdurman. The following are all from Radio Dabanga: Bread shortage as Khartoum bakeries shut-down | February 26, 2017 | KHARTOUM Acute shortage of bread in Sudan | January 9, 2017 | KHARTOUM / EL OBEID / EL GEZIRA ‘Children in Sudan dying from lack of clean drinking water’ | November 1, 2016 | KHARTOUM Sudanese MPs: People dying of thirst in Red Sea and Blue Nile | November 9, 2016 | RED SEA / BLUE NILE Shortage of petrol in Khartoum and other Sudanese towns | February 14, 2017 | KHARTOUM / EN NAHUD Bus fares soar in eastern Sudan | November 9, 2016 | KHARTOUM Transport crisis developing in Sudan capital | December 5, 2016 | KHARTOUM Power cuts disturb life in eastern Sudan’s El Gedaref | February 20, 2017 | EL GEDAREF Sudan: Pharmacies swept up in high drug prices | November 22, 2016 | KHARTOUM 34 patients lose eyesight completely, Khartoum eye centre closed | February 24, 2017 | KHARTOUM And when humanitarian organizations face funding shortages (sometimes a cover excuse for leaving what are intolerable operating circumstances), Khartoum almost never provides replacement resources, no matter how critical the human needs: Swedish group plans to close 20 aid centres in South Kordofan Sudan Tribune| November 26, 2016 (KHARTOUM) -A Swedish humanitarian group announced this week it would gradually end its activities in the troubled South Kordofan State where they provide nutrition and health assistance to some 200,000 people. Failure to invest in critical infrastructure projects is also taking a heavy toll, making further nonsense of Gemayel’s claim about the regime’s “sustainable economic policies.” There are increasingly serious and numerous water shortages, and this is the major reason behind the vast outbreak of cholera in many regions of Sudan in recent months—an outbreak the regime refused to acknowledge, even as the laboratory evidence was conclusive. See: “What the Cholera Epidemic in Sudan Tells Us About the Absurdity of Lifting U.S. Sanctions on Khartoum” | January 25, 2017 | http://wp.me/p45rOG-20U (Sudan Tribune | http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article61489 ) Why does the IMF offer no substantial correction to the outrageous, mendacious, and destructive pronouncements of Gemayel? In fact, the IMF says nothing even in the face of such vast economic self-destruction. As subsequent analyses will show in detail, the economy continues to function as a kleptocracy. And self-enrichment by the regime that takes increasingly desperate form as financial and economic pressures continue to increase at terrifying rates. DARFUR The economic disaster in greater Sudan certainly extends to Darfur, where people are particularly vulnerable, especially to hikes in food prices. And yet again the international community refuses to speak honestly about the grim realities. Europe and the UN are deeply complicit in this moral corruption. A recent visit to Darfur by European Union officials is all too revealing. An “information-gathering” visit—certainly defined and overseen by Military Intelligence (MI), with extreme constraints on what could be seen—was reported only by Radio Dabanga: ‘Situation in Darfur improved’: EU diplomat | February 12, 2017 | EL FASHER | The security and humanitarian situation in Darfur has significantly improved, according to the head of the EU Delegation to Sudan. On Wednesday, in a meeting of EU ambassadors with the North Darfur government in El Fasher, EU Ambassador Jean-Michel Dumond said that the EU stays committed to the projects commenced under the auspices of the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA). The mandate of the DRA ended in July last year. Unmentioned by EU Ambassador Jean-Michel Dumond are the four devastating human rights reports on Darfur from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International over the past two years, together providing us a devastating portrait of human suffering and destruction that rises to the level of “genocide by attrition”: “Men With No Mercy”: Rapid Support Forces Attacks Against Civilians in Darfur, Sudan," Human Rights Watch | September 9, 2015 “Sudanese Army Attacks against Civilians in Tabit," Human Rights Watch| February 11, 2015 “Darfuri Students Arrested, Detailed and Tortured for Speaking Out,” Amnesty International | January 18, 2017 “Scorched Earth, Poisoned Air: Sudanese Government Forces Ravage Jebel Marra, Darfur,” Amnesty International | 109 pages; September 29, 2016 The last of these provides overwhelming evidence of Khartoum’s use of chemical weapons in the massive military campaign against the people of Jebel Marra (Central Darfur) for much of last year (2016). There was no mention by the expedient Dumond of the many areas where “development” is irrelevant because there is no humanitarian access. Withering humanitarian operations in Darfur are increasingly under-funded, with no replacement capacity provided by Khartoum, even as the regime speaks of the “Sudanization” of relief efforts. As it has for the past fourteen years, Khartoum continues to impede, harass, and obstruct humanitarian efforts in Darfur. The claim by Obama administration Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power that there has been a “sea change” of improvement in humanitarian access in Sudan is simply false; her claim is thoroughly belied by the facts on the ground. All we have really seen, beyond a couple of gestures designed for international consumption, are “promises” by Khartoum to facilitate humanitarian access for the next few months (until the decision to lift sanctions from Khartoum is finalized by the Trump administration, an almost certain outcome of the July review by this hideously cruel and ignorant group of men). Khartoum’s promises have of course consistently proved worthless since the regime came to power by military coup in 1989. There was no mention by Dumond of the fact that the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) is acknowledged by all—even if silently by some—to have been a complete failure. The Darfur Regional Authority that emerged from the DDPD achieved virtually nothing of significance, certainly if we consider the levels of violence that currently prevail, and the roughly 3 million Dafuris who have been displaced from their homes and cannot return because of insecurity or because their lands have been violently expropriated by Arab militia groups, including some from Chad, Niger, Mali, and elsewhere in West Africa (a fact regularly reported from the early years of the Darfur counter-insurgency). See: “Changing the Demography”: Violent Expropriation and Destruction of Farmlands in Darfur, November 2014 – November 2015" | December 1, 2015 | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1P4 Dumond made no mention of this deliberate, genocidal “change in demography,” first urged by notorious Arab Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal in a widely distributed memo of August 2004 from Misteriya, North Darfur (http://wp.me/p45rOG-1Oo/). Hilal urged that Darfur be “emptied of African tribes,” and current levels of displacement suggest how successful Hilal and Khartoum have been. There was no mention by Dumond of the threat to close the camps for displaced persons, a threat that the regime has been explicit about for more than a year. I wrote at length in January 2016 about the comments of the Khartoum regime’s Second Vice-President, Hassabo Mohamed Abdelrahman, speaking in North Darfur in late December 2015. I cited a dispatch from Sudan Tribune, December 28, 2015 that included the following: In a speech delivered before the representatives of former rebel groups and IDPs in El-Fasher, North Darfur on Monday, [Second Vice-President Hassabo Mohamed Abdelrahman] said Darfur has "completely recovered from the war and is now looking forward to achieve a full peace, stability and development." "IDP camps represent a significant and unfortunate loss of dignity and rights of citizens in their country" he said and called on the displaced "to choose within no more than a month between resettlement or return to their original areas." He further reiterated his government’s commitment to take all the measures and do the needful to achieve this goal, stressing that "the year 2016 will see the end of displacement in Darfur." Abdel Rahman told the meeting that he has just ended a visit to Karnoi and Tina areas in North Darfur, adding the two areas which were affected by the conflict have totally recovered. He said his visit with a big delegation to the two areas "is a message sceptics in the fact that security and stability are back in Darfur"… A year later, Radio Dabanga reported: Displaced given days to vacate South Darfur camp, February 17, 2017 | KALMA CAMP - The Commissioner of Nyala locality in South Darfur has given the residents of Centre 4 of Otash camp near the state capital less than a week to vacate it before it is dismantled. The spokesman for the Darfur Displaced and Refugees Association, Hussein Abusharati, told Radio Dabanga that a Land Cruiser mounted with a Dushka machine gun drove into the camp on Thursday afternoon. “It moved through the camp using a loudspeaker, calling on the displaced to evacuate the camp by Feb. 22, without specifying an alternative place for the 14,000 displaced to live.” The emptying of Otash 4 was delayed be two weeks, and has not yet occurred. But there simply can be no doubt about ultimate Khartoum’s intentions. And even a partial emptying of camps that house, however poorly and insecurely, more than 2.5 million people will be catastrophic, producing overcrowding in other camps and leaving many completely without food, shelter, or water. Why was there no statement from Ambassador Dumond about this looming catastrophe? Does he believe with Vice President Hassabo that “security and stability are back in Darfur”? Has he seen Hassabo’s remarks as reported by Human Rights Watch: Ahmed [a defecting soldier interviewed by Human Rights Watch] said that a few days prior to leaving for East Jebel Marra, Sudanese Vice President Hassabo Mohammed Abdel Rahman directly addressed several hundred army and RSF soldiers: “Hassabo told us to clear the area east of Jebel Marra. To kill any male. He said we want to clear the area of insects. … He said East Jebel Marra is the kingdom of the rebels. We don’t want anyone there to be alive.” Does Ambassador Dumond understand the word “genocide”? Does he care about its commission in Darfur? An extraordinarily revealing news exposé from last year provides far too much of the answer, as the EU seeks to stanch the flow of African migrants to Europe by partnering with the Khartoum regime—providing high-tech surveillance and registration equipment, with an unfathomable decision by Germany to assist in the building of what will be “concentration camps” outside Khartoum—prison-like camps where people will be “concentrated” on the basis of ethnicity, place or country of origin, as well as political and religious views. See: Der Spiegel (May 13, 2016), "Questionable Deal: EU to Work with [Sudan’s] Despot to Keep Refugees Out" | http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/eu-to-work-with-despot-in-sudan-to-keep-refugees-out-a-1092328.html There was no mention by Dumond of the threats to transportation in much of Darfur posed by armed Arab militias, often obstructing humanitarian supplies. This was particularly true of Sortony IDP camp last years, and became so serious that the UN had to fly, at enormous cost, people from Sortony of the el-Fasher area, where IDP camps are already badly overcrowded. Armed pastoralists closes Darfur main road Sudan Tribune | December 6, 2016 (KHARTOUM) – Armed pastoralists Monday closed the road linking Nyala and El-Fasher the capital towns of South and North Darfur states and seized passenger buses in Darbat area, in East Jebel Mara locality. Radio Dabanga, Tabit in North Darfur ‘besieged by armed herders’ | January 26, 2017 | TABIT Such actions ensure that we will continue to see reports directly linked to the denial of adequate humanitarian access to Darfur (reports from Radio Dabanga unless otherwise indicated): Insecurity, lack of education harm Darfur's Sortony camp | February 21, 2017 | KABKABIYA (North Darfur) Health, water crisis spreads disease in Darfur camps | February 15, 2017 | KASS / TAWILA Darfur camp residents complain of attacks, poor services | February 19, 2017 | MURNEI / MERSHING Seventh mother’s death highlights midwife shortage in South Darfur | February 16 - 2017 | NYALA Darfur IDPs complain from severe cold, lack of shelter materials | Sudan Tribune | December 21, 2016 (NYALA) - Thousands of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in South Darfur state have complained from the severe weather conditions saying there is an acute shortage of blankets and plastic sheets to protect them… Darfur’s Jebel Marra hit by disease, displaced need winter aid | January 15, 2017 | JEBEL MARRA / KHARTOUM Thirst in North Darfur’s Shaddad camp | January 9, 2017 | SHADDAD CAMP Three die of food poisoning in North Darfur camp | January 29, 2017 | SHANGIL TOBAYA Why does none of this figure in the assessment statement made by Dumond and the other EU officials who accompanied him? One answer of course is that they would never have been allowed to see what Khartoum did not want them to see: they had no freedom of movement, and the orchestrated “assessment survey” was hopelessly corrupt, as Dumond and his fellow travelers surely knew. This was all of a piece with the shocking expediency revealed by Der Spiegel a year ago. PREFACE TO SUBSEQUENT ECONOMIC ANALYSES If we want to understand why the regime survives amidst deep and widespread civil unrest and resentment, we need to see clearly the costs of expediency by the most consequential international actors—the UN, the EU, the U.S., Arab states, and the African Union—in turning a blind eye to realities in Sudan. This includes not only rapidly escalating repression—detention of scores of political prisoners and human rights activists, extremely severe curtailment of newspapers; it includes not only the pursuit of what are genocidal counter-insurgency wars in South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Darfur, entailing the commission the grossest violations of human rights and international law; but it includes as well the destruction of a Sudanese economy. In the face of all this, the world continues to pretend to believe the view most cynically articulated by former U.S. special envoy for the Sudans Princeton Lyman, who preposterously suggested a very different political future for Sudan in December 2011: “We [the Obama administration] do not want to see the ouster of the [Khartoum] regime, nor regime change. We want to see the regime carrying out reform via constitutional democratic measures.” (Interview with Asharq al-Awsat, December 3, 2011 | http://english.aawsat.com/2011/12/article55244147/asharq-al-awsat-talks-to-us-special-envoy-to-sudan-princeton-lyman) We have seen nothing of the sort—only the fantastically concocted “National Dialogue,” culminating in the sham of a “new government” formed by President al-Bashir with First Vice President Bakri Hassan Saleh as Prime Minister. There has been no meaningful “reform,” merely the most transparent repackaging of the National Islamic Front since it renamed itself the “National Congress Party” in the late 1990s. In looking away from the outrageous economic destruction wrought by this regime, whatever we call it, the world is ensuring that this destruction in many cases cannot be reversed. Here it is particularly important to note the sale and long-term leasing of large tracts of agricultural lands to Arab and Asian countries that are seeking to provide for their own long-term food security needs. This comes at the expense of future agricultural needs in Sudan, where half the population lives under the international poverty line and millions of people are suffer from either Acute Malnutrition (see Action Contre la Faim | http://actioncontrelafaim.ca/what-is-acute-malnutrition/what-is-acute-malnutrition/) or, more dangerously, Severe Malnutrition (see World Health Organization | http://www.who.int/nutrition/topics/malnutrition/en/). Unless the international community recognizes not only the brutality of this regime, but its enormously destructive management of the Sudanese economy, Sudan as a country will remain in desperate condition for the foreseeable future. Ignoring this reality, as the international community is presently doing, in no way diminishes the danger to the people of Sudan—now and in the future. A ruthless military junta is determining fate of many millions of Sudanese children—and are being accommodated as they do so. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (c) 2017 SUDAN Research, Analysis, and Advoca

IRBIL, Iraq (AP) — The United Nations warned that the alleged use of chemical weapons in Mosul, if confirmed, would be a war crime and a serious violation of international humanitarian law, according to a statement released Saturday. "This is horrible," Lise Grande, the humanitarian coordinator in Iraq said in the statement, "there is never justification — none whatsoever — for the use of chemical weapons." The alleged attack occurred this week in eastern Mosul, an area declared fully liberated by Iraqi forces in January. The attack hit a neighborhood along the Tigris River — which roughly divides the city in two. Doctors in an urgent care hospital in the nearby city of Irbil say they began receiving patients showing symptoms of chemical weapons exposure on Thursday. "The mortar hit our house, right inside the living room where we were sitting," said Nazim Hamid, whose children had burns to their faces, arms and legs. The family was being treated in the Irbil hospital. "There was a very bad smell, it was some kind of gas," he said. "My kids were affected, some of them were burned and some of them had difficulty breathing." Hussein Qader, the deputy director of the hospital, said all 10 patients admitted for exposure are in stable condition and will be discharged in the coming days. Most of western Mosul is still under Islamic State group control despite a handful of recent gains on the city's southwestern edge by Iraqi forces over the past two weeks. IS has used chemical weapons in Iraq and Syria at least 52 times according to a report published late last year by IHS conflict monitor, a London-based research and intelligence gathering group. The report said that at least 19 of the 52 attacks took place in and around Mosul. Iraqi and U.S.-led coalition officials have repeatedly expressed concern regarding IS chemical weapons attacks. However IS-claimed insurgent attacks in Iraq and attacks targeting civilians attempting to flee Mosul cause far greater numbers of injuries and deaths to civilians. Iraqi forces launched the operation to retake Mosul in October and began a push to retake the city's western half last month. After more than two years of slow territorial victories against IS by Iraqi ground forces backed by U.S.-led coalition air power, western Mosul is the last significant urban area IS controls in Iraq. (C) 2017 The Associated Press

The first famine in six years has been declared in the world's newest nation, South Sudan. To understand just how dire the situation is, you need to understand the United Nations' reluctance to use the f-word: famine. Famine has a very specific definition. It must meet three criteria before it can be declared: four out of every 10,000 children die each day, one in five families do not have enough food to meet basic human nutrition requirements, and one in three people are acutely malnourished to the point that they are too weak to go to school or work. To put this into context, if famine were declared in the state of Victoria, 400 children would die daily from starvation. And if famine were declared in Australia, 1700 children would die every day. As it stands, 1 million men, women and children are on the brink of starvation in South Sudan. And 4.9 million people -- more than 40 percent of South Sudan's population -- are in need of urgent food, agriculture and nutrition assistance. This figure is likely to rise to 5.5 million at the height of the lean season in July if nothing is done to curb the severity and spread of the food crisis. As is the case with so many emergencies in the developing world, it is girls who suffer most. Plan South Sudan estimates 100,000 girls are currently at immediate risk of harm. Famine can be hard to comprehend unless you've seen it firsthand. It is ghastly. I was on the ground during the response to the last two famines, first in 1991 in Somalia and then during the 2011 East African drought. You see children with skeletal arms and legs, desperately clinging to life. And when they are rescued, they have to be put on drips because they are too weak to feed through their mouths. The doctors are trying to bring them back from the edge of death. I've seen children lose the fight simply because their bodies are so weak. Sometimes, they die from pneumonia because of their compromised immune systems, or they die from diarrhoea because their bodies are too frail to fight the loss of liquid. They are so very vulnerable. It is heartbreaking. As an aid worker living this reality, you wonder why governments did not release enough money or raise enough resources to help in time. You wonder: how did we get in this situation? You feel guilty and the only thing you can do is your best to try and change it. This is why we need people to listen early and respond early. If you go back to Ethiopia in 1984 -- which was the biggest famine in a generation -- there was a very harsh drought compounded by the fact that normal food transfers and trade within the country was blocked by war. That created a perfect storm for people to become isolated from food supplies and end up completely destitute. It was largely invisible to the world until BBC reporters were able to get into the country and expose what was happening. Right now, we are seeing almost exactly the same conditions in South Sudan as we did in the lead up to Ethiopia in '84 and again in Somalia in '91. Here we have the same terrible culmination of conflict and drought, but with the added challenge of climate change. Extreme weather events have spurred along an already tense situation into a deadly one, with ongoing conflict stranding communities in isolated social pockets, restricting their access to aid. Sadly, when a famine is first declared it is hard to garner support because people simply can't picture what's happening. It's only later on when things are completely broken that we start to pay attention. It's only when we start to see images of emaciated children hooked up to drips in white tents being attended by emergency doctors that people can fathom the sheer horror of famine. We need everyone to understand this important fact: now is the time when we can help to protect the most vulnerable in South Sudan from the terrible consequences of disaster. Now is the time when all of us -- governments, INGOs, citizens of Australia -- can step in to save South Sudan's children from a horrific death from starvation. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) The Huffington Post

United States Congressman Jim McGovern has expressed strong disagreement with the easing of sanctions against Khartoum holding Sudanese parliament responsible for authorising repressive actions carried out by the government. Last January, former President Barack Obama eased the 19-year economic and trade sanctions on Sudan. The decision came as a response to the collaboration of the Sudanese government in the fight against terrorism, denying safe haven to the South Sudanese rebels and, improving humanitarian access to people in need. This week, Jim McGovern, a senior House Democrat and leading voice in Congress on human rights, met with the Speaker of the Sudanese Parliament Ibrahim Ahmed Omer. In a press release on Tuesday, the Democratic Co-Chair of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission said during the meeting that Sudan’s National Assembly and Omer in particular, “have been responsible for authorising many of the most repressive actions carried out by the regime of President Bashir”. “And therefore are accountable for the murder of millions of their fellow citizens and for the humanitarian crisis in Sudan,” he added. According to the press release, the Congressman “plans to reintroduce bipartisan legislation this year to impose targeted sanctions on the Sudanese government for its genocidal acts and crimes against humanity”. McGovern insisted “on the continuing need for unfettered humanitarian access, the release of all political prisoners and the cessation of all hostilities” in order to further improving bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Sudan. He accused the Sudanese government of renewing attacks against the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/North (SPLM-N) positions in South Kordofan and the Blue Nile. “Rather than ensure humanitarian access to South Kordofan, Darfur and Blue Nile, Khartoum has renewed offensive operations in South Kordofan, in violation of the agreements reached with the Obama Administration that resulted in the easing of sanctions,” he pointed out. South Kordofan and neighbouring Blue Nile states have been the scene of violent conflict between the SPLM-N and Sudanese army since 2011. Last August, the two sides failed to reach a humanitarian cessation of hostilities deal paving the way for political talks including the political opposition parties. In a bid to break the deadlock in the peace talks between the Sudanese government and SPLM-N, the former U.S. Special Envoy Donald Booth last November proposed that the USAID will deliver medical humanitarian aid to civilians in the rebel-held areas by air directly after its inspection from the government. The SPLM-N declined the proposal insisting on the need to transport 20% of the humanitarian aid directly from Ethiopian border town of Asosa to the rebel areas. Meanwhile, U.S. Charge d’Affaires to Khartoum Steven Koutsis on Friday has urged the SPLM-N to allow humanitarian assistance to areas under its control saying the Sudanese government has agreed to the U.S. proposal in this regard. In an opinion article published in Sudan Tribune on Friday, Koutsis reiterated the U.S. proposal saying Washington has offered to deliver humanitarian medical assistance to the people in SPLM-N controlled areas. “Our offer to oversee and implement these deliveries intends to give confidence to the SPLM-N that the Government of Sudan would not be able to control or block aid provided under this mechanism,” said Koutsis. He pointed that the Sudanese government “has agreed to this proposal, but as of yet, the SPLM-N has not allowed the proposal for humanitarian access to go forward”. “Given current predictions of emergency-level food insecurity likely to occur within the next two months in SPLM-N controlled areas, an agreement to allow humanitarian access to begin now is critical to save lives,” he warned. “The United States urges the SPLM-N to remove political conditions preventing humanitarian assistance from reaching populations in need and allow rapid deployment of humanitarian aid to civilians in the areas it controls,” he further said. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Sudan Tribune